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                                                   Abstract 
The Niger Delta region is, indeed, not a stranger to attention and controversies. For more than 
a decade, it presented Africa’s most populous country with its most profound security 
challenge, a situation that was only recently changed with the emergence of the Boko Haram 
Islamic insurgents. It also threatened to undermine the flow of oil in Africa’s most important 
oil-producing country, a country which produces more than 2.5 million barrels of crude oil 
daily, with attendant implications for global energy supply. While different aspects of the Niger 
Delta controversy have been addressed by particular scholars, there remains an aspect that 
seems to have attracted only superficial attention. This is a detailed analysis of the role of 
ethnicity in the array of complications that have unfolded in the region. Indeed, beyond the 
platitudinous mention of the plight of the minority in the country’s zero-sum politics, not much 
attention has been given to the complex impact of ethnicity on the politics and intrigues’ of the 
Niger Delta. 
The purpose of this thesis is to interrogate the ethnic dimension of the perspectives of key 
groups in Nigeria on what their rights are in sharing natural resources wealth and the 
consequences of a natural resources conflict driven by these agitation for a fair share among 
different ethnic groups in the Nigeria Federation. This thesis investigates one of the most 
pressing, yet neglected issue in the Niger Delta conflict: ethnicity and who has right in the 
sharing and ownership of natural resource wealth in the Niger Delta. 
However, in light of the commonly stated thesis that corruption and miss-management of oil 
revenues is frequently said to be the causes of armed conflict in the Niger Delta, this study 
challenges the accepted premises and enter unfamiliar territory, and stimulate new ideas by 
arguing that corruption, lack of security, and miss-management of oil revenue is only a causal 
factor. Therefore, the role of ethnicity is the key factor regarding who will hold political power 
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                                   CHAPTER ONE 
                                 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the research project and to outline the research themes 
guiding this thesis. 
The issues surrounding the ownership, management and control of natural resources have 
dominated discussions in many developing countries. This has been particularly profound in 
cases involving mineral resources. The high profitability of the resources, the monetary 
opportunities they offered to elites, the complication of extraction, the controversies involved 
in, and the effects to the external involvement in their extraction are just some of the profound 
issues often generated in the politics of corruption and miss-management. The Nigerian Niger 
Delta region presents all the above and even more. Different catch-phrases that have been used 
to describe the controversies associated with natural resources miss-management, such as 
14 
 
“Resource Curse1”, “Tragedy of Endowment”2, “Dutch Disease”3 are indeed, all applicable to 
the situation in the Niger Delta. However, although, the region has historically been affected by 
conflict for several decades, the emergence of organized armed militant pressure groups in the 
1990s has added a new dimension to the crisis. 
Broadly speaking, the resurgence in the 1990s manifested in two forms: (1) militants struggle 
for a greater control of oil and gas revenue; and (2) the fight by indigenous local Niger Delta 
communities for compensation from multinational oil companies (mainly due to 
environmental hazards imposed on their communities resulting from pollution from oil 
exploration and the destruction of the eco-system). In a way, the multi-dimensional nature of 
the conflict in the region can be described as the clash between “local claims”, (by militant 
group, youth movement, and local communities) and the “national interest” of the Federal 
Government—the latter as defined by the political elites of the Nigerian State.4 
In fact since the 1960s, oil and gas exports have brought in revenue of enormous proportion to 
the Nigerian state. This resulted to the formation of a new State National Oil Company in 
1977, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to take over foreign owned assets 
and to serve as the major vehicle for dealing with foreign companies and investors. The result 
was variations in export earnings which, combined with strong political pressure to spend 
available revenues in funding of low return capital project during the boom years, and the 
consequent neglect of high yielding projects in the lean years when no resources had been 
saved. As a consequence of this miss-management there is lack of public infrastructure in the 
                                                          
1 Collier and Hoeffler (2003) 
2 Alao (2007) 
3 Ross (2004) 
4 Alao, A. (2007) Natural Resources Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment, where he argues that local 
claims, national interest, and international involvement in oil politics creates division between locals versus 
global interest, p.193-98. 
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Niger Delta: roads, electricity, schools, public transport, piping water and health care despite 
the fact that the region produces 2.5 million barrel of oil daily.
5
 
But Niger Delta’s instability is hardly altogether an isolated phenomenon. Indeed, a cursory 
glance show that many natural resource-endowed countries are vulnerable to political 
instability, evidenced by the modern histories of Iraq, Iran, Angola, Libya, South-Sudan and 
Algeria. This has considerable implications, not the least for global oil-supply. Therefore, this 
study tries to investigate the social-economic and security nexus in one of the most important 
countries in Africa and one of the fastest-growing resource dependent economies: Nigeria. 
Nigeria has been struck since the 1990s by increasing violence and unrest, especially in the 
most productive oil region—the Niger Delta—which affected oil production and the sector’s 
growth. The fundamental question being ask here is: What exactly do we know about the 
struggle for access to control natural resources wealth and the rights of key actors? This study 
will contend that the driver of natural resources conflict is also inextricably intertwined with the 
nature of the state in question, the complexities of its composition, especially the variation of its 
ethnic groups, the ownership of land, and the fear of ethnic domination in employment in the 
extractive industry. Given the importance of this issue to security studies, economic intelligence 
and development literature, it is not surprising that the subject has received overwhelming 
attention from experts, and leading to a plethora of studies on this phenomenon.
6
 But the 
                                                          
5 Obi, C. (2003) The Oil Paradox: Reflections on the Violent Dynamics of Petro-Politics and Miss-governance in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta which focuses on corruption and revenue allocations; Also Obi (2010): Oil as the causes of 
conflict in Africa: peering through the smoke and mirrors where he argued that the resource curse thesis feeds 
certain perspectives on the nature of the Africa oil-rich states built upon an internal resource conflict nexus 
that is subversive of development, democratic governance, national, regional and global security. He strongly 
believed that such perspectives need to be critically interrogated, A Review of Africa Political Economy, 37:126, 
483-495, Routledge. But beyond such an interrogation, we need to get to the core of what is really an 
ideological notion of natural resource-determinism that obscures, rather than promotes an accurate 
understanding of the roots and wider ramifications of violent conflict in Africa countries. 
6 Among these studies are: Omeje, K. (2010) The state, conflict & evolving politics in the Niger Delta of Nigeria; 
Edozie, R.K. (2012) Socially Constructing Democracy and Peace: Nigeria’s National Dialogue on the Niger Delta 
Conflict; Luqman, S. (2011) Managing Nigeria’s Niger Delta Crisis under democratic rule; Ukeje, C. (2008) Oiling 
Regional Insecurity? The Implications of the Niger Delta Crisis for Security and Stability in the Gulf of Guinea 
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central argument and focus of this thesis is to interrogate the nature of instability in the Niger 
Delta and question some of the existing data that have been advanced. Valid though as they 
might be, looking at the ethnic diversity of the Nigerian Federation with multiple ethnic groups 
that share these resources, the evidence suggest that the accepted truth has now changed. 
However, a brief discussion of Nigeria and the Niger Delta may be appropriate at this juncture. 
The country is one of Africa’s largest producer of oil and gas with a population of about 170 
million people, divided into 36 states federation and with more than 250 ethnic groups. The 
vast swampy terrain of the Niger Delta region support almost 30 million people, many of whom 
live in isolated communities only accessible by boat. The region serves as the economic nerve 
centre of the Nigeria Federation with its vast oil and gas deposits. Presently, crude oil and gas 
accounts for about 85% of the nation’s revenues and Niger Delta accounts for about 20% of oil 
supply to the US.
7
 Although, the technological innovation of shale oil and gas revolution is 
changing that now. Therefore, the area has become increasingly important from a strategic 
perspective, as an alternative source to the Middle East, especially as political instability 
continues to plague that region and as sanctions on Iran, civil war in Syria and Iraq may 
threaten oil supply from the Persian Gulf in the future.
8
 
However, despite this enormous endowment, Nigeria has not been able to use these resources 
to its own advantage due to conflict of interests among key actors of ethnic groups within the 
Nigeria Federation. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to seek to harmonize the 
imperatives of natural resources exploitation in Nigeria based on ethnicity and ethnic relations 
as a problem in sharing oil revenue. This will suggest a departure from the status quo which 
                                                          
and West Africa; and Sampson, I.T. (2010) Niger Delta militancy and the Challenge of Criminalising Terrorism in 
Nigeria. None of these studies addresses the issue of ethnicity as a major factor of instability in the Niger Delta. 
7 World Bank Report: “Nigeria Natural Resources Export”, 2010. 
8 Stokes, D. and Raphael, S. (2010) Global Energy Security and American Hegemony, where they argued that 
the 2008 American National Security Strategy made clear that US interest in the Niger Delta Region was 
“unhampered access” to oil and other vital natural resources in the region, p.145-46. 
17 
 
seek to explain the problems of lack of transparency and bad resource governance in resource 
utilization for a more equitable sharing of natural resources wealth. 
With this in mind, and by way of investigation, this chapter sets out to undertake a number of 
tasks. First, the limitations in existing literature is explored, and the thesis’ contribution to 
knowledge is given by analysing this new domain of scholarship, identifying the gaps, which are 
considered in tandem, in order to understand what drives the struggle for access to control of 
natural resource wealth in Niger Delta of Nigeria. Second, the scope of the study and research 
questions is presented. Third, the research design and methodology that will enable us to 
answer the research questions to achieve the aim and objectives is given. 
 
                   Statement of the Problem, Thesis Focus and Argument 
Since independent in 1960 Nigeria has continued on a path of instability with ethnic violence 
among rivalries scrambling for a share of limited natural resources rather than unifying on a 
common goal for broad economic development. A number of factors make violent conflict in 
multi-ethnic societies particularly complex, which Ilorah summarizes as follows: 
 Ethnic bias and favouritism whereby, the behaviour of the leadership towards others 
varies depending on whether those others are from the same ethnic group, with whom 
affinities are shared and who therefore should be treated fairly; or outsiders, including 
people from other ethnic groups, who must be politically and economically 
marginalised. 
 When leadership backed by members of the same ethnic group, uses their political 
power to obstruct all political and economic reforms that could interfere with its 
control over the country’s natural resources. 
18 
 
 The ethnic group that dominate the leadership uses their political or military power to 
effectively promote wider division within diverse ethnic groups, especially if members 




Out of the above mentioned reasons, this thesis argues that instability and the dynamics of 
natural resources conflict in Niger Delta of Nigeria is not only due to corruption and a lack of 
basic structures and institutions found in a developing state. But the root causes is the division 
among various ethnic groups that make up the Nigeria federation. This has caused resentment 
among marginalised ethnic groups, fuelled natural resources conflicts and sometimes wars, and 
discouraged investment, retarding growth and development prospects. This has also led to lack 
of united agenda for common aims and objective. This situation puts each ethnic group at risk 




However, since the Nigeria leadership depend on the state oil revenue to maintain their power 
base, they resist any restructuring away from this extraction and divide-and-rule policy. The 
leadership see economic reforms as barriers to important sources of self-enrichment and they 
waste oil revenue on patronage and on corrupt and rent-seeking activities in order to hold on to 
power with their ethnic associates.
11
 Therefore, this thesis argue that ethnic divisions within the 
Nigerian federation has worked to systematically divert natural resource control through the 
allocation of oil blocks for investment to people in power and a few cronies from the same 
                                                          
9 Ilorah, R. (2009) Ethnic bias, favouritism and development in Africa, Development Southern Africa, 26:5, 695-
707, DOI: 10.1080/03768350903303209 where he argues that the ‘Minority at Risk’ includes those 
marginalised groups who provoked by political and economic discrimination, often resort to political action in 
pursuance of collective interests. The fairly well-treated group usually comprises those to whom the leadership 
owes its power or on whom its continued power depends. Also, see Todaro, 1994, p.591 
10 Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997) Africa’s growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Division, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112: 1203-50. 
11 Ilorah, R. 2009, p. 697; and also Brass, P. 1991, p. 45 
19 
 
ethnic group, thereby shifting the distribution of oil revenue in their favour and at the expense 
of other ethnic groups. . It is the view of the thesis that the state of affairs with corruption, lack 
of security and mismanagement of natural resources revenue has overshadowed and hindered 
the development of a healthy and productive debate of ethnic cohesion in a secular society as 
the central problem of instability in the Nigeria federation.  As Kumuyi (2007) points out the 
political leadership has remained a business of narrow ethnic and group interests, serving only 
special interests without public infrastructure development like: electricity, portable water, 
healthcare, free education and a guarantee of security for ordinary citizens.
12
 It has thus far 
failed to address the legacies of the colonial administration of divide and rule, with the resulting 
fact that harmonious ethnic co-existence remains elusive in the Nigeria federation.  
Therefore, this study represents an effort to explain why the power of certain ethnic groups has 
been perpetuated, and why these groups consider it a worthwhile national ideal to monopolise 
a disproportionate share of state natural resources and which has resulted in conflict. It also 
shows that the instability in Niger Delta is due to a lack of a unifying force and deep resentment 
among minority groups agitating against special political favours to any group on the basis of 
ethnicity. 
                Limitations of Existing Literature, and Thesis Contribution to Knowledge 
To define the potential literature pool more exactly, two approaches were taken into 
consideration. I was first involved in searching for text that specifically addressed the issue of 
natural resources conflict that included academic journals such as: African Security, Third 
World Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary African Studies and Conflict, Security and 
Development. These texts were then used to identify additional sources that may by applicable 
to instability and conflict. Second, to understand the topic in the context of the wider literature 
                                                          
12 Kumuyi, W.F. (2007), the case for servant leadership. New Africa, 467: 19-20 
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available on natural resources conflict, I also explored published primary source materials by 
group of scholars and practitioners of national security studies. 
For a start, three particular mechanisms through which the resource curse is supposedly 
working are often distinguished: (1) the ‘Dutch Disease’ mechanism; (2) the expansive spending 
mechanism; and (3) the ‘renter state’ mechanism. The first mechanism (Dutch Disease) refers 
to the massive inflow of resource-based state income driving the real exchange rate and wage 
levels up. Other productive and trading sectors, especially manufacturing and agriculture thus 
become less competitive on the world market. Through this mechanism resource-rich 
countries’ economic structure is fundamentally transformed from manufacture or agriculture-
led to a resource extraction-led economy. This leaves the country less productive, more 
exposed to sudden commodity price changes and with a significantly lower number of jobs for 
its people, something which may lead to conflict. The second mechanism refers to expansive 
spending often accompanied by excessive borrowing against expected future oil income. With 
oil rents suddenly flooding in like manna from heaven, the political elites of resource-rich states 
often go on a spending spree (the Dubai Syndrome)
13
. Whether the money is invested in 
infrastructure or public service or wasted on luxurious prestige projects does not really matter, 
but money is being spent on a large scale where this has not been the case before. This sudden 
increase in spending may increase inflation and have an impact on the exchange rate. It may 
also lead to a massive accumulation of debts as soon as the terms for the repayment of the 
loans becomes less favourable.
14
 
These are the two classical economic mechanisms through which the resource curse theory 
works. Natural resources conflict have been studied extensively and approaches have been 
                                                          
13 The term ‘The Dubai Syndrome’, is the categorization of excessive funds investment and banking loans in the 
United Arab Emirate (UAE) in white elephant projects based on future oil price.  
14 Michael Roll (2011) (ed) Resource Governance, Development and Democracy in the Gulf of Guinea, FES 
Berlin, p 8-9 
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developed to deal with them effectively, but with little success. The third mechanism which this 
thesis dwells on extensively is the ‘renter state’ mechanism, is of a different nature. It is not 
economic but political and refers to the effects of the income from natural resources on the 
politics, security, social cohesion, and public structures/institutions of the state. That is why this 
thesis focuses on these political and security challenges, rather than on the macroeconomic 
side. The ‘renter state’ approach claims that countries which derive a high proportion of their 
revenue from rents, that is unearned income, differ from those who have to earn their revenue 
through other means, such as taxation. The massive inflow of unearned income has several 
effects. First of all, Ross 2012 argues that it makes the governing elite more autonomous from 
their citizens. It also allows them to strengthen the state security apparatus and their grip on 
power, which may result in a more authoritarian political and security system.
15
  Perhaps most 
importantly, it turns the state apparatus, including both politics and the bureaucracy into a rent-
distributing network. Therefore, the focus of the state action shifts from service delivery to 
allocation of rents. This can lead to corruption, lack of transparency and other symptoms of 
bad governance which often thrive in such an environment and which may degenerate into 
instability. 
 But despite the publication of several studies between 1980s and 2013 which have commented 
on the extent to which mainstream resource conflict studies presents a selective and biased 
reading of the subject, this conclusion has thus far only been based upon a cursory survey of 
the literature. With the partial exception of Jeff D. Colgan’s (2013) work, there is a distant 
absence of any systematic survey of the research output, based upon a clear conception of the 
picture of natural resources conflict. In this light, several work make no reference at all to any 
particular issues of the ownership of land and ethnic composition in the Niger Delta region as a 
major problem or area requiring consideration. Other studies simply underplay the pull and 
                                                          
15 Ross (2012) The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, p.63-66 
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push effect of these two factors (ownership of land and ethnicity) and provide vague evidence 
for claims that remain unsubstantiated. Still others engaged with particular works in greater 
depth, but fail to provide wide-ranging support for the claims made regarding miss-management 
of oil revenues and corruption. 
This gap has been filled, to a certain extent, by the work of Michael Ross. More than any other 
critical scholar in the field of the oil curse syndrome, Ross embarked upon a research effort to 
demonstrate a theory that the causes of instability and conflict in oil producing states is the 
secrecy of oil revenue that can be easily hidden and commonly squandered. However, valuable 
though much of his work is, there exist several methodological difficulties which characterize 
his research, and which significantly limit the general applicability of his conclusions. In his 
context, while Ross does engage with the dependency theory of oil producing states, he fails to 
provide a general concept of how to diversify resource dependence economies. As such, the 
conclusions reached may have some validity on their own terms, but have limited applicability 
toward the Nigerian case as a whole. Therefore, this thesis’ aim and objective is to give the 
important details; these include the particular types of natural resource the country possesses, 
the costs of extraction and the country’s degree of resource dependence. The aim is to then 
tackle some of the most crucial context conditions that include the quality of institutions in 
Nigeria before oil wealth arrived. But also the involvement and responses of international 
actors, the degree of social fragmentation along ethnic, religious, cultural and other lines, 
vulnerable or rather consolidated position of ruling elites, and the socioeconomic conditions 
more generally. 
However, no scholar has yet explored the underlying motivating factors and influences that 
incentivize what drives the struggle for access to control natural resources wealth in the Niger 
Delta. In answering this question, this thesis aims to fill a significant gap in the existing 
exploration of instability in natural resource exporting countries. It seek to initiate a transition 
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of this body of research from a position of assessment of the dynamics and identifying the 
factors, to one where academics may engage in a more challenging task of critical exploration 
geared toward finding a solution. This thesis aims to bring empirical analysis to bear on this 
topic of research for the first time. 
Therefore, without some understanding of the ethnic diversity, culture and customs of the 
people in Niger Delta, and an explicit method for selecting the figures which derives logically 
from this understanding of natural resources conflict, it becomes difficult to sustain an 
argument that the analysis is based on general assumptions. By focusing on the causes and 
factors of instability and natural resources conflict, rather than the mismanagement of natural 
resources, environmental degradation, and corruption, we can begin to see the dynamics of 
violence conflict. While the role of Multinational oil companies in Joint Venture Contracts 
(JVC) is significant, the main causes of conflict and struggle for access to control natural 
resource wealth in Niger Delta has become a difficult topic despite exploring all available 
settlements. The works of Michael Ross (2012) Cyril Obi (2003), Alao Abiodun. (2007) and 
others have explained many of the problems that natural resources conflict poses when it 
occurs among multi-ethnic groups in a specific region. However, their approaches have 
stopped short of looking at how the wider composition of the Niger Delta Region has 
influenced instability. Although it may seem that I am undertaking a study that looks solely at 
security and the factors responsible, I do take into account natural resources nationalism into 
consideration. However, I consider these dynamics in a different way. My basic contention with 
respect to them is that these dynamics mean something different in terms of cultural heritages 
of the ownership of land and hereditary norms and customs and how such meanings construct 
an understanding mind-set among the people in the Niger Delta. Though instability and its 
dynamics effect on natural resource conflict with its different layers of violence, its major 
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significance in this case is aimed at exploring the question of: what drives the struggle for access 
to control natural resource wealth in the Niger Delta of Nigeria? 
 This study is a part of the growing body of literature on natural resources conflict, and of the 
scholarship on the “Dutch Diseases” and “Resource Curse”, theory in general. But it goes 
beyond the ‘resource curse’, something which is important in understanding country specific 
dynamics. Indeed empirical evidence supports the links between resource wealth and relatively 
slower economic growth that can led to conflict (Sachs and Warner 2001), civil war (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2004) and authoritarian rule (Roll 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004)
16
. 
Another important connection that will not be dealt with further in this thesis but is essential 
enough to be mentioned here is the one between oil export-based growth and the persistence 
of patriarchal norms and greater gender inequality in the Middle East and Africa resource 
dependence economies (Ross 2008 &2012)  A key point of departure for this project has been 
the recognition of the political and economic nature of oil wealth as posited by a group of 
scholars and practitioners of national security studies that looked critically at primary 
commodity dependence and mismanagement of natural resources revenues in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century.  Such key scholars include: Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler (2003), 
Philippe Le Billion (2005), Humphrey Michael (2005 and Ian Bannon (2003). There is a 
related and much broader scholarship on the security nature of natural resources conflict and 
the perils associated with the activity of militant groups that stretches beyond the Niger Delta 
case. This scholarship has a starting point of the argument made by Fearon that, ‘it is not yet 
clear what is the most important mechanism that causes natural resources conflict’, whether 
‘Primary commodity export really causes armed/violence conflict is not yet known’.17 Such 
                                                          
16 Michael Roll (2011) (Ed) Fuelling the World-Failing the Region? Oil Governance and Development in Africa’s 
Gulf of Guinea: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation (FES), Berlin, p. 8-26 
17 See Fearon (2005), where he argued that, “Oil exporter do seem to have been more disposed of conflict 
from onset, but it is not yet clear what is the most important mechanism are”, whether ‘Primary Commodity 
export really causes armed conflict’, p.500-503 
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criticisms have helped bring about the realization of the deeply security nature essence of 
natural resources conflict. For example, Charles Ukeje’s “Oiling Regional Insecurity?” (2008) 
explains the implications of the Niger Delta crisis for security and stability and how armed 
group diverted stolen oil and used the revenues for the purpose of protecting illegal crude 
export networks. Recognising that natural resources conflict in Niger Delta is fundamentally an 
economic and political act, rather than a neutral one as it has mainly been purported, this 
research therefore assesses the perspectives of key groups in Niger Delta on what their rights 
are in terms of natural resource wealth sharing. This approach fits with the work of the Ministry 
of Niger Delta Affairs that has been working to develop public infrastructure and investing in 
local communities to create jobs to avoid insecurity resulting from militant groups’ use of 
violence to secure their stake in oil revenue. It is also related to the work being conducted by 
various governments and NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth, to devise a means to use oil 
revenue to bring about certain political and economic outcomes in conflict situations such as 
that in the Niger Delta. The research is also linked to the work of scholars who are interested 
in the political economy of violent conflict and who have attempted to move beyond the ‘Dutch 
Disease and Resource Curse Theory’. These scholars convey a negative impact of resource 
dependent economy in developing countries in term of economic development and growth.
18
 
Their work has gone a long way in building a more nuanced understanding of how political and 
economic factors interact in conflicts. However, some of these scholarship has not given 
consideration to an understanding of ethnic diversity, ownership of land, access and control of 
resource wealth and its effects on natural resources conflict. While politics also plays a part in 
their analyses, it does so generally with respect to how economic agendas frame the politics of 
conflict. To add to this understanding of the causes of instability and natural resource conflicts, 
                                                          
18 Auty Richard (1993), Sustaining Development in Natural Resources Economies: The Resource Curse Theory, 
P.56; also Ross (1999), “The Political Economy of Resource Curse”, World Politics, p.301-319; Ross (2012) The 
Oil Curse-How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, P.4-8; but also generally the survey of 
arguments of scholar like Paul Steven (2003), Resource Impact—Curse or Blessing? p.45-8 
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this analysis also focuses on the fear of ethnic domination and ownership of land that has been 
underplayed as a cause associated with violence as part of the larger dynamics of conflict and 
instability. My research, however, is not another study of ethnic politics or the economic role of 
natural resources wealth. Instead, it offers a focused look at the relations between the struggle 
for access and control by militant groups and the Federal Government, in order to understand 
how, through this relationship, oil revenue affected the evolution of groups like: Movement for 
the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and thus the outcome of the instability in Niger 
Delta. In this way, we can understand the dynamic and the different layers of conflict, but it is 
also a consideration of the evolution of a militant group that is so strongly linked to the political 
structure of key oil producing states in the Niger Delta. By illustrating the evolution of the 
Militant groups like MEND and its ideology through a large amount of primary materials, this 
research adds value to the body of scholarship attempting to explain the factors responsible for 
instability. These modifications to the original resource curse thesis will enhanced our 
understanding of the impact of resource wealth, because, at least implicitly, many of them tend 
to be somewhat deterministic and retain a path dependency or lock-in notion as the only causes 
of conflict. That is- this thesis hopes to convince-not the case! This research is also part of the 
scholarship which focuses on the Gulf of Guinea energy resources and insurgency, particularly 
the work on multinational oil companies itself; this should be seen as part of connected to any 
discussion relating to ‘Niger Delta Oil Paradox’, as outlined by scholars such as Cyril Obi, Elias 
Courson, Uwafiokun Idemudia, Graham Brown, Wilson Akpan, Mark Davidheiser, Michael 
Watts, JNC Hill and among others. This is part of wider work on instability and natural 
resources conflict. Moreover, this research is also connected to the tradition of scholarship 
which focuses on the evolution of non-state actors and pressure groups more generally. Ian 





 However, my work aims to show how ethnic diversity, culture, tradition and 
customs influence and affect a change in the understanding of instability and the dynamics of 
natural resources conflict, and, therefore, to investigate the causes and factors that contribute to 
the general study of the level and layers of  resource conflict. From a theoretical perspective my 
work should be seen as situated as a part of the Dutch Disease and Resource Curse theory. It 
draws directly on the work of Ross, Collier, Obi, and dependent model of Philippe Le Billion, 
to explain the process of greed and grievance in natural resource control and conflict. 
Moreover, this study is linked to wider research, such as that of Pierre Englebert and James 
Ron, and their ideas in Primary Commodity and war. This is discussed in greater detail when I 
discuss the key actors and dynamics of the conflict. 
  
                                   Importance of this Study and Research Questions   
As the purpose of this study is to know what factors are responsible for instability and violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria? First, this study differs from previous research in the 
sense that it not only the resource curse theory alone can fully explain conflict in African 
countries. Apart from such thesis of the ‘Dutch Disease’, this study get to the core of what is 
really internal natural resource nationalism that obscures, rather than promotes an accurate 
understanding of the roots and wider consequences of violent conflict. This is done by 
addressing the issues of ethnicity, cultural diversity and ownership of land in resource mining 
space. The findings of this research will go beyond the issues of corruption and miss-
management of resource wealth. It will probe into the social and cultural diversity that form the 
fabric of the Nigerian state. Second, this study aims to take a critical look at the Niger Delta 
resource exploitation paradigms with a view of analysing the security impacts on local 
                                                          
19 Ian Bannon and Paul Collier , “Natural Resources Conflict: What we can do”, in Natural Resources and 
Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (ed) Washington D.C.; World Bank, 2003, 1-16 
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communities in the region. Third, I attempt to effectively reconcile the overarching issues 
involved. It needs to be borne in mind that natural resource country like Nigeria may inevitably 
be faced with seemingly conflicting and sometimes irreconcilable interests and other social 
issues such as: ethnicity, ownership of land and cultural diversity. 
Moreover, while the centrality of natural resource wealth like oil and gas is important to social 
and economic development, the production and export of crude oil can also bring significant 
insecurity and environmental liabilities to a state. For the Niger Delta region, the net impacts 
and consequences of oil thus necessitates a comparison of economic gains and incidental 
social, economic, security and environmental costs. The comparison becomes more 
meaningful and appropriate at the local community level where the paradoxes of poverty, 
unemployment, lack of public infrastructure and misery fuel insurgency in the midst of massive 
wealth.
20
 Beyond offering what I hope is a helpful dispute resolution contributions, my aim is to 
join political and realism theory in a way that promotes a moral research question.  To that 
effect, the research questions this study investigates are: 
1. What drives the struggle for access to control natural resource wealth in Niger Delta?  
2. What are the perspectives of key actors in Nigeria on what their rights are in sharing 
natural resource wealth?  
3. Has the fear of ethnic domination and ownership of land been underplayed in analysis 
of instability and violence conflict in Niger Delta?  
4. Does the struggle for access to control natural resource in the Niger Delta increases the 
likelihood of armed conflict when the revenue derived from them is not distributed 
fairly?  
                                                          
20 Cyril Obi (2003) The Oil Paradox: Reflection on the Violent Dynamics of Petro-Politics and Miss-governance in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta which focuses on corruption and revenue allocations; also Charles Ukeje (2008) Oiling 




                                          Justification for this Study 
Political and security risk is one of the main variable that influence the future prospects 
of the Nigeria state. Striving for political power is inextricably linked to accessing oil 
revenue; it therefore becomes clear that access to power is one of the main subjects of 
research in political science. For example, according to Max Weber instability and 
violent conflict in any given society can be best explained using existing political science 
models and theories.
21
 This can be used to explain the internal conflict of interest 
regarding how the distribution of natural resource wealth should be shared between 
regional states, otherwise known as-the derivative principle.
22
  First, the case of oil and 
gas export in Niger Delta of Nigeria, from the point of view of security and economic 
experts reveals a number of contradictions and inconsistencies which this study intend 
to highlight. Second, this study will contribute to knowledge by exploring the thinking of 
people in an ethnically diverse society by interviewing grass-roots inhabitants of Niger 
Delta, thereby activating the thinking of minority groups deviating from the elites’ 
model of primary sources. Third, this study will make an important contribution to the 
debate about what drives the struggle for access to control natural resources. 
Furthermore, international comparison can be made and lessons can be learned from 
this specific case. Therefore, in carrying out effective and efficient research of the 
causes and factors responsible for natural resources conflict in Niger Delta, the 
following four factors were considered: 
                                                          
21 In Max`Weber (Economy and Society) deals with the distribution of power within a community where he 
argues that the structure of every political order directly influences the distribution of power, economic or 
otherwise, within its respective community. Therefore, the emergence of economic power by some ethnic 
groups in Nigeria may be the consequences of power existing on other ground in sharing of natural resources 
wealth; this is true of all political order and not only that of the state. See H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From 
Max Weber (Economy & State) vol.2 Routledge: London 1991, p.180-90, 194-5 
22 The Nigerian Derivative Principle in sharing of oil and gas revenue stated that, funds should be distributed 
based on Oil and Gas production and value/importance of oil/gas assets in regional States’ territories. 
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1. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the causes of instability and violent 
conflict in Niger Delta is the issue of poor governance, whereby, there are 
inadequate institutions in place or institutions that exist without structure to tackle, 
for example, the issues of environment pollution, land disputes and protection of 
citizen rights. 
2.   The issue of corruption and miss-management of oil and gas revenue: whereby 
ninety-two per cent of the Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings come from oil and 
gas. The country earns about $340 billion dollars per annum from oil export—
Ninety per cent of this comes from the Niger Delta
23
 But the living standards of the 
people in the Delta is nothing to write home about, however, as 70 per cent of the 
population live on less than  two dollar a day. Since 1960, Nigeria has earned about 
$1.5 trillion dollars from oil export, though only half of this money is unaccounted 
for due to corruption and nepotism.
24
 
3. Lack of transparency and accountability: The source of this revenue also matters. 
The scale of oil revenues can be massive. Since oil-funded governments are not 
financed by taxes on their citizens and instead on the sale of state-owned assets. 
There is also secrecy surrounding petroleum revenues; whereby governments often 
collude with international oil companies to conceal transactions, and used their own 
national oil company to hide both revenues and expenditure.
25
 
                                                          
23 Omoyefa, Paul (2010) ‘The Niger Delta Conflict: Trends and Prospect’, African Security Review, 19:2, 70-81; 
also G. Wurthman, Ways of using the African Oil Boom for Sustainable Development, Tunis: African 
Development Bank, Economic Research Working Paper series No. 86, 2006. 
24 World Bank Report: ‘Nigeria Natural Resources Exports’, 2010. 
25 Ross (2012) ‘The oil Curse’—How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, where he argued 
that secrecy is a key reason why oil revenues are so commonly squandered. Therefore, oil fuelled dictatorship 
and leaders can remain in power, since they can conceal evidence of their greed and incompetence, p.4-8. 
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4. The demand of indigenous people in the Niger Delta for access to control oil 
revenue for infrastructural development projects such as: roads, electricity supply, 
schools, health care, piping water, as well as employment in the oil and gas industry.  
            Research Design and Methodology 
The nature of the research seems to have dictated its own methodology. First, the thesis 
consulted a broad range of published materials on the subject. As noted earlier, the Niger Delta 
region has had its own fair share of academic attention. Here, there has been an extensive 
consultation of book and journals. While the list of books and journals are included in the 
bibliography, the ones I used focused mainly on the various aspects of the conflict in the Niger 
Delta. 
Most importantly, however, extensive interviews were conducted in the Niger Delta after the 
receipt of Ethnical Approval permission from King’s College London. Those interviewees were 
selected based on an ethical criteria standard and conducted using semi-structured interview 
techniques and mainly open-ended questions which were judged to be the best means of 
gathering data. 
However, use of semi-structured interview approach was adopted, with open-ended questions 
does place greater pressure on the skills of the interviewer. As King, Keohane and Verba 
describe it as ‘selection bias’ can creep in and therefore “interviewers must develop rapport 
rapidly and then follow the participant’s arguments closely by a decision as to which question to 
select that is crucial for the outcome of the research and the degree to which it can produce 
determinate and reliable results”.26 They must carefully direct the conversation: sensing when 
and how to ask the more difficult questions, to interrupt repetitive answers, to probe for greater 
                                                          
26 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research, p.128-9 
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depth, and to circle back to themes passed too quickly. They must also sense when it is best to 
say nothing at all and let the interviewee fill the silence. All this must be done against the clock, 
focusing the discussion towards the most useful themes as time runs out. 
Semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions can also present problems in analysis. 
Since the exact same questions are not asked of each interviewee, it is more difficult to 
compare data across all participants. As Burnham et al suggests, a semi-structured interview 
method is very useful: ‘almost guarantees that the interview will not be very consistent source of 
reliable data that can be compared across interviews.’27 However, there are two major concerns 
with interviewing: first, there is the issue of interview effects, and second, the issue of 
interviewer fraud. Interviewer effects arise when respondents give different responses to 
interviewers because they are perceived to be more or less empathetic to the respondent. This 
may be because of gender, ethnicity, accent, demeanour, dress or similar attributes. It is widely 
assumed that interviewers will be more successful in gaining full and honest answers when they 
have an understanding of and sympathy for the situation of the informants and their point of 
view. Interviewer fraud is another concern. The fear is that interviewers may run out of time 
and make up some of the interview reports or else, if they do conduct them, ask only a few of 
the questions and make up the rest. 
28
  But this is only common with unstructured interviews. In 
fact, unstructured interviews are best used as a source of insight, not for hypothesis testing. This 
is an important constraint on the findings of this thesis: while insight are provided on how 
relationships work between interviewer and respondent and the fundamental questions they 
aim to answer, the methodology precludes the testing of hypotheses or statement of intent and 
inference before firm conclusions are made. 
                                                          
27 Burnham et al 2004, p. 95 
28 Peter Burnham, Karin Gilland, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry (2004) Research Methods in Politics: 
Questionnaire design and Interviewing, p.95-102 
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 As a result of these difficulties in securing interviews, a significant number of participants were 
accessed through referrals from other interviewees: the so-called ‘snowballing’ technique. 
Others were through distributing letters by local government councillors on my behalf and 
inviting people to be interviewed. The advantage of personal referrals and use of personal 
contacts is that access can be gained to participants who would not otherwise be identified. For 
example, local traditional chiefs did provide referrals to questions they were unable to answer. 
Furthermore, referrals undoubtedly allowed a means of ‘getting in the door’ to secure 
interviews with participants who perhaps would not necessarily have agreed to participant if 
approached without the recommendation of a former participant. 
Therefore, data collection would have been significantly impeded if such referrals had not been 
used. However, use of the snowballing method does have some disadvantages. A snowball 
metaphor is an appropriate one, since a small core if initial interviewees can be used to gain 
access to many others. Used correctly, it can create a representative sample of a size that would 
otherwise be unachievable. However, the method relies on that initial core accurately reflecting 
the wider sample frame, otherwise, minor biases in the sample at an early stage are amplified if 
interviewees made recommendations on the basis of shared background or viewpoint. For 
example, the initial sample of NNPC administrative managers does not reflect government 
policy, and those interviewed early in the fieldwork phase only refers to NNPC as oil 
companies; but not a government institution, and in turn their referrals are to other NNPC 
managers individual point of view which can make the imbalance of the sample progressively 
worsens. To guard against such methodological problems, care was taken to ensure that the 
emerging sample, created in part by the snowball method, reflected the wider sample frames. 
Where potential holes in coverage were identified, efforts were made to make new contacts. 
Furthermore, to ensure that recommendations were not simply made on the basis of shared 
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outlooks, participants were questioned carefully as to why they had made the particular 
referrals. 
Most participants were invited to participate in the study by letter printed and distributed on my 
behalf by local government councillors. In some cases participants were approached via email 
or a telephone call, particularly those identified using a snowball method and where the initial 
contact recommended that as the best form of communication. The initial email or letter 
doubled as an information sheet: explaining the purpose of the study, why the addressee was 
being approached, the objective and themes the intended interview would cover, and how 
information gathered from the meeting would be used. All interviewees were given the choice 
to be cited by name, job title and organizational affiliation; to be cited anonymously; or for their 
comments to be used only as background information and not cited in the thesis. The majority 
of participants were happy for their reflections to be directly attributable. However, nearly all 
serving civil servants and government officials preferred to speak anonymously, with comments 
attributed to their portfolio only. Participants were also told that they could signal during the 
interview that certain information was ‘off the record’, and many interviewees allowed the 
conversation to flow between comments that could be attributed and those that could not. Very 
few interviewees spoke ‘off the record’ to make substantive point that might have negative 
consequences if they were attributed to the individual or their organization. Often they were 
constrained by organizational policies relating to speaking to researchers or they wished to 
illustrate points with confidential information. 
Those interviewed during the early stages of the study were offered a transcript of the interview, 
which they could edit and approve. However, in response to the views of early participants, this 
method was substituted by an offer for the pages of the final draft in which an interviewee was 
cited to be sent to them for approval. Just over a third of participants choose to edit their 
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remarks at this stage. The edits of only one participant were perceived to substantively weaken 
their initial argument. One interviewee also choose to withdraw at this stage. 
A list of potential questions was also enclosed in invitations to early participants. However, 
feedback suggest that list was intimidating, suggesting that participation required significantly 
more time than was requested, and that it was unsuited to the semi-structured nature of the 
interview. Participants were advised that the interview would be recorded digitally, unless they 
preferred that notes were taken instead, and that they had the right to withdraw from the study 
any time. They were also given the contact detail of the thesis supervisor should they have any 
questions or concerns. Use of a consent form was considered an ethical requirement and 
appropriate for the nature of the interviewees. Consent was acquired in written form. 
Interviews were normally conducted in the offices of the participant or the researcher’s office. 
In a few cases where scheduling was difficult, interviews took place in private houses or 
community centres. Each interview began with a five minutes summary of the research, the 
purpose of the interview and the intended of the resulting data. Most participants had prepared 
some thoughts about the subject in advance. However, a few had little understanding of the 
purpose of the interview beforehand, having had the meeting scheduled well in advance by the 
local constituency councillor. All were given the chance to ask questions about the research 
project, before being asked if they were happy to continue and permission gained for taking 
notes. In many cases, participants invited colleagues to take part, or in a separate meetings 
immediately following their own. Special care was then taken to ensure such participants were 
fully informed before continuing. They were normally handed a stock information sheet 
carried for the purpose, and sent a follow up letter afterward, again explaining the project. 
Interviews ranged from thirty minutes to over two hours, with the average lasting slightly over an 
hour from being greeted to being escorted out. In some cases, the researcher was invited to a 
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drink before or after the interview, or to shadow the interviewee for a few hours. Such segments 
of the meetings were ‘off the record’ unless the interviewee indicated that he or she was happy 
to be cited. During early interviews, participants were asked for an hour of their time. However, 
feedback suggested that this was too long a period to request at the outset, and most 
interviewees were initially asked for a meeting of 30 minutes. Although interviewees were 
warned at 25 minutes that they were nearing the end of the scheduled time, the majority 
seemed happy to speak for longer without request. 
Moreover, semi-structured interviews challenged the researcher to direct discussion far more 
than with other interview techniques: monitoring coverage of themes and developing probing 
questions that follow up on the participant’s remarks. Since digital recording was quite 
intimidating, detailed notes were taken by hand. This also allowed a more accurate record of 
what was said and allowed the researcher to remember the exact nuance of conversations at a 
later date. In fact, extensive notes were taken during interviews for the purpose of recording 
accurate data. These notes allowed the researcher to visualise and analyse the participant’s 
arguments in real time so that key themes could be identified and followed up during the 
interview. Note-taking also seemed to have the additional advantage or reassuring participants 
that what they were saying was interesting and relevant, particularly as there is a danger that 
participants will feel inhibited by digital recording devices. 
 As a researcher, I was supposedly constrained by the principle of anonymity and impartiality 
and therefore, interviews were conducted only through sources that were genuine with people 
that live in the Niger Delta region, who witness the violence and can give an accurate account of 
what really happened in the peak period between 2008 and 2010. Due to the ongoing nature of 
the conflict, the researcher was unable to interview military personnel, and militant 
commanders (except one in Bayelsa state), even some of the traditional chiefs were excluded 
due to being actively involved in the violence. As such, one of the aims of this research is to 
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employ a methodology that brings the belligerents of different ethnic groups into the body of 
empirical material covering the instability in the Niger Delta region. Also, it aims to show that 
such research is not as complicated, either practically or ethically, as many might believe. 
Decisions between cases or events, as well as the mode of analysis, are as much based on what 
occurred on the ground as on the aim of the project. The following, therefore, tries to explain 
the choices made and why they are best suited for this study. 
 For the purposes of part of this research, I juxtaposed various source material types to 
corroborate information about events. I also juxtaposed narratives taken from interviews to 
derive a narrative of the conflict. By examining the internal policies of the Oil Mineral 
Producing and Developing Area Commission (OMPDAC) and communication, official 
government documentation relating to the implementation of policy, and other primary 
sources, I constructed an overall narrative. Then, I used the extensive secondary literature that 
covers militant activities in Niger Delta to corroborate and challenge narratives interpreted 
from the primary material. As one of the major criticisms of a qualitative approach, especially 
when examining the result, is the bias inherent in a narrow data pool, I therefore used 
triangulation of data type and of source origins to limit biases. However, as discussed below in 
the ‘Ethical Consideration’ section, biases often allowed me to gain an understanding of certain 
aspects of how the Niger Delta Oil communities perceived the Nigeria government and oil 
companies; an attempt to avoid bias altogether would have precluded such an understanding. 
In many respects the ethos of this methodology is to embrace the sympathies developed during 
field research in the hope of discovering understandings that could illuminate the current body 
of scholarship. This project also embraces a field-intensive research methodology, drawing 
strongly on ethnic diversity historical approaches. 
For the purpose of understanding the place of instability in natural resources conflict in political 
decision making the revealed grievance of the Niger Delta communities were most valuable. 
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These individual opinions of where local inhabitants themselves positioned lack oil revenue 
considerations were used to construct the different layers of conflict in decision making analysis 
described in detail below. This tool helped determine roughly the general themes in the share 
of oil revenue that is related considerations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) law 
on The Economic Rights and Duties of States in the ownership of natural resources as a policy 
framework for importing states and multinationals in the extractive industries.
29
 This was then 
used as the basis of the importance of local community stake in oil revenue. The interpretation 
drawn from these materials were used to construct narratives that provides analysis of the 
relationship between access and control of resource wealth. 
                                                         Data Collection 
The qualitative method and research design has been built in at the beginning with the initial 
goal of investigating of what drives the struggle for access to control natural resource wealth in 
the Niger Delta of Nigeria. The data available were adjusted according to concerns regarding 
source material and analysis as the project progressed. In this sense, the study has very much 
been a case of conflicting events. Semi-structured interviews were used, something which 
ensured key themes were covered in every interview, but also that the course of the interview 
was shaped to a great extent by the response of the participants. New and interesting 
perspectives could be probed, urged by pre-prepared follow up questions or occasionally by 
abandoning the question scheme entirely.  
 The conversational style allowed the generation of nuanced data shaped by the local 
participant’s own framework of understanding. To some extent, the use of open questions was 
necessitated by the relatively understudied nature of the subject matter. However, open-ended 
questions also allowed participants to reflect on and explore the themes on their own terms. 
                                                          
29 See Leif Wenar (2012) Clean Trade in Natural Resources, p.7 
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The collection of data began with the chance to meet a key source like: oil company 
representatives, local community leaders, government officials, traditional rulers and NGOs 
operating in the area of interest. I was also privileged to meet a high-level militant commander 
who participated in the amnesty programme in 2008. My relationship with him and the initial 
contacts he facilitated have largely set in motion the snowballing of primary account and 
material for the study. 
I also made an important connection with the official of the newly created Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs (MNDA) which now designs the policy and strategies for dialogue and the 
amnesty programme. This has been an essential contact, assisting me in gaining access to the 
development programme for public infrastructure development, along with statistics and 
progress made and actors involved-that I might otherwise have overlooked
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Since information from the government ministry forms a significant starting point of interviews 
and long-running inquiries, any data from them is referenced in notes as in the interview with 
MNDA. While the starting point of my research was the work of the more prominent scholars 
studying countries with resource wealth dependence, many of the less conventional sources, 
which become central to this study, were not apparent to me until the Niger Delta Ministry gave 
a sense of direction to certain events and actors who then provided a keen insight that the 
typical field worker sources could not. The Ministry granted me permission to access the office 
of National Planning and Statistics and were very happy to see an independent external 
researcher confronting these issues and probe the factors and causes of violent conflict in Niger 
Delta. 
Different actors in conflicts consider government information to be misleading or providing 
only a skewed picture from what is happening on the ground; therefore, this is deeply 
                                                          
30 The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, Information & development programme centre for public infrastructure 
provision to local communities 2008-2012 
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considered here too in my analysis. However, government sources afforded me a level of 
access that made a primary data-focused design feasible. Such design would have been 
impractical without the extensive network of contacts and the almost free access I have had to 
Local communities, youth movements and environmental activists in the region. Such access is 
essential to a study that relies on interviews and primary material, and is particularly important 
for the return interviews with key contacts that are part of my approach. 
A multitude of other individuals provided me private access to documents and helped me 
establish contacts with local government councillors, community chiefs and oil company 
operatives in the areas that eventually made possible a comfortable exchange with MEND 
officers. Other individual involved with the Evangelical Churches in Niger Delta, NGOs 
employees and members of local community organizations such as women’s micro-finance 
schemes all provided essential connections too. Those individuals who have been involved in 
Niger Delta conflict resolution for a long time had friends in political parties and oil company 
workers’ unions; such connections were crucial for mobility and thus covering the five oil 
producing states in the region. Access to local government councillors was essential to conduct 
this research and they too considered this research of great importance to them. In this case the 
assistance of security officials of the Joint Task Force (JTF) for oil and gas infrastructure 
protection as well as the office of international NGOs were very helpful. On a more general 
note, the openness of the JTF at the time was impressive in protecting foreign nationals and 
domestic workers. 
I began with highly structured interviews but soon changed to ones that were openly structured. 
As more and more interviews were conducted, it become almost instinctual to fellow up on 
certain issues relating to oil revenue allocation for infrastructure development in local 
communities in the Niger Delta. The interviews became much more fluid and the informants 
more open and candid. Realizing this, I returned to many of the sources I interviewed in the 
41 
 
first years of my research to analyse whether there was a change in events. For example, my 
interview with the officials in the Ministry of Niger Delta, were initially quite rigid and 
confidential and did not reveal much about reasons for actions, the most important data for my 
analysis. Over the past two years, being able to ask the Ministry and State Revenue Allocation 
Department further questions on several occasions has resulted in deeper understanding. Also, 
this approach has allowed me cumulatively lengthy interaction with people who are 
exceptionally busy. 
Answers in interviews often took on a character that might be described as greed and grievance 
clashes between different actors. Very little misunderstanding was required once I had put 
forward my basic areas of questions to be asked. For, example, to my recollections, when I 
asked about security dynamics of militant groups kidnapping oil workers for ransom payment, 
the respondents typically entered into a long description of their memories of a curfew being 
imposed in communities by government JTF when such event occurred. Because of this, the 
risk of inadvertently guiding and leading response was, for the most part, effectively avoided. If 
I felt the respondent had not already covered them, I did present key themes after the 2008 
military conflict between Militant group and Government JTF was recounted. Sometimes this 
was done through second and third interviews or by asking follow-up questions via phone or 
email. Issues of interest included experience dealing with the likelihood of armed conflict if oil 
revenue stopped coming in to local communities; or what their rights are in sharing natural 
wealth.  
Interviews were also often framed by general questions about key periods and events discerned 
from my initial comparative chronological analysis. Of special interest during the interviews 
were the events of 2007: the ethnic conflict between the Istekiri and Uhrobo in the oil city of 
Warri over ownership of land; the battles for the payment of royalty to oil block communities; 
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the fighting and blowing-up of export pipelines in Escravos terminal; the work of Evangelical 
Churches as part of peace negotiations between communities in the Niger Delta. 
None of the interviews were recorded on tape. However, it quickly became clear that 
respondents were significantly more comfortable with me taking notes rather than video 
recording. It was made clear in the consent form by the selected interviewees that they were 
particularly worried and sometimes even intimidated by vigilante groups. As such, I began to 
take only notes of the interviews. Recaps of the interviews were immediately composed after 
the interviews were conducted. In these reviews I injected personal impressions and 
emphasized parts of the interview that seemed most pertinent. 
I conducted an initial running analysis to inform future interviews. This running analysis 
focused on the nature of the responses to the various thematic areas in general, and aimed at 
either discarding certain thematic focuses or adding those that were being ignored. When new 
issues arose they were immediately injected into the study. 
As introduced above, an important part of this study’s method was the re-interviewing of many 
of the interviewees. Some key sources were contacted on a regular basis right up to the 
completion of the thesis, and some were presented with the thesis for their thoughts. In the 
secondary, sometimes tertiary or further interviews, many of the assertions put forward by the 
interviewee in the initial interview were posed again in a manner that assisted in the 
construction of a situation that juxtaposed sources to try to understand events. As in differences 
between statements of participants’ source which I used to build an interpretation that best fit 
the events under study allowed me to challenge some of the responses of interviewees after 
time had passed, so that the interviewee did not feel he/she was being interrogated. The span of 
time between initial interview and secondary interview also afforded me the opportunity to see 
if people maintained consistent stories. This is particularly important because the method of 
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analysis here look carefully at the language used: if the rhetoric used by respondents was not 
consistent between the initial and second interviews, major questions arouse that required 
further consideration and investigation. These conversations have added much of the substance 
to and illustration for the study, and have been essential in checking details and across 
referencing information. 
Choices of interviewees were largely made using a random selection process. I made every 
attempt to guard against key sources directing me to those who would reinforce their stories; 
effort was also made to have as many opposing views as possible. As such, I approached all 
types of personalities. Generally, the apparently relaxed nature of the oil company officials with 
respect to visitors enabled me to approach many significant figures that might otherwise be 
inaccessible to those not familiar with the Niger Delta. That said, because of the huge influx of 
UN Environmental Agencies, NGOs and other internationals, and because the militant groups 
are more or less part of state governments, it has becomes much more difficult to walk into the 
offices of key states officials. 
The social network approach also afforded me a better understanding of the social organization 
and hierarchies that exist within MEND. Furthermore, this approach helped me to derive a 
better understanding of the power relations between MEND and state officials. Essentially, it 
was valuable to reflect on who connected me with whom and how these people were linked 
within MEND, thus allowing a view of MEND social networks. Moreover, this reinforces the 
idea that MEND is a ‘grand alliance’ and that during the research it was continually important 
to consider the major role of prominent individuals. Also, it revealed significant social networks 
between NGOs and MEND. This was particularly important in understanding the flow of ideas 
and their significance inside MEND’s militant organization. 
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Given the important of interviews and the time spent in the Niger Delta region conducting 
research into security issues, discussing these trips in more details is thus worthwhile. What 
follows is a description of various trips to the field, the number of interviews as well as other 
types of research conducted on these trips. 
The initial trip into the Niger Delta was conducted in April of 2012. During this trip time was 
spent in Port Harcourt, the largest oil and gas city in the region, where interviews with a 
significant number of local government officials (both former and serving) were conducted. I 
established contacts thanks to assistance from some local government councillors, who were 
also working at the time on negotiating peace among different militant groups and oil 
companies in River State. 
These initial contacts in Port Harcourt were essential to developing further contacts in other 
states in the region. Interviews in Port Harcourt focused on the security concern for oil 
companies’ expatriates that are based in towns around creeks and pipelines flowing stations. 
Within the Niger Delta region, interviews focused on local people who had been involved in 
the protesting against multinational oil companies and environmental pollution they were seen 
to have caused. They also demanded compensation for land and agricultural damages 
incurred. Local chiefs and NGOs working in the area were also interviewed. Also interviewed 
are people who lived in the areas of violence during the 2008 conflict between militant groups 
and JTF help to corroborate the stories relating to local actors and government strategy to 
achieve peace. 
By late August 2013, however, the amount of research inside the Delta region continued to be 
limited to oil company officials and the number of key interviews was around 30. Through this 
interaction, I had learned a lot about the dynamics, profile and security strategy put in place to 
protect oil installations in the region, but access to the core of MEND remained difficult. It was 
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not until September 2013 before the situation began to change significantly, and I was allowed 
access to interview some youth members of militant groups who participated in the amnesty in 
2009 that produced sources more comprehensively reliable with much more extensive details. 
Two major events were key to opening up extensive access. First was taking part in a 
Community Forum that was distributing oil revenue to the Sagbama Local Government Area in 
September. The number of NGOs present that are undertaking development project in the 
region and their connections with important locals proved a major opportunity and provided 
increased access. Also, many people taking part in the management of oil funds, government 
monitoring agencies, and the UN also proved exceptionally valuable for interviewing contacts 
and logistic assistance during all future field research conducted. Most importantly, strong 
friendships were fostered which have proven critical in completing this project. 
The second trip in October 2013 opened major access to some government officials in the 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and connected me to the highest level in the NNPC and thus 
allowed interviews about government policy in revenue sharing. Introductions from the 
ministry officials proved critical in gaining the trust of many sources, and allowed me to build 
an extensive network of contacts and interviewees in Delta state.  Of immense importance too 
was my connection with the Women’s Micro Finance Association (WMFA) in Bayelsa State 
was particularly helpful in providing assistance to how oil trust funds are being managed in 
establishing small scale businesses among women in the region. I conducted confidential 
interviews with 15 key women’s group members on their behalf. Without this assistance I 
would not have been able to collect the views of some these individuals due to logistical, 
language and other constraints. The bibliography features a summary of the analysis of number 
of interviews conducted, along with the details and reports of those, as well as a short summary 
of the findings from this group of interviews referred to as confidential. 
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Of special note was a trip along the river noun rescue barge, which afforded me the 
opportunity to travel along the creek and to visit communities, particularly Bonny Island--a key 
location of oil and gas exploration and thus important in its own right with relation to the 
dynamics of the conflict. Also, the time on the barge allowed for discussion with crew members 
who had played a significant role in both humanitarian and public social service; this was hugely 
informative regarding fighting between militant groups and government forces at the peak of 
instability and threats to oil installations in the region. 
My primary concern in analysing interviews and text sources was to search for the reasons 
behind the struggle for access to control of oil wealth in the Niger Delta, as well as to discover 
the perspectives of key groups in the Niger Delta regarding what their rights are in sharing 
natural resources wealth. 
These two key elements provided a frame for my analysis: the presence of oil and gas as the 
major earner for the Nigeria economy, and changes in the sharing of oil revenue. Once these 
features were identified, I assessed their significance compared to other influence like the 
ownership of land where the resource wealth is found and the fear of ethnic domination. I also 
examined the narratives provided by the federal revenue sharing formulae of the derivative 
principles to determine the source of instability and conflict. This analysis is elaborated in 
chapter two and three. Through this ethnic discourse, I was able to determine how the 
belligerents actors interpret and conceive their rights and influence that increases the likelihood 
of armed conflict when the revenue derived from oil and gas are not distributed fairly. 
Official reports from the Niger Delta Commission were also used as a starting point to establish 
data and policy prescriptions for the Federal Government. Key focal points were established, 
and an initial interpretation of the link between oil revenue and the outbreak of conflict in the 
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region was constructed. This interpretation guided the primary research for documents and 
interviews from the key figures in the NNPC and MNDA portfolios that were concerned. 
The parallel statistical data and chronological approach was not meant to provide proof for a 
hypothesis, but as a method of critical analysis that would facilitate an awareness of how the 
conflict started, which was superimposed from the past and is recollected and joined with the 
present to interpret the present dynamics. I was then able to interpret the forces and actors that 
were involved to build a view of the dynamics and reasoning of the processes and 
corresponding consequences of the conflict. Several interpretations had been piloted before 
that did not reflect from the synthesis of the data collected through primary sources. This series 
of contending interpretations was turned into a multiple explanatory narrative. 
Since the contending responses were quite different from the initial assumptions of resource 
conflict in Nigeria by many of the actors in the events under consideration; it was thus useful to 
return to these local communities and put to them alternative questions to explore different 
discourse. The responses can be seen as part of an argumentative discourse between the 
interviewee, who represents some of the assumptions and interpretations and the interviewer 
(researcher) who presents some other form of outstanding that is underplayed but discerned 
from other sources. The resulting interviews, therefore, turned to addressing complex issues 
that also turned into a meaningful idea. By putting interview material through such a process, 
this results in a more reliable understanding of acceptable norms that form the basis of the final 
analysis and report used in this thesis. Determining the effect of such practical activity upon 
other practical activity requires a critical questioning often consisting of several layers of the 
conflict that involved different actors. The method that follows is essential to the analysis 
describe above because it is through this approach that several opposing interpretations of the 
nature of instability has had upon the oil industry in Niger Delta. 
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A significant part of the research has been focused on developing an approach through which 
we can build an understanding of contested space, such as who should control natural resource 
wealth. Several other interpretations are retrieved from the source materials; the most plausible 
interpretation focused on the judicial argument between the Federal Government and the oil 
producing states in the ownership of resource wealth in the continental shelf of the Niger Delta 
offshore space. Making such judgements, whether in a court or in this research, is a process 
that relies upon first-hand judgement passed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria within a 
particular series of events which resulted to unresolved dispute that led to inaccurate or 
contradictory accounts by different parties.  
In the interviews, informants were asked questions such as: What do you think drives the 
struggle for access to control oil wealth in Niger Delta? This was often done by presenting the 
scenario to the interviewees regarding competition for oil revenue. As an open ended question 
and by putting to the interviewee versions of events from previous analysis and discourse, the 
interviewee was able to give his/her opinion with regards to the disagreement between the 
government and people in resource mining space. After the interviews were analysed, a process 
of synthesis uncovered internal contradictions, factual errors, inconsistencies, or fallacies. Each 
key respondent’s answers and explanations were cross-examined and a final analysis is built. A 
similar process was followed for the statistical data for primary sources material, such as 
government development projects for oil producing areas, NGOs, community organizations, 
oil companies and states finances for local authorities. Analysis produced from these processes 
are cross-examined and considered in the context of reviews of scholarly secondary and tertiary 
material. These were like the various versions of events and dynamics, analysed as a part of the 
argument. I have produced an explanation of how instability has affected the production of oil 
for the periods identified in my initial analysis of parallel conflict events and the action the 
government took to regain control of natural resource space. Once these interpretations were 
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constructed, they were aligned with dynamics and used to develop an understanding of how 
they link together and influence the flow of oil. 
All of the typical ethical concerns for conducting social research are amplified in a conflict 
setting such as that in the Niger Delta. As a result, I took significant care to protect sources as 
well as myself as a researcher. However, I encountered an even greater burden once friends 
had been made and sympathies developed—an obligation to communicate a version of the 
experience of the people that does justice to their condition and struggle. This thesis is only a 
part of the attempt to repay the people of the Niger Delta for what they have afforded me and 
for the knowledge I have gained from them. 
Ethical issues that surround conducting research in conflict settings and sensitive political 
environments are numerous. In Doing Research in the Real World, David E. Gray attempt to 
address the deep and complicated issues of personal safety, and the obligation to vulnerable 
populations, among other issues, for research amid conflict situation. Although I did not 
engage in the local politics and in such a comprehensive consideration of the myriad ethical 
issues dealt with in Doing Research in the Real World , I do reflect upon the issues that 
presented themselves most starkly to me while conducting research in the Niger Delta on 
various trips between 2011 and 2013. The most challenging one was the security issues and 
arms proliferation in the Niger Delta that endangered the lives and property of 30 million 
inhabitants. To quote David Gray: ‘The fieldworker must have a good knowledge of the 
working environment both in terms of the research venue and the geographical area in which it 
is situated”.31  Safety issues apply just as much to researchers as they do to respondents. 
However, understanding the instability and dynamics of natural resources conflict in the Niger 
Delta has affected my research in two ways. First, it allowed me access to features of the social 
                                                          
31 David E. Gray, Doing Research in the Real World, Safety Issues for Researchers, Sage Publication, 2014, p.92 
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and security setting of the instability in the region. These may not have been apparent if I had 
attempted to retain the distance that so many people purported to have taken. This could also 
be called bias, because it is an enabler for future research. Sometimes the appearance of bias 
toward a particular group’s ideological inclination can grant a researcher access to certain 
localities, individuals, and other source material that might have otherwise been blocked to the 
researcher. Allowing oneself to develop sympathies and build friendships, even empathizing 
with certain individuals and groups, is potentially a powerful asset to the researcher. In fact, 
through this, one can begin to gain a deeper, or ‘thicker’ understanding of the social 
environment, and the meanings and reasons for action held by people-something, which is 
critical for conducting an interpretative project such as this one. As David Gray put it, “One 
way of avoiding, or at least minimizing this bias is for the researcher’s method and approach to 
be reliable and consistently with what it set out to measure”.32 
I have found such qualification is best gained by spending time with the various actors in the 
Niger Delta, so understanding and empathy were developed for the various parties to the 
conflict and precluded biases from distorting research and analysis from the goal of a sincere 
and balanced account. By developing sympathies towards Niger Delta indigenous populations, 
individuals and groups, as well as toward various multinational oil companies in the region, I 
was better able to gain an understanding of how militant groups became the bona-fide 
representative of the people by channelling their grievances to the Federal Government and 
how they came to accept many of these norms. 
This is not to suggest that what respondents said was always taken at face value or considered 
without serious critique or even suspicion. It simply contends that a sense of why individuals 
did what they did, and an understanding that there was some virtue in their positions, allowed 
                                                          
32 Ibid, p.389 
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both access to deeper source material and the production of a more illustrative scenarios. It 
also seems important for security reasons for the perspective adopted by local communities in a 
conflict environment such as the Niger Delta to observe researcher in their communities for 
some time, and make sure that he/she is not as an informant of JTF before opening up to 
inquiries. This experience raises the interesting question of the degree to which research of the 
kind I conducted takes on a clandestine or secretive model. Much of the source material for 
this research has been acquired by committing to discretion with respondents or those who 
have provided access to documents; details have been kept from respondents and their 
alternative views assessed in opposition to one another.  
This, however, does not make the activity clandestine in any way. The fact that the aims of the 
research, my affiliated institution, and any intended possibilities for dissemination were 
disclosed to sources before engaging in interviews or other source collection limited most of the 
suspicion that typically surrounds anyone asking questions about security issues in a conflict 
zone. Also, due to the good information that were provided by key members of the Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs, this suggest that they were generally comfortable with my presence. Also, 
the more time I spent and the more interviews I conducted, it become clear to many that my 
presence in the local communities was not associated with a government or with any 
organization other than King’s College London. In a way, I think people became accustomed 
to my presence. 
Interestingly, due to a deep reverence for academic and educational pursuits throughout the 
Niger Delta, people were willing to accept the conducting of social and security research as 
important and they typically understood, and as such respected, why I would want to research 
the situation in the Niger Delta. Adding to this was the fact that the Department of War Studies 
at King’s College was known by at the state government level, and was also well respected. Thus 
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my association with the department granted a level of credibility that proved essential in gaining 
trust and limiting the fear of being a spy that engaged in some sort of clandestine activity. 
As a result of the features described above, some of the ethical issues that are core to the open 
versus closed research debate were resolved. Since the objectives of the study were primarily to 
know the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta, members of the state governments had 
knowledge of and respected academic research in military and security affairs. This seemed to 
alleviate the suspicion of many critics of social research ethics. Also, because I was interested in 
the hidden facts of a reasonably recent conflict between communities and oil companies, there 
was not a concern that I might be providing information that could be used by ‘the enemy’ in 
the JFT and the economic struggle that continued, despite the amnesty to militant groups. 
Issues regarding disclosure did occasionally arise, however, I have no concern that top-level 
multinational oil companies executive were more than competent to make decision about 
talking to me or not, disclosure concerns did surround many of the lower-ranking oil workers. 
First, it must be understood that one cannot present a disclosure form to such individuals and 
expect anything resembling a positive response; the sort of disclosure form advocated by 
medical research or others in social science research is not applicable in an environment rife 
with suspicion, where signing documents is not culturally understood in the same way as it is in 
Europe. 
Another complication I did not anticipate was that, having gained permission from local 
community leaders to conduct interviews, many residents took this permission as something 
like an order and responded in a very different fashion than I had anticipated; they were often 
clearly going out of their way to give me information that would please me rather to reflect on 
their own opinion and experiences as they saw them. While this was also a problem in the 
general population, it was more so in the context of most communities with militant groups. 
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In fact, I was confronted several times with the dilemma of reporting one sided events that 
might have had a very negative impact upon certain individuals. In all of these cases I decided 
that specifics of particular orders, and narratives or event would be subject to rigour in the final 
presentation of this thesis, though they significantly informed my personal understanding of the 
situation. A similar dilemma arose with respect to many of the local government councillors, 
and environmental activists; the activities of NGOs in the region can become the source of 
environmental scandals that is based in a one sided narratives of pollution. Although, absolute 
care was taken to highlight the positive work that these agencies are doing not to hamper the 
progress already made. 
Since I was not engaged in investigative journalism and I gained much of this insight with the 
confidence garnered from presenting myself as a ‘PhD student’ doing academic research, 
which I exercise throughout the interviewed process. While I was careful to make certain that I 
continued to take a critical perspective of different actors, by focusing on the parameters of the 
study I worked to limit the risk of engaging in the presentation of a sensational characterizations 
of different organizations. While in descriptions and analysis I clearly indicate that I see the 
role of militant groups as critical both in the security and peaceful settlement of the Niger Delta 
question, I do not engage in value judgments or considerations of the appropriateness of such 
significance; the readers of this thesis must decide for themselves. 
Even for those who clearly provided informed consent, the sensitivity of many of the issues and 
events discussed must be protected through a strict adherence to confidentiality. Citations, 
when appropriate, are given in terms of the general role of the source only: the month and 
general location in which the confidential interview was conducted are given; names are 
withheld. The original material, including notes and interviews are kept in secure safe and will 
be destroyed within a reasonable time after the final submission of the thesis.  
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                                                      Major Findings 
As a result of the systematic analysis of the above data, the thesis reaches the following 
conclusion: overall; and notwithstanding occasional exceptions and nuances within security 
studies that, when assessing natural resources conflict in an ethnic diverse society, consideration 
should be given to a research output which is based upon issues of political and economic 
management of resource wealth in a highly selective treatment of the subject, with this 
selectivity both systematic and based upon a clear political bias. As such the thesis finds that the 
core expertise exploring conflict has, throughout the 2000s, served the economic model of the 
redistribution of resource wealth from the government to the poor, instead of addressing the 
ownership of land where the endowment is found. Ensuring that appropriate measures are put 
in place to compensate them in case of indemnity and usage of fixed asset (land). 
In addition, the thesis finds that this selective focus of previous researchers is sustained largely 
as a result of research practices which suffer from two major problematic features. First, natural 
resources security research output has often (although by no means always) rested upon a 
remarkably narrow base of independently-sourced empirical data. Some of the key claims 
made by the core experts throughout the literature have been largely upon unsubstantiated 
assertion and circumstantial evidence, whilst others have been reliant upon the uncritical 
incorporation of ‘officially sourced’ information. In this regard, there has often been a heavy 
reliance upon military intelligence and other government sources from states directly involved 
in combating the primary threat of armed insurgents to natural resource mining space. This 
narrow base of (independent) empirical evidence does not always probe to the bottom of the 
social and ethnic dimension and thus often leads to false premises. 
The second major problematic feature of the core research output of natural resources conflict 
has been the widespread references to law and order doctrine in relation to much of the 
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relevant statistical data in regards to criminal gangs under the cover of resource nationalism. 
Specifically, there has been a distant lack of engagement by the federal government of Nigeria 
with militant groups in the Niger Delta. Whether such forces are criminal gangs or insurgents 
forces working to destabilise the country or whether they have separatist agendas to overthrow 
the government. The core literature has tended to display a distant lack of engagement with the 
relevant groups. In this way, the core experts have examined in detail only a sample of violent 
conflicts which may reasonably be said to meet the criteria of having a separatist agenda, and 
have therefore seen military force applied to them in order bring peace to conflict areas in the 
Niger Delta. 
 Third, research also revealed that the debate over of ownership of resource wealth has shifted 
from revenue distribution to resource control among indigenous oil operators. Non-Delta 
region shareholders/directors owned 83% of oil blocks in the country and the Niger Delta 
indigenous militants movement has called on the government to revoked or re-allocate the 
controversial oil blocks or an equivalent number to be given to the people from the Niger 
Delta region whose lives are being degraded by oil exploration. Overall, these are three major 
problematic features of the core research output—the problem of one sided government 
sovereignty right and ownership of natural resources mining space and the problem of using 
military force to silence minority rights. Although, it is important to note that these findings do 
not mean that there is a total absence of research which challenges the premises and practices 
of the Nigerian government in reaching an agreeable settlement to the Niger Delta question. It 
is agreed here that as set out in the earlier literature review, there is a rich tradition of research -
and a concomitant extensive literature--which engage in sustained critique of issues pertaining to 
resolving natural resources conflict. Scholars such as Humphrey Michael, Philippe Le Billion, 
Michael Klare and Pierre Englebert, have all authored detailed empirical research which focus 
on the use of military force in engaging separatist movement tied to natural resources 
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nationalism. But the issue of ethnicity is always missing. In this light, the insulating function of 
the core literature examined here is not finite, and there remains sites in the academy of 
significant resistance to the dominant narratives and of alternative interpretations and research 
agendas against the dominant focus of resource curse. However, the core research question is 
detailed in some depth in chapter four. 
                                               Definitions of Key Concepts 
Ethnicity: Ethnicity is one of the most intensely discussed concepts in social science and there is 
no general consensus on the exact meaning of the term. This thesis starts with Wolfgang 
Gabbert’s definition of ethnicity “as a specific form of social differentiation whereby actors use 
cultural or phenotypic markers to distinguish themselves from others”.33 While other theorist 
like Bruce Berman see it as a product of a “continuing historical process, always simultaneously 
old and new, grounded in the past and perpetually in creation”.34  But in my view, ethnicity is 
understood in this thesis ‘as a group of people with similar or multiple culture and customs, as 
well as divergent interests and conflicts among generation, clan, faction, tradition and culture all 
seeking recognition of their identities in the political and economic process relating to the 
sharing of natural resources. But in the Nigerian context, ethnicity also represent so much large 
and more sharply defined and differentiated groups and it continue to be internally 
differentiated into geo-political zones, regional or cultural sub-groups and identities which are 
engaged in vigorous internal rivalries to safeguard their group interest. In my view, the state of 
affairs of corruption, lack of security and mismanagement of natural resources revenue has 
overshadowed and hindered the development of a healthy and productive debate of ethnic 
cohesion in secular society as the central problem of instability in the Nigeria federation. A 
                                                          
33 Gabbert (2006) Concepts of Ethnicity, Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, 1:1, 85-103 




similar view was represented by the modernization theory that dominated the debates on 
development up to the 1960s, the idea that ‘tribal’ loyalties in developing countries were a 
hindrances to societal integration and nation building.
35
 But as a response to the mounting 
critique of the nineteenth-century evolutionary concepts, the term tribe has largely fallen into 
disuse in political science and been replaced by ethnic group. Nonetheless, tribe is still used in 
political anthropology as a category for a particular form of pre-state social organization. 
Derivative Principle: The term is defined here as the percentage of oil revenue littoral states in 
the Niger Delta retain from tax on oil exploration and production.
36
 In the case of the Niger 
Delta, the five littoral states consists of: Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River and Rivers 
state and the derivation fund currently stands at 13% since 2001 meaning that it should be 
distributed according to that figure based on oil and gas production (current and historical); and 
value/importance of oil/gas assets in their territories. These allocations are retained by oil 
producing states before federal allocations based on five criteria: equality (equal shares per 
state), population, social development, landmass, and revenue generation. 
Access and Control: These are the two ways to understand the causes of instability in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria. “Access” is defined and applied here as “local involvement”, giving 
opportunities to local inhabitants in the Niger Delta region in the oil industry, while “Control”, 
is used here as “local ownership”, whereby local citizens are stake-holders as managers in the 
sense of directing ownership of assets and resources of oil and gas for productive purposes. In 
applying these meanings to resource conflict, access and control can be through concession 
between countries, state and multinational companies, or between regions and companies. But 
most academics argued that the word concession is, and has been for some years now, 
politically incorrect because it transfer the rights of resource endowed countries to foreign 
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36  The 1999 Nigeria Constitution, Chapter 3, section 14, paragraph 5. 
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government and companies, under some kind of duress. In fact, most legal experts believe that 
concession stems from a time when now independent states were mere colonies or 
protectorates. Therefore, in the twenty-first century, the term has been replaced by the more 
acceptable one of exploration and production (E&P) agreement which embraces the 
sovereignty of states in various countries, and other terminology, such as production-sharing 
agreement (PSA), joint venture (JV) and risk contracts. 
From the expert point of view’, concludes Francisco Parra (2010), concessions and production 
agreements of oil and gas resources in developing countries vary vastly and significantly in 
content, but all have similar features in common:
37
 
 The government grants the company or country an exclusive right to carry out 
exploration, development and hydrocarbon production operations in a defined area for 
a limited period of time; 
 The company acquires titles to the hydrocarbons and is almost always free to dispose of 
them without further restriction; 
 The company bears the financial and commercial risks associated with the undertaking; 
 The company or party involved agrees to make certain payments to the government in 
return; and 
 The concessions are contracts with the state, though this does not itself imply insulation 
from state’s general power to pass legislation overriding the terms of the contract. 
Therefore, in looking at the issue of resource conflict, access and control is important due to 
the fact that, those who have access and control oil and gas wealth get the larger share of 
resource revenue through the distribution of natural resources wealth. But in most countries 
                                                          
37 Where he argued that, the term concession has been replaced by the more neutral one of exploration and 
production agreement, but however much of their legal framework may differ in term of structure, companies 
obligations and tax system, Parra (2010) p.8-10 
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where there is inequality in term of allocation of resource revenue, dependence on natural 
resources commodities like oil and gas export may substantially increases the risk of conflict 
that could lead to state instability 
Instability:  Instability is derives from the Latin word “unsteadiness”, meaning lack of balance 
or state of disequilibrium. In terms of a state in a conflict situation, it refers to the level of being 
unsteady varying from uncertainty, insecurity, imbalance, unpredictability to a high level of 
vulnerability in a position of collapse. The result may be state failure or an ungovernable entity 
and functionaries within the state system. Michael L. Ross (2012) defined instability in energy 
resource countries as the volatility of world oil prices, and the rise and fall of a country’s 
reserves that can produce large fluctuations in a government’s finances.  He argues that this 
volatility is produced by a combination of three factors: changes in oil prices, changes in 
production rates, and the contract between governments and oil companies, which can either 
smooth or heighten fluctuations. 
38
 But “instability” is applied here as the lack of security for oil 
companies personnel’s, gas infrastructure and violence in local communities in oil and gas 
producing areas due to lack of access to oil revenue. In exploring the issues of instability, a 
landmark United Nations World Development Report followed up by a report from 
Commission on Conflict, Security, and Development shifted the focus of security to instability 
from nation states to individuals, groups and organization of ordinary people struggling with 
everyday challenges like access to resources, poverty, unemployment, crime, political 
repression, environmental degradation and marginalization.
39
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In looking at the issue of instability, one of the prominent fear is the sense of insecurity and that 
can shape what happens in economic, political, and other domains in a state. In the case of 
natural resources, the fear of conflict, war, or natural disaster that may disrupt their supply 
shape the insecurity of consumer nations. Moreover, instability in any given society can 
endangers violence and insecurity, as state-making strategies to control citizens through the 
legitimate use of force in dispute between different groups may clash with the interests of 
particular segments of the population that perceive the extension of the state authority as posing 
a direct danger to their social, economic, or political interests. But the fundamental question is 
how to explain the link that transcend from the struggle for access to the control of natural 
resources to state instability and the likelihood of armed conflict. This is what this research 
design will address. 
Natural Resources:  Instability and the dynamics of natural resources conflict arise when people 
compete for limited material resources, such as non-renewable natural resources, and often 
develop into violent conflicts. This is the simple understanding of one set of theories, 
sometimes referred to as realistic or materialist conflict theories.
40
 Oil and gas as a natural 
resource in the Niger Delta comprises a large fraction of fossil fuels which are non-renewable 
of natural compounds consisting mainly of hydrocarbons formed in the Earth’s crust. Steven 
Gorelick argues that oil is not the same thing as petroleum. Petroleum includes natural gas as 
well as crude oil and processed fuel products, whereas oil is the liquid that is refined to yield 
products such as gasoline, jet and diesel fuel, and lubricants.
41
 
Therefore, there are some definitions related to oil and gas availability that are central to the 
discussion of natural resources; this thesis also uses the term natural resources, which is defined 
                                                          
40 Moghaddam, F. M (2010) The New Global Insecurity—How Terrorism, Environmental Collapse, Economic 
Inequalities, and Resource Shortages Are Changing our World, p.80 
41 Steven M. Gorelick, Oil Panic and the Global Crisis, Predictions and Myths, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.17 
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here as “a concentration of naturally occurring solid, liquid, or gaseous material in or on the 
Earth’s crust in such form and amount that economic extraction of a commodity from the 
concentration is currently or potentially feasible”. 42 A more specific definition for petroleum 
resource is, “Concentrations in the earth’s crust of naturally occurring liquid or gaseous 
hydrocarbons that can conceivably be discovered and recovered”.43  The Niger Delta Oil 
Endowment includes the estimated oil and gas resource plus all of the oil that has been 
pumped from the ground. This can be classified as a subset of resources reserves. A reserve is 
defined here as the portion of the resource that can “be economically extracted or produced at 
the time of determination.”44  But a more targeted definition of petroleum reserves is, “The 
quantities of hydrocarbon resources anticipated to be recovered from known accumulations 
from a given date forward
45
 The key distinction between the two quantities is that an oil 
resource are the presumed volume of all plausibly recoverable oil, while a reserve is the portion 
known to exist that can be profitably recovered with existing technology. 
 
                                    A Plan of the Thesis and Research Approach 
The thesis is organized into six chapters followed by a conclusion. The introduction in chapter 
1 presents some background information considered essential for understanding the research 
questions and analysis that fellows. 
                                                          
42 Ibid, p17; also US Geological Survey (2009), Mineral Commodity Summaries, p.45 Washington DC 
43 US Minerals Management Service, “Assessment of Undiscovered Technically Recoverable Oil and Gas 
Resources of the Nations Outer Continental Shelf, 2006. 
44 US Geological Survey, 2009 
45 US Geological Survey, Washington DC:2009 
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Chapter 2 focused on the historical evolution of the Niger Delta, earliest documentation of the 
people, native tribes and inhabitants, colonialism and trade between middlemen and 
missionaries. 
Chapter 3 outlined and analyses the different key actors, profile and dynamics of the conflict by 
examining the role of civil militias as a security threat to the oil industry. 
Chapter 4 presents and then analyses land and ethnicity in the politics of instability in the Niger 
Delta by looking at the issue of land as a social and economic construct for natural resource 
control; it also examines the conflict between the Federal Government of Nigeria and local 
groups vying for ownership of land. 
Chapter 5 investigate the politics of resource control in the Nigerian Federation. It’s also 
examines revenue allocation politics among the six geo-political zones, and the scramble for oil 
and gas revenue along ethnic lines. 
Chapter 6 examine the external dimensions of resource control in the Niger Delta and the 
grievances it generates as a result of a lack of locals participation in the oil industry.   
Chapter 7 highlight what we learn by looking at these different actors and draw a conclusion 
with some policy prescriptions and recommendations. 
 
 
                                         Chapter Two 
                 Historical Evolution of the Niger Delta 
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 In its history and development, Nigeria’s Niger Delta region is quite different from that of 
most other regions in the country, and the nature and consequences of this are to 
reverberate continuously in the nature of the controversies involving the region. But writing 
on the historical evolution of the Niger Delta is fraught with considerable difficulties. While 
the proliferation of literature on the subject has reduced the burden on this chapter, 
extracting what is relevant in logical sequence has brought its own burdens. 
Bearing this difficulty in mind, the main focus of this chapter is to give a historical 
background of the Niger Delta region. First, it starts with the earliest documentation of the 
people in Niger Delta—the native tribes, ethnic composition and their cultural heritage. 
Second, this chapter analyses the politics and intergroup relations before British 
intervention by outlining what constitutes the Niger Delta and the types of governments 
that existed before colonialization. Third, it assesses the Monarchical system of Kingship and 
the importance of the palm oil trade between middlemen and missionaries. It concluded 
that oil has been, and remains an importance factor in strategic interests between the 
native ruling elites and European traders. History of this particular region is important 
because, it is through the understanding of the historical background of the Niger Delta 
people that none-indigenes of all works of life will be able to know the ethnic diversity and 
composition of the region. History also teaches us that ethnic conflict is based on 
differences that originated from cultural tradition among people based on custom, religion, 
tribe, language or kingship associated with human settlement. 
However, of all of Nigeria’s regions, the Niger Delta is perhaps the most controversial in 
terms of historical data regarding the region. Although many people have tried to record the 
history of the region, scholars from this part of Nigeria have also written about their own 
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history. While some of these have been somewhat nationalistic and designed to whip up 
sentiment through the documentation of a glorious past that can sustain present struggles, 
they have also brought out unique aspects of the region’s history that can assist in how the 
past is determining the present development in the region.46 
 It is only since the civil war in 1966 that the Federal Government of Nigeria begun to realise 
the importance of the Niger Delta region. The importance of natural resources like: oil and 
gas among other resources such as coaster waterways and forestry have now been 
recognised. But the fact that the history of the Niger Delta is quite different from other parts 
of the Nigerian Federation in terms of its history of colonialism, culture and ethnicity is 
regularly reported in domestic politics while the national press invariably reports oil revenue 
and the state of the economy, the condition of minorities and so on—all within the context 
of a federal system with which such wealth is shared.  
In fact, from the point of view of this thesis, the difficulty faced is that, it is more 
complicated to tell the story of the Niger Delta than other parts of the country. For example, 
it is easier to omit complete manifestations, many of which add comparatively little to our 
knowledge, or simply to repeat information already contained in a previous research for the 
benefit of another contributor. This does at least make somewhat easier the task of 
reducing the amount of available material to a usable length. 
This now brings us to the most difficult set of considerations: of the available sources, which 
ones would be most appropriate to use? Such a question should be answered while bearing 
                                                          
46 Among these scholars in the early 60s are: Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1883, 1960, p.20-
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the Oil Rivers Protectorate under Colonial rule, 1966, p.50; and Obaro Ikime (1960) Niger Delta Rivalry, where 




in mind the amount of material already published, either at the time of this thesis or more 
recently. 
But looking back in the history of what constitutes the present day Nigeria today, the 
infamous Berlin Conference in 1884 put a formal seal on British domination of the area, 
later known as the Oil Rivers Protectorate, is only one manifestation of interest in the Niger 
Delta region that long preceded this formal annexation.47 Indeed, before the conference, 
intense rivalry had existed among Europeans for control over this rich region. Perhaps all 
that the Berlin Conference did was to regulate Europe’s scramble for the regions. 
Moreover, Britain’s involvement here went back further than was the case with its interest 
in East Africa. The region is a centre of trade, in terms of both raw materials and humans in 
the so-called Oil Rivers, in what later became the centre of the British colony of Nigeria. 
From there, beginning in the early 1880s, grew the scramble for West African territory, and 
reaching a climax with the conference held in Berlin at the end of 1884.48 Once credited 
with starting the scramble for Africa, the Berlin West Africa Conference is now perhaps 
better seen in the Niger Delta as an attempt to regulating increasing European competition 
for influence and territory in the interior of Africa. It certainly marked a high point in the 
two-decade-long scramble for West African territory, and therefore figures prominently in 
the opening of the Niger Delta to a large volume of trade.  
Later, the strategy the British used in annexing the Niger Delta was the same as that 
adopted in many other parts of southern Nigeria. This often involved two stages. The first 
                                                          
47 Partridge, M. and Gillard, D (FOC) Series G Part 1, Vol.21, p.71-80 
48 Partridge, M. and Gillard, D. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign 
Office Confidential, Series G Part 1; Africa from the Mid-Nineteenth to the First World War, Vol. 21: The Niger 
and Oil Rivers, 1860-1898, UPA. 
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was the signing of a “treaty” with the local ruler, purportedly committing him to open his 
territory to the British market and/or to accept Christianity in exchange for guns and 
ammunitions. These treaties were often written in the English language, which the local 
rulers did not understand. This meant that he had to make provisions with often distorted 
translations to local dialect which were is not available at that time. When he discovered the 
inequality embedded within the treaty and attempted to repudiate it, the second state was 
triggered usually a full-scale war euphemistically termed an “expedition”.49  
                      The Earliest Documentation of the People in Niger Delta 
A general classification and analysis of existing data shows that going from east to west, and 
beginning with the Old Calabar district, there are the Efiks who claim their descent from 
Ibibio; to the south are the Ibani, Bonny, and Opobo people who, although they trace origin 
to an Ibo and can speak that tongue, also claim connection with Brass island. It had been 
hypothesized by P.A. Talbot in the early 1930s that the New Calabar natives appears to have 
been a combination of Efik from Creek Towns and of the Ijaws on the coast, who divided 
into three section in early 12th century—one  remaining as the New Calabar, the other two 
separating in the direction of Brass and Bonny. But the Brass men, Uhrobos, Isokos Ukwiani 
while tracing their origin to the Bini Kingdom, the `Itsekiris trace their origin to the Yoruba 
kingdom and it has been acknowledged that the same time an influx of Ijaws to New Calabar 
was underway. For all the data available nothing is known about the Ijaws, except the 
question of their Bini descent, which, however, rests on customs, traditions and mode of 
kingship similar to the Bini kingdom as evidence of decent. Most critics and historians argue 
                                                          
49 W.P. Livingstone (1942) 10th edition, Mary Siessor of Calabar-Pioneer Missionary, the Conquest of Okoyoung 
People-Editor of the record of the United Free Church of Scotland, p.57-61 
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that the Bini origin of the Ijaws is similar to that of the Delta Ibo though they no longer exist. 
Yet, meagre and disconnected as these data are, they are not however, entirely valueless.  
The language of the Efik, Kwa or Akwa, and Ibibio is practically identical. The Bonny and 
Opobo, while able to speak Igbo, have a distinct dialect of their own, which is unknown to 
the Ibo. Quite unlike and different from the Ibibio group, which includes Andonis, it is the 
same as Okrika, and different only in dialect from New Calabar. While it has many words in 
common and a distinct dialectic affinity with Brass more particularly, and with Ijaws in 
general, early documentation also shows us that the Ijaw language in comparison was made 
between the Ibani, Okrika, New Calabar, and Brass dialects and thus reveals the fact that all 
four of them (including Oru), are dialects of the Ijo. 
Andoni, on the other hand, is connected with and of the same derivation as the Ibibio or 
Akwa language. Yet right in the midst of the Andoni clan is a town called N’Koro, the 
inhabitants of which, who are said to have deserted from Okrika and speak a dialect that is 
not understood by their present countrymen. The Ogoni, again, speak a distinct dialect of 
their own, which, so far as I could discover, is quite different from Igbo or Ijo, and about 
which I was unfortunately unable to get any reliable information regarding its origin. The 
Jekri (Itsekiris) are undoubtedly of Bini origin, in spite of their language’s affiliation with 
Yoruba. According archives in the Niger Delta Heritage in Warri, from what is known so far 
about the Ijaws, Jekri and Bini languages, the former is said to have but a slight resemblance 
to the latter, and this again to the Jekri, which resembles more, or rather is cognate with- 
the Yoruba. This curious circumstances is all the more significant and worthy of remark 
when other facts are taken into consideration. The Ijaws and Jekri (Itsekiri) are direct 
descendants of the Bini, and in spite of their separation, presumably for the last few 
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centuries at least, they have all the same been more or less in touch with one another. Yet 
an examination of existing data showed that of the six or more dialects of the Ijaws and the 
five of Bini, of which Sobo and Igabo are practically one, they are dissimilar not only to each 
other, but to the other neighbouring dialects too.50 Therefore, this make the differences in 
ethnic groups more complex that creates division that the colonial masters were able to 
take advantage of in terms of patronage and sharing of natural resources during the palm oil 
trade. 
Under the conditions which have always existed among these Delta tribes—condition of 
war, of pillage, of drastic measures and enforced methods of slavery—it is an impossibility 
for the Niger Delta to have a single identical ethnic group. Though, personal cultural 
heritage such as language do exist, it is too low to encourage an idea of ethnic unity. So, to 
my understanding, the dialect of the weaker tribe becomes merged or absorbed into that of 
the stronger, or, as frequently occurs, ceases to exist after the birth of an entirely new 
generation. In this way we have seen, in more than one instance which has come within my 
own personal experience, that whole communities of people have, under new or altered 
conditions, abandoned their mother dialect and adopted the language of the country which 
either forces or which circumstances to become inhabitants of a new state. For example, 
commencing with Bonny and its people, if they are of Igbo origin (as all the evidence 
obtainable appears to prove), it is also arguable that, their coming into Ijaws country 
provided females of their own race, and as they intermarried with the Ibo at that time, their 
own original dialect was abandoned, or, to be more correct, gradually assimilated and lost in 
the speech of the people around them. And when we take into consideration the fact that a 
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similar process was evolving in their immediate vicinity with the Okrika—also of the Ibo 
origin--and a little farther off, among the New Calabar people (an Efik offshoot), both of 
which they were in touch (and as a rule on good terms with), it is not in the least surprising 
that, different although the Ibani and New Calabar were to each other because of varying 
origins and local conditions, they evolved for themselves separate yet affiliated dialects out 
of the common Ijaw tongue. 
In exactly the same way the Ibani, Okrika, and New Calabar people assumed the language of 
their adopted country and discarded their own native tongues; the Brass men changed their 
pure Bini into an Ijaw dialect, which in more remote days had at one time itself evolved 
from the self-integration of Bini into Ijaws ethnic group.  With regards to the Ibani, however, 
one fact is deserving of notice, and that is, that more recently (within the last eighty to a 
hundred years or so), trading as they have done in Ibo markets, has seen them practically 
become half Ibo, and they have once more resumed their ancient dialect, but only in 
addition to their own. 
Without making any further illustration to the cases of other ethnic groups that reside in 
N’koro and Ogbayan, it is also said in the history of the Jekri that there was another 
unmistakable illustration of the certainty of the lingual link among the tribes when applied 
to the people such as these Delta natives are. That they were of pure Bini origin there is not 
the slightest doubt, and what is equally certain is that, settling as they did at a 
comparatively modern date among the Aku tribe of the Yoruba, their dialect became so 
strongly influenced that it is no classed as cognate with the Yoruba language, which, like the 
Igara, belongs to the great North African family. In the broader and deeper sense of the 
word, not a single tribe in the Niger Delta—not even the Ibo, in spite of their numerical 
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strength and greater unity of language (in contrast with the greater differences which exist 
among the other tribes and clans), can be called a nation. Yet from a sociological standpoint 
there is a marked unity with but trifling exceptions, in their general characteristics, their 
customs, laws, and religion, that also in a wider sense is distinctly national: the variations 
being nothing more nor less than petty or significant differences in formulas or habits that 
have arisen partly as the outcome of varying conditions. But in a modern perspective of 
cultural heritage, there is a greater measure of customs among the Niger Delta inhabitants 
out of the self-imposed idiosyncrasies or individualities of autocratic patriarchs that exist to 
the present day.  
      Politics and Intergroup Relations before British Intervention in the 
                                                   Niger Delta      
Before the British intervention and throughout medieval Niger Delta, the Kingdom of Benin 
was the dominant power in southern Nigeria and extended its conquests from Lagos in the 
West, to Bonny River in the east, and northwards to Idah. It was the only state recognized 
by the Portuguese, during their early visits to the Niger Delta and with whom it maintained 
diplomatic relations.51 The persistence and universality of the claims to Benin origin in Delta 
traditions is evidence, at the least, of the powerful influence which this Kingdom exerted 
over the imagination of her neighbours, particularly in south-eastern Igbo country, where 
her military power under King Egwuare the Great in about 440 A.D. was felt by Ibos and the 
Kalabari speaking peoples east of the Niger delta.52 He was reported to be so powerful and 
                                                          
51 K. O. Dike (19560 Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885-An Introduction to the Economic and 
Political History of Nigeria, Oxford, p. 19-46 
52 J.U. Egharevba (1934) A Short History of Benin, where he argued that the King had become absolute and 
oppressive at the time of the first migration of Ijaws from the Benin kingdom to the coastal rivers areas, p.12 
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courageous that he fought against the eastern Yoruba and captured 201 towns and villages 
in Ekiti, Ikare, Kukuruku, Eka and the Ibo country on east side of the river Niger. He took 
their petty rulers captive and caused the people to pay tribute (taxes) to him.53 
Moreover, within the Benin Kingdom the political organization of the coast communities 
was easily well established and appreciated. The system of law and authority among the 
Niger Delta ethnic groups was closely interwoven with social and political fabric that still 
exists up until today. But to avoid confusion, it is proposed in this thesis to confine the 
present analysis of indigenous political structure to the Niger Delta communities. The 
analysis here would indeed find it almost impossible to give an accurate account without 
first analysing the smallest unit and ending with the highest, and this data was not derived 
from a single ethnic group, locality, but from a diversity of cultures and customs. Before 
British intervention in Niger Delta, within this formation, we have: the village-group or small 
clan, large clan, the sub-tribe and the town group and Kingship. 
(1) The Village-Group or Small Clan: In all the Niger Delta communities the basic social 
unit is the group of patrilineal relatives who live together in close association and 
constitute what is known as Uluwoh (Kindred) or umunna in Igbo language. For 
example, the children of a common forefather may coincide with a single extended-
family. The group composed of a man and his wife and small children, his grown-up 
sons and their wives and children, and his brother or cousins and their wives and 
children. The kindred occupies an area which, if the kindred is small, may be 
described as a hamlet, or if it is large, as a village. A number of contiguous villages, 
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which believed themselves to be related in the Niger Delta form a village-group.54 
The Niger Delta village-group constitutes a single political unit usually the highest 
political figure found in these communities is the most elderly person. Rules is based 
on a sense of common ancestry, the possession of land territory and home, common 
customs and a belief of earth-deity. Therefore, the village-group that existed before 
the British intervention may be regarded territorially as a commune, and socially as a 
clan, though it is seldom an exogamous unit. 
(2) The large Clan: It has been said by historians and anthropologist that the single 
independent village-group or commune is usually the highest form of political unity 
found in the Niger Delta. But there exists the large clan with a sense of territorial and 
social solidarity that cover a wider group, even though the ties binding the group 
together are less than that which binds the village-group. In the large clan, social and 
political structures seldom meet together for any common purpose, and each 
manages its own affairs. But in abnormal circumstances, such as threats to the 
security of their land, or if mercenaries were threatening an invasion, all would 
assemble and a general meeting would be held, and the head of the senior family of 
the clan would lay his juju or sacred object on the ground, pour a libation of palm-
wine or native gin over it, and deposit on it the seeds of a Kola-nut with the saying, “I 
ask you the ancestry gods for protection of our lives, even as you protected the lives 
of our forefathers”. The main issues would then be discussed and arrangements 
made that all should go to the assistance of the clan which had been attacked. A 
                                                          
54 But the term “village” does not necessarily imply a collection of houses closely adjoining on another as in 
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area, and it is sometimes difficult to judge by the eye where one ‘village’ ends and another begins. Also see 
Meek, C.K. (1937) Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, Oxford, p.87 
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general meeting might also be held to settle a dispute between two villages over the 
ownership of land or lakes. 
(3) The sub-tribe: There are other sub-group which may fall under the clan system but 
sub-tribes are special bonds of relationship between the constitute elements that 
are so feeble that it is safer to describe the group as a sub-tribe or sub-ethnic than a 
clan. These constitute village-groups that exist in the Niger Delta are each wholly 
independent, they never meet together for any common purpose, and they do not 
even claim to be related. And yet there is some sense of kingship based on a certain 
community of customs. They maintain common institutions like local markets, trade 
and management of communal land and, palm/raphe palm tree plantations through 
leasehold and rent seeking. These institutions are the principal means of maintaining 
law and order and served as a unifying force between the various village-groups, 
thus giving a greater measure of solidarity than they would otherwise have enjoyed. 
(4) The town-group and Kingship: This group consists of different kindred or extended 
families. All these families, with the exception of certain migrants or strangers such 
as foreign traders are believed to be related to one another by direct descent but 
can marry each other from the fourth generation. They also have a local king or 
senior chief who is the head of the community. As in other households each married 
man must provide for himself and his wife, children, and other young dependent 
relatives. There is no community of stocks, but there is a good deal of co-operation. 
The king’s power includes: the control of land, settle disputes, palm oil exports, 




It is clear, therefore, that even in the larger territorial groupings there is some consciousness 
of unity and kingship between the constituent elements of government structures based on 
the similarity of cultural patterns. It is likely that this was utilized for the purpose of building 
up federal native administration during the time of King Jaja and Chief Nana. On the other 
hand, the political organization of the coastal communities was easily appreciated, though 
with considerable misgivings by the British who intruded into coastal affairs during the early 
nineteenth century. For example, the manner in which the large Ibo and Ibibio groups in the 
hinterland organised their political structure baffle the British agents, as argued Professor 
Anene (1966). In the end, to my understanding, it seemed more convenient for the British to 
assume that anarchy prevailed or, at best, that the people were leaderless.55 But the Igbo do 
have a village structure similar to the Niger Delta clans and this facile assumption was 
destined to lead to tragic blunders and ruining of the traditional life of the Ibo and the Ibibio 
communities. Thus at every river mouth on the Niger Delta there was a centre of trade, a 
city-state developed with its own mechanisms for self-rule, for the maintenance of law and 
order, and for export commercial activities such as those—with the Portuguese before the 
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                                   What Constitutes the Niger Delta? 
In discussing what constitutes the Niger Delta, there seems to be an intermixing of 
geography and ethno-linguistics. The Niger Delta occupies an enormous area crisscrossed by 
rivers, tributaries, swamps, and lagoons—indeed, water has always been in the terrain as 
the geographical element of Niger Delta Land by nature. The actual Delta comprises an area 
defined by the Forcados River to the West and the Imo River to the east. Often, however, 
neighbouring rivers and coastal areas like the Benin in the mid-west and Calabar in Cross 
River border with Cameroon are included in discussions of the region. The Niger Delta’s 
coastal boundaries are thus often considered to coincide roughly with the furthest limits of 
the Ijaws settlement, reaching from Opobo in the east and nearly Lagos in the west. The 
northern boundary falls above Aboh, an Igbo town on the Niger River at the head of the 
Delta. To the Niger Delta inhabitants, water is synonymous with life itself, with spiritual 
sustenance, with wealth and prosperity, and especially with communication and identity. 
For centuries, the waterways of the Niger Delta have connected and divided people, serving 
as conduits and obstacles, repositories of riches and realms of danger. The ambivalence 
associated with these contrasting potentials is made manifest through the arts, cultures, 
and ethos of the many people inhabiting the Niger Delta region. In the Ways of the Rivers 
(2002) Anderson and Peek argues that people in the Niger Delta experience a dynamics 
confluence and a dramatic divergence of ideas, memories, histories and culture.57  
However, the general assumption of most studies on Africa is that the diversity of the Niger 
Delta suggests that to understand the geography of any African region is to explore the 
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formation and expression of an entire region as opposed to a single ethnic group. It has long 
been acknowledged that ethnic entities in the Niger Delta are arbitrary categories and that 
lived experience constantly defies such invented boundaries and demarcations created by 
colonial rule.58 In fact, whether through trade, intermarriage, ancient warfare, migration, or 
political consolidation, ethnic groups in the Niger Delta constantly interact with one another 
even though identities shift according to historical circumstances and social 
transformations. Therefore, the Niger Delta offers a rare glimpse into the complexities on 
intercultural dynamics, while presenting some of Nigeria’s most remarkable visual and 
ethnic diversity within their broader contexts. This imagery could, of course, have been 
applied to the human occupation of the Delta long before the economic and political 
development of oil exploration that gave rise to the ethnic categories recognised in Nigeria 
today. The geographical dimensions of the Niger Delta, however, are far more than 
metaphoric in their ability to shape the social and cultural development of the people living 
there. The area is made up of a seemingly endless number of islands that change in size and 
type of resources available from the small sandy stretches of beach where the Delta meets 
the sea, to the islands in the mangrove swamps that are inhabitable only prior to the 
flooding during the rainy season, to the large island of Bonny in the southeast that form the 
headlands. This island environment provided the kind of isolation that led to adaptive 
variation within historically related peoples, and the waterways were also the pathways for 
trade and social interaction that produced cultural convergences among peoples of different 
provenience.59 The intricate maze of islands and waterways that run through the Delta 
initially baffled Europeans historians who researched the areas in the early seventeenth 
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century. It took several centuries to discover that the rivers they had been trading from 
formed the end of the mighty Niger. As only a handful of these Europeans ever ventured 
more than a few miles from the major rivers and creeks, they knew remarkably little about 
the Delta’s people.60 Thus, although the Portuguese arrived in the Niger Delta as early as the 
fifteenth century, Europeans did not reside in the Isoko countryside until the 1920s, and 
only a handful of them ever lived in the villages near the Delta’s centre.61 This was due to 
widespread fears of inland waterways travels and even many Nigerians including 
government officials continue to avoid the area today. 
                       Who are the inhabitants of the Niger Delta? 
As previously stated, the Niger Delta includes a plethora of ethnic groups, including Ijaws, 
Isokos, Urhobo, Ogoni, Kalabari, Obolo, Ukwani and Itsekiri peoples.62 Nigerian census data 
are notoriously inaccurate. In an attempt to gain accurate figures and a politically accepted 
count, while avoiding the strife that resulted from earlier efforts, the census of 2005 
excluded questions revealing ethnic, linguistic, or religious affiliation. Some of the people in 
the Niger Delta, defined by the primary language spoken, were roughly estimated in the 
census to be: Ijaws 10,779,000; Isoko/Urhobo 4,546,000; Itsekiri 510,000; Ogoni 500,000; 
Ukawni 1,550,000; Kalabiri 2, 456, 00; Obolos 956, 877, 00; Ibibio 3,566,000 and Igbo 
3,577,000.63 Ijaws speakers occupy the major portion of the Delta, flanked on the far West 
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by Itsekiri; on the Western and North-western borders of the Delta, by the Isoko, and 
Urhobo; on the north and northeast by the Ukawni and Igbo, and on the East by the Ogoni 
and Ibibio. The Itsekiri speak a Yoruba language but appear to be culturally closer to Benin; 
the Urhobo, and Isoko speak dialects of Edo, yet are culturally distinct from the Itsekiri, and 
to some extent from each other; and Ijaws speakers have a language dissimilar to the 
others, yet share cultural and social features with Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Igbo, Ogoni, and 
their other neighbours. Although Ijaws speakers predominate, the region is ethnically 
diverse; its inhabitants represent a number of different language groups, and each of these 
groups, in turn, contains several distinct languages, most of which are not mutually 
intelligible. In fact, many languages are further subdivided into dialects. Because of this 
exceptional diversity, many Delta inhabitants will speak two or three Nigerian languages in 
addition to English or Pidgin English. 
As much as identity shifts with context, the similarities and differences within and among 
these various populations depend on the degree of focus. When investigated, individuals 
see themselves as being quite different from others living in the region. For example, Ijaws 
living in central Delta villages interviewed have said they can hear the nuances of speech 
among people in their own clan who came from neighbouring communities. Dialects spoken 
by the Ijaws in the east and west are mutually incomprehensible. Ijaws in the southern part 
of the Delta stress the mother’s descent group; while those in the northern part, that of the 
father’s. But when the focus is broadened, it is difficult to delineate one linguistic group 
from another on the basis of social and cultural features.64 Nonetheless, Ijaws living near the 
mainland tend to share more cultural features with their neighbours, such as the symbolic 
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importance given to the “right hand” among the western Ijaws, Itsekiri, Urhobo, and Isoko, 
rather than with the central Ijaws. For centuries, people with diverse cultural traditions have 
lived in the Delta side-by-side, sharing an environment dominated by water and subject to 
floods, tides, and tropical rain forest. But because resources vary from one part of the 
region to another, people have long used the rivers as avenues of commerce; and some 
later served as middlemen in the overseas palm oil trade. Most groups maintained their 
own languages, but the cultural exchanges that accompanied economic transactions often 
generated comparable customs and ethics. To my understanding, and congruent with the 
way other people who are not from the region see it, the Delta seems not to have divide 
people, but rather, the waterways have helped to create cultural confluences among them. 
Taking a wider perspective, the differences in ethnic groups in the Niger Delta becomes 
more a variation of languages, but has been used as the basis for drawing sharp boundaries 
of states around ethnically integrated populations (settlement). In many ways the physical 
qualities of the Delta seem to be a figurative reflection of the difficulties confronted in 
identifying the people living there. The boundaries between mainland Edo State and Delta 
State have shifted over time due to the creation of more state in the Nigeria Federation, and 
the rivers and streams leading from the Niger to the sea are intermeshed, as are the 
mangroves whose branches and roots are so intertwined as to become indistinguishable 
from each other. However, Nzewunwa (1980) argues that whatever analytical problems that 
arise in an attempt to bring conceptual order to a region where every island in the Niger 
Delta was an opportunity for establishing new “frontiers”.65 This can be put simply as a 
frontier of opportunity for colonial masters to divide and rule. According to documents 
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found in the Niger Delta cultural heritage centre Warri, it must be understood that the 
peoples of the Delta did not need European explorers, colonial administrators, or scholars to 
tell them who they were. The Itsekiri, for example, as Ayomike points out, did not have ‘to 
await the Portuguese or the British to give them the acceptable variant of the name of their 
homeland’.66 The Ijaws say they called themselves “Izon” meaning (Truth) before their name 
was mispronounced by early European traders. Without a doubt however, who the Niger 
Delta peoples eventually became, is a matter of identity formation of divide and rule 
strategies employed by the colonialist administrative power(s). 
Inter-group Relations among the Groups in the Niger before Colonialism 
Ancient documents in the Niger Delta heritage foundation revealed that the People of the 
Niger Delta were analogous to the habitat they occupied, were diverse and many of them 
were connected parts that constitute the whole.67 There are various theories proposed to  
explain the purpose of settlement in the Niger Delta with such a tough and unfriendly 
environment with difficult terrains—all of which tacitly assume that no one would normally 
seek to live in such an environment—which constitute another area of debate. The “refuge 
area” thesis, for example, asserts that people would only migrate into the Delta to avoid 
greater harm threatened or experienced elsewhere. Traditions concerning the irrational 
demands made by the Oba of Benin (the most powerful ruler in the Benin Kingdom), or the 
fear of an avenging army is one example cited as the cause for peoples fleeing into the 
Delta. But Alagoa argues that, given the warrior ethos cultivated by some people within the 
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Delta, it is not improbable that a group may have provoked its own expulsion.68  A further 
issue for consideration is the cohesion of multi-ethnic communities, significant because the 
Delta peoples seem to demonstrate a variable patterns not applicable to any other multi-
ethnic groups in different countries. The Urhobo, Isoko and Ijaws as long-term occupants of 
the region illustrate that there was a dual cultural processes of divergence and convergence. 
Their linguistic affinities reveal that the Ijaws, the Itsekiri, among other groups had separate 
root origins. The differences within each resulted from a long period of separation due to 
migration, contact with other population, and adaptation to the historic and environmental 
conditions of the Delta. The process of migration also brought different populations closer 
together through trade, markets, intermarriage, and transmission of belief and objects. 
The earliest accounts indicate that European used names and stereotypes to identify a 
population. The ways in which the populations themselves came to use these ethnic 
identifications were not unique to the Delta. What may be unique was the use of figures, 
masks, and other objects in formulating the process of cultural change within a context of 
decent among groups integrated through multiple forms of marriage. Historian like: Philip 
Leis who studied the region believe that new settlements in the Niger gained and retained 
their history by referencing the spirit object, such as Egbesu in the central Delta, carried as a 
symbol founder of a community.69 A community’s morals authority rested in the belief that 
the object had historical significance; it legitimated a descent group’s claim to the land, 
rivers, and lakes. In this, the scope of authority extended to the level of clan organization. 
Moreover, the unique identity of each object acted as a reference point to provide the 
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historical grounding and everyday rationale for dealing with individual and communal 
conflict. For example, every ethnic group category has a part of stereotyping that apparently 
began in dispute around land, natural resources that gave rise to migration into the Niger 
Delta that continue to the present day. 
However, the importance of the individual belonging to an ethnic group reflects the 
relationship between ethnic identity and the identification of spirit objects with ethnic 
groups. The spirit objects referenced an ethnic category as part of stereotyping that 
apparently began in disputes around land natural resources that gave rise to migrations into 
the Delta that continue to the present day. You cannot separate these ancestor objects and 
the spirit that occupied it. Each ethnic group is unique, yet the process of intercultural 
transmission diminished differences between people of similar or different origins. Similarly, 
each tradition and custom was unique, identified with a name and with powers and tastes 
unique to it. For example, the native gin from the raffia palm serves as divine drink to 
worship the ancestors to protect the living. One was known for the ability to heal or to help 
a woman overcome her barrenness; another, for killing thieves. Yet the style of objects and 
the commonality in the rituals performed, including songs and dance rhythms, resulted in a 
dynamic fusion of cultural representation that all the ethnic groups in the Delta identified 
with and which crossed ethnic lines. 
Another key issue here is trading relations between the ethnic groups, Urhobo traditons 
state that the Urhobo bought salt from the Itsekiri long before the sale of salt became a 
popular item of trade to the outside world. The Itsekiri thus had salt and pots of various 
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types and sizes to trade with their Urhobo neighbours.70 In addition to these two 
commodities there were the products from the fishing industry, in which the bulk of the 
Itsekiri indulged in. In exchange, the Urhobo bartered agricultural products—pepper, yam, 
plantain, corn and later the various products of the cassava plant, as well as some ivory and 
palm oil. The latter in particular grew in importance as demand for it grew with its 
exportation into Europe.71 While the people of the Delta have managed to maintain 
peaceful, cohesive communities for long periods of time, they have also waged savage wars 
against each other as well. Contemporary events provide dramatic proof of such pendulum 
swings. On one hand, terrible interethnic violence has occurred in the city of Warri in 1998, 
2000 and 2005, while on the other, enthusiastic conventions of Delta peoples continue to 
strive for a stronger, unified political voice like the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta people (MEND)  
                            Land and Political Evolution of the Niger Delta 
The only thing that is common to all the peoples who inhabit the Niger Delta is the 
communal ownership of land, and the absence of any conception of individual possession. 
The use by the inhabitants throughout history was by custom, transferred and inherited and 
the actual difference between tenure lay in the power to revoke the original feudal system, 
and the evidence was overwhelming that this power always remained in the hand of the 
paramount chief. The chiefs are considered as the trustees of the people, who are as a body 
the owners of the land. The individual is entitled to the use of a portion of his family’s 
estate; the principal, however, is identical: the family being merely the tribe on a smaller 
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scale, and the family itself having the use of the land by permission of the state, to whom 
the land would revert to in the event of the extinction or outlawry of the family. The native 
conception and political evolution in the Niger Delta appears to be that each head of a 
family is entitled to the enjoyment of sufficient land within the limits of the village or other 
community to which he belongs to for the support of his household. If the land he has 
occupied is exhausted, he is entitled to permission to occupy fresh land. If he has no land, 
for example, when he grows up and has a family of his own, he is entitled by permission to 
cultivate a new piece of land. 
The use of this land was granted by the chiefs or elders of the family as long as the grantee 
behaved well, and could at any time be taken away from him if he failed in his duty to the 
state.72  So long as these obligations were met there is little danger of being dispossessed, 
because public opinion is too strong to be overridden by any chief. Even the use for farming 
often descends from father to son through many generations without in any way impairing 
the title of the family to the land or placing the later users in any stronger position as 
regards ownership of the farm than that of their ancestor who was first granted the use of 
it. The user is not permitted, in any circumstances, to sell the land, or even transfer it to 
another user without the sanction of the tribal trustees-the chiefs. In fact according to the 
native customary laws in the Niger Delta, land is inalienable, and the sale of land is a crime 
against the Gods. Indeed, all those acts of native chiefs which, by means of treaties made 
with strangers (Europeans) alienated the tribal lands were done according to the native law 
and custom which made them ultra vires73.  
                                                          
72 As the principal duty was that of fighting for the defence of acquisition from a tribe, there is no difference 
between this system and the feudal system which formerly existed in England. 
73 Ultra vires means nil and void, not recognized in property laws and custom in the Niger Delta. 
85 
 
With these linkages of land with the Gods, when the European arrived, it was the aim of the 
British Oil River Protectorate to support the African idea of land tenure and preserve it for 
future generations the unlimited ownership of the land by the natives (they were against 
any form of freehold). But the opening up of the palm oil trade and the influx of European 
merchants, money and ideas would, without Government control, undoubtedly have 
resulted in the rapid acquisition by middlemen and Europeans speculators of the people’s 
land. Europeans traders begun to purchase from some of the chiefs the land they held in 
trust for their people and future generations (their people’s children). Public opinion could 
not restrain them, as the tribe would probably be ignorant of the meanings of the sale, or 
possibly unaware of the sale itself, till long after the transaction was complete, while the 
proceeds of the sale would become the property of the chiefs and not of the people—the 
real owner of the land.74 Although, owning to the climatic conditions in the Niger Delta 
before colonialism, the oil river did not attract to it European settlers because of 
mosquitoes, and as a result of this the region has escaped the serious problems of land 
tenure which have arisen in East Africa. But as of today, there have, however, been 
demands from commercial oil and gas companies for freehold sites for drilling purposes 
and, in at least case, for pipelines flow stations; these demands were invariably rejected. 
Moreover, in the political sphere a historical anthology showed that along the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra, the migrant communities from outside the Niger Delta were widely 
separated from each other. Most of them were islands like Bonny, dominating the mouth of 
a river that linked the hinterland to the sea. Within this period each developed the 
independence and individualism typical of insular inhabitants. Every river mouth, trading 
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centres, and towns developed its own overlord. Archaeological findings reveal that each 
city-state developed government apparatuses that helped to maintain law and order. 
Necessary instruments were instituted for peaceful trade for about four centuries. All these 
systems were properly established and institutionalized before the advent of the Europeans 
in the area.75 
The two properly developed types of government in the area were monarchical and 
republican systems. The significant monarchies were Bonny (Ibani), New Calabar (Kalabari), 
Warri, and other micro ones like Bell Town, Aqua in the Cameroons, and Qua Ibom. The 
republics were single trading units with divided political authority as in Old Calabar, Brass, 
and the Cameroons. These two types of political groupings were exemplified by Bonny and 
Old Calabar. Bonny was the economic and political centre of the Niger Delta during the 
greater part of the nineteenth century, and even its successor from the 1870s, Opobo was 
an offshoot of the older kingdom.76 The former had always been a monarchy as far as can 
be ascertained. 
Dike who studied the area in 1949 produced archaeological evidence that shows several 
well-preserved documents of the dynasty of the Pepples of Bonny; he also discovered that 
the monarchy was founded around the mid-fifteenth century, hence in 1830 their institution 
was about four hundred years old. The king in that year was Opubu (of the House of 
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Pepple). The first king of the house was Perekule; Opubu was the third of the Pepple, but he 
was the fourteenth king (Amanyanabo) in an unbroken line of succession. It could thus be 
said that monarchy was a deep-rooted institution at Bonny.77 
The Royal House of Pepple which ruled from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries 
produced remarkable men argues Ume (1980). The Pepple dynasty founded Bonny, New 
Calabar as a trading centre for unity and strength among the delta communities. The Pepple 
wielded power by alliance and conquest to gain supremacy in the delta and the adjoining 
interior markets. The only strong opponent was the Kingdom of Kalabari (New Calabar), 
which refused to fall a minion to Bonny. In the course of conflicts that raged for a long time, 
Kalabari was defeated. In 1790, it was reported that the king of Bonny had destroyed New 
Calabar and compelled the merchants to pay tribute to Bonny.78 
The European traders who were well acquainted with Bonny, recognized him as a monarch 
with constituted power. The Pepple ruled in consultation with the aristocrats, who were 
members of the royal courts, later known as the “Palaver House”. The King presided, but the 
deliberations were more or less democratic. The King’s power was indeed felt in the council, 
but limited in all other spheres. In spite of some of these political lapses, Bonny had a 
properly developed system of government that provided an effective safety valve for 
integration among the Delta communities. Although the monarchy was of a primary 
consideration (in the Delta city-states), wealth was a principal determining factor. The 
respect and status of a monarch depended largely on riches-hence the system was 
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somehow plutocratic. To my knowledge, this political organization provided a basic 
structure for other Delta principalities. 
Moreover, the Efik community on the mouth of the cross river was noted for internal 
sharing of power with the recognized King. In the eighteenth century, there were four 
trading towns or republics in the Old Calabar, namely, Creek Town, Henshaw Town. Buke 
Town, and Obutong. Each of these towns had an independent ruler who cared for their 
peculiar affairs. The common interest was handled by a congress of kings united by the 
“Egbo” Fraternity. The Egbo society was a sort of freemasonry and secret cult, uniting the 
aristocratic classes in all four towns. Membership was open to freemen only. This 
“confraternity” was initiated by the nobles as a bound of union.79 It functioned as a supreme 
authority for enforcing law and order among equals and rivals. It intended to safeguard the 
interest of the aristocratic group and to some extent regulated trade with the Europeans. As 
an instrument of social organization, its agents acted as an arm of the law, as asserted by 
Hope Waddell.80 Its order was in many respects a supreme political power in all of Old 
Calabar. It exercised executive, legislative, and judicial functions. It acted as the highest 
court of the land, and its president was regarded as the first citizen of the community. This 
structure shows that, above all things, that Egbo society was very symbolic in regulating the 
affairs of Old Calabar. The British who had dealings with the Chiefs recognized the 
importance of the society, hence their contact with the towns of Old Calabar was within the 
framework of Egbo laws, thus restricting European activities to conform to indigenous laws. 
                                                          




The pivot of delta social organization was the “House System”81 or House Rule. This peculiar 
constitution was common in all trading states and could be regarded as a direct result of the 
trade with the Europeans, which was developed to handle the growing capacity of Afro-
European trade. The new social organization was based purely an African precedent and 
experience with certain elements derived from European contact. The “House” developed 
into a cooperation trading unit and a local government institution. As a rule, every trader of 
any importance owned many slaves bought from various tribes argued by Dike. These slaves 
and other members of the trader’s family constituted a “House”. As a result, many of the 
slaves were retained for all economic welfare of the “House”.82 
However, it should not be misleading to indicate that the “House System” developed not 
only as a result of the experience from Europeans contact; this was basically indigenous with 
coastal flavour. For all practical purposes, the House was primarily a local government unit. 
It was responsible for laws and order in its respective section. It follows, then, that in a place 
like Bonny, the king, who was the leading merchant, had no direct control over the House of 
Chiefs. He could intervene to resolve a conflict between two Houses and confirm the 
election of a new House head. He also determined the status of chieftaincy in the state. He 
was in direct control of foreign relations, war, peace and also initiation of commercial 
policies, but his power was derived from the council.83 
Most socio-political units among Delta peoples are small in size and diverse in origin. Large-
scale ethnic identification is very recent, and Delta communities still function primarily at a 
village-group, or “Clan”, level. While the term clan might not be correct technically today, it 
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continues to be used by the people living in the region. Most Delta communities owe their 
origins to a procession of many different groups arriving over long periods of settlement; yet 
these same communities ascribe themselves to common historical traditions that serve to 
unify them and accept titled leaders who trace descent from different ancestors. Therefore, 
while Delta peoples are extraordinarily autonomous, they also demonstrate an exceptional 
capacity for incorporating and fusing social units before and after independence in 1960 
from British colonial rule. 
                                   Colonialism and the Niger Delta 
In April 1840 Captain Beecroft, in the “Ethiope”, arrived by the Benin river and the Warri 
branch to the Niger and then went up that river to Lever (near Eyakede), where he reached 
on the 11th September 1840. He returned again by the Warri river branch and the Benin 
river to the sea. In 1841 the British Government sent out another expedition to the   Niger 
under the command of Captain H. D. Trotter, Commander William Allen and Commander 
Bird Allen (Who died at Fernando Po on the 25th October, 1841); Parliament voted £60,000 
for this purpose. This is known as “The Great Niger Expenditure”. Captain Trotter and Allen 
were accompanied by Mr William Cook, Her Majesty’s Commissioner, Rev. J. S. Schon, 
C.M.S; Dr. F.R. Vogel, Botanist (who died at Fernando Po on the 17th December, 1841) Dr 
Stanger, geologist; Mr Roscher, Mineralogist, along with Mr Frazer, Zoologist and Mr John 
Ansell, plant collector. The last five were sent out by the Africa Civilization Society.84  
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The expedition left Devonport on the 12 May, 1841. The “Albert” and “Soudan” entered the 
Niger on the 13th, and the “Wilberforce” on 15 August. The “Wilberforce” left Lokoja to 
return down river on 21 September, and reached the mouth by the 25 September. The 
“Albert” anchored above Egga from 28 September to 5 October 1841.85 
Captain Beecroft, in the “Ethiope”, ascended the river to Stirling Island where he met the 
“Albert”. On 13 October he escorted her to the mouth of the river Nun, which was reached 
on 15 October, 1841. After bringing the “Albert” to Fernando Po, Mr Beecroft ascended the 
old Calabar River, visited Ommanu, and then returned to Calabar old town.86 From then on 
the British Government acquired a naval base under the command of Admiral Richards and 
Admiral Salmon-the Commander-in-Chief who visited King Jaja of Opobo on11 July 1843 for 
permission to speak to the natives. Jaja background was originally a slave of the Pepple 
House of Chiefs, but his ability and industrial insight saw him rose to wealth and freedom. 
After he was removed from Bonny for his loyalty, he enfranchised himself and set up at 
Opobo, acquiring a commanding position. He had a fleet of 50 canoes armed with breech-
loading cannon and rifles. Jaja couldn’t speak English well, and according to documents 
found in the Public Office Records of Consul Johnston’s description, he exercised a generous 
hospitality to naval officers and traders, his demeanour was marked by quiet dignity, and his 
appearance and conversation were impressive. His constant communication with the 
Secretary of State through and the Consul displays admirable diplomatic ability as he argued 
for the independent sovereignty of Andony country.87 But after Admiral Salmon paid a short 
visit to the two rivers (New Calabar and Bonny), on his way to Opobo, and asked him to call 
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at these, or at all events at Bonny for further understanding of the region. Bonny was the 
oldest of the trading rivers, and Opobo the newest. The Bonny Chiefs had been more loyal 
to rule of King Jaja with whom for rejecting the total control by British explorers of Qua Ibo 
affairs and therefore, Admiral could not visit both rivers, that why Admiral Salmon preferred 
going to Bonny.88 
It is not a matter of surprise that the Admiral had no complaint to Bonny or Old Calabar 
about King Jaja’s treatment of the Qua Ibos people as claimed by the consul, or that the 
Senior Officer in the Navy should not have referred to the matter in welcoming Admiral 
Salmon. The King’s and Chiefs in both these rivers recognized the Consul; and not the 
Admiral or any other naval officer, as the regularly appointed person to whom to make their 
complaints.89 As the Qua Ibo and King Jaja’s resistance to total control of the river was 
under the consideration of Earl Granville, a despatch from the colonial office in London 24 
April 1883, the use of military force was seen as the most effectual way of putting an end to 
the actions. This action would have put Qua Ibom on the same footing as the other Oil 
Rivers, that is, it would be opened to European traders, while the Opobo people prohibited 
from going there, and measures would be taken to prevent Jaja intrigue to bring about 
disturbances in the river.90 Jaja had been told that Her Majesty’s Government would hold 
him responsible for any disturbances that may have originated from him or his people in the 
Qua Ibom country. Whether he tried to accomplish by “juju”, or fetish, what he would 
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otherwise have attempted by force, for example, to stop the Qua Ibo trading with a 
European and so acquire the river for himself.91 
 Treaty Negotiations with King Jaja of Opobo and Chiefs of the Benin River 
On 24 August, 1884 Lieutenant and Commander Moor, of the “Goshawak”, paid a visit to 
the River Forcados to prevent a German Commissioner from planting the German flag there, 
as he had done at Bay Beach and Cameroon. His mission was to go and look after that River 
and he deemed it prudent to take measures also to prevent the Old Calabar and the Rivers 
generally of the Niger Delta being made subject to Germany.92 On 26 September 1884 
Commander Moore arrived at Bonny Bay with Captain Brooke when he concluded a 
preliminary Treaty with the Bonny people, and to obtain the services of Captain Bell, an 
agent for steam-ship companies and a pilot for the Forcados, who, nonetheless, had 
stipulated that before he could take in one of Her Majesty’s ships, the crew should make 
sure that the channel is wide enough to accommodate a branch steam-boat.93 The result of 
this visit was the signing of Treaties by which Bonny and Brass accepted British protection 
for six months.94 On 29 September 1884, Commander Moore, however, and two of his 
lieutenants with Captain Bell met Nana and King Jaja of Opobo, and a few other native 
Chiefs had also signed a Treaty whereby, among other things, they had agreed to accept the 
protection of the Queen of England, and should any white men now appear in their river 
they were to send word to him, and if these men were other than British they were to have 
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no communication with them. These were his instructions, and they must be complied with, 
or else the British would come and punish them.95 
Having promised that they would obey his orders, some gifts were presented to the Kings 
that were brought from the Queen as a diplomatic exchange of friendship. From now on the 
British traders could proceed to the Forcados, Brass, Escarvos and the Calabar Rivers, in 
which they could anchor off a large towns on the south bank. These included towns like: 
Abohhorotu who was also inhabited by people of the Ijaws tribe. It was also acknowledged 
that they were subject to King Jaja of Opobo and Chief Nana, both told local people about 
the Treaty, and gave their orders, as had been done to others.96  These Treaties were 
designed in such a way that that in the event of death, the succeeding King could not 
repudiate the Treaty obligations they had entered into were not binding on the King only. 
The Treaty was explained to them, but they did not understand the language. The majority 
of the minor Chiefs were unwilling to sign it lest, as it appeared to me, they should be 
considered presumptuous. Whether the majority signed it or not, it was binding on them. At 
the end some gifts were then distributed to them, and also a Union Jack, which was 
immediately hoisted in their towns and cities. 
However, on 5 June 1885, the British Protectorate of the Oil Rivers was created which 
comprises on the line of coast of the Delta with reference to the encouragement that it is 
desired to give to free trade, and to take the initiative in disturbing the present system of 
trading in the Oil Rivers of the Niger Delta. For Example, extract from the “London Gazette 
“on June 5, 1885 on the Oil Rivers reads: 





                           The “middlemen”, as you term the Chiefs, with whom, for the most, we have            
                           Treaties, have a clear and decided use, inasmuch as they are now responsible 
                          For the protection of the European traders in their districts, and for the  
                          Security of their factories and goods. 
                        Deprive them of that responsibility, and of their means of living, and who can  
                        Be so held responsible? The so-called monopolies I took upon as being dues        
                       Fairly liveable for the security of the traders. Tear up the treaties and proclaim 
                    Free trade, and you will have the natives cutting each other’s throats, European 
                   Will be safe everywhere, and the squadron on the station will be under endless  
                       Requisition for operations in out-of-the-way places for punishment of isolated  
                     Outrages. Time will tend to develop free trade, but it cannot in my judgment be  
                   Done with a rush, without the first result being anarchy.97   
 
Moreover, Her Majesty’s Government had given full weight to the representation that 
reached her from various quarters as to the development of British trade in that region, and 
as to the importance of proper protection being afforded to the traders and their agents by 
establishing the Royal Niger Company. The Niger Company took upon themselves a very 
large responsibility, and duty to be allowed as far as practicable to discharge their trading 
pattern in their own way. If their methods did not stand the test of practice, the Secretary of 
State has such ample powers of control and veto vested in him by the terms of the Charter 
(especially by sections 5 and 13) that it is scarcely necessary for him, in the initial stage, to 
exercise a very stringent supervision.98  While, on the other hand, they have felt it 
imperative to pause before sanctioning increased Consular expenditure, they have, on the 
other hand, recognized that it is unquestionable that British trade is largely on the increase, 
that the absence of a civilized rule makes it essential that the lives and property of the 
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traders should be protected by British officials. Therefore, effective steps was taken to 
guard against the danger to commercial enterprise resulting from the ignorance, greed, and 
weakness of many of the native Chiefs. 
The Oil Rivers were not included in the Niger territories which the British Protectorate of the 
Niger Districts under the Royal Niger Company were administered under the Charter; but 
being on the seaboard, and thus accessible to gun-boats at all times of the years, they are 
under the care of a British Consul, who settles any disputes with the natives. Seven of these 
coastal Settlement—Brass, Benin, New Calabar, Bonny, Quaebo, Opobo, and Old Calabar—
have no intercourse with the chartered territories, except in one district, to which New 
Calabar canoes have the right to penetrated occasionally. But in the case of the nearest “Oil 
rivers”—Brass complaints have been made by the native canoe men of being obliged, on 
their trading visits to the main Niger, to pay the customs duties authorized by the British 
Government, and levied by the Company for meeting the expenses of administration.99 
By the Treaty of 4 January 1873, Jaja was recognized as King of Opobo by Her Majesty’s 
Government. The markets to which the Europeans sought access were not in Opobo 
territory, but Jaja’s influence there was paramount because hitherto the natives there had 
to rely on him and his Chiefs for the goods with which they traded with the natives beyond 
them. This treaty guaranteed the payment of comey—a sort of custom’s duty to Opobo at 
the same rate as was payable in Bonny. The recognition of Jaja as King and by implication, 
Opobo as a sovereign state, as well as the mode of settling disputes in an acceptable form 
increased the power of Jaja. For example, an offending ship or streamer was to be seized 




and detained by Jaja until a fine of 100 puncheons was paid by the owners to Jaja.100 This 
treaty was the corner-stone of the new Anglo-Opobo cooperation agreement under King 
Jaja. In a letter sent by the Queen through Lord Roseberry dated 16 June 1873 with the 
assumption that the protectorate will enable the territories in the Gulf of Guinea prosper. In 
the view of Her Majesty, will be a principal centre for the promotion of the welfare of the 
natives of all the territories taken as a whole by insuring the peaceful development of trade, 
and by facilitating their interaction with Europeans.101 King Jaja of Opobo opposed carrying 
out these objectives.  In the same letter he was told, “It is not to be permitted that any Chief 
who may happen to occupy a territory on the coast should obstruct this policy in order to 
benefit himself”.102 This was a clear warning against the use of any restrictive measures, 
such as those he was reported to have taken to prevent Europeans trading at the markets. 
This warning was totally disregarded, however. Therefore, Jaja was charged with barring 
access to Europeans to markets outsides his territories.103  It was feared that if he was left 
unpunished, other Chiefs would soon imitate him in other Rivers, and trade amounting to 
over one million pounds per annum would be wrested from Europeans traders, and left as a 
monopoly in the hands of the natives.104 
In fact, during the time of colonial Niger Delta, no native Chief in the district had so much 
power in his own territory, or welded so much influence among other tribes, as Jaja did. He 
was a middleman and like all the Oil Rivers trading chiefs, sought to establish a monopoly 
over as wide as an area possible. His boys (for example, slaves, but domestic slaves and well 
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treated) went up the river and bought oil from the actual producers. The actual producers 
were not allowed to meet the Europeans buyers, and the Europeans were not allowed to go 
up-country to deal directly with oil producers. It is the view here that the issue of ownership 
of oil and control of natural resources in the Niger Delta did not begin with discovery of 
petroleum and natural gas in the early 1950s.  In fact, it actually begun in the seventeen 
century as palm oil was traded with Europeans. The system of exclusive and compulsory 
brokerage may be a bad system, but it was the course of trade which had existed ever since 
the abolition of the slave trade and the legitimate commerce in palm oil began. It existed 
throughout all the rivers, and in particular at Bonny, before Jaja left Bonny. Jaja was brought 
up in this system of trade, and carried it on like other trading chiefs, but with greater tact 
and success. He had forces at his command needed to support his monopoly and to 
suppress any interference. If European firms attempted to go up the rivers and trade 
directly, he could put pressure on the oil producers, and this was invariably successful in the 
long run in stopping free trade. Against the natives he would, use force of arms against 
those who attempted to trade with European agents. 
This was the custom of the trade, and this custom was, as regards Jaja, to some extent 
legally recognised by the British Government. In fact, in the Treaty of 1873 Bonny people 
were given exclusive right to six markets, and Jaja had the exclusive right to the Opobo 
River, according to Consul Livingstone’s letter of 15 July 1873.105  Jaja demanded monopoly 
over his river, and to this the British Government, according to the above-cited document, 
agreed. However, February 1885 the General Act of the Conference of Berlin (to which 
Great Britain and all the other Great powers were parties), according to Articles 26-33 
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declared the total freedom of navigation in the Niger Delta with no exclusive privileges of 
navigation were to be granted to companies or private persons.106  This freedom of 
navigation was excellent in principle, but inconsistent with Jaja’s treaty rights. Therefore, to 
the Europeans trade was increase if he was deported, but the Chiefs in the other rivers 
would be much more easily managed, as they would be deprived of his bad advice, and Her 
Majesty’s Government would certainly be saved a great deal of trouble. On 12 December 
1887, King Jaja of Opobo was removed, and a decision was pending as to whether it was 
expedient that Jaja to be allowed to return. The charges brought against him were proved, 
and the following sentence was inflicted on him: 
1. King Jaja is deposed, and is no longer King of Opobo. 
2. He is to leave the West Coast of Africa, and take up his residence in one of the four 
undermentioned places: the Cape Colony, West Indies, St. Helena, and Ascension. 
3. He is to receive an annual pension, independent of his personal property of £800 a 
year. 
4. No person will succeed Jaja as King of Opobo: the country will, for the future, be 
ruled by the Governing Council under the supervision of Her Majesty’s Consul. 
The sentence also read: ‘it has not been without considerable reluctance that Her Majesty’s 
have called upon to pass this severe sentence on King Jaja, exiling him from his country and 
deposing him from his kingship; but the step was rendered imperative by Jaja’s repeated 
breaches of Treaty obligations, and his resolute disregard of advice from Her Majesty’s 
Consul, and from the various naval officers who were deputed by the Opobo administration. 
                                                          
106 Treaty of the Berlin conference, Article 26-33 The General Act, February 1885 
100 
 
“Let what has befallen Jaja, therefore, be a lesson to the Chiefs of the Oil Rivers’ 
Protectorate”.107 After the removal of Jaja, the market throughout the British Protectorate 
was thrown open without any reservation whatsoever, for all to trade in alike. That is to say 
that Bonny’s men could trade at the Opobo market, Opobo men could trade in Bonny’s 
markets, new Calabar could trade at Endelli, and Bonny at Obiatubo. All could now trade 
wherever they willed in the Protectorate without let or hindrance. King Jaja of Opobo was 
deported to St Vincent Island in the West Indies. But tension soon rose in Opobo after the 
commotion during Jaja’s last days in exile. Jaja was already suffering from chronic bronchitis 
and in February 1891 he was transferred from St Vincent to Barbados. Every chief in Opobo 
expected that King Jaja would shortly return, but on 7 July 1891 Jaja died on his way after 
been pardoned at Santa Cruz, in the Spanish island of Tenerife.108 
To my understanding, as long the Opobo Chiefs acted loyally towards the British authorities, 
they would continue to receive support and assistance due to the gracious protection of Her 
Majesty’s government. It was clear that Her Majesty’s Government would resolutely 
punished any further attempt on the part of the Chiefs or natives of the Oil Rivers to 
attempt any further opposition to the Consular authorities or interference with free trade. It 
had been a possibility that the traders settled in the Oil Rivers district would come to terms 
with the Niger Company, and thus pave the way for bringing the whole Protectorate under 
the Charter granted to the company. But because King Jaja revolted, however, this 
arrangement did not appear practicable; the oil rivers traders were not disposed to 
negotiate with the company, which was not ready to increase its jurisdiction on the coast in 
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face of their hesitation or opposition.109 But there was plan B on the agenda. The Consul 
introduced a series of Governing Councils in the more important rivers. Those on Old 
Calabar, Opobo, and Brass were established. Bonny and New Calabar were also added to 
the list. These Councils were composed of natives Chiefs and European residents in equal 
proportions. It was trusted, proved, at any rate, and heralded—the the beginning of a stable 
system of local government. The Niger Company’s hold on the coast was at the Nun-the 
main mouth of the Niger. But the British Protectorate extended over all the remaining 
mouths of the Niger and over those of the Old Calabar or Cross River. In the interior the 
Protectorate was at less prominent depth except as regards to the territory administered by 
the Niger Company. With regards to the natives of the Protectorate trading directly with 
Europeans, they were informed that they were at perfect liberty to do so; but all persons, 
Kings, Chiefs, natives, or foreigners, exporting oil and kernels from the Protectorate would 
have to pay “comey” alike; that is to say, If King George of Bonny or Chief Ogolo of Opobo 
send oil exports to England, they must pay the same “comey” on it per ton as would any 
European agent in the rivers.110 [See Appendix Doc 68 on the Regulations for the 
Constitution of a Governing Council to manage the local Affairs of Brass,-Oil Rivers 
Protectorate February 1888]  
The minutes of a meeting recorded on July 4, 1888 explain how Great Britain secured the 
Protectorate of the Oil Rivers, by means of a series of Treaties with the Maritime tribes, 
extending from Benin to Old Calabar. These tribes, in the past, owed their wealth and power 
to the slave trade, of which in that part of the world they had a monopoly as middlemen- 
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due to their position on the seaboard. On the abolition of the slave trade, British merchants 
alone began to create what is known as legitimate commerce in the Niger Delta, and 
gradually established numerous factories in to promote palm oil trade in the Oil Rivers. 
Though the objects of trade had changed, the position of the maritime tribes, as powerful 
middlemen, remained unaltered. They alone were able to penetrate into the markets of the 
interior where the principal article of export, palm oil, was produced. On their co-operation 
was imperative for the existence of commerce in the Niger Delta region, and their good-will 
had to be purchased by annual and other subsidies made to them by the British merchants, 
unaided particularly by Great Britain. Still the Consuls-backed by gun-boats were  
occasionally used to act as arbiters in settling the disputes that arose between two tribes or 
between some tribe and the Europeans trading agents, these also acted as a military 
deterrent over the actions of the latter.111 
The Niger Company was also allowed to charge interest on amount over £250,000, on 
account of expenses connected with the acquisition of the Protectorate. The Liverpool 
traders were ready to amalgamate, if they could charge the interest on £500,000. To my 
understanding, their argument was that they had for many years subsidized the Chiefs to be 
loyal, by payment of “handshakes” (bribes), the natives would never have accepted the 
Protectorate. Therefore, these subsidies, or “handshakes”,112 otherwise-the natives would 
never have accepted the protectorate. Therefore, these subsidies, or handshakes were 
expenses connected with the acquisition of the protectorate, and therefore, the amount 
should be restored to them. With these incentives, the Royal Niger Company made Treaties 
with natives Chiefs, bought out foreign companies, and directly paved the way for the 
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Protectorate. The traders established themselves on the coast for their own purposes; the 
Chiefs, who were the coast middlemen, would not let them trade unless they were paid 
“handshakes”, and they accepted the terms. 
 But the British dilemma was for the Protectorate to improve their position by breaking 
down the middlemen and abolishing the “handshakes”. Their contention was, therefore, 
that in taking over the Protectorate the expenses incurred by the merchants under these 
and similar heads should be recognized as money not only laid out for the benefit of the 
Protectorate natives. But essential for it being taken over, and should form a claim on its 
administrative resources.113 In letter sent to the Lords by the Chairman of the Africa 
Association reads: 
                          “We would therefore ask your Lordship that, in the event of a fusion 
                             Of the interest of the Oil Rivers and of that Company, and in the event 
                             Of the extension of the Charter of that Company over the Oil River,  
                            Permission may be given by Her Majesty’s Government for the levying in 
                            Protectorate of a special revenue, in excess of that raised for current 
                            Administrative purposes, to the amount of £25,000 per annum, being 
                           5 per cent on the above minimum expenditure of £500,000.” 
On behalf of the African Association, I am, & c. (Signed) T. STANLEY ROGERSON, Chairman. 
I am of the opinion that the bribery and corruption today in the oil and gas industry in the 
Niger Delta was first introduced by Europeans traders during colonialism. It is absolutely 
clear from the claim put forward by the African Association—that the British merchants who 
traded on the Oil Rivers should be repaid out of the revenues of the Protectorate the sums 
expanded by them in establishing their trade by way of “handshakes” (which appears to be 
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the Anglo-African for “pot de vin”) or in buying out foreign competitors. That money was 
used for their own purposes, and no doubt brought in splendid returns, when palm-oil (in 
both senses) was so remunerative. The Delta production, which averaged 15,000 to 20,000 
tons was worth approximately £500,000 and in peak years like 1845 was nearly £750,000 at 
£34 a ton.114  Palm oil was not the sole commodity of trade, but it was by far the most 
important at the time. For example, in 1842 the ivory produced in the Delta was worth 
about £17,000 per annum; Camwood and other dye-woods were worth between £10,000 
and £15,000 per annum.115 The timber trade, although at that time increasing, was 
unimportant. [See Treaties Agreed upon in 1851 & 1854 in Appendix E] 
English manufactured goods were exchanged for Delta oil through a system of barter trade 
known locally as “trust”, a peculiar form of credit. Goods were trusted to the Delta 
middlemen by the British merchants for periods of between six months to a year- or, in 
some rare cases, up to two years during which time the African recipients were required to 
trade them for interior produce and pay back their European customers the equivalent in 
oil, ivory, timber or spices. This system was not new to the Niger Delta traders for it was 
certainly prevalent during the slave trade. Therefore, it is clear that the new premises 
established in this thesis and inferences drawn from analysing the evolution of trade in the 
Niger Delta, that it was not the laws passed in the United States or the William Wilberforce 
motion in the UK Parliament that stopped the slave trade. It was the discovery of alternative 
products—particularly—the palm oil that was more profitable than human trafficking. 
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                                 The Work of the Royal Niger Company and It Objectives 
Towards the close of 1885 Her Majesty’s Government had assented in principle to the 
granting of a Charter to the National African Company (then the Royal Niger Company). Still, 
a question arose as to the method by which the company should be enabled to repay itself 
considering the political outlay incurred in the acquisition and maintenance of about 237 
Treaties signed with native Kings and Chiefs which secured for Great Britain trade in the 
Niger Delta. With all the relevant document available and to my understanding, in meeting 
these obligations the main aim and objectives of the Royal Niger Company was threefold: 
1. In establishing, prior to 1883, political influence over the native Kings and Chiefs, and 
the people of the Niger Delta. 
2. In preventing, during 1883-84, such influence being usurped by another power 
through those foreign associations, which were fortunately absorbed into the 
Company just before the West African Conference at Berlin of November 1884. 
3. In maintaining British influence against the efforts of German adventurers during the 
difficult period of interregnum (1885-86) between the Berlin conference and the 
granting of the Charter.116 
It should be noted that, during this period and until the issue of the Charter gave an 
international sanction to the sovereignty Treaties of the company, Lord Salisbury argued in 
the House of Lord that, “Franco-African and German explorers and the France press were 
vehemently urging on the French Government that, the British Protectorate Treaties only 
extended over scattered districts, and that the Company’s Treaties were (from the 
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standpoint of international law) invalid, and that France had more districts possessed in 
1884 establishments in the Lower Niger basin numerous than those of the Company”.117  
Another issue that arose was the repayment of the company’s political outlay by means of 
certain small privileges, something which was questioned by Lord Salisbury and was 
considered by the Lordship to be inconsistent with the engagements toward Germany of 
May 1885. The Company then suggested that the amount expended for political aims should 
be considered as a State debt of the Niger Territories, and that the draft Charter, previously 
approved by the Lordship should be amended so as to permit this to be done and of the 
Company raising revenue to pay itself the annual interest on this debt.118 Great Britain and 
Her Majesty’s Government having accepted this view, the requisite change was made by an 
addition to clause 14 of the Charter.  
For technical reasons the Charter as issued dealt only with those scattered portions of the 
Territories referred to in the petition against the company of February 1885, and it was only 
then, (since under the House of Lords has under clause 12 of the Charter extended the 
effect of that instrument to all the company’s territories), that the Council of Territories 
were in a position to ask for a settlement of the amount expended in respect of the whole 
of those territories.119 
On the other hand, the company was prepared as stated in the status book to adhere to 
what it understood to be the arrangement at the time, and also to accept the comparatively 
small sum of £250,000 without further discussion.120 But in the event of failure in the 
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struggle to solidify British rule in the region, no British Government was obliged to repay the 
company’s debts, or the company to ask for either assistance or guarantee from Great 
Britain. Therefore, year by year the company opened up new factories, and new products 
like liquor (alcohol), gunpowder, silver, rubber, ivory, shear butter, adansonnia fibre, potash, 
hides, tin, gum, oil seeds and cowries which were traded in exchange for palm oil. Trade by 
this time, by force of circumstances, confined to the neighbourhood of the waterways, but 
as time went on other small outlets, (doubtless owned by companies and other private 
traders’), and factories were established inland. These took place of the travelling Hausa 
merchants coming from the North.121 
In exchange for these articles, native tribes were given all sorts of European commodities 
like good from Manchester, Birmingham wares, tobacco, salt, and an infinity of odds and 
ends, while in the Delta regions spirits, gunpowder, and “Long Dane” and other trade 
muskets were still admitted.122 Regarding the sale of these latter articles, some explanation 
is necessary. The extent to which the whole of the Niger Delta was flooded with spirits 
(alcohol) ever since trade was established with Europeans is well known to everyone, and it 
is only after independence that any attempt has been made to put a check on the enormous 
imports of this items. There were however, some attempts before this time by the British (at 
the Berlin Conference of 1884) to impress on the powers the importance of putting some 
restraint on the spirits traffic. It is also noteworthy that Sir George Goldie, who represented 
the Niger Company at the Conference, was the prime mover on the liquor question, though 
nothing came of his suggestions until the Brussels Conference in 1890.123  
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However, the company decided to take independent action, and with backed by the Royal 
Charter put a heavy duty on the import of spirits into the territories; following this up, it 
next prohibited the introduction of spirits into the countries north of the confluence, thus 
confining the traffic to the pagans of the Lower Niger. Again it reduces the area of crime, 
and admitted spirits only as far north as the River Nun in Aboh. In fact, this was the most 
prohibitive duty in the Delta acting as a most effective check on liquor consumption.124 This 
action gave rise to considerable disaffection among the Delta tribes, who looked on cheap 
drink as one of the benefits to be derived from the European traders; still, the company fully 
maintained a total prohibition on the introduction of gin and rum into its territories. 
The gunpowder and arms mentioned above as imports are of the most dangerous 
description also known as “trade powder”, with propulsive powers was sufficient to 
discharge a bullet from a musket, and the arms consisting of more deadly than old-
fashioned percussion gun were all prohibited. Yet the Royal Niger Delta Company always 
discouraged as much as possible (via a heavy import duty) the sale of even these articles, 
while the introduction into the territories of arms of precision and other related materials of 
any kind was still prohibited in accordance with the Brussels Act. 
For nearly fourteen years the Royal Niger Company continued its administration; then the 
government became convinced that the time had arrived for “an Imperial Authority to be on 
the spot”.125  The Royal Charter was revoked not because the company had in any way failed 
in its administration, but for the reason that it was considered to fulfil its mission in 
                                                          
124 In two years the import of spirits was reduced by one-half, though in the adjacent Oil Rivers, it may be 
remarked, the raising of the import duty has made little difference to the quantity of liquor consumed, 
Mockler-Ferryman, p.90 
125 This means the revoked of the charter in 1899 by the British Government due to inefficiency and debts of 
the company, but it was claimed otherwise. 
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establishing trade and commerce in the region.126 A few statistics concerning the Royal 
Niger Company will be of interest here, more so especially as until the revocation of the 
charter decided in 1899, none were ever published: 
       YEAR DUTY ON IMPORT 
             £ 
DUTY ON EXPORT 
           £ 
   REVENUE 
          £ 
EXPENDITURE 
           £ 
1887 24,037  16,781 42,396 71,324 
1888 34,467 19,915 55,771 73,830 
1889 30,610 25,920 57,652 82,870 
1890 36,768 24,656 62,430 92,258 
1891 53,767 31,198 89,667 107,975 
1892 51,648 50,272 103,115 107,115 
1893 56,897 52,324 110,756 99,256 
1894 26,381 46,867 74,160 104,001 
1895 40,614 46,260 87,806 108,963 
1896 44,462 51,556 102,330 117,905 
1897 47,873 45,330 94,045 135,637 
1898 63,054 48,981 113,305 135,093 
     
Source: Royal Niger Company Chartered and Limited, Office of Secretary of Colonial and Foreign Affairs, 1899. 
                                                          
126 On resigning its Royal Charter, the Niger Company was reformed in order to continue its trading operations. 
Some of the old members became directors of the New Company, but Sir George Goldie ceased to have any 
official connection with it.  
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Of the duties on imports and exports in the above table the Royal Niger Company contributed on 
average, 95% per annum, which shows that it practically had a monopoly of trade. The revenue was 
derived from these duties and from small receipts from licences; while the expenditure included the 
whole cost of administration, and the principal items being the subsidies given to native chiefs; 
special missions and punitive expeditions, maintenance of the constabulary force and flotilla, 
administrative stations, the salaries of staff, various sundry expenses, and interest at 5% on public 
debt of the Niger Territory (£250,000).127 From these figures it would appear that the Company, in 
administering its territories, was out of pocket to a very considerable amount. 







FUTURE KERNEL TRADE 
21,000 
Benin 7,000 10,000 21,000 
Nembe-Brass 2,000 2,000 6,000 
New Calabar 5,000 1,000 15,000 
Bonny 4,000 1,500 12,000 
Opobo 8,000 6,000 24,000 
Old Calabar 7,000 10,000 21,000 
Total 44,470 61,759 21,000 
Source: FO84/1882 “Minutes of Governor Moleney in Connection of his visit in April 1888”. 
This table is based on the figures compiled by the governor of the Lagos Crown colony in April 1888. 
This raises an interesting question for our consideration: To what extent did the nascent trade in 
                                                          
127 Colonial Office Secretary, the Trade Balance Sheet of the Company from 1887 to 1898 given in full in a 
Parliamentary paper F/O 345 document No. C.9372 
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palm oil and kernels change the pre-existing allocation of export shares among the eastern Niger 
Delta state? However, the varying output levels of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in this nascent trade 
were well established before the arrival of the Europeans. 
The Era of Chief Nana of Itsekiri and Trade between Middlemen,                 
                             Oil Traders and Ethnic Dimensions 
The Treaty with King and Chiefs of Opobo was ratified at Opobo on 19 December 1884. The 
treaty recognised Chief Nana as the Governor of the Bight of Benin (Itsekiri). The situation in 
another advanced British station, Warri, was remarkably different. The local political 
situation played into the hands of the vice-Consul. Warri was the traditional capital of the 
Itsekiri, and, whether founded by a Benin Prince or not, Warri was for centuries before the 
arrival of the British a virtually independent principality. Chief Nana, the overlord of the 
region, did not oppose the action of the Macdonald administration (Vice-Consul). The vice-
Consuls were as active as their Chief. In his first venture inland, he undertook an extensive 
tour of the Itsekiri and Urhobo hinterland. The Urhobo were a great oil producing people, 
although the Itsekiri acted as middlemen. 
But Nana’s pre-eminence was due partly to the thorough work done by his father, Alluma. 
The latter had not overthrown his rival, the son of the Queen of Warri, but by 1865 had 
founded and consolidated the new stronghold of Ebrohemie. Nana’s mother was an Urhobo 
and this was a great advantage to Nana in his relations with the neighbouring Urhobo 
people. Nana seemed to have reconciled in his person the traditional frictions which 
bedevilled Itsekiri-Urhobo relations. Through remarkable commercial acumen, Nana gained 
considerable influence over other petty Itsekiri chiefs and over surrounding Urhobo oil-
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producing districts west of the Forcados’ River. His wealth and prestige marked him out as 
the dominant personality in the commercial and political life of a large portion of the Itsekiri 
and Urhobo country.128 But Urhobo locals naturally tended to deny that Nana’s position in 
the Urhobo country ever had any political significance. Rather, they saw Nana as no more 
than an Itsekiri middleman trader who exploited the potentialities of finance to control the 
external trade of Urhoboland. The real problem for Nana was though dominant he certainly 
was, he had yet to establish the machinery of governance which embraced Itsekiriland and 
the portion of Urhoboland he controlled commercially. 
He acquired even greater prestige in the eyes of his local Itsekiri rivals and the commercially 
dependent Urhobo communities. His trade boy’s naturally exploited their master’s prestige 
to engross the trade of the oil-producing Urhobo country. British merchants who wished to 
do any business on the Benin River had to do so on Nana’s terms. The palm oil trade 
replaced that in slaves and posed its own problem for Chief Nana. Palm oil trade infinitely 
needed greater organisation and resources than did the slaves trade of the earlier period. 
The British introduced the trust system that became a more general feature of the trade 
than it had been earlier. Not only did the white traders have to entrust goods to their Itsekiri 
customers, but the latter had to entrust goods in their turn to the producers of the palm oil, 
in this case the Urhobo (and also some Kwale) in the hinterland of the Itsekiri country. 
Obaro Ikimi (1968) argues that in these circumstances, it became necessary for any Itsekiri 
who aspired to be a great trader to be seen to be credit worthy. This in turn had its various 
ramifications. First, it meant for the successful trader an ostentatious display of wealth in 
                                                          
128 J. C. Anene (1966) Southern Nigeria in Transition-Theory and Practice in a Colonial Protectorate, p.135-151 
Cambridge University Press 
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the form of fixed assets. Second, the trader had to possess a large fleet of trading canoes 
which could collect the palm oil from the various Urhobo settlements.129 These features of 
the palm oil trade led to great rivalry between the leading Itsekiri traders—rivalry in the 
display of opulence to justify continued trust being given, and rivalry in securing oil from the 
Urhobo producers. The trade in palm oil also affected relations between the two ethnic 
groups—the Itsekiri middlemen and the Urhobo oil producers. The Urhobo were not always 
able to meet the obligations they undertook with their Itsekiri customers and so failed to 
produce the agreed quantity of oil. It was in this kind of situation that the giving of children 
and slaves as pledges became strongly entrenched in the commercial code observed 
between the Itsekiri and the Urhobo. In strict law the children thus given out as pawns were 
not slaves. They could be redeemed at any time on payment of the outstanding debt.130 
 The development of the palm oil trade had another effect on Itsekiri—Urhobo relations. 
Although through the system of pledges, diplomacy and inter-marriage, it was often 
possible to maintain friendly relations between the middlemen and the producers, though 
disputes between the Urhobo and the Itsekiri were not always resolved peacefully. For 
example, Itsekiri traders were offended by the non-fulfilment of promise made by their 
Urhobo customers usually sent their slaves to raid the villages of the offenders concerned; 
the idea was that slaves taken during such a raid would, by working for the Itsekiri, 
eventually make good the loss sustained by the non-fulfilment of the obligations previously 
agreed on.131  
                                                          
129 Ikimi, O., (1968) Merchant Prince of the Niger Delta: The Rise & Fall of Nana Olomu Last Governor of the 
Benin River, p. 5 
130 Ikimi 1968, p. 7 
131 F.O. 84/1002 Campbell to F.O. No.9 24 March 1856, Also Ikimi 1968, p. 8 
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Another problem was the monopoly created by King Nana between the Itsekiri, Urhobo and 
the white traders made relations within the Niger Delta uneasy. It was not easy to tackle the 
two main factor responsible for this uneasiness—the fixing of prices acceptable to both 
sides, and the question of debt inherent in the trust system. The fixing of prices for palm oil 
produce was complicated. The white traders had their eyes on the European market and 
tended to offer such prices as would assure them of what they considered a reasonable 
profit. The coastal middlemen, unable to check on the European market prices and so 
uncertain about the fairness of the prices which the white traders offered, tended to resent 
any fall in prices. In fact, when there was a fall in prices, it was the practice of the 
middlemen to hold up their palm oil produce in the hope, thereby, of forcing up the price. 
The white traders invariably resented this economic sanction which the leading Itsekiri 
traders, and more especially Governor Nana were able to bring to bear against them, and 
their usual reaction to such a situation was to send a protest to their Consul and request his 
intervention with a view to the resumption of trade. For example, one of Nana’s offences in 
the opinion of the British authorities was that he adopted the sanction of stopping trade in 
1886 at a time when the price for palm oil produce had fallen by about forty per cent.132 
Thus, like Jaja of Opobo, Nana was bound to fall foul of the British merchants and then of 
the British political agents. Three years later, Consul Annesley confiscated Nana’s ‘staff 
office’, and Nana’s protest to Lord Salisbury produced no result. The charge against Nana 
was that he interfered with the effort of the Europeans firms to establish inland business.133 
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Another source of disagreement between the Itsekiri and the white traders in the period up 
to 1884 was the question of the debts which the inescapable concomitants of the trust 
system. There were many instances when a disturbed situation arose in the Benin River 
district, either as a consequence of parties failing to agree on the amount of debts 
outstanding, or white traders seizing oil belonging to Itsekiri traders in an endeavour to 
make good outstanding debts.134 
 The Vice-consuls who were appointed to the region in 1891 were hardly settled in the new 
vice-consulates when they were flooded with complaints by British merchants. These 
complaints were naturally embodied in the reports submitted to the Consul-General, 
Macdonald. The vice-consuls assumed that the smaller Itsekiri and Urhobo Chiefs were 
anxious to repudiate Nana’s authority and trade freely and directly with the Europeans 
firms. They imagined that it was their primary duty to break Nana’s trade monopoly, and 
referred with approval to the fate of Jaja of Opobo. Galloway, the vice-consul, emphatically 
argued that as long as Nana was allowed to continue his ‘reign of terror’, no progress was to 
be expected.135 Eventually, Galloway and the merchants had their way and a British gunboat 
was sent against Nana, who, they argued, was playing a very dangerous game. In April 1894 
Sir Claude Macdonald formally abrogated Nana’s appointment as the Governor of the Benin 
River. The letter forwarded to Nana explained that, since the Queen’s government had been 
established, he was no longer to be recognised as Chief of the Itsekiri people.136 Nana 
refused to recognise the Consul-General authority and too late, perhaps, Nana began 
quietly and secretly to accumulate all kinds of arms to fight the British from his headquarter 
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135 Foreign Office Document 2/63, Report on the Niger Delta Coast Protectorate, 24 August 1894. 
136 Foreign office document 2/64, see letter from Gallwey to Nana dated 21 June 1894. 
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by the Ebrohemie creeks. Matters came to a head shortly after Sir Claude Macdonald left 
the protectorate on leave in the summer of 1894. The last straw for the British was Nana’s 
refusal to accept the price for palm oil produce stipulated by the British trading agents 
themselves. Nana retaliated by stopping all trade relations with the merchants.137  Nana’s 
actions were no more than a crude way of doing what a trade union might do to maintain 
the integrity of a strike nowadays. It is easy enough to see the analogies between the issue 
and Jaja’s dispute with British merchants in 1887. There was, however, a fundamental 
difference. Nana’s behaviour was that of a businessman, whilst Jaja’s was the exercise of his 
sovereign rights. 
Military operations against Nana began on 25 August 1894 with Rear-Admiral Bedford 
ordering an assault on the Ebrohemie creek with a heavy gun-fire. It was therefore decided 
to cut through the mangrove on the eastern approach of Nana’s stronghold. A massive 
advance against Nana was made on the 25th and Ebrohemie eventually fell to the British. 
Nana fled to Lagos, through a creek at the back of Ebrohemie, but the canoes containing his 
property and his letters were captured by British troops.138 The legal awkwardness was 
overcome when Nana voluntarily surrendered himself. The trial was a brief affair, and Nana 
was convicted on the grounds that he had violated his treaty with Britain and had also 
broken the protectorate laws. There were hardly any legal arguments about the precise way 
in which the protection treaty was violated by Nana or about the protectorate laws which 
Nana had sinned against. His punishment was deportation to the Gold Coast (Ghana). The 
deportation of Nana meant the dissolution of his empire. According to reports of the 
protectorate administration, Nana had 2,000 slaves as well as a number of villages under his 
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control. Nana’s slaves were predominantly Urhobos but included, surprisingly, Yoruba’s too. 
All these were now set free but were persuaded to settle in Nana’s villages which the 
administration transformed into autonomous communities under headmen chosen by the 
British.139 [See Appendix E: for Treaties and Agreement on Trade] 
Table 2.2: Total Voyages and Casks of Palm Oil imported into the UK from the Bight of Biafra 
YEAR # of Voyages Casks of Oil Import 
1830 52 27,476 
1835 67 30,993 
1840 76 35,908 
1845 112 53,683 
1850 85 44,975 
1855 137 83,170 
Source: FO2/16 T.J. Hutchinson, “General Report on the Bight of Biafra (Enclosure # 1 in Despatch # 69, June-December, 
1856) 
Table 2 represented the total number of casks of palm oil from the Bight of Biafra into the United 
Kingdom. These figures show that even by 1855 the palm oil economy was booming but moderate in 
some part of the West Africa Coast. This explains why the state could not rely on palm oil as the 
main export revenue earner for its survival. On the other hand, Bonny may have benefited from the 
early boom in palm oil trading when the economic transition began. Thus the initial high profits from 
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the oil trade and the anti-slave trade compensations may have served as sufficient financial 
incentives for Bonny to abandon slave trading sooner than other city-states in the Oil Rivers. 
Table 2.3: Palm Oil and Kernel Exports to Europe from the Oil Rivers Protectorate b/w August 1891 and July 1892 
COUNTRIES PALM OIL EXPORT in IMPERIAL 
GALLONS 
PALM KERNEL EXPORT in TONS 
UNITED KINGDOM 6237518 11946 
FRANCE 2445261 273 
GERMANY 609541 19468 
GRAND CANARY 292479 322 
WIND WARD COAST 49050 165 
TOTAL 9633867 32174 
Source: FO84/2111 M.C. MacDonald to the Foreign Office, 1891 
As table 3 shows above, the United Kingdom controlled 66% of the total export-import commerce of 
the Oil Rivers protectorate. This control represented a mark of continuity with the past because it 
began during the era of the informal empire. Germany and France, the two other most industrialized 
Western nations competing for markets in Africa, vied for the second largest overall share in the 
protectorate’s foreign trade. The competition among these Western European powers continued 
until the First World War in 1914 when the German firms were expelled from Southern Nigeria. The 
firms were expelled along with the German members of the Basel Mission because their presence in 
the colony was considered inimical to the British war interests.140 Moreover, Christianity was used by 
missionaries in the continent to pursue the political interests of their respective mother countries. 
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                           Niger Delta and the Nigeria State at Independence 
The Niger Delta, at the least around the Bight of Benin, was different from most others parts 
of Nigeria when independence came around. First, the climate was so bad that European 
settlers found it an impossible land to live in. Second, sleeping sickness, malignant malaria, 
the dysenteries and other fevers were so prevalent that outsiders coming in with no natural 
immunity died by the thousand, so much so the area was known as “the white man’s 
grave”.141 It could be said that Nigeria, as defined in the days of independence was really 
not an idea centred on either race or geography; it was rather a conglomeration of ethnic 
groups, three which predominated—The Hausa, Igbo and the Yoruba. 
In 1953 a member of the Action Group, Anthony Enahoro, introduced a measure in the 
Nigerian legislature calling for independence by 1956. Northern representative proposed an 
alternative measure calling for independence as soon as it was practicable. In the council of 
Ministers, a majority composed of the four northern ministers and the six British officials 
voted to bar ministers from participating in the legislature’s debate on an independence 
resolution. The four Action Group ministers representing the Western Region resigned in 
protest. In the legislature’s March 1953 session, northern votes defeated the Enahoro 
resolution (motion). Representatives from the East and West then walked out when the 
legislature took up the North’s alternative motion. Crowds in Lagos booed northern 
representatives. Newspapers in southern Nigeria attacked both British officials and 
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Northern politicians. Papers controlled by the Action Group talked of a Mau Mau—like 
uprising in Nigeria and the party threatened a nationwide campaign of civil disobedience.142 
In 1957 the Western Region of Nigeria had just received independence while national 
independence for all regions was still three years away.143 Regional independence meant 
that the Nigerians politicians belonging to the majority party formed a government which 
had complete control over all regional matters excluding the Niger Delta people. Still, all 
important and actual decisions were made by the Executive which consisted of the 
Governor and expatriate civil servants. Thus a nationalist movement which was a conscious 
part of an international movement for freedom came to be identified in the eyes of many 
other politically conscious Nigerians as a predominantly ‘tribal’ or at best as a ‘regional’ 
force in politics.144 It was not long before this internationally inspired ‘nationalism’ gave rise 
to rival regional struggles based on the main linguistic, and ethnic groups in the north-east, 
south and west. Even though at the beginning of 1948, there was a financial arrangements 
based on derivative principle in the Richards Constitution; in the 50s the problem of 
allocating fair shares of revenue between the three regions became suddenly, the most 
serious and intractable political issue. The Regional Houses (with unofficial majorities 
nominated by provisional electoral colleges) had no power to appropriate revenue. They 
were themselves electoral colleges for the central Legislative Council, which made available, 
via its votes, an allocation of revenue based on the principles of derivation and the 
assignment of specific revenues to the regions or groups of provinces. At this time the actual 
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needs of the each region to maintain existing services did not coincide with the derivation of 
funds, but with the intensity of the past demand for education and other services. 
Therefore, it was necessary to give the Eastern Region that included in the Niger Delta an 
‘extra allocation’. It was this necessity which brought out the latent possibility of inter-
regional strife over the division of centrally collected revenues.145 
At the same time, the second intractable problem which was to dominate public 
administration over the next few years (and up till today) was in the financial arena where 
the unofficial majority reproduced in the Finance Committee, contained nationalists whose 
hostility to alien officialdom took the form of demands for Nigerianization and rejected 
official proposals designed to make it possible to recruit and retain the expatriates needed 
for the execution of the development programme. For the nationalists, with bitter feelings 
about the inadequacy of services for indigenes in the past, and with deeply ingrained 
suspicions that Nigeria was being run by officials from foreign country for their own benefit. 
This was the feelings to be associated with measures that sought to increase the numbers 
and improve the situation of British officials.146 These two problems—the sharing of 
revenues between the regions and the question of salaries and conditions for expatriate 
officials—were the twin poles around which controversies revolved around sparked for 
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146 Hugh Foots, A Start in Freedom (London), 1964, p.103, the autobiography reveals that ‘taking and holding 
the initiative’ had become in him, by the time as a Chief Secretary late in 1947. By the time of his Nigerian 
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to bank up. The people must be given a ‘lead, a hope, an assurance that orderly and constructive effort will be 
worthwhile……Everything depends on clear lead and a sense of urgency in pursuing it’ (op. cit., p.106)  
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several years, tending to distract political attention from the actual work of the planned 
development of resources in the Niger Delta. 
 But another analysis by historians traced the problem to Lugard’s amalgamation of North 
with the South in 1908. Many of the ethnic divisions present until today and present 
problems of Nigerian government seem now to flow from Lugard’s own decisions. The proof 
of this contention would be long, since it involves the imaginary construction of a world in 
which Lugard never existed. It is now recognized that the Nigeria of the 1950s at 
independence and the system of federal representative government which was initiated had 
not developed the necessary prerequisite of social conditions in which institutions of this 
kind could succeed. At the time it was thought that the new institutions after independence 
would induce the appropriate changes. People in the Niger Delta interviewed during my 
fieldwork believe that so long as the new system remained under the criteria of the old, and 
the federal authority remained reticent in public about the difficulties created during 
colonialism, the danger of the situation still remained.  Therefore, Nigeria was not yet a 
nation marched towards independence, not at a pace after independence. At that time little 
hearing could have been gained from warnings about inadequate institutions at the level of 
the federal representative government, although there is nothing novel about these. But in 
comparing this analysis with John Stuart Mill, surveying the wreckage of European 
experiments in parliamentary government two century ago, set them out clearly enough.147 
The relevance of Mill’s idea here is that the creation of a representative Federal structure 
for the Nigeria state toward and after independence was not a pace well suited for different 
ethnic groups that constitute the Nigeria state. But at a pace better suited to those most 
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anxious to make an end of colonial dependence. For a nation, Mill prescribed common 
sympathies, uniting a portion of mankind which made them co-operate with each other 
more willingly than with other people, and which increased the desire to be under the same 
government, as well as the desire that it should be governed by themselves or a portion of 
themselves exclusively. With this criterion, there was in 1960 not one Nigerian nation, but 
the possibility of many. In mid-1968 there was one nation, (the Ibo including the Niger 
Delta), which struggled, under strong internal leadership, against a strongly hostile external 
environment, to become a nation-state. The hostility looks too strong for either separation 
or peaceful reconciliation. Comparing the Niger Delta faith and the Nigerian state at 
independence, for free institutions, in a country made up of different nationalities, Mill saw 
little prospect: 
‘Free institutions are next to impossible in a country up of different nationalities. Among a people 
without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public 
opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist. The influences which 
form opinions and decide political act, are different in the different sections of the country. An 
altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of one part of the country and of another. The 
same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. One section does not know what 
opinion, or what instigation are circulating in another. The same incidents, the same acts, the same 
system of government, affects them in different ways; and each fears more injury to itself from the 
other nationalities than from the common arbiter, the state.’148  
For a federation of nationalities in the circumstances of this kind (very close to those of 
Nigeria in the 1960s when federation was being considered) Mill prescribed three 
conditions: first a certain amount of mutual sympathy among the populations; second, an 
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inability of each of the constituent parts to rely on its own unaided strength; and a third 
condition is a common language, not less important than the two others. The essential of 
this scenario is that the Niger Delta at independence was less powerful than the rest so as to 
be capable of vying in strength with many of them combined. But according to J. S. Mill, 
there should not be any one state much more powerful than the rest so as to be capable of 
vying in strength with many of them combined. If there be such a one, and only one, it will 
insist on being master of the joint deliberations: if there be two, they will be irresistible 
when they agree: and whenever they differ everything will be decided by a struggle for 
ascendancy between the rivals.149 
The Nigeria of the 1950s inclusive of the Niger Delta could not have passed Mill’s first test. 
Mutual sympathy between the regional peoples was not strong; in particular, antipathy 
towards the Ibo-speaking peoples was strong in the Niger Delta, North and West. Nor could 
Nigeria have passed the third test. It was not a case of the North being so big that it could 
insist on being master of the joint deliberations prior to independence, but it was a case 
where the balance of electoral strength between the North and the rest was so poised that 
during the brief years of experiment with federal representative government, as to bring 
about just the kind of struggle for ascendancy between two rivals which Mill predicted. 
First, after the 1959 elections, the leaders of the North and East agreed on the sharing of 
power at the centre, and they were thus irresistible; the chief item of agreement was on the 
destruction of the opposition government from the West, and on the dismembering of that 
region. Later, when the Eastern leaders realized that these developments had greatly 
strengthened the North, with its disciplined electorate, and as the leaders of North and East 
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began to seriously differ with one another, their struggle for ascendancy brought the whole 
system into discredit and finally into general contempt.150  
But before this at the constitutional conference of 1957, it was decided that the Secretary of 
State should appoint a commission of inquiry to ascertain that facts about the fears of 
minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well 
or ill founded. The Commission toured Nigeria for several months between 1957-1958, 
receiving memoranda and taking oral evidence in public and private from individuals, ethnic 
associations, minority groups, political parties, and government officials. Its report 
recommended safeguards for minorities other than the creation of new states, on the 
grounds that minority fears expressed would not be remedied by the creation of a new state 
in any one of the existing regions.151 In the commission’s view it was asserted with 
confidence that broadly based majorities in each of the proposed states and the Niger Delta 
actually favoured the separatist solution.  For the Commission, however, it seemed more 
likely that new minority problems might well flow even with the creation of new states to 
alleviate minority fears. Moreover, the new states would be comparatively weak with 
respect to financial resources and trained administrative officials. Finally, the Commission 
did not think that tribal separatism should be embodied in the structure of Nigerian 
                                                          
150 I.F. Nicolson (1969), The Administration of Nigerian 1900-1960, p.308-312 Oxford; where he argued that 
civil war between rival military factions between the East and the rest, was thus a logical if not the inevitable 
outcome of mutual antipathies exacerbated by much bloodshed; first individual assassination, then civil 
massacre, then civil war in 1967. 
151 Colonial Office, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities and the means 
of allaying them (London: H.M.S.O., 1958), p.87. Other basic documents include the following: Memorandum 
submitted to the Minorities Commission by the Central Executive of the Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State Movement 
(Calabar: 1957); The case for a Mid-West State by the Mid-West State Movement, Nigeria (Warri: 1957), “A 
Written Address by R.A. Fani-Kayode and O.N. Rewane, Counsel for Action Group and Allied Parties to the 
Commission of Enquiry into Minority Problems in Nigeria” (mimeographed). Lagos and Colony State 
Movement, The Case for the Creation of Lagos and Colony State within the Federation of Nigeria (Lagos); The 
Citizens Committee for Independence, The Case for More State (1957); and the brief but excellent discussion 
by Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 384-396. 
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Constitution and government; it envisaged the security of the minority in the inevitable shift 
of political gravity from the regional governments to the federal government, where no 
single nationality group pre-dominated.152  
However, prior to independence, there has been a` marked increase in oil and gas 
explorations activities in the Niger Delta. Apart from the Shell-BP Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria and the Exxon-Mobile Exploration Company which were the early 
pioneers in the search for oil in the country, other oil companies of international repute had 
also been granted licences to prospect both in the Niger Delta area as well as off-shore 
concessions on the continental shelf of Nigeria. Altogether ten continental shelf oil 
prospecting licences, three land and territorial waters oil prospecting licences and 14 oil 
mining leases have been granted to five oil companies.153 Four oil fields at Afram, Oloibiri, 
Bomu and Ebubu were also partly developed and have been proved capable of commercial 
production. A large number of exploration wells outside the area of proved production have 
also been struck encouraging oil and gas companies and the appraisal of some of these 
discoveries, something commenced even before independence. According to the Public 
Records Office, with the commissioning of the Bonny Island oil loading terminal and the 
completion of the pipeline from Bomu oil fields to Bonny island, production from the 
developing fields had risen from 16,000 to 65,000 barrels per day by the end of 1961.154  
                                                          
152 Report of the commission appointed to enquire into the fears of Minorities, p.88-89. Specific 
recommendations were made to ensure federal control of the police force and the Mid-Western, Calabar, and 
Niger Delta areas. Also see Richard L. Sklar (1963) Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African 
Nation, p.133-140 Princeton. 
153 Nigerian Handbook of Commerce & Industry, Public Record Office, compiled and published for the Federal 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, June 1962 Lagos, p.140-141 
154 Nigeria Handbook of Commerce& Industry, Public Records Office; Federal Ministry of Commerce & Industry, 
June 1962, p.140-141 
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Crude petroleum exported during 1961 amounted to 2,224,140 barrels (tons) and valued at 
over £11.5 million155. In November, 1959, agreement was reached between Shell-BP and the 
Electricity Corporation of Nigeria to use natural gas from the Afram field to generate 
electricity. The construction of the plant was completed and went into operation in 
September 1962. Since then, the Federal Government started showing keen interest in the 
Niger Delta oil industry and plans were drawn up for the establishment of a refinery in 
which the government and Shell-BP participated.156  But the minority question and the fear 
of regional ethnic hegemons grew and minorities resorting to force in the quest for self-
determination has deepened. Thus, in the 1960s some minority groups resorted to violence 
against what they perceived to be the hegemony and domination of the majority. In order 
to concentrate power and its monopoly of revenue the Federal government changed the 
basis of the Revenues Allocation formula from derivation (which had benefitted the 
hegemonic nationalities in the old regions) in favour of the principles of equality and the 
population of states.157 With specific regard to the Niger delta, provision was made for the 
creation of a Niger Delta Development Board to allay the fears of the minorities there, and 
to attend to their peculiar development needs. However, after independence in 1960, the 
board never took off and people continued to protest. The latter argued that the new 
revenue sharing formulae benefitted the big ethnic groups, thereby shutting off and 
alienating the oil producing minorities from direct access to oil-the new wealth of the 
nation. Clearly, as Momoh and Adejumobi point out: 
‘the new principles were a response to the change in the shift of the wealth of the nation from agriculture to oil, and the 
desire by the hegemonic faction of the ethnic majorities to continue to retain the larger share of national revenue. These 
                                                          
155 ibid 
156 ibid 
157 Obi, 1988, Oil and the Minority Question p.100-101 
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moves further marginalised the oil-producing ethnic minority states who saw in these changes in inter-governmental 
revenue sharing in Nigeria, a ploy to deny them the benefits of the oil produced from their ancestral lands and waters and 
perpetuate their marginalization and exploitation within the Nigeria state’.158  
This served to exacerbate contradictions between the oil-producing states and majority 
groups in Nigeria. 
Conclusion: Just as the contradictions spawned by oil in the colonial time with Europeans 
traders widened into sovereignty issues; the same is happened both before and after 
independence in the Nigerian state. A most critical point at this conjuncture is to 
meaningfully address the grievances of the oil minorities in the Niger Delta, by granting 
them more control and access to oil resources, as was the case during the time of King Jaja 
and Nana. The Oil Rivers Protectorate had been contested by King JaJa of Opobo, Chief Nana 
of Itsekiri, who argued that the British merchants who traded there before the 
establishment of the Protectorate had no more claim to compensation at the time for their 
land.  Rather the foreign traders in the territory ultimately claimed it to become a British 
possession. The case of the Niger Company was quite different; their claim to a Protectorate 
over the Niger was not firmly established at the time of the Berlin Conference in 1884. 
British predominant interest there was admitted by reason of the so-called Treaties made 
by the Niger Company with the natives Chiefs. Something which they were hitherto involved 
in along with Germany who was also contesting that region. The Company was called upon, 
for Imperial purposes, to give up exclusive commercial rights reserved to them under those 
Treaties, something which they were hitherto involved in along with Germany who was also 
contesting that region. The Niger Company had been allowed to levy £250,000 for that 
                                                          
158 Momoh, A. and Adejumobi, S (2002) The National Question in Nigeria—Comparative Perspectives, p.101 
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purpose. It was a heavy burden on trade, and one of the great advantages of placing the Oil 
Rivers under the Niger Company was that this burden spread over a wider area, and 
therefore more easily managed.  The conclusion established here is the practical monopoly 
aimed at and then obtained by the company, was not open to the objections entertained 
against monopolies in general, with a commercial advantages—so long as no regularly 
constituted authority existed in the Territory— to this trade advantage. The Territory was 
occupied by about 200 tribes, differing in language and in customs, whom were taken over 















                            Chapter Three 
   Actors and the dynamics of Conflict in the Niger Delta 
Like most conflicts involving the politics of natural resource management, the one in Niger 
Delta has its own array of actors and the politics (and intrigues) among these actors are central 
to understanding the complexities of the conflict and the politics of local and international 
reaction towards it. Understanding these actors and the dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict is 
also crucial to the understanding of different narratives that runs through ethnic lines that create 
dichotomies among the inhabitants of the region. While not going into the details that have 
been well covered in literature, the objective of the chapter is to identify the actors and the 
considerations that have determined their actions (and, sometimes, inactions) in the politics of 
the Niger Delta conflict. This is followed by a section identifying the different layers of conflict 
and how these impact on the issues of definition of “rights” and politics of sharing of natural 
resource wealth, and how they may apply to the identification of violence actors as critical 
players in oil conflict. Then, the next section examines the oil industry and violent armed 
conflict and the manner in which this agenda was defined and expanded in different ways over 
a relatively short period of time.  The central argument advanced in this chapter is that the 
zero-sum nature of the relationship between different actors contesting for control over Niger 
Delta’s natural resources is complex and in different layers. The focus will be on how a 
particular set of issues was defined by one set of actors (initially the Federal Government of 
Nigeria and regional states and subsequently, the international oil companies, militias groups 
and local communities in the Niger Delta). All try to ensure the greatest benefits coming from 
the natural resource endowment of the Niger Delta in order to establish how resource wealth 
should be shared.  The relationships among these various actors have produced a diversity of 
new forms of governance and collaboration between militias group and politicians; 
disagreement between oil companies and militants; and unification of militia groups to enhance 
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their resource control.  Therefore, this chapter part undertakes to outline the dynamics and the 
key actors so as to determine what natural resources control means in the Nigerian context.  
The dearth in research focusing on this particular area of the Niger Delta, and the fact that few 
scholars have attempted to review and classify conflict and resource control in these 
perspectives. Understanding the perspectives of these key actors are important because it will 
enlighten us as to whether the struggle for access and control of natural resources, like oil and 
gas, is perceived by security experts as increasing the likelihood of armed conflict. Given the 
tremendous complexity and diversity in how oil and gas is perceived among the groups 
mentioned above, it is not too surprising that there is a multiplicity of approaches in 
understanding the experiences and perspectives.
159
 Thus, it is important to explicate the 
different actors involved in the politics of the Niger Delta. These are: (1) The Federal 
Government Perspective (2) that of the Oil Producing States Perspective, (3) the Perspective of 
Oil Companies, (4) the Militants Perspective and (5) the Local Communities Perspective. 
1. The Federal Government Perspective: According to this perspective, ownership of 
mineral resources especially oil and gas is vested in the state. Constitutionally and 
statutory provisions in Nigeria make clear the Federal Government’s ownership and 
control of natural resources, particularly oil and gas. Therefore, as provided by section 
162(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria is required to maintain a special account—to be called the 
Federation Account—into which shall be paid all revenues collected from the export of 
oil. This account is to be shared according to the derivative principle. The Federal 
Government strongly believe that state ownership of natural resources affects both the 
                                                          
159 Ibaba. S. Ibaba (2011) Corruption, human-right violation, and the interface with violence in the Niger Delta, 
Development in Practice, 21:1, 244-254, conceived natural resources conflict as corruption-induced violations 
that have become cyclical, and calls for the integration of the fight against corruption into the peace-building 
process in the Niger Delta. 
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land, subsoil minerals and the source of oil revenues. Therefore, regional states have no 
property rights to onshore/offshore mining space, all of which should be shared equally 
regardless of the proximity to any particular state of the federation.
160
  Federally-
collected revenue is the mainstay of the finances of the governments, accounting for a 
little over 90 per cent of their total revenue. Upon this revenue, therefore, depends on 
the ability of the state governments to maintain their services—to pay their staffs, 
essential supplies and execute capital-intensive projects. The financial viability and 
credibility as autonomous governmental units hung upon it. As far as these other 
governmental units are concerned, the motivation for its sharing is understandably one 
of self-survival. For them the sharing is a matter of life and death, exciting their deepest 
concerns and strongest emotions. Hence the intensity of the question surrounding this 
issue. This contrasts with the motivation for revenue sharing in older federation like the 
United States where the revenue to be shared represents only a small fraction of the 
states’ total revenue, and is therefore “merely a supplementary rather than a primary 
source of State resources”. As the Okigbo’s Commission on Revenue Allocation (1980) 
pertinently observed: 
            ‘The primary motivation for revenue sharing in the United States is economic: 
               To assist the financially and fiscally weak States with federally-collected revenues…… 
              For this reason, also the system of sharing is essentially through grants whether tied 
             To a formula, or to a project or to a programme or to a category of needs.’161                
2. Oil Producing States Perspective: From this perspective, the five littoral States of Akwa 
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Rivers and Delta state believe that sharing of oil revenues 
                                                          
160 When the modern age of oil production began in the early twentieth century, government ownership of 
subsoil minerals was well established in Europe. The British Crown already claimed ownership of gold and 
silver deposits; with the Petroleum Act of 1918, it established ownership of all petroleum deposits as well. 
From Europe, the principle of sovereign ownership was passed on through to British colonies abroad as a legal 
obligation codes of conduct in the British empire, see Ross (2012), p. 34 
161 Report of the Presidential Commission on Revenue Allocation, Federal Government Press, Apapa Lagos (the 
Okigbo Commission) (1980), vol.1, para.31 
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between the Federal and sub-national governments of the federation has been done in a 
grossly unequal fashion. The states argued that the derivative formula gives the federal 
government a disproportionately higher revenue share in onshore and offshore space. 
Therefore, the Onshore/Offshore Oil Dichotomy, as it is called in Nigeria, is the latest 
dimension of the conflict over ownership and control of oil mining space in the 
country. The present revenue distribution formula between the autonomous 
governments of the Federation is enshrined in the 1999 Constitution, whereby section 
162(2) provides for an allocation of only 13% derivation revenue to the oil generating 
states (in reality, to oil mineral producing states). As Kenneth Omeje (2006) points out, 
in addition to the 13% derivation revenue, the 1999 formula allocates the national 
revenue as follows: Federal government (48.50%), State governments (24%) and Local 
governments (20%).
162
  But south-south geopolitical  states argue that the Federal 
government only  implemented the payment of 13% derivation revenue with respect to 
resources generated from onshore oil mining space and has never extended the 
payment to offshore resources regarded by the Federal government as resources under 
the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf of the sovereign Federal state.
163
 Since 
nearly half of Nigeria’s crude oil resource are produced offshore, therefore, the Niger 
                                                          
162 Omeje, Kenneth (2006) “The Rentier State: Oil—related Legislation and Conflict in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria”, Conflict, Security & Development, 6: 2, 211-230. 
163 The people of the Niger Delta have long being agitating for upward review of the derivation paid to oil 
producing states from the present 13% to not less than 50% to enable them tackle the myriads of problems 
confronting them, as a result of oil exploration activities. They argued that there precedence, pointing out that 
50% of revenue from oil and gas were officially allocated to areas from which those resources were derived 
during Nigeria’s First Republic from 1960 to 1966. However, as Nigeria’s oil industry boomed and the 
government increasingly relied on oil income from the Delta region, subsequent military administrations 
reduced derivation payments to 45% in 1970, 20% in 1975 and by the time then military government handed 
over power civilian administration in 1979, the derivation principle had been abolished. In 1982, under the 
civilian administration, it was reset to 1.5% allocated directly to oil producing states. In the final part of the 
Babangida regime in 1992, the share of revenues specifically allocated to oil producing states was doubled to 
3%. This was as a result arising from the recommendations of a 1995 constitutional review conference, 
derivation payments were increased to 13%, where they currently stand. Also See Ronald & Ejibunu (2007) 




Delta littoral States felt they were not compensated for a significant proportion of crude 
oil resources mined from their coastal backyard, where mining leaves them with 
devastating ecological consequences. 
3.  Militant Perspective: Militants have argued that exploitation of natural resources must 
go hand in hand with economic development of basic infrastructure in areas where oil 
and gas is produced to achieve stability and security for oil company assets. Militants 
believe that unless the issue of economic development, poverty eradication, and 
unemployment is addressed, oil companies must be obliged to cancel their contract 
with the Federal Government and leave.
164
 Regarding the issue of infrastructural 
development, militant groups have advocated a program of road building, water piping, 
electricity networks upgrading, improvement to water transport systems, schools and 
health facilities for all communities within 70 kilometres of oil and gas fields in all 
settlement areas of the Niger Delta. In addition, to ensure stability and oil supplies, they 
argue that the Federal Government and Oil Companies must create licences for 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta communities or clusters of communities with any 
population up to 100,000 people.
165
  In other words, licences should be created to allow 
those communities to own and operate an electric and water company—such facilities 
would be built by the Federal Government in partnership with the oil companies 
operating in such communities. The counter argument is that government officials often 
cite difficult topography and terrain, reason they argue for lack of infrastructure 
development. Their argument is that the Niger Delta terrain is swampy and 
problematic. But militants counter that, the government managed to find a way around 
                                                          
164 To resolve the issue of revenue allocation at the National Political Reform Conference in July 2005, Niger 
Delta delegates asked the federal government to increase derivation payments between 25% and 50% of 
revenues, an offer that was countered by an unofficial offer of 17%.  But it was rejected by the federal 
government and Niger Delta delegates walked out the conference in anger after a group of influential northern 
leaders—the Arewa Consultative Forum derided the 17% offer as an excessive generosity. 
165 The Jamestown Foundation: The Niger Delta Insurgency and its threat to energy security, 22 February 2011. 
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similar problems in the Oworoshoki Mainland axis of Lagos. There, the government 
constructed the longest bridge in Africa stretching 30 miles over this equally difficult 
terrain. Therefore, the argument that the Niger Delta terrain hinders development and 
modernization is belied by the government’s capital expenditure to reclaim and develop 
the comparable Lagos region, and the development of the New Federal Capital 
Territory in Abuja with new infrastructure projects in a mountainous region. 
4. Oil Companies’ Perspective: Multinational oil and gas companies contest and argue 
that, the instability in the Niger Delta is a result of the State’s failure to redistribute 
natural resource wealth appropriately. They argue that since MNCs are public limited 
liability legal entities with the motive of exploring and producing of oil and gas to make 
profit and pay dividends to their shareholders, they are obliged to engage in economic 
development in the local communities in which they operate. Rather, they strongly 
believe that their main aim and responsibilities in a joint venture or production sharing 
contract agreement with the Federal Government is: (1) to pay tax from their profit, and 
(2) create jobs by investing in new exploration and production ventures.
166
 The view is 
held that it is the duty of the Federal Government, who receives economic rents, to 
provide public infrastructure, security and protect oil and gas assets. 
5.  Local Communities Perspective: According to the local community perspective, the 
practice of true federalism should be based on the pact of federating units expressing 
their rights to primarily control of natural resources within their borders; in the process 
                                                          
166 Oil companies proposed the introduction of the Alaska Model through direct distribution of revenue to the 
people in light of the people’s complaint that oil to them is a curse, since they have had no any direct benefit 
from it. This process involves a radical approach whereby revenue will be distributed directly to the population 
rather than being held by government. This approach being suggested is used in Alaska, USA, where 15% of oil 
royalties is channelled into the Alaska Permanent Fund, and one half of the fund’s investment earning as direct 
cash payment to the state’s residents and host communities in the form of annual cheque or through 
registered trustees of communities clusters. A cluster will be made of up to at least 50,000 residents and the 
communities can elect to use the funds to implement specific development projects. 
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and they all make agreed contributions towards the maintenance of common services 
offered by the sovereign nation state to which they belong.
167
 For example, in their final 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between different communities in Niger 
Delta—the so called- “Kaiama Declaration”, it was posited that in order to address the 
growing discontent regarding lack of access to control of natural resources, the Federal 
government must recognize that, “all land and natural resources within the Niger Delta 
territory belong to local communities because they are the basis of their survival”.168  
Local communities also rejected the Land Use Act of 1979. Land related problem in 
the Niger Delta are many since land is highly limited in the area. Very often the 
indigenous people are evicted from the small portions of their native land to make way 
for oil exploration and production activities. This practice further reduces the amount 
of land available for local economic activities and residential purposes.
169
 Also, local 
communities argue that the government must respect rules such as those on Importing-
State Policies and International Law based on WTO-GATT which requires public 
accountability over resources and the following principles: (a) self-determination 
whereby, citizens of the country, not the regime or foreigners, have final authority over 
the laws of the country, including the laws regarding the disposition of natural 
resources; (b) human rights in which no regime may prevent citizens from exercising 
their final authority over the law; and (c) property rights whereby, resources of a country 
are ultimately the people’s rights to dispose of as stated in the human rights treaties, that 
                                                          
167 Local Communities proposed solutions is the transfer of resources control as a degree of ownership to local 
governments by ensuring that they acquire shares in joint venture (JVs) companies. This way they feel vested 
in the oil industry. Given that the average federal government share holdings in the JVs is about 60%, they 
proposed that 15% of these shares should be transferred or sold to the state government and 15% to the local 
governments while the federal government should retain the balance of 30%. 
168 See “Kaiama Declaration” by the Niger Delta Youth Council which can be regarded as the beginning of the 
current wave of “resource control”, struggle in the region, December 11, 1998. 
169 Azaiki, S. (2007) Oil, Gas and life in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, where he argues that the token compensation 
for this displacement is paid in some cases and denied in others. Therefore, residents rarely own their land, 
p.201 Y-Book Ibadan 
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country’s natural wealth and resources are “theirs”170. To take the analogy of Wenar 
(2012): each country’s citizens are the shareholders of the country’s natural assets. 
Citizens do not manage these assets directly, but citizens are the owners of the assets.
171
 
                            Layers of Instability and Conflicts in the Niger Delta 
In understanding the above perspectives, this study analyses the different layers of instability 
and conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Based on the fact that the Nigerian Federation 
comprises more than 250 ethnic groups, there are different levels of dispute among oil 
producing communities within the same ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta; between the 
Federal government and oil producing states; and between oil companies and militants groups. 
It is essential to probe into the level of violence in the area of study. We are becoming aware 
that there is high degree of fear of instability by multinational oil companies, local communities 
and government agencies for insecurity of personnel, oil infrastructure and assets. Probing into 
these layers of conflict will enable us to better understand the causes and the rate of violent 
conflict resulting from the struggle for access and control of natural resources in the Niger 
Delta. 
First Layer: These conflicts happen among different oil producing communities within the 
state, between youths, militants groups of different ethnic identity whilst they battle for political 
power which centre on many controversies such as those over land tenure, unresolved 
chieftaincy title, the location of local government headquarters or the issues of access to the 
control of oil revenue. For example, this issue of access to the control of oil revenue 
exacerbated the disputes between youths and traditional chiefs among the Ijaws and the Itsekiri 
                                                          
170 See WTO/GATT The Economic Rights & Duties of States in the Ownership of Natural Resources 1998, p.145-
49 
171 Leif Wenar (2012) Clean Trade In Natural Resources-A Policy Framework for Importing States and 
Multinationals in the Extractive Industries, p.7 see wenar.info/CleanTrade.html  
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turning violent in Warri in 2004, 2007 and 2009. This had resulted to armed clashes between 
warring fashions vying for resource control. 
Second Layer: This is between the Federal government and oil producing communities in the 
Niger Delta. This occurs due to a perception that the method used for revenue allocation at the 
local level is unacceptable; that the environmental damage being suffered during the course of 
oil exploration, and the strategies of divide-and-rule often employed by the government, 
especially through the citing of public infrastructures and amenities in one part of opposition 
party—adversely affecting the communities in the Niger Delta. These and earlier grievance 
invariably preventing development projects by armed youths and clashes between militias and 
government security forces. 
Third Layer: This is between the Federal Government and the State Government. It occurs as 
a consequence of a disagreement over how revenues are shared from the offshore/onshore oil 
production. This has resulted in court cases wherein there is disagreement over whether coastal 
states exercise the right over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploiting its natural 
resources. For example, the littoral States of the Niger Delta claims that, since the Federal 
Government began to implement the constitutional provision on derivation, it has at the same 
time insisted on the onshore—offshore dichotomy and failed to apply the stipulated 13% 
derivation principle to all oil derived from offshore revenue.
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Fourth Layer: This is between the State Government and oil-producing communities within the 
state. The major causes of these conflicts are: (1) non-disbursement of allocation of oil 
revenues coming from the Federal Government to Local Government Areas (LGAs); (2) 
hidden and sometimes blatant support being given to the Federal Government’s repressive 
measures; and (3) collaboration with multinational oil companies in the arrest, detention and 
                                                          




torture of members of armed groups. The results include an increased manifestation of armed 
resistance, especially by militia groups and the closing down oil refineries.
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Fifth Layer: This is between multinational oil corporations and oil-producing communities in 
the Niger Delta, where there is a lack of Federal Government regulations for addressing the 
issues of environmental pollution. The issues of environmental pollution caused by the process 
of oil exploration is thus an important point of tension which is coupled with the endorsement 
of oil companies to government security forces who use repressive methods, and a lack of 
respect for indigenous customs. Such issues builds on an anger connected to the failure to carry 
out promised development projects. Subsequently, to empower themselves in this struggle, 
groups have become increasingly militia, taking the law into their own hands by kidnapping of 
foreign and domestic oil workers and the sabotaging oil pipelines as a form of gaining 
leverage.
174
 As Hill (2010) points out, this lawlessness, perpetuated by the failings of government 
local justice systems has driven the recent growth of private security companies which have 
been set up to protect personnel and oil infrastructures.
175
 Subsequently, because of the high 
level of violence in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government, multinational corporations, and 




                                                          
173 Alao A., (2007) Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa: The Tragedy of Endowment, where he argued that 
conflicts involving oil manifest in different layers and controversies with causes and effects, p.194-198 
174 ibid 
175 JNC Hill (2010) Corruption in the Courts: The Achilles’Heel of Nigeria’s regulatory framework? Where he 
argues that this level of conflict has led to expansion of private security companies (PSS), providing a range of 
services to a wide variety of client ranging from guarding oil installations in the Niger Delta, to training the 
armed forces, and protecting children as they make their way to and from school each day; Third World 
Quarterly, 31:7, 1161-1179 
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                                     Layers of Instability and Conflict Dynamics
 
Source: Own Analysis 
Table 3.1 Impacts of Conflict and the Dynamic in the Niger Delta 
Type of Layers        Dynamic and Tactics Outcome/Impact in the Niger 
Delta 
Intra-community conflict Violent attacks on opposing 
factions by armed youths or 
militants group 
Destruction of properties: building 
and personal effects, 
deaths/injuries, population 
displacement and loss of livelihood 
Inter-community conflicts (a)Violent attacks on opposing 
communities by armed youths 
(b)Attacks on rivers, stream and 
creeks with dangerous chemicals 
such as Gamelan and dynamites 
(a) Destruction of properties: 
buildings and personal effects, 
death/injuries, population 
displacement and water borne 
diseases 
(b) Pollution of water and 
destruction of marine life 
Community—Oil Company 
conflict 
(a) Occupation of oil-
production facilities such as 
flow station, blockade of 
access roads to oil 
(a) Oil companies invited the 
police and military to 
protect their equipment 
and facilities. These 



































production sites, seizure of 
equipment such as drilling 
rings and vehicles 
(b) Sabotage of oil 
infrastructure such as oil 
pipelines and well heads 
interventions led to violent 
clashes, causing deaths, 
injuries, destruction of 
homes and other properties 
(b) Results in oil spills that 
devastate the environment 
Community—State conflict (a) Militant strategy of forceful 
seizure of land and attacks 
on oil production 
infrastructure, 
kidnapping/hostage taking 
of oil workers, attacks and 
counterattacks between 
militants and the military 
(b) Oil theft (oil bunkering) to 
raise funds for recruitment 
and mobilization of 
militants, and as economic 
enterprise 
(a) Destruction of local 
communities and 
properties, deaths and 
injuries, internal population 
displacement(refugees) loss 
of livelihood, and pressure 
on natural resources caused 
by life-coping measures of 
displaced persons 
(b) Results in oil spills that 
devastate the environment 
Inter-ethnic Violent attacks on opposing ethnic 
groups by armed youths 
Destruction of properties: building 
and personal effects, 
deaths/injuries, population 




Speed-boats petrol face to face 
shoot-out with government military 
task-force versus MEND groups in 
creeks and rivers 
Blowing-up of pipelines, export 
terminals, and flow station; export 
closure that reduces revenue 
allocation to states 
  Source: Ibaba S. Ibaba (2011) Corruption, Human-Rights, and the Interface with Violence in the Niger Delta, Development in Practice  
                                 Oil industry and Violence armed conflict 
It has become common knowledge as indicated above that the attempt to control oil revenues 
remain the roots cause of violence in the Niger Delta. That violence which as we have shown 
has different layers to it remains a significant threat to the oil economy in Nigeria. Shell, the 
largest of the oil companies operating in the country, reported a loss of about 43 million barrels 
of oil in 2012 as a result of shutdowns to production facilities arising from communal conflict, 
especially in the Delta, Bayelsa and River state. The company also reported around 188 crude 
oil theft incidents, resulting in the loss of an estimated 10 million barrels of oil, seventy-eight 





 This bring us back again to the political economy of conflict. Empirical and 
policy-oriented research has identified a number of fundamental mechanisms by which foreign 
trade and investment can contribute to the political economy of conflict by creating conditions 
that facilitate the eruption of violence or its continuation.
177
 Some mechanisms are general in 
nature, while others are specific to the development and exploitation of natural resource 
wealth, thus leading to the special targeting of the oil industry. The main mechanisms are: (1) 
the attractions and depredations of resource wealth itself; (2) the politics of inequitable 
distribution of economic activity, often exacerbated by ethnic divisions; and (3) problems 
stemming from security or protection of services provided to firms, which arise at the project, 
community, and state levels.
178
 
Moreover, high-value natural resources can be categorised according to whether they are 
‘lootable’ or ‘non-lootable’, which have different patterns in their relationship to the outbreak 
of conflict.
179
 Lootable resources are easily obtained and carried from place to place, with high 
value for their weight. The best-known example is that of diamonds. Although deep-mined 
diamonds may be difficult to obtain and trade illegally, many areas of West Africa have alluvial 
diamonds, which do not require deep mining. Much of the diamonds business in alluvial fields 
is by artisanal miners, who sell their diamonds to middlemen, such as the so-called “Blood 
Diamonds” in the Sierra Leone civil war in the 1990s. These then become part of a chain of 
diamonds sales, polishing, and marketing that stretches across the globe and spans legal and 
illegal markets. 
Then is the fixed-resource development (non-lootable), such as oil and gas projects or deep 
mining typically requiring contracting between governments and investors. Such contracts 
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stipulate, among many other things the percentage of revenue from the project that must be 
paid to the government as taxes and fees. But in the Niger Delta this fixed-resource can now be 
looted by tapping into pipelines and siphoning oil into badges for private sale in the high seas. 
The end result is that revenues from legitimate business that is meant for positive development 
goals instead produce conflict and underdevelopment. Therefore, the Niger Delta as an already 
weakened state is particularly susceptible to the dangers of mismanaged resource development. 
In many cases, these problems are exacerbated by the lack of security. When it comes to 
private sector trade and investment like oil and gas, fixed investments face a much bigger 
security risk than others. For example, most mobile industry and services simply leave conflict-
ridden areas, but large projects may remain in place (although they may cease operations at the 
height of violence).
180
 According to data obtain from the Ministry of Petroleum, foreign 
companies are obliged by their contract with governments to secure protection through the use 
of government military task force or the police to protect their assets. A community leader 
interviewed in Warri South Local Government Area indicated that government forces have 
used company facilities—private airports, helicopters, and trucks—in order to carry out what he 
called “repressive operations” against local communities.181 In a string high-profile incidents in 
Odi in Bayelsa state in 1999, such private forces also proved to be in war crimes against civilian 
populations and were accused also of corruption. In all these cases, the inequity of providing 
security to companies and their employees instead of local communities can become a 
significant source of grievance.  
                                                          
180 Most businesses flee violence, but some do not. If the violence is in a distant of inaccessible part of the 
country or the firm is not itself a target of attack, then businesses can continue. For example, the oil industry 
continued operating throughout the Angolan civil war because it was not a target of attack and most of the 
fighting was outside the oil-offshore producing areas while the fighting was onshore; see Berman (2000).p 101 
on views on natural resources conflict. 
181 There are disputes about the exact relationship between company managers and public and private 
security forces operating in the Niger Delta in several interviews conducted in April 2013. Some within the 
companies defend themselves as unwitting accomplices in atrocities, while others accuse them of acting in full 
knowledge of the dangers of using any sort of security forces in such an uncertain environment in protection 
oil and fields. 
144 
 
Moreover, there is widespread accusation of environmental damage and the issue of 
companies’ lack of corporate social responsibility. For example, the 2011 United Nations 
Environment Programme, environmental assessment of the Niger Delta showed demonstrated 
a clear case of environmental devastation and grave threat to public health, especially the high 
risk of benzene contamination of water tables due to decades of unsustainable oil production in 
the area by multinational oil companies. Regarding instability, a major study commissioned by 
Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria (SPDCN) itself state: “it is clear that 
Shall Petroleum is part of the Niger Delta conflict dynamics and that its social license to 
operate is fast eroding.” This results from, “a quick fix, reactive and divisive approach to 
community engagement expressed through different areas of policy, practice and corporate 
culture”.182 In all the local communities visited during my fieldwork, there are widespread 
allegations of this divisive approach and susceptibility to unethical methods in handling 
community relations by oil company field managers. For the companies, they do not seem to 
be subject to adequate scrutiny and aspect of their community relations budgets that come 
under the nebulous cover of security that leave room for abuse.  
Indeed, due to constant threats to oil companies operations in the Niger Delta by militias, 
youths and community grievances, it was widely speculated in the media especially in 2008 
during the peak of violent conflict that Shell and ExxonMobil would withdraw from Nigeria. 
But the companies promptly dismissed the speculation. A Total oil company director 
interviewed stated clearly that the oil business is too lucrative in Nigeria for oil companies to so 
easily shut their door and leave. Nevertheless, according to an NNPC document relating to a 
joint venture with Shell in some of the onshore oil and gas fields, it was made known that Shell 
auctioned almost 30 per cent of their stake-hold in the most security dangerous areas to 
SINOPEC of China. In fact, to avoid the demands of host communities the Nigeria 
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government has been encouraging oil companies to pay increasing attention to offshore oil 
development. However, the MNCs are not particularly worries, since they are part of a joint 
venture with the Nigeria government, which is represented by NNPC and the costs are simply 
transferred to the joint venture account.
183
 The companies, therefore, lose very little. In fact, 
they have everything to gain with the current record prices of oil in the world market. The 
losers are actually the poor people of the Niger Delta and the rest of Nigeria who continue to 
be victims of both bad governance and militias attacks in the quest for selfish and corporate 
profit by MNCs. Yet, peace and stability in the region remains paramount to both the Niger 
Delta people and the government. The government’s latest efforts in this direction have been 
the adoption and implementation of Amnesty Programme (AP) in the region since 2009. The 
majority of the oil refined in illegal Nigerian refineries goes to waste—making it a highly 
polluting industry. 
Output Produce 
Source: Stakeholder Democracy Network-The Wall Street Journal, 2015 
                                                          












 Pipeline theft in the Niger Delta ranked among the petroleum industry’s most difficult 
problem—an invisible tax priced into the global cost of oil. Major oil companies shut pipelines. 
For example, the Royal Dutch Shell PLC has sold off at least $2.4 billion of oil properties in 
Nigeria since 2010. Meanwhile, environmentalist watched the constant spills add up. Another 
United Nations report in 2011 reckoned it would take 30 years to clean this expense of coastal 
wetlands. There have been countless more spills since then. 
Moreover, until recently, government book-keepers could only guess how many hundreds of 
thousands of barrels of oil were taken each day. Now, as of January 2015 officials in the 
presidency said it is less than 50,000 barrels of the 2.3 million Nigeria produces daily.        
 Civil Militias Role as Actors in Natural Resources Control in the Niger Delta 
Before we properly grasp the dynamics of the theoretical construct of civil militias in the Niger 
Delta, there is the need to understand the evolution and concept of civil militia. There are two 
levels: (1) State-Centric Theory; and (2) Non-State Theory of social construct. There are also 
two levels of understanding regarding state-centric theory of militias. These are the First 
Generation and Second Generation concepts of civil militias. The first generation militias 
operate in strong and viable states. The second operates as a challenge to the state failure to 
meet the expectation that led the struggle against colonial rule. In this instance, the Second 
Generation militias operate at level of Non-State Actors (NSA). This tend to manifest in 
guerrilla, terrorist or with mercenary-militia attributes.
184
  The centrality of this theoretical 
variable posits that militias emerge either as a result of increasing inability of regular 
professional military forces to cope with the ebbing social problems in society. It could also be 
an attempt to complement the effort of the state military forces in time of war, disaster, 
                                                          
184 See Yoroms G.J. (2005) in Francis (ed) : Militias as a Social Phenomenon-Toward a Theoretical Construction 
where he argues that the character of the state as a legitimate authority specifically determine the state-
centric theory of militias over a given territorial entity, p.33-36 
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emergencies and related civil police actions among other contending social phenomena. This is 
supported by the view that the use of the military in less-combatant conflicts gives the 
impression of a war scenario that will scare foreign investors. Therefore, to address the non-war 
driven scenario, militias become relevant in establishing the moral antecedent of the state, from 
its legitimate use of force, which has become repugnant for ordinary people living in the Niger 
Delta. 
There are also community militias. Community militias are citizen soldiers. They are recruited, 
trained and located within the communities as it’s done in the Niger Delta. They are made up 
of members of the communities where they are recruited and stationed. They are bound to 
their communities as part of the mandate and legacy which citizens’ soldiers are known for. 
And as community soldiers, they are mostly made up of volunteer citizens, who willingly offer 
themselves for military training. Citizens from villages and communities are encouraged to take 
short-term military training in such a way that their normal vocational activities may not be 
affected during the period when their service is required.
185
 Based on the foregoing, militias are 
defined as citizens primarily and soldiers only on occasion. Also, community militias tend to 
have strong support from the state as it helps to decentralise the cumbersome processes of 
providing security; an example of this was seen with the establishment of the Janjaweed militias 
in Sudan Darfur region. This becomes necessary when the state security apparatus is 
insufficient to provide security. In the case of civil society militias, community militias in 
particular act as supplement to the state’s military power. 
However, with the development in society, following the pressures for self-determination, 
separation of powers between the structures of government, the quest for liberty and the right 
of individuals to freedom means that, the state loses its appeal as a legitimate user of force. This 
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is the fundamental basis for the rise of non-state militias with the objective of challenging the 
existence of the state. While the state may be raising its armed forces to defend the general will 
of the people, it may also be confronting other social components not willing to concede to the 
general will that establishes the state. As the state increases the standard of its forces in terms of 
weaponry and establishment of militias and reserve forces, the rebellious group may also be 
raising civil militia forces for their own defence and to contest the state. This can led to the 
collapse of the state as a result of some social and economic discontents, which create a basis 
for revolutionary pressures from within society.
186
 The state becomes weak as its basic functions 
can longer meet the security requirements of the population. In this case it cannot survive by 
coercion as much as it can no longer earn the confidence of the people.
187
 It is on this basis that 
the rise of ‘First Generation’ civil militias in the Niger Delta becomes prominent in this thesis. 
On the other hand, with regards to Second Generation militias, from the conceptual analyses 
we can make a general deduction that these can emerge in any society for various reasons: First, 
they may arise as a form of defence of particular social and cultural values of an ethnic group. 
Second, they may demand a share in the economic resources of the country by violence when 
regular procedures have failed. Third, they also engage in fighting to liberate themselves from 
political repression or marginalization. This involves making demands for greater autonomy of 
political participation or by changing the political structure of governance in their favour. In this 
case, sometimes, the militia becomes revolutionary by being irredentist or separatist in 
approach. Fourth, where the government fails to provide security for some groups or 
individuals, these groups may then organize vigilante or personal security to protect themselves 
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and their property without recourse to due process of the law. Fifth, in some cases militias are 
formed for the purpose of protecting the environment from degradation as well as using it as a 
means to take ownership of resources, which they have been hitherto denied. For example, in 
Africa many militias developed in the context of struggle of particular ethnic groups, classes and 
general uprising against colonial rule. These groups and classes saw the formation of militias, 
commonly known as guerrilla forces as a means toward actualising their self-determination. 
This was common in Southern African countries like Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and South 
Africa. The South Africa National Congress (ANC) was a unique case of multiple ethnic 
associations struggling for self-determination. But before we go into the understanding of the 
types of militias groups in the Niger Delta, it is important for us to clarify what constitute Non-
State Militias Actors. 
 Non-state Militia Actors or Group theory can be categorised into two: First, we have those that 
are socially guaranteed by the state to perform some functions as defined by the existence of 
the state.
188
 These include party militias and other volunteer groups. Apart from community 
militias, which have a relationship with the state in maintaining the status quo, there exists also 
political party militias and private security militias, which exist as socially guaranteed civil 
militias. There are Party militias and Private militias. Party militias are the armed wings of 
political parties set up as militant propaganda machineries and the protective organ of the party 
to be present at its various meetings. They are distinct because of their features as armed wing 
of political parties, which are power-seeking organizations. Political parties raise militias to 
strengthen and defend their struggle for political power (as was the case in the Niger Delta 
general elections of 1999, 2003 and 2007). They have regular exercises like training and 
political education programs. Party militias help to maintain order within the party. They play 
fundamental, though sometimes secondary and unobtrusive roles. The militias can be used to 
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overthrow a government. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood pressure group in Egypt and 
the Salafi in Libya that helped to overthrow President Mubarak and Gaddafi in 2011 in the 
Arab Spring uprising is a case in point. 
Civil society militias may not be socially guaranteed by the state but are in some countries 
tolerated for some obvious reasons such as their use in covertly defending or helping the state. 
Such civil society militias may be based on an ethnic, religious basis or even those within labour 
unions which are more ideological. They can be differentiated from community militias 
because they cut across boundaries and barriers. Unlike community militias that are 
territorially-bound civil society militias recruit their membership on the basis of interest, with 
multiple identities and ideologies potentially being evoked.  They could be private security 
outfits or groups recruited and trained to defend the interest of their sponsors or the cause of 
the group once their interest are undermined. The state centric is a type of first generation 
concept of civil militias that emerge as a reaction to the failure of the state to meet rising 
expectation. But it is the reactive militias like MEND in Niger Delta that concern us in this 
thesis. However, the state’s militias are intended to maintain the status quo while the reactive 
militias respond to the status quo by reacting negatively. 
The Non-state theory is defined by the fact that it is a private force. Therefore, following the 
theory of social contract, it is an illegitimate force established by groups to withstand the 
legitimate exercise of the use of force by the state. In the social contract, Rousseau argued that 
‘natural man’s freedom was an inferior kind of freedom and that a more developed freedom 
was possible only in political society’.189 The militias in this category are organised into armed 
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group for the purpose of challenging the status quo, or with the purpose of achieving their goals 
and objectives within the larger environment where they are marginalized, denied their rights 
and alienated. Group militias see violence as a means of de-monopolising the instrument of 
power by intending to cause violence. The vogue mind set is that the oppressor understands 
only the language of violence rather than non-violence. 
As Davidson pointed out, such militias aim not only to defeat an aggressive enemy (whether 
external or internal), but also aim to overthrow a tyrannical regime, arbitrariness or 
oppressions.
190
 They engage mostly in irregular or non-conventional fights with the state, as their 
fighting strength cannot withstand the fire power and assaults coming from regular forces. Thus 
the militias are not just groups of armed bandits having political intentions to defend their 
interests but in most cases also seek to destroy the state. The methodology and tactics of non-
state militia start with establishing cells for political education. The essence of this is to 
indoctrinate members about the objectives of the struggle and debrief them on certain policies 
of the state that are disadvantageous to them. It is believed the solution lies on turning their 
disaffection and frustrations into threats by making the country ungovernable. By this means it 
draws attention to their collective plight. In the course of doing this, the group may become a 
guerrilla force when the government decides to react by confronting them with her regular 
military force. This can drive them underground and they may begin to fight an invincible war 
against such regular forces. For example, Boko Haram insurgency in the North East of Nigeria 
can be categorized into this level. In the process, they may draw strength from local and 
international sympathy that will enable them to expand their scope of operations to destabilise 
the state. In most cases though not all Non-State Militia Actors are well known. In most cases 
only the moderate ones are given the rights of registration to operate. The most radical ones 
are not allowed to operate because of the fundamental course they pursue; they operate outside 
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the state purview. They maintain consistency in their attack of government policies and are 
prepared to retaliate once the state security organs physically assault them. They are however, 
known by their actions, territorial staging posts, demand and symbolic identities. 
          Factors Investigated toward a Theoretical Construction of Violence Conflict 
 At the root of the current problems of the Niger Delta region is the issue of “resource control” 
which the oil producing communities are protesting. Since the exploration and production of 
crude oil and gas commenced in the region over 50 years ago, the federal government has 
always claimed to have “ownership” and “control” over the resources while production is 
carried out by multinational companies under joint venture arrangements with the federal 
government. 
First, the oil producing states and communities argued that they have been left out in this 
arrangement (between the federal government and the multi-national oil conglomerates). 
Second, their frustration is against the arrangement whereby, less than 3% of the total oil 
revenue that the federal government has realized from its “control” of the oil and gas industry 
has been used in the development of oil producing communities. The result is that abject 
poverty is still pervasive in oil producing communities unlike many parts of the country and oil 
producing communities in other parts of the world. Thus the oil producing communities have 
been struggling to wrestle back “ownership” and “control” of the oil industry from the federal 
government. The aim is to compel the federal government and the oil companies to devote 




                                                          




Third, looking back at the period independence in 1960 (see chapter Two), the founding 
fathers of Nigeria agreed to have a ‘true federation’i of three regions. In 1963, the Mid-West 
region was carved out of the Western region, as the fourth region of the federation. The 1963 
constitution was fashioned to reflect some of the tenets of true federalism. For instance, it 
included a provision for the payment of 50% derivation (of rents and royalties from mineral 
resources) to the regions from where such mineral resources were obtained. 
However, when the military took over the government in 1966 it opted for a federal system of 
government and dismantled the regional governments, replacing them with 12 states 
governments and increased the number gradually to 36 states before handing power over to a 
democratically elected regime in May 1999. In line with the centralization of fiscal powers, the 
military regime abolished the 50% derivation in 1969. After the civil war, crude oil became the 
major sources of government revenue after the sharp increase in crude oil prices in 1973/74 
and the rapid increase in Nigeria’s crude oil production. By the mid- 1970s, oil had become 
the mainstream of the economy, accounting for over 85% of federally collected revenue and 
95% of foreign exchange revenue. All the oil is produce in the Niger Delta region and its 
adjoining offshore area but the region remained neglected and impoverished and faced the 
negative consequences of oil exploration and production activities.
192
 
Successive military regimes dominated by military generals who were not from the Niger Delta 
region did not deem it fit to tackle the development and environmental problems of the oil 
producing areas or allocate a good percentage of revenue accruing from oil to the oil-producing 
states to address these problems. In 1980, the federal civilian government reduced the 
derivative allocation to oil producing states to 1.5% but later increased this to 2.5% of the 
Federation Account which was allocated to a special committee to tackle the developmental 
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problems of the oil-producing areas. The committee was ineffective and most of the revenue 
the committee received ended up in private accounts of bureaucrats and contractors and did 
not reach the poor people of oil producing communities. With the return of the military in 
1984, the 2.5% was scrapped.
193
  
Meanwhile discontent and restiveness continued to grow in the oil producing areas of the Niger 
Delta. The major grievances of different ethnic groups like: the Ijaws, Urhobos, Isoko’s, Itsekiri 
and the Ogonis are centred on wealth distribution policies of the government. The ethnics 
groups demanded that a larger proportion of Nigeria’s oil wealth be spent on their 
communities, rather than distributed throughout the country. For example, under the 1960 and 
1963 Nigeria constitution, 50 per cent of oil revenue was returned to the states in which the 
resources were derived.  
Currently, under the 1999 constitution, this “derivation formula” stands at 13 per cent and 
much of the money never trickles down to the community level due to massive corruption. 
The federal government has promised to slightly increase the revenue allocation to the states in 
the future. The ethnic communities are calling for derivation formula of 25 per cent. They are 




 Partly as a result of these disagreements, the Ijaws, Urhobos, Ogoni, llaje and the Isokos 
formed militias groups that launched attacks against the oil infrastructure and expatriates 
working in the Delta, as well as against government authorities. They receive support from local 
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people, making it difficult for the government to isolate and eliminate them. Their success in 
damaging oil infrastructure and terrorizing international oil workers resulted in Nigeria’s oil 




 Militia Groups as a Security Threat to Natural Resource exploitation in the Niger Delta 
 It has become common knowledge as indicated above that poverty and attempt to control oil 
revenues remain at the root of the violence in the Niger Delta. That violence remains a 
significant threat to the oil economy as the Niger Delta remains crucial to the Nigeria economy 
as a whole. The oil and gas that sustains the nation is produced in the region and its contiguous 
continental shelf. This region has in recent years grown into a hugely complex enigma that is 
difficult to decode, even by the most informed analyst. The rest of this chapter address the 
origins and development of militias groups in the Niger Delta. It indicates how the existing 
struggle mainly for a fair share of the resources of the region, social rights, and environmental 
protection was appropriated and transformed the Niger Delta into ethnic armies and its 
factions, into a zero sum violent struggle for power whose central objective is the expropriation 
of oil revenues. For the past ten years, scholars, policymakers, and activists have also 
increasingly highlighted the material economic factors that are critical features of many 
contemporary conflicts. They have pointed to the importance of natural resources, especially 
oil and diamonds, in fuelling long-running civil wars in Africa.  
Origin of Militant Groups: In the early 1990s the modern militias group existing in the Niger 
Delta today spring from NGOs for poverty alleviation and environment degradation activist 
groups. This drew awareness among local youths at an unprecedented rate. Student activists 
joined the groups through education, and travels projects as well as social media information 
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which eventually bred action. The youths were able to compare the state of affairs in the Niger 
Delta with that in other parts of the country, especially the ultra-modern facilities and steady 
development of the New Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. A youth leader interviewed in 
River State contended that the young people observed that the attention being given to the 
capital city was in the interest of making it comfortable for the corrupt ruling class mostly from 
the military regimes of the Hausa/Fulani dynasty to whom the city is home. 
Their method of expressing dissatisfaction with the situation has been an unexpected armed 
struggle against the regime that was uncompromising. Security experts in the military at the time 
cynically labelled these militia groups as expression of “youth restiveness”.196  But many of these 
youth now realize that this expression of armed struggle and violence has become the most 
potent force for emancipation from ethnic bias against the Niger Delta, change, and a voice. 
While outlining the effects of this violent environment on the oil industry, the followings are 
the exploration of the militia groups that operate in the Niger Delta: 
1. Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP): This group was formed in 
1990 by the leaders of the Ogoni ethnic group in River state who adopted the “Ogoni 
Bill of rights” which they presented to the federal military government and the peoples 
of Nigeria. Among their demands was: (a) increase of the derivation formula to 50%; (b) 
Total control of land and natural resources in their territory; (c) Cleaning up and 
compensation for environmental pollution; and (d) Regional autonomy and self-
determination.
197
  The “Ogoni Bill of Rights” brought some of the leaders into direct 
confrontation with the federal government and leading to military occupation of Ogoni 
territory and to the execution of nine activists of the Movement including its leader, 
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Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. [Appendix H: Kiobel  versus Royal Dutch Petroleum 
company, 569 U.S. (2013)] 
2. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND): This is the most 
powerful of the militant groups in the Niger Delta. It was formed in 2006 and function 
as a loose network of gangs rather than a coherent organization. Today, they have a 
common political agenda and political wings that could participate in a negotiation; they 
have a 10,000 strong train combat army.
198
 Their major objectives includes: Succession 
from the Nigeria federal structure independence under the name, ‘the Niger Delta 
Republic’, Closing down of all oil  wells in the Ijaws land; returning oil revenue to the 
region in their estimate worth about 200 billion dollars which they said was stolen from 
their land; lastly, compensation for environmental damaged done to their land.
199
 This 
group has become increasingly violent, both towards oil workers who they kidnap 
randomly. The militias go for foreign oil workers and other people who are not 
associated with the oil industry but perceived to be rich. 
3. Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF): This separatist group was formed in 1966 by 
Isaac Boro who was a Major in the Nigeria Army and who  declared  the Republic of 
Niger Delta that lasted for three months and which eventually led to the Nigeria civil 
war in 1967. Boro was considered to be a threat to the free exploitation of natural 
resources in the Niger Delta. His activities were suppressed and he was killed in the 
civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970. Today, this group have an armed wing called 
the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) which has declared war on the Nigeria 
government and started attacks on oil-company personnel, vandalism of oil pipelines 
and flowing stations and siphoning of oil via tapping into oil pipelines in order to fund 
their illegal activities. They also terrorize foreign oil workers, unless the latter close their 
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joint venture and leave the country. Although other militant groups were at time 
motivated by ransoms when taking hostages, NDVF objectives and demands remained 
political in nature. 
4. Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF): This group was formed in 2005 and 
has a Headquarter in the oil city of Warri and Port-Harcourt. The movement has a 
20,000 volunteer’s force of mostly undergraduates and unemployed youths who act as 
vigilantes for oil communities in the region.
200
 In a recent trend which stems from the 
movements large following oil companies have begun to strike contracts with the 
NDPVF to carry out work on damaged pipelines, as well as for surveillance and waste 
disposal. The proceeds from such arrangements and from the sale of stolen crude oil, 
and from ransom payments for kidnappings fund the group’s weapons procurement. 
5. Egbesu Boys of Africa-Ijaws: This group is a part of the Martyrs Brigade and the 
Coalition for Militant Action (COMA). This group believe that their followers and the 
Ijaws communities should continue their armed struggle against the government and 
against international oil firms since this is the only way to achieve political and 
economic rights. According to the statement, which was released on July 24 2007, they 
argued that:  “How can we [the Ijaws] negotiate when we are in chains and 
dispossessed? The only noble and honourable path open to us is the glorious and time-
tested path of armed struggle”. 201  Violence escalated on 23 August 2007 when militants 
opened fire on nine oil workers travelling on a boat along the Benin River. The workers 
had reopened oil wells closed down by the armed group. Seven oil workers were killed, 
including two American contractors working for Chevron Texaco. The Delta state 
government offered a $75,000 reward for information leading to the capture of the 
                                                          
200 Stratfor 2009: http:www.stratfor.com/images/interactive/Niger_delta_hierarchy.htm (accessed 
23/03/2011)     
201 Kiama declaration 2002, p. 15 
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attackers. Amid escalated military operations, vandals blew up a major Chevron Texaco 
gas pipeline running from Escravos to Warri. The violence, kidnapping and killing in 
Warri forced Chevron Texaco to reduce oil production by about 140,000 bpd, which 
in monetary terms translated to a daily loss of $4.76 million per day in 2007
202
. The 
same violence resulted in Shell Petroleum Development Company reducing its output 
by about 60,000 bpd. Since 2006 the federal government estimated that the crises in 
Niger Delta lost the country approximately $2.5bn in revenue every three months. In 
fact Shell withdrew from the area in 2009 because of rising ethnic tensions.
203
 [see 
Appendix A for number of militias attacks from 2001 to 2012] 
6. The Bakassi Boys: The Bakassi Boys emerged in late 1997 in the Igbo commercial city 
of Aba in Abia State as a desperate societal response to the inability of the relevant state 
institutions, namely the police and the judicial system, to solve the pervasive problem of 
violent crime. Corruption, inefficiency and double-standards were seen as the bane of 
state institutions and armed robbers had no difficulties in using their stolen riches to 
bribe their way through the system. At this point, the police and the judiciary had lost 
all their moral authority and were generally distrusted not only in Aba town but also in 
other big commercial cities of the country where armed bandits reigned unchallenged 
that resemble the ‘coming anarchy’ in the Niger Delta region. Such new conflicts of the 
post-Cold War era have been described as related to identity issues and not geopolitical 
and strategic issues which underlined earlier conflicts.
204
 It made no sense reporting 
suspects or crimes to the police or pursuing related litigations in court because justice 
would hardly ever be served by such institutions. People withdrew from the state and 
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resorted to self-help in fighting crime. Local vigilantism and mob action against 
suspected criminals became rampant. The militiamen also established a Bakassi 
training camp on the outskirts of Aba, where young recruits were provided with some 
paramilitary training, but not until they had gone through a rigorous occult initiation 
and talismanic empowerment in some undisclosed shrine location, believed to be 
somewhere in Ogoniland in River State.
205
 Locals interviewed confirmed that the 
Bakassi Boys encourage members of the public to report or to deliver crime suspects to 
them. Often too, the militiamen have stormed criminal gang hideouts or mounted road-
blocks across streets and highways to flush out criminals from ransacked vehicles. 
Diverse charms are used to identity a criminal suspect from a crowd, the most well-
known being the “magic machete test”. In this test, the Bakassi Boys wave their magical 
instrument across the faces of all the surrendered suspects and, it is said, the metallic 
machete usually turns red when positioned across the face of a practising armed robber. 
The latter is usually whisked off to the Bakassi headquarters for detention and 
interrogation. If upon this arrest the suspect is searched and, for instance, found to be 
in possession of an unlawful firearm, the militiamen do not require any further 
evidence to confirm their suspect is an armed criminal. Instant justice usually follows in 
such a case, and the suspected criminal is decapitated with the magic machete or set 
alight in the full glare of bystanders. For cases that are ultimately taken to the 
conspicuously juju-adorned Bakassi headquarters for trail, the interrogation of suspects 
is often interspersed with torture. In this method the Bakassi Boys were no different 
from the Nigeria police who are notorious for inflicting severe torture on criminal 
suspects and detainees in a bid to extract confession from them
206
 Militiamen often 
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extend their investigations to the detainees’ home, which they ransack for firearms and 
stolen items. If a detainee has not been directly apprehended by the militiamen but had 
been reported or delivered up by a third party, confidential evidence is usually taken 
from the reporter to guide the militiamen in their investigation. [See Appendix M: The 
Role of Militant groups] 
Figure 3.2 Configuration of Armed Groups in the Niger Delta 
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 JRC (Ally sometime) & Enemy too) MEND                                         Ally                          Greenlanders 
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                                           Reformed NDPVF                                           Bush Boys (Egbesu) 
Source: SIPRI by Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner-Based on Small Arms Survey Consultant armed group profile 2007                                              
                          From Niger Delta Youth Council Protest to Insurgency  
The paradox of rising unemployment, environment pollution, poverty, and public 
infrastructure underdevelopment in the midst of massive flowing from wealth-generating 
natural resource (primarily oil) has exacerbated the grievances of the Delta’s population. 
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Consequently, since the 1980s local youth protests groups have emerged. When peaceful 
methods produced few results, these demands became increasingly violent. As the conflict 
drivers remained extant, the struggle continued in modified form, beginning with a period of 
relative quiescence succeeded by a gradual growth in organized politically motivated violence. 
Following the continuous armed conflict escalation, there was a proliferation of contending 
parties in the post-Boro era, extending through to the late 1980s.
207
 This escalation period was 
characterized by numerous, disparate and often poorly organized nonviolent protest by a cross-
section of local residents. These protests ranged from written petitions to authorities to large 
public events and rallies, such as dancing by women demonstrators outside the local 
government headquarters of oil companies. For example, in 1990, under the internationally 
acclaimed writer and environment activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, her leadership propelled the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) to redefine and revolutionize 
nonviolent struggle in the region. Adopting local and international public awareness strategies, 
such as mass community mobilizations and media campaigns, MOSOP drew unprecedented 
local and global support for Ogoni struggle for self-determination. Ken Saro-Wiwa was 
classified by Niger Delta nationalist as the fourth generation of King Jaja and the Opobo 
regional resistance movement. 
The Ogoni struggle was directed against both the Nigeria state and the multinational oil 
companies particularly the Royal Dutch Shell, which has a significant stake in the country’s oil 
sector. Local Delta inhabitants interviewed in a weekly market survey have attributed much of 
the regional environmental damage to Shell’s abusive production activities that have decimated 
local livelihoods, compounded poverty and undermined the region’s social fabric. For the 
Nigerian state, Ogoni’s calls for self-determination and autonomy were “counter to national 
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policy, not the least by having highlighted long-standing tensions between the country’s ethnic 
division and its political centralization.”208 The protest and agitations were initially peaceful, but 
they escalated for a number of reasons. First, the policies of transnational oil companies and 
the federal government and the arrogance and insensitivity of some states’ government actions 
such as inviting security operatives to quell protests. The security responses led to violence and 
the visitation of more terror on the local population in many instances. This incensed the local 
people and led to counter-violence. A second reason for the escalation of the conflict was 
corruption. The repression bolstered the arguments of those who averred that violence is the 
only viable approach to the struggle and the only means of obtaining concession. Consequently, 
beginning in the 1990s, multinational oil companies (facilities and staff) became targets for 
violent youth campaigns. Seizure, occupation, and stoppage of oil company operations became 
particularly common. The lucrative potential of such actions intersected with the widely felt 
grievances and feelings of unjust deprivation, leading to a marked increase in the further 
proliferation of militias groups in the region.
209
 
The protest in the region, which are largely led by the youths, yielded some results as the 
derivation of revenue was increased from 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent in 1992 and later to 13 per 
cent in 2000. The Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was 
established in 1992 to manage the 3 per cent fund for the development of the region.
210
 But as it 
is widely known, corruption and related factors inhabited the efficient use of the funds. The 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which replaced the OMPADEC in 2000, has 
also been immersed in a number of corruption allegations. A significant point to note is the 
huge funds that flowed into the Niger Delta when the 13 per cent derivation fund was 
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implemented. Available data obtain from the Ministry of Finance shows, for instance, that in 
2010, the six Niger Delta states of Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and River 
States, received $4 billion out of the total of $11 billion distributed among the 36 states which 
make up the Nigerian federation.
211
 The flow of monies through state and local government has 
done little to improve living conditions however, meaning that the problems of development 
such as the lack of potable water, health facilities, electricity, poverty, unemployment, etc. that 
drive the conflict have not been attended to. The allocation of funds neglects the provision of 
basic social amenities and infrastructure as huge funds are spent on white elephant projects 




The third reason is the militarization of the region. In responses to the strong state security 
presence, many militias groups (armed non-state groups) emerged to engage the security 
operatives which led to armed confrontation. The Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND), an umbrella body for numerous militia groups, stands out as the most 
prominent. Related to this is the freedom that came with the return of democracy in Nigeria in 
1999. With the end of military dictatorship, the atmosphere for protests became conducive, 
and this also encouraged the formation and proliferation of militia groups. A significant feature 
of the militia-led violence was the “capability and willingness of the people to directly confront 
federal and state security forces, through a skilful deployment of the sophisticated firearms at 
their disposal in the mangrove creeks.
213
 The modus operandi of these groups include attacks 
on oil facilities/equipment’s and disruption of oil production, targeting security operation, 
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kidnapping and hostage taking of oil company personnel for ransom payment, and oil 
theft/illegal oil bunkering. Such activities coupled with the proliferation of arms to militia 
groups have endangered national and human security. For example, it is estimated that as of 
2008, about one thousand lives have been lost to the militia conflict, and another three 
hundred taken hostage.
214
 This excludes the lives that have been lost due to attacks by security 
operatives. A classic example is the Umuechem community in River State, where reprisal 
attacks by the mobile police force in October 1990 led to the destruction of 495 houses and 
several deaths.
215
 The police also lost a colleagues when they were called in to quell an oil-based 
protest in the community. Another example is Odi community in Bayelsa state which was 
completely destroyed by the Nigerian military in November 1999. Again, this was a reprisal 
attack over the killing of eight police personnel by militant youths based in the community.
216
 
One fundamental outcome of such destructions and oppressive security presence is forced 
migration, population displacement, deprivation, violation of fundamental human rights such as 
freedom of movement and fear of insecurity. 
                                Government Failure to Stabilize the Niger Delta 
There are a multitude of reasons why the Nigeria government has been unable to stabilize the 
Niger Delta. 
1. One of the most obvious explanations is the terrain of the Delta. According to the 
Niger Delta Development Commission, the Delta is the world’s third largest wetland 
and is composed of dense mangrove swamps and waterways, making it an ideal location 
for guerrilla operations. The various oil facilities and pipelines saturate the area and are 
easy targets for militant who are able to navigate the dense web of waterways in 
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speedboats, lay siege to a facility, capture international oil workers and then disappear 
back into the swamps and mangroves. 
2. The security forces usually suffer from poor equipment, training and morale, placing 
their dedication in doubt. The weapons used by the militant are more sophisticated and 
abundant in the country since small arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like 
Liberia, Sudan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
3. According to the Chief of Nigeria Naval Staff, the militant operating in the Niger Delta 
are well trained and have studied Nigeria naval operations and discovered the security 
forces weaknesses; moreover, the navy lacks proper equipment to combat these 
militants as many of its fleets are in poor condition. This is one reason why in 2004 the 
United States provided special boats to Nigeria authorities to help fight piracy in sea 
lanes, arms and oil smuggling. The United States also conducted joint military exercise 
with Nigeria troops in Calabar in 2004 with a focus on water combat.
217
  Stability in the 
Niger Delta is an important concern for the United States as a result of the current low 
supply of oil as of that time. 
4. The sheer number of oil installation and pipelines also make protection of the 
infrastructure difficult. For example, Shell, which is the largest foreign oil company in 
Nigeria, has more than 1,500 oil wells in the Niger Delta region, and these wells are 
linked to a 7,000-kilometre pipeline networks.
218
 Protection against attacks, in addition 
to preventing sabotage to the pipelines, also causes pipeline leaks and results in the loss 
of millions of dollars in oil revenue and the destruction of local environment. It is too 
much of a burden for the Nigerian authorities to handle. The government has already 
sent thousands of additional troops to the Delta, but they have not been able to re-
establish stability. Furthermore, the army and security forces are restrained in using 
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overwhelming force against the militants because this would likely result in a larger 
conflagration with ethnic groups and result in a  complete shutdown of oil and gas 
exports, an all-out civil war and thus crippling the economy. 
5. In addition to the tactical difficulties in suppressing Delta militants, there is also the 
problem of corruption. In a country where 40 per cent of the population lives on less 
than $2 per day, corruption and crime are major concerns. With the price of oil 
peaking over $100 a barrel in July 2014, oil theft (bunkering) is tempting for many and 
provides an important source of revenue for militants, insurgents and criminal 
elements. Even members of the navy are drawn into colluding with militant groups 
during bunkering operations. Yet, the process of siphoning oil from pipelines causes 
leaks, which not only causes supply disruptions, but also destroys the environment. 
Militias and other criminal elements then demand that the oil companies pay certain 
contractors to repair or clean up the leaks, creating a never-ending cycle of contracting 
work. Additionally, oil companies are known to covertly channel money to militants 
groups so that they may protect their installations. Companies consider the pay-off 




6. Also, the money allocated to the Niger Delta states from the Federation Account often 
falls prey to cronyism since community leaders and elected officials filter the funds to 
contracts and firms that end up in their own pockets. Much of the revenue never makes 
it back to the Niger Delta communities. 
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Table 3.2: PIPELINE VANDALIZATION, 2006-2007 
                                2006                                                            2007 
















2,091 21,885.00 na  1,631 6,333 na 
Warri 662 1,052.00 na  306 9,854.00 na 
Mosimi 486 13,709.00 na  479 10,634 na 
Kaduna 176 163 na  126 273 na 
Gombe 268 573 na  702 929 na 
Total 3,683 37,382.00 na  3,244 27,523.00 na 
        
Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Published by the National Bureau of Statistics 2008 
 
                          From Arms-Buy-Back to Amnesty Programme (AP) 
As was mentioned in the previous section, following the return of democracy to Nigeria in1999, 
the mechanism of electoral politics have further complicated armed conflict and tensions in the 
region. It became commonplace for political parties and leaders to arm groups of young men 
in order to mobilize them as instruments of political pressure and coercion. This practice 
became widespread prior to and during the 1999, 2003, and 2007 elections when politicians 
encouraged the formation of youth and cult groups, arming and using them for political goals 
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that led to violence, intimidation, and election rigging.
220
 These youth groups included the Niger 
Delta Vigilante Group (NDV) led by Ateke Toms and the Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
(NDVF) headed by Asari Dokubo, among others. Most members of these groups are 
unemployed youths who were promised jobs and who viewed the groups as a means of self-
advancement. Abandoned by their political patrons after the elections, the youths were left with 
no viable livelihood sources of income but kept their guns, which then became their means to 
accrue wealth by other means.
221
 
This reliance on violence led to the development of more armed militias groups who engaged 
in arms robbery infiltrating the regional political struggle. Arms, thus, became a conflict-specific 
capital contributing significantly to the emergence of a complex insurgency characterized by 
various combatants. This was illustrated in 2006 when MEND, a prominent militant 
movement, emerged on the scene and began carrying out frequent attacks on the region’s oil 
infrastructure. Targets mainly included onshore assets such as pipelines, oil facilities, and gas 
sector employees. However, some attacks were also carried out offshore, a key example being 
the 2008 attack on Shell and Total Bonga oil platform, located 75 miles off the coast of the 
Niger Delta, which temporarily stopped production activities.
222
 MEND was so effective in its 
violent campaign that it disrupted production by 25 per cent between 2006 and 2009. The 
intensity of the insurgency coupled with the military response by the Nigerian government 
brought enormous turmoil to the region. Such disruptions have affected national revenue 
budget implementation, and development planning. 
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One of the most effective measures adopted by the Federal and State government was the 
Arms-Buy-Back Programme, which was introduced for militia groups in Nigeria in 2004 to 
stem insurgency and arms proliferations in the region. In 2004, the Rivers State government 
embarked on an ‘arms for cash deal’ to help restore peace. In that exercise, the following 
firearms were submitted: 
Table 3.3: Firearms submitted during the arms for cash deal in Rivers State in 2004 
            Type of Firearm 
              Assault Riffles 
             Number submitted 
                      778 
                    AK-47’s                       324 
            Czech SA Vz 58                       428 
           HK C3, Short and FN-FAL                 22, 22, and 3 
Light Machine Guns, Berretta and MAT 49                 19, 12 and 2 
Czech model 26, Sten MK 2 and 
Machinegun 
                   2, 7 and 1 
Czech model59 (Rachol), MG 36, Hunting 
Rifles, Pistols, Revolvers, Craft weapons, 
Short-guns, Revolvers and Air Guns 
          2; 1; 3; 9; 4; 17; 10; 7 and 1 
                    Total                           1675 
Source: Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye and Okhomina, Consortium for Development Partnership module 5 
(2007) 
The identified costs and sources of the aforementioned firearms provide further insights into 
the dynamics of weapons proliferation in the Niger Delta. In terms of costs, firearms are 
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relatively affordable. For example, the general price cost for weapons are: shotgun ($570); 
Kalashnikov rifle ($850), bazooka ($2,150).
223
 Money to procure such items is easy to come by 
given the huge incomes from oil theft (bunkering), kidnapping for ransom payments, but also 
via corrupt government officials and other conflict profiteers. 
Comparably, in 2010, the federal government amnesty committee reported that 287,000 
different types of ammunitions—about three thousand magazines, two thousand explosives and 
dynamites, and eighteen gun boats were surrendered by different militia groups and their 
members, who accepted the amnesty
224
. Although, in some cases, the widespread view is that 
not all firearms in the creeks and hands of militia groups were surrendered, this is not the issue 
of debate here. What is obvious is that the large volumes of arms surrendered show their 
centrality in the violence and the question remains, what motivated the proliferation of arms in 
the region? In short, Watts and Ibaba argues that, the commoditization of violence in the 
Nigerian electoral process, interethnic conflicts such as the type between Ijaws and Itsekiri in 




                   The Construction of Amnesty as a Measure of Conflict Resolution 
Under the 2009 Amnesty Programme, the federal government proclaimed a blanket amnesty 
with a time frame of 60 days—August 6 to October 4, 2009—for all Niger Delta militias groups. 
With this proclamation, militants who surrendered their arms within the specified period were 
unquestioningly granted freedom from prosecution for participation in armed rebellion against 
the state or in armed criminal acts. This non-retributive approach may seem to suggest that 
forgiveness was accorded a role in the disarmament process and in the resolution of conflict in 
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the region, yet the design of the amnesty initiative rests on the potential of forcible disarmament 
to influence militias’ calculations (i.e., utility maximization), leading them to choose to 
participate. The state’s advantages in resources and power were expected to cause the militias 
to fear that an amnesty rejection would risk a determined offensive and a consequent military 
defeat.
226
 Under the programme screening centre were set up in all six of the Niger delta states 
where gunmen were required to report and turn in their arms. Having registered and taken an 
oath renouncing militancy and violence, the militants received an unconditional pardon. Those 
who accepted the amnesty were granted a stipend of NGN65, 000 (US$433) per month for 
food and living expenses. The Nigerian government budgeted around US$63 million for the 
amnesty programme, including the stipends for those who accepted a pardon. It targeted 
around 10,000 militants who it hoped would take the amnesty offer.
227
 
The payment programme for pardoned militants remains in place at the time of writing. Exact 
figures on the number of militant in the programme are not available, but it is thought that at 
least 10,000 have signed up, according to the policy and security report seen from the newly 
created Ministry of Niger Delta affairs. Other reports estimates that up to 25,000 have taken up 
the amnesty offer.
228
  If we take the estimate of 10,000, militants have taken the amnesty offer, 
the government’s monthly bill for the stipends would be US$4.33 million. The government 
hopes that production gains from a reduction in violence will cover the additional costs but 
security analyst see this as optimistic, with several others claiming the government could be 
pouring money down the drain, especially as much of the money is reportedly being siphoned 
off by administrators. Some government officials have suggested that IOCs should contribute 
towards funding the amnesty programme. This would throw up serious issues for IOCs, which 
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would find it highly problematic to be seen to be channelling funds to militias groups. Payments 
could be made under the guise of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes, but that 
would be a risky route for IOCs to take. Several ex-militias interviewed see the amnesty as a 
step in the right direction, but it remains to be seen how effective it will be in the long term. 
Indeed, regarding the longer term prospects for peace and security in the region, unless the 
fundamental causes of unrest in the Niger Delta, including environmental pollution and the 
lack of public infrastructure that can create jobs and services for the population, are addressed, 
there is little hope for the government’s efforts will succeed.229 
                             Post-Amnesty Program Implementation: 2010 to 2013 
By mid-October 2010, the amnesty process had increases to cover roughly 15,000 militants 
who had accepted the AP offer. The ex-militants were sent to different demobilization camps 
in Okrika, Tombia, and Aluu camps in Rivers state and the Agbarho camp in Delta State.
230
 But 
some grass roots militants interviewed in April 2013 which had already left their camps spoke 
of their frustration with what they saw as a major flaw in the process: demobilization had 
commenced in these camps but without any of the typical planned transition activities designed 
to give the ex-militants social and job skills that could support a civilian lifestyle. It was expected 
by government that ex-fighters would begin the process of humanization and confidence 
building at the demobilization camps through psychological and physical training activities. 
However, in the camps I visited in River and Delta states, respectively, which should have 
served as a kind of mediation between the creek life of militias and their formal rehabilitation 
and reintegration into civil communities did not happen. The single exception was the 
continued subsistence bi—monthly allowance payments to ex-militants of NGN65, 000.00 
(US$433 at the prevailing exchange rate of 157 Naira for a dollar). 
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However, these payments still encountered frequent delays, thus weakening the militants’ 
confidence in the process and decreasing their commitment to it. Further compounding the 
situation was the poor condition of the camps. Security, electricity, water supply, and the 
general living conditions at the demobilization camps were grossly inadequate and to some 
extent even more precarious than life on the creeks. In the Aluu camp, for example, ex-
militants slept on the floor. Such poor conditions contravened the purpose of the 
demobilization camps, which should have re-socialized the former combatants and prepared 
them for re-entry into civilian life. Given this circumstances, life in the camp is dull and 
demoralizing for the militants and forcing some to move back to their villages. It was argued 
that most of the militants who stayed in the camps were the homeless and those fearing 
prosecution and police harassment for offenses committed prior to the declaration of the 
amnesty.
231
 The emptiness of camp life and the tardy payments did precipitate intermittent 
violent protests borne out of frustration by militants, who increasingly felt abandoned and 
deceived by the government. 
Moreover, the programme is enmeshed in a legitimacy crisis because it was largely imposed on 
the militia groups—the youth movement and several other stakeholders, hence the widespread 
notion in the Niger Delta is that “the amnesty came from the blue”232. Being as it may not the 
result of dialogue or negotiation, the ex-militants and their supporters hardly see the 
programme as genuine settlement. This feeling is not helped by inadequate facilities at most ex-
militant rehabilitation centres owning to poor planning, and leading to many going back to the 
creeks. As General Nico Martins, a leader of a group of one militias in Akwa Ibom state 
succinctly put, the frustration of the ex-militant is due to the fact that they were: 
       “Promised skills acquisition, training, quality education for as many that wanted to go back 
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        To school. But now nothing had happened. We did not request any assistance from government from the          
creeks where we were before the amnesty programme. 
         But now we are suffering and roaming the street.   
        There is no accommodation, and they have driven us out of the camps for about two years.”233 
Security analysts also argue that poor management also manifests in the form of corruption and 
embezzlement of funds. The enormous take-off budget for the project, standing at around N50 
billion was allegedly mismanaged by officials. For example, 80 per cent of that amount was 
allocated to consultants and contractors rather than the beneficiaries, while 20 per cent was set 
aside to establish businesses.
234
 Apart from the corruption of some officials in the amnesty 
programme, many ex-militant leaders also tampered with the salaries of their ex-foot soldiers. 
The ostentatious lifestyle among ex-militants that the violence they were previously involved in 
had cultivated expensive behaviour. During the pre-amnesty era, the average militant was 
earning a minimum allowance of about N100, 000 monthly with other supplementary packages 
to support of the struggle in the creek. Many undergraduates who put in two to three months 
returned to school with about N200, 000. Militant leaders were said to have received millions 
of Naira monthly mostly from illegal oil theft, ransom kidnapping payments and patronage 
from politicians.
235
 To ex-militants, the N65, 000 stipend is therefore paltry and unattractive. As 
Aghedo put it, militant always laughed at the absurdity of becoming a pipeline welder after 
reintegration: Me? You no dey serious! (You are not serious).
236
 Needless to say, determining 
the job or business that would be suitable and attractive enough to suit their status and income 
profile necessary to keep them away from crime or going back violence is a huge challenge for 
the federal government. 
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In a new wave of violence, MEND which initially announced a ceasefire to assess the work and 
education amnesty programme claimed responsibility for the bombing in Warri on the 15 
March 2010 as well as an attack on 1 October or the Independence Day bombing in parade 
square in Abuja where several people died. Similar attacks have targeted at the Atlas Cove Jetty 
in Lagos and other strategic oil installations in the Niger Delta over the last four years.
237
 The 
rate of crude oil theft has also increased dramatically since 2010. According to Royal Dutch 
Shell, as much as 140,000 barrels valued conservatively at US$16 million are stolen daily. 
Shell’s corporate media relations manager who was interviewed for this research explained how 
criminals bore holes onto oil pipelines to steal crude products while others also tapped the 
products directly from wellheads leading to spill incidents, environmental and production 
disruption. JTF spokesman interviewed confirmed that over 6,000 illegal refineries were 
destroyed by security outfits and over 150 oil thieves arrested in 2011 alone.
238
 Some ex-
militants have also been arrested for sea piracy. According to the Malaysia-based International 
Maritime Bureau, Nigeria’s 853-kilometre coastline remains a high-risk area as a result of 
incessant sea piracy. The organization puts the number of post-amnesty attacks at over 40 
cases, with about 50 cases of attacks on fishing trawlers in January 2012 alone, resulting in 10 
deaths and provoking a strike by the Nigerian shipping owners Association. This has led to 
higher shipping costs and insurance premiums for Nigeria-bound ships.
239
 
Today, Nigeria’s oil sector is at a great risk of losing its value in the international market. The 
government of Nigeria is even struggling to have an approved regulatory framework for the 
sector after 53 years of independence. The revelations of the sector’s rot that culminated in the 
January 2012 nationwide protests due to a petrol price hick seem to have even intensified the 
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rate at which the nation’s oil is being stolen. Over 200,000 barrels of crude oil, which is more 
than Gabon’s oil production per day and amounting to over $120 million is reportedly stolen 
from Nigeria daily.
240
 In 2009, during the insurgency by the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND), companies declared force majeure twenty times.
241
 The number of 
force majeure dropped to four in 2010 after the government declared an amnesty for MEND 
fighters but went up again to eleven in 2011 as most of the former militants who had initially 
given up their weapons returned to a life of crime.
242
 In fact, the story of crude oil theft and its 
impact on investments is far worse today. 
However, despite the setbacks, the amnesty programme is significant for several reasons. Apart 
from the drastic reduction in the loss of lives, the intensity of violence in the region has also 
reduced when compared to the peak periods of 2008. The amnesty deal has also led to youth 
empowerment. So far, over 16,336 ex-combatants have been demobilized. While some are 
undergoing training in Nigeria, hundreds of ex-militants have been sent to Malaysia, Russia, 
South Africa, Britain, and so on, through scholarship programmes for education and skills 
acquisition in order to facilitate their reintegration into society.
243
 Moreover, the amnesty 
programme has increased Nigeria’s oil production from an average of one million barrels of 
crude oil per day in 2008 to an average of 2.2 million barrels as of July 2012.
244
 Increased oil 
production means more rents for Nigeria’s excess crude account. Between June and December 
2013 alone, industry experts estimated that Nigeria earned as much as N4.5 trillion (about 
US$30 billion) from oil sales.
245
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Conclusion: As noted at the outset, there are different actors with different perspectives on how 
natural resources wealth should be shared in the country. The starting hypothesis of this 
chapter is that the reasons for conflict in the Niger Delta is crisis-proneness’, a fact which comes 
from a lack of unity and legitimacy of the government—or, put differently, the dynamics of the 
conflict passes through many layers. The present structures and institutions are corrupt and are 
not geared to address such challenges. Therefore, the militias find it very easy to exploits this 
ungovernable resource space to their benefit by illegally stealing oil which they view as their 
share of resource wealth. The chapter tests this hypothesis in three steps. First, it examined the 
dynamics of conflict and the analytical lens of federal, states and local level in order to better 
understand the types of security requirements they pose to the Nigeria state. Second, the 
chapter scanned through the various militias groups in order to spot the types of actors and the 
dynamics of conflict with which security challenges have been met. I look at the amnesty 
programme and whether these match- or deviate-from the identified problems. In a third step, 
the chapter explores the factors why the government of Nigeria is unable to stabilize the region 










                                    Chapter Four 
  Land and Ethnicity in the Politics of Instability in Niger Delta 
The centrality of land to the conflict and instability is well documented in literature, and so too 
is the importance of ethnicity in contextualising the pattern of behaviour and the interpretations 
of actions in post-independence Africa.
246
  Resource politics and political instability in the Niger 
Delta have traces of the intricate juxtaposition of ethnicity and land politics in considerable 
abundance.  However, instability in the Niger Delta raises a number of particular issues. 
Prominent among these are significant two key factors-- ethnicity and land ownership (property 
right)—in terms of its effect in increasing armed conflict in the Niger Delta. On a more general 
level, it can be hypothesized that any multi-national and multi-lingual society where both highly 
dominant and less powerful ethnic groups compete for greater access to scarce resources, 
accusations of tribalism, nepotism—among others—tends  to be rampant.247 To clarify its 
meaning and following in the footsteps of Marina Ottaway (1999), the working definition of 
ethnicity here is of human beings who belong to natural groups that share a common culture 
and language, and sometimes the myth of common ancestry.
248
 But sometimes the definition of 
the ethnic group stresses something common to the group other than ancestry, language or 
even the subjective conceptions of the members. For example, Abner Cohen offers this kind of 
definition when he notes that: “……an ethnic group is an informal interest group whose 
member are distinct from the members of other groups within the same society, in that they 
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share a measure of what Smith calls ‘compulsory institutions’ like kinship and religion and can 
communicate among themselves relatively easily’.249 In other words, the bonds which provide 
members of a distinct group that possess a sense of common identity.
250
 Land is used here as a 
fixed asset, a natural endowment for humans to earn a living from that is hereditary and passed 
on from generation to generation. 
This chapter looked at ethnicity and land as a social, economic and traditional phenomenon 
associated as factors within political system for the ownership of natural resources.  This is well 
explain within political arena for the claim of ownership of natural resources in the Niger Delta. 
It raises the issues of resource control between ethnic groups that are competitive rather than 
co-operative associated with violence. It is shows that ethnicity is characterised by cultural 
prejudice and socio-economic and political discrimination. Underlying these characteristics are 
the feelings of indigenous people in some particular groups in the Niger Delta that they share a 
common consciousness and identity with other members of the group to the exclusion of 
others. This section explores ethnicity as a phenomenon linked directly or indirectly to forms 
of affiliation and identification built around between “we the owners” and ‘them’, the 
“outsiders”. As it is well investigated in other societies, ethnic groups whose interaction may 
generate conflict are in fact social formations distinguished by the communal character of their 
boundaries.
251
 The relevant communal factors may be culture, language or both. But in Nigeria, 
as in other cases in Africa, language has clearly been the most pervasive and crucial variable. 
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      Ethnic Composition in Instability and Natural Resources Control 
                                      In the Niger Delta  
As noted earlier, Nigeria’s Federation comprises more than 250 ethnic groups of which about 
30 live in the Niger Delta. These are: Adonis, Calabaris, Egbemas, Ekpeyes, Engennes, Efik, 
Ijaws, Ibibio, Ikwerres, Isokos, Itsekiri, Ogbas, Obolos, Ogonis, Oron, Urhobos, Ukwanis, 
Ilagel, among others. Here is always some kind of dispute centred on land, political patronage, 
and resource ownership disputes between these ethnic groups. It has been hypothesized that, 
most African countries remain tied to ancient beliefs centred on cultural heritage which is 
passed on from their ancestors; they are always tension between groups in recognizing the 
diversity of ethnic identities in the overwhelming majority of states.
252
  It has been claimed that, 
for example, in the case of Nigeria that, due to extensive population distribution of about 170 
million people, this produces a more complex ethnic situation than in most other countries 
since minority groups are highly concentrated in single geographic areas (such as the Niger 
Delta) when compared to minorities in other regions (such as in the meddle belt of the 
country). As Jeffrey Herbst (2000) points out, this creates a continual problem of a relatively 
large number of outlying groups that are not only spatially distinct but that also can be 
mobilized around ethnic and cultural symbols that can compete with the state.
253
 For example, 
in Nigeria the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba dominate 
political and economic scene. The Niger Delta oil-producing communities are regarded as 
minorities despite the fact that the Ijaws are the majority in five states, and they are the fourth 
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largest ethnic group in the federation. Since the Niger Delta is currently the only area where oil 
and gas is found in Nigeria, some greatly resent the ethnic domination of the above groups. 
They believe that there is a strong ethnic discrimination element attached to the methods of oil 
revenue allocation based on population, land mass and equality of states. The politics of ethnic 
identity have been tied to oil wealth sharing formulae. These seem to be some of the causes of 
instability and armed conflict in Niger Delta. 
Also, the littoral states seem particularly incensed by the perceived injustice of sharing oil 
wealth due to the fact that, before oil revenue assumed its central role as the major foreign 
exchange earner for Nigeria economy in the early 1970s, the main export commodities were 
agricultural products: groundnut from the North owned by the Hausa/Fulani, cocoa in the 
West (Yoruba) and Palm oil in the East (Igbo) which constituted the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy. Back then, this wealth was shared based on a 50% derivative revenue allocation 
principle in Nigeria. Therefore, the fundamental question that Niger Delta indigenes are asking 
the federal government of Nigeria today is why have they now reduced revenue allocation to 
13% for oil and gas producing states under central fiscal control? Cyril Obi (2004) believes that 
the struggle for access and control of oil wealth contributes to the centralisation of power, and 
its concentration in relatively few hands. As such, “oil is both an object of intense struggle for 
state power between different ethnic groups, as well as a resource with which to acquire 
instruments of coercion, with which to repress the opposition, or competing forces”.254 
Moreover, within many states in the Nigerian Federation, there are ethnically defined rules for 
access to positions of prestige. The criteria of original resident of a state are determined by the 
ethnic affiliation of their parents or grandparents, who receive preference in state-sponsored 
allocations, appointments, and employment.  This is despite their being no official lists of what 
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groups constitute indigenous ethnicities.  For example, Local Government Areas (LGAs) have 
a large degree of discretion in handing out certificates of origin which are necessary for public 
employment, access to higher education, and eligibility for different forms of state financial 
assistance to their citizens. Therefore, frequently, LGAs rely on the assessment of local 
traditional authorities in certifying people’s ethnic group. 
Scholar like Englebert (2009) argues that this process of indigenization allows some groups to 
establish local domination over others and magnifies the powers of those in positions of legal 
command, giving local officials the power to grant or deny indigenous status to their residents. 
Furthermore, this de- facto veto power affects an individual’s life choices, from attaining federal 
government employment, education and other benefits.
255
 Moreover, ethnic indigenization is 
derived in part from the idea of parity to federal office, known in Nigeria as the principle of a 
“federal character”, whereby the constitution mandates the President to appoint an equitable 
number of officials from different states of the federal level using a quota system. But the issue 
arises as to whether, a Delta person residing in Lagos could be appointed and imputed to 
Lagos’s tally. So, in order to avoid such a situation, the notion of there being indigenous ethnic 
peoples to specific states gained prominence and was eventually extended to states positions.
256
 
As a result, only people who descend from ethnic groups deemed indigenous to a certain state 
are allowed to seek public employment in that state or to represent that state in federal 
employment or oil and gas contracts. Given wide-spread in- country migration of around 170 
million people, this has created numerous problems. Even when new states are created in 
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ethnic minority areas, it is still a particularly troubling issue whereby the new state then tends to 
chase away civil servants who had been indigenous and now find themselves strangers at home. 
These ethnic divisions provides opportunities for some groups and individuals but imposes an 
indigenous-versus-outsiders logic onto social, economic and political relations within the 
Nigerian federation, giving more legitimacy to some groups’ claims for access and control to 
natural resources than others. For example, in the Niger delta, both militant groups, local 
communities and youth movements nurses grievances that, the NNPC, multinational oil, 
companies and the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources are dominated by larger 
ethnic groups taking all the jobs and government employment in their states but are 
discriminated against in other states of the federation. Therefore, as a none ethnic indigenous 
person going to another state for employment, one has to pay them 20% tax on their wages as 
an economic rent or risk being kidnapped and pay a ransom to militant groups before they are 
allowed to work in their state. These principles of ethnic divisions serves in part to limit access 
to individual freedom and state resources, as a larger number of Nigerians, despite being 
obviously Nigerians, fail to establish the local foundations of their national identity and find 
themselves deprived of access to natural resources, employment and local appendages of the 
state. 
However, within the Niger Delta region, ethnic group claims to natural resources is an 
important agency of socialisation into the ethnic scheme of things. First, in the struggle to 
destroy or protect lives and property, ethnic lines are sharply demarcated. The individual’s 
identity and sense of exclusiveness are vividly defined as each act of violence reinforces 
sectional feeling of being different, and of being able to count only on members of their group 
for action, security and welfare. This has resulted to inter-ethnic violence in the Niger Delta 
that leaves behind long-lasting and bitter memories of inter-ethnic relations because it touches 
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those aspects of man’s existence which are dearest to him: life, death, provision of shelter and 
the ability to make of a living.
257
 
Second, apart from passing on ethnic sentiments from generation to generation, inter-ethnic 
violence also leads to the growth of ethnic group solidarity. On the part of both the perpetrators 
and their victims alike, a certain collectivism characterises such violence. Indeed, witnesses 
involved in such violence which were interviewed said--on both sides of the narrative that a 
collective sense of belonging, mission, self-realisation and self-affirmation within the 
community, and a feeling of seizing the individuals and the group’s destiny in one’s hands is 
developed during the dynamics of mobilization. Under the unifying force of ethnicity, the 
inevitable consequence of such attributes is a greater inward orientation to the ethnic in-group, 
with a consequent growth in ethnic identification. A shared history increases the exclusiveness, 
feeling of uniqueness and growth of ethnic divisions. Inherent in struggle for access to control 
natural resources in violence is escalating conflict and tension. Both reflect a growth in the 
factors which characterise the pre-violent situation or phenomenon. Since violence leaves 
behind a lingering taste of bitterness, it is very difficult for peace to return to its original level at 
the end of violent activities. Instead, equilibrium is achieved at a different but higher level of 
hostility between the perpetrators and their victims. Such upward security issues in the Niger 
Delta as always shifted the equilibrium of inter-ethnic tension to a paradox of “foreigners are 
taking our oil jobs”, and the continual increase in ethnic divisions with every bout of inter-
ethnic violence. This is particularly so when successive conflicts reinforce memories of previous 
ones. In such cases, growth in tension and ethnicity becomes greater.
258
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Other confidential interviews conducted put these ethnic feeling in another perspective. A 
number of locals in Eket in Akwa-Ibom state strongly believe that local control cannot happen 
while foreign interests persist. This is because Niger Delta indigenes felt that the indigenised 
enterprises’ of the NNPC ethos, symbols, values, lifestyles, relations of production and modes 
of operation still continue to drive the imperative of exploiting local resources for the benefits 
of foreigners of both multinational oil companies and the ruling elites who are not from the 
Niger Delta. These factors constitute strong built-in pressures on the local population to 
conform to the wishes of foreign interests. Niger Delta indigenes believe that, instead of the oil 
industry becoming more national in its use of local resources and catering to the needs of the 
vast-majority of the local population participation, they are in fact, becoming more an extension 
of foreign interests. It is the citizens of the Niger Delta who become denationalised. This 
process gives indigenised firms like the NNPC a national image and protection without 
seriously endangering foreign investment in the oil industry. In addition, as long as indigenised 
companies carry on the same pattern of activities as before, they would be effectively controlled 
by foreigners without local ownership.  Therefore, the interest of the Nigerian privileged classes 
in indigenisation was not to eliminate this foreign control but merely to partake in the profits 
accruing from the activities of these companies.
259
 Indeed, minority ethnic groups argue that is 
the larger ethnic ruling elites who benefit from the Niger Delta resource wealth. 
 Some scholars such as Herbst (2000), Williams (2011), Joseph (1999) and Englebert (2009) 
strongly believe that in addition to its polarizing effects and the vulnerability ethnicity creates for 
people in the excluded group, the Nigeria system also has quasi-exponential features since it 
produces new minorities each time new states are created in the Nigerian federation.
260
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Therefore, the Nigeria Federal Structure is a state creating division in diversity rather than unity 
in ethnicity. In order to escape non-indigenous status, which shields individuals from state 
benefits, the minority then must make its own claim to statehood through resource nationalism 
while at the same time fighting against state marginalization. Ethnicity has the potential to 
embody both positive and negative elements. On the positive side, it promotes the appreciation 
of an individual’s social roots in a community and the creation of a social network which 
provides material and emotional support for members of society. As an intermediate layer of 
society, it fosters a sense of belonging, which mediates between the individual and the larger 
society. This mediatory role is particularly important in mass societies that are complex, 
impersonal and alienating. Thus, within the context of socio-economic insecurity generated by 
destructive competition in the oil sector in the Niger Delta, ethnicity holds individuals together, 
gives them internal cohesion, encourages them to provide mutual security for each other and 
promotes their sense of identity and direction. In other words, to the Niger Delta indigenes, 
ethnicity offers a personal solution to the generic problems of exploitation, oppression, 
deprivation and alienation. 
     Land as a Social and Economic Construct for Natural Resources Control 
 Furthermore, the issue of land ownership and tenure is another important factor that was 
considered for the instability and natural resources conflict in the region. The Federal 
Government promulgated two important statutes to address the issue of ownership of land and 
control of onshore/offshore oil mining space. The first was the Land Use Decree of 1978 and 
                                                          
increases localized homogeneity, as people denied local indigeneity in their state of residence tend to migrate 
toward states where they might be considered indigenous by descent, although this is not an option available 
to all. Another major problem is that once an individual’s ethnicity might have been diluted in a sea of 
heterogeneity, there are now more territorialized group identities. This leads to indigenous sovereignty 
reproduction of the Nigerian nation parallels its increased internal differentiation, p.212; Also see Williams, 
P.D. (2011) War & Conflict in Africa p.113-126; Joseph (ed) (1999) State, Conflict & Democracy in Africa, p.299-
319; and Herbst, J. (2000) States and Power in Africa- Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, p.133-6 
188 
 
later re-enacted as the Land Use Act in 1979. This Act stipulates the entire ownership and 
control of all oil and gas in place in Nigeria belong to the Federal Government. Moreover, the 
issue of Federal Government ownership of mineral oil resources and land was subsequently 
enshrined in Section 40(3) and Section 44(3) of the 1979 and 1999 Nigeria Constitution 
respectively. 
Kenneth Omeje (2006) argues that the Land Use Act, helped to consolidate state’s power to 
expropriate land from local communities and private citizens for oil, industrial and large-scale 
agricultural purposes. The Act makes all land comprised in the federation of Nigeria a property 
of the state and vests its allocation and administration in the State Government.
261
 As mentioned 
before the federal government’s perspective on the ownership of natural resource lead to 
incidences of violent and instability among Niger Delta indigenes who have been living on this 
land from the past centuries from generation to generation as they protested and resist such 
changes. To the citizens of the Niger Delta there are traditional beliefs concerning the cultural 
significance that the land holds, from the forests, shrines, ancestral cemeteries, specific crops 
locally-consumed crops (such as raffia and oil palms trees) and the like. In rural Niger Delta 
these items are valued both for their cultural and spiritual significance as well as for their 
functional or “economic” worth. Land in the Niger Delta is not simply a ‘factor of production’ 
or a ‘piece of earth’, it is more fundamentally an extension of community identity, a piece of 
earth with ‘mystical qualities’.262 Therefore, a forest is not just a collection of wild vegetation and 
an abode of wild animals. Its existence, like that of local rivers and streams, is bound up with 
the existence of the community. Mitee (2002) too supports this viewpoint, stating that the land 
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holdings and the forest is where the people of the Niger Delta works, worship their Gods and 
pray. Tombstones and shrines are not simply physical structures but physical structures with a 
spirit-social dimension: “they represent ancestors, who are believed to have a connection with 
the living and the unborn”. Once constructed, a tombstone has no clear market-related price 
and is not, in the mind set of indigenous people, for sale and therefore oil companies cannot 
demolished it, substitute or paid for it at will. It cannot be valued in terms of the amount of 
money or cement and steel rods used in its construction.
263
  
Although people today usually regard land as an asset for compensation, the real problem is 
that because the Act legalises arbitrary expropriation by the state, oil companies now acquire 
land from an enhanced position of strength, exploiting federal government weakness and do 
not hesitate to seek the authoritative intervention of the state should the local Niger Delta 
landowners prove difficult to subdue. Furthermore, even if compensation for destroying 
building, economic trees and crops are made to the previous owners of land, this is a one-off 
payment, usually that is said to be inadequate and not reflective of the actual value of the land. 
Moreover, it is paid to the community Chief or traditional ruler. Finally, to make matters 
worse, in matters of compensation, the provisions of the Act, Section 27 stipulate that, “no 
court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into any question concerning or pertaining to the 
amount or adequacy of any compensation paid or to be paid under this Act”.264 Militant groups 
like MEND, COMA and NDPVF view this legislation as a central point of grievance, calling 
for its repeal, as well as removal from the statute book of legislation including the 1978 Land 
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Use Act and the Petroleum Act of 1969-laws that also facilitate the dispossession of oil-
producing communities from their land. 
Conflict between the Federal Government and the Local ownership Over the 
Land Use Act 
In the multiplicity of it constitute elements, land is unlike any other property. For it comprises 
not only the ground itself and things growing naturally on it, like trees, or items artificially 
attached to it by human agency, like buildings, but also the subsoil down to the centre of the 
earth. It is also capable of accommodating a multiplicity of rights and a variety of uses. It is 
basic as much as human existence as to the existence of government; like an individual, a 
government has to exist on land; it cannot exist in the air or in the water. This indispensability 
of land to the discharge of the functions of government and the wide-ranging ramifications of its 
nature have inevitably affected the way power over it is divided between the federal and state 
level under the Nigeria constitution without freedom for local and indigenous people in the 
Niger delta.  
First, the Constitution recognises that the federal and state governments must each have power 
to acquire and hold land for the purposes of their respective functions. The recognition is 
predicated upon the doctrine that such power is incidental to the existence of both 
governments and to the discharge of their functions.
265
 But in any case, the doctrine of 
incidental powers does not depend upon express constitutional provision. Therefore, it arises 
by implication of law. Since every grant of power is construed to include, by implication, all 
other powers reasonably incidental to it. Local communities challenged these matters in law on 
the basis that it gives the government arbitrary use of the power to take private properties in the 
name of national interest. Meanwhile, the government argued that no government can be 
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expected to discharge its responsibilities adequately as it has to depend on private purchase to 
meet all its land requirements. It fellows therefore, that both the federal and state governments 
have a concurrent power to acquire and hold land for the purpose of their respective functions.  
Second, power over “mines and minerals, including oil fields, geological surveys and natural 
gas” is assigned exclusively to the federal government of Nigeria.266 By this, the federal 
government has the power to legislate in matters such as exploration or prospecting for oil. The 
actual mining operations, and conditions in mines and oilfields, the construction or operation 
of refineries, inspection and supervision of exploration, prospecting or mining operations, 
prescribing rents and loyalties payable by operators, the protection of surrounding communities 
from the hazards of oil pollution and spillage; safety requirements generally, and oil pipelines 
are not regulated. 
Third, subject to the exclusive power of the federal government in respect of mines and 
minerals, including oil fields, provisions in sections 274(5) and (6) of the Constitution and by 
the Land Use Act raises a number of questions regarding two subsections upon which depend 
the determination as to how power over land is divided between the federal and state 
government. These questions relate to the interaction between the Act and Constitution, how it 
affects local communities in a period of conflict, and the inconsistency between their provisions 
for compensation to local communities in cases of environmental hazards.
267
 But in spite of the 
ownership of land being declared an exclusively federal enactment, it is argued that the Act 
remains under the executive authority of the State Governor by virtue of section 276. As the 
actual words of section 276 state that: “the State Governor by the Land Use Act has the 
property right, privilege authority vested in him or any former authority of a state as 
representative or trustee for the benefit of the state, so as to pass to the Governor and 
government of the state any land for economic and national interest”. But local communities 
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also argued that it does not regulate town and country planning, or the use of land for 
agriculture. Therefore, Nigeria has not developed an agricultural land use policy for local 
communities in the rural countryside. In the Niger Delta where land is scanty due to the 
terrain, some regulations on the use of land for agriculture is demanded by militias, youth and 
NGOs as a human right issue which is necessary to reducing conflict. On the other hand, the 
preservation and control of forests has been a long-standing government policy, dating back to 
1938 when the first Forestry Ordinance was enacted.
268
  
As stated earlier, the Land Use Act abolished private ownership of land, and transferred it to 
the state, free of any obligation to pay compensation. The individual is restricted to a right of 
occupancy as the largest interest in land capable of existing in his favour. Even this is also 
divested to the extent that the land, if underdeveloped in an urban area that exceeds half a 
hectare can be forcefully acquired by government. The excess of occupancy right in 
underdeveloped land in urban area over half a hectare is also transferred to the state again free 
of any payment of compensation. To the Niger Delta native communities these federal 
government land laws are of an oppressive measure. The idea underlying the nationalisation of 
land is that it enables land to be controlled and management conferred by ownership, the state 
can thus try to achieve certain socialist objectives with respect to land—greater social justice in 
the distribution of land and the income from it, control of land speculation and absentee 
landlordism and exploitation tendencies, and a more productive use of land. 
The Act also empowers the state to revoke a right of occupancy if the land is required for 
public purposes, such as, mining or oil pipeline purposes or for the extraction of building 
materials, but subject to payment of compensation. The amount of compensation is governed 
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However, there is another Act in the Nigeria federal structure whereby, state government under 
the inclusive legislative lists has the power to a public objection hearing that should be 
organized at the respective state judicial level on behalf of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
where petroleum development projects are taking place. But these state laws are not observed 
by the multinational oil companies and the federal ministry of petroleum resources. For 
example, these hearings and development-planning verification sessions are only typically 
associated with land-use systems are statutorily provided for, in order to grant permits to survey 
the routes of pipelines in petroleum development projects.
270
 
So far, the prevailing situation regarding public objection hearing exemplifies it as a government 
initiative without teeth of enforcement which is not properly understood by the oil-producing 
communities. Although the multinational oil companies are versed in these legal system, some 
of them occasionally undermine the interests of the communities affected by their operations. 
For instance, refusing or being reluctant to pay compensation or delaying the payment of 
compensation to certain communities affected by their operations, multinational sometimes 
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seek refuge under Section 9(2) of the Oil Pipeline Act, which provides for the “quantum of 
compensation”, and not non-payment of the compensation.271 
 
         Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations as a Problem in the Sharing of oil Revenue 
Studies on ethnic relations in the Niger Delta in regards to conflict of interest in the sharing of 
oil revenue have frequently proceeded with ambiguous generalization regarding government 
corruption and a lack of accountability. Such studies either gloss over the problem of ethnic 
issues, or ignore it altogether, in spite of the fact that the conceptualization of the phenomenon 
under study is the most necessary way for an efficient settlement of the Niger Delta question 
related to resource control as well as the collection of relevant data which will help in such a 
project. But going back to the Niger Delta history, in modern times, the exploitation and 
shipping of oil and gas products from the Niger Delta no longer follows the pattern of trade 
established in the early 19
th
 century of King Jaja’s era. 
Nevertheless, some food stuffs grown in the hinterland are now traded to with the coast, and 
some fish caught by the coastal Niger Delta people is sold in the hinterland. The former 
political dominance of the coast is a thing of the past, but because the Niger Delta peoples have 
been exposed to foreign trade earlier than any other part of the Nigerian federation, they are 
still able to exercise greater economic influence than the hinterland groups. However, 
petroleum flows out of Delta pipelines, leaving both coastal areas destroyed with oil pollution 
while the hinterland people are quite unaffected. The ethnic indigenes of the Niger Delta see it 
as a great irony that the people who are literally sitting on top of Nigeria’s greatest asset have so 
far reaped little benefit from the new oil wind fall. The entire area is quite underdeveloped, 
especially in the fields of public infrastructure and opportunities for employment. Moreover, it 
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is politically speaking, a minority area in the sense that all the groups are relatively small, and 
hence their political influence is very limited. The most surprising observation of people 
interviewed in the Niger Delta is that, while the entire Niger delta region is a “minority area” in 
relation to areas occupied by Nigeria’s major ethnic groups, the hinterland peoples of the Niger 
Delta are in turn minorities within their provincial boundaries. While all Delta peoples feel 
threatened by the majority groups of the: Yoruba, Hausa, and Ibo whom they accuse of 
squandering their oil revenue and neglecting the economic development of the Delta (an 
accusation with some basis in facts), the hinterland peoples of the Niger Delta see themselves 
threatened by the political power of the superior coastal groups of the Ijaws and Uhrobo. 
However, in relation to oil resources and revenue allocation from the federal level, agriculture 
has always been the main revenue earner for Nigeria. In a ten year period 1955-65, the main 
revenue earning commodities are groundnuts, cocoa, and palm oil products in that order. 
Groundnuts all come from the North, cocoa from the West and the palm oil from the East and 
Niger Delta. However by 1965 petroleum constituted 28% of Nigerian foreign exchange 
earnings but still contributed only 9.1% to the revenue. This increased to 95% in the 1990s and 
the known reserves are in the minority areas of the Niger Delta.
272
 Therefore, the most sensitive 
areas are related to ethnicity and thus revenue sharing and distribution of money of oil export 
from the central pool to the regions. The fundamental question is: on what principle was it to 
be based? If based on need, the North with its large population and poor economic situation 
would benefit. Or, was it going to be based on derivation, that is, on the basis of the economic 
contribution of each region? One thing was certain, no agreement on this was possible without 
Mid-west and Eastern regions consent, either way, the North would benefit. 
So it was 40 per cent out of 95 per cent was allocated to the North; 31 per cent out the 95 per 
cent to the Mid-west and Eastern region; and 24 per cent out of the 95 per cent to the West in 
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the Federal Pool Account. In 1963, the North got 45% of the federal allocation, which is almost 
80% of its entire yearly revenue. The East and Mid-West got 31.3% which was about 62% of its 
yearly revenue. The West got 23.7% which was 35% of its yearly revenue.
273
 Despite this 
Northern advantage, it was the North which first showed the signs of discontent. Then the 
North “has been complaining that the Federal government had all the buoyant sources of 
revenue while it was finding it harder and harder to make ends meet”274 In the meantime, the 
Mid-West and East which had been the poor among the regions discovered a new and 
extremely profitable source of funds: oil and gas. Whereas during the original revenue 
allocation negotiations in 1958, the Mid-West and the East had been entirely for distribution 
according to need (in fact according to population) it now swung to the opposite view and 
pressed for a complete return of royalties to the region of origin. Under the 1958 constitution 
(clause 140) a region recovered 50% of mineral royalties, while of the remaining half, 20% went 
to the Federal Government and 30% was paid into the Distributable Pool Account.
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Consequently, while there have been steady revenue increased from all sources in the other 
regions, that of the West hit  all-time low margin of 17.6% in 1963 due to the fact that the Mid-
West was created from the West. It was the year when her entire political machinery was in 
disarray. From 1964 on the federal allocation to the West improved.
276
 This coincided with the 
period that a broadly based government was formed at the federal level. This may mean that 
government in a multi-ethnic state may be better able to do justice in terms of sharing of natural 
resource wealth to all her citizens if all the groups were represented in government at the 
federal level. 
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But when the military came to power in 1966, Decree 9 of 1971 anticipated the boom in oil 
revenues which occurred between 1973 and 1978 and the contribution of offshore production 
to it. This decree gave the federal government the sole right to the rents and royalties from 
offshore oil production. Moreover, in 1975, Decree 6 insisted that all revenue to be shared by 
the states should first be deposited in the distributable pool account. Only 20 per cent of 
offshore mining rents and royalties due to the states of origin on the basis of derivation were 
exempted. This affected in real term, 80 per cent of mining rents and royalties, 35 per cent of 
some import duties, 100 per cent of duties on fuel and tobacco, and 50 per cent of excise 
duties.
277
 Much of the acrimony which in the past attended the allocation of revenue in the 
country was muted during the military regime between 1966 and 1979. The major reason for 
this was the lack of governmental autonomy on the part of the state governors in relation to the 
federal government. They were appointees of the central military dictatorship and took their 
orders from the central government. They were in the states on military, not political 
assignments. 
Therefore, as the transition to civilian government was being organised, it was necessary to 
work out an adequate formulae for revenue allocation to be handed over to the civilian regime 
that would take office in 1979. 
Consequently, in 1977 the government of General Obasanjo appointed the Aboyade Technical 
Commission on Revenue Allocation which was asked to review the existing arrangements for 
revenue allocation and to make recommendations to guide the Constitute Assembly in 
formulating an acceptable formula for allocation that would be incorporated into the country 
1979 Constitution. In its report, the committee recommended that all federally collected 
revenues should be lodged in a ‘Federation Account’. The allocation of funds in the account 
should be made as fellow: 60 per cent to the federal government; 30 per cent to the states and 
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10 per cent to the local governments. It created a Special Grants Account made up of 3 per 
cent from the federal governments share. This account, to be administered by the federal 
government, was to be disbursed for the benefit of the mineral-producing areas and areas that 
needed rehabilitation after disasters. In the allocation of the states’ share of the account to the 
various states five principles were to be followed: (a) equality of access to development 
opportunities, 25 per cent; (b) minimum standards for national integration, 22 per cent; (c) the 
absorptive capacity of a state, 20 per cent; (d) independent revenue and tax effort, 18 per cent; 
and (e) fiscal efficiency, 15 per cent.
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Politicians that came to power in 1979 (the second democratically elected government) 
subjected these recommendations to incessant, severe criticism. Via reports, they argued that 
they could not easily assess the possible benefits of revenue allocation for their ethnic 
communities. They dismissed the recommendations as too technical to be useful, impractical 
and academic. As a result of these complaints, the 1978 Constituent Assembly refused to 
incorporate the recommendations into the 1979 Constitution. Instead, the Constituent 
Assembly provided the National Assembly with the constitutional power to enact legislation 
regarding revenue allocation as and when it wished 
As the above example made clear, revenue allocation in Nigeria will probably always be 
controversial. The reason is because various ethnic groups seek advantage through the 
distribution of oil revenue. Yet all the ethnic groups cannot be equally helped at the same time 
to fulfil their state expenditure. Those who believe that they have lost out will protest and call 
for a review of the formula. One of the latest ways through which ethnic leaders seek to 
improve their advantage in revenue allocation is to have their state split into more states. Such a 
split enables them to increase their share from the federal account to more than one portion. 
This is why many groups who opposed the splitting of their groups into separate states now 
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advocate it with seriousness, commitment and activism. This point will be taken up in the next 
chapter in the discussion of the politics of resource control and the Nigerian federation. 
Thus, with the politicisation of ethnicity, regionalisation of economics and politics of 
consolidation of ethnically based political parties, inter-ethnic struggle for national oil wealth 
has found expression in the inter-regional/interstate struggle for maximum advantage regarding 
the allocation of oil revenues in the country. As always, very little thought is given to how to 
increase that nation’s wealth that is to be allocated. Competition among regional-ethnic leaders 
has become bitter. For example, in the 1960s, they needed the money to supplement the funds 
accruing from the regionalisation of the marketing board funds. In today’s struggle, ethnic 
factions of the relatively privileged classes of sectional ruling elites ignored the fortunes of their 
rival factions in other regions or states. In fact, they even ignored sources of revenue within 
these states or regions because they believed that the bulk of their recurrent revenues would 
accrue from oil in federal sources regardless of their contribution to economic production and 
GDP growth. 
 
      Ethnicity and Cultural Diversity in Natural Resources Control 
In a pluralistic society such as Nigeria, where different cultural groups and values exist, it is 
imperative to promote values which will minimise tension, allow for tolerance and integration 
and the overall communal security of all and sundry. Unfortunately in Nigeria, culture has not 
been utilised as a strategic tool through education for the management of values which may 
threaten national security in resource exploitation areas. For example, the primary groups 
which are concerned with the conflict in the Niger Delta region, involve three of the main 
ethnic groups in the area namely: the Urhobos, Itsekiri, and the Ijaws. Respondents to 
questionnaire in fieldwork suggest that the conflict is being played out most vigorously in the oil 
and gas city of Warri in Delta State. The various communities are hardly ever at peace with one 
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another. The people have no access to clean water or electricity; educational opportunities are 
low, while the level of unemployment very high. The result is the presence of an army of 
jobless youths who are easily mobilized and ready to go on a rampage at the slightest 
provocation. Informants also confirmed that there are frequent running battles between the 
youths and the oil companies and by extension, the government. Oil employees, both Nigerian 
and expatriates are regularly abducted for ransom. This security threats to the oil and gas 
industry has led to the frequent deployment of security forces to the area; thereby creating the 
impression of a region permanently under military occupation.
279
 
A local government councillor interviewed in Ikot-Epkene in Calabar, Cross River state 
attributed the problem of security and the consequential conflict situation centres on tension, 
injustice and marginalisation. He explained that the bone of contention is partly to do with 
allegation that, some segments of the country are carrying the burden that sustains the entire 
nation, while other segments are enjoying the paradise that has resulted from this inequality. 
This problem has been linked to the character of the state and the actions of the dominant 
interests of the ruling class. Returning to the issue of the Urhobo/Iteskiri conflict, we note that 
there are two neighbouring peoples who inhabit this part of the western Delta region. Available 
data showed that relations between these two people are currently quite tense and uneasy.
280
 Yet 
they had for a long time been known to be socially related, with a high frequency of 
intermarriage among them; they lived together in the same community, were commercially 
interdependent and remain very much so up until this day. The conflict between these two 
ethnic groups is historical in origin, thereby making it difficult to assess is actually presenting 
real facts. The Urhobos claim that they are the original owners and settlers in Warri, and only 
gave tenancy lease to Itsekiri people to farm, since they had previously only occupied swampy 
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areas of the West Niger Delta and as such had no dry land to farm. Therefore, they perceive 
the Itsekiri as migrants whom they had helped to overcome their occupational crisis at a given 
point in time, and thus when their leasing period ran out, instead of handing over the occupied 
areas, they cashed in on their privileged position with the colonial masters to engage in claiming 
ownership of Warri.  
An Urhobo man interviewed argued that Ode-Itsekiri is the ancestral home of the Itsekiri and 
that this was the only place where they had ownership and control over the land. To support 
this view point, he cited the fact that Itsekiri refer to Ode-Itsekiri as “big Warri” while Warri 
town the area in contest they call “small Warri”. He therefore summed up his contention by 
asking how one could leave big Warri and make small Warri the seat of their traditional ruler if 
not for the social and economic benefits that are associated with the small Warri’s oil revenue. 
According to the Urhobos, they have more stakes in big Warri than in small Warri, and an 
ancestral home of the Itsekiri people should be the seat of their traditional ruler. 
Amongst all the Itsekiris interviewed, they gave a different narrative which claimed long-
established ownership of Warri town. They argued that they are the original occupants of the 
area referred to as both small and big Warri; and that they only gave the area in contest now to 
their slaves (the Urhobos) to farm since they (the Itsekiris) are mainly fishermen and were the 
middlemen for palm-oil traders with the Europeans. 
The distinction between the big and small Warri was made because of the river that separates 
the same community into two. They see the Urhobos as the intruders into their community. 
Another bone of contention is related to the position of the King of Warri (the Olu of Warri) 
The argument amongst the non-Itsekiris (the Ijaws and Urhobos, but mostly the latter) is that 
since Itsekiri are not the original owners of Warri, and the fact that there are other ethnic 
groups inhabiting the areas, one particular ethnic group cannot lay claim to the Kingship of the 
place. Therefore, the Urhobos and Ijaws suggest that the state government should refer to the 
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Kingship title as Olu of Itsekiri, an appellation that automatically delineates the jurisdiction of 
the Kingship and defines the limitations and the extent of his power. While the Olu of Warri, 
an Itsekiri by birth indicates that he is the paramount ruler of all the ethnic groups residents in 
Warri and that the title therefore carries some power of supremacy with it. That’s to the 
Urhobos is unacceptable. To the Itsekiri, the Olu of Warri institution has been in existence as 
far back as 1480 A.D.; and as such no one can change it now on the ground that migrants have 
come to stay with them.
281
 These two major issues regarding ethnic claims to the ownership of 
land has laid the foundation of natural resources conflict in Niger Delta; and has become the 
source of incessant violent conflict amongst the two communities. 
Moreover, since Warri became the second largest oil producing city in the Niger Delta, and 
especially after the increasing activities of oil companies, a new dimension was added to the 
crisis in that area. The Ijaws who also occupy the coastal areas along with the Urhobos and the 
Itsekiris started agitating against the marginalization of their ethnic group. The Ijaws demanded 
their own local government where they could be heard and recognized. So, the new dimension 
of conflict is now between the Ijaws and the Itsekiri in Delta state. This new dimension to the 
conflict in Warri has further helped in complicating an already complex situation. For example, 
the creation of Warri South Local Council in 1997 gave the seat of the Headquarters at Ogbe-
Ijoh, an area predominantly occupied by the Ijaws. The Itsekiri protested about the creation of 
the new council by arguing that they were the ones who had requested the creation of a new 
local government area, and as such, the Headquarter should be in Ogidigben an enclave of the 
Itsekiris. An attempt to move the Headquarter to Itsekiri town resulted in violent conflict where 
houses were burned down and hundreds of people killed with the affected area totally 
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destroyed. Imobighe (2003) believed that the Urhobo cashed in on their standing grievances 
against the Itsekiri to give a tacit support to the Ijaws and that this helped to widen the scope of 
the conflict. 
282
 This particular conflict is yet to be fully resolved. 
Nevertheless, around twenty individual interviews were conducted relating to these matters 
both in Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaws riverine towns and they indicate that the issue of land and of 
the ownership of Warri town is the main point of contention. There are claims and counter 
claims by each ethnic group as to who is a migrant in Warri Township and who should be in 
control of Warri South Local Government Council. About 20 people of Itsekiri indigenes 
respondents think that the main cause of the Conflict is the inability of the Urhobos and Ijaws 
to accept their slave migrant status in Warri. On the other hand 30 people of Ijaws and the 
Urhobos identified the Itsekiris’ claim to the Kingship of Warri and their political domination 
as the main cause of the conflict. The issue of ethnicity, land ownership and which group 
should be the political leader and legitimate King of Warri remains the central ingredient in the 
violent confrontation in the city of Warri in Delta State. 
However, during 2011 general elections, state-levels politics revolved around the issue of the 
creation of more local government areas able to identify with different ethnic groups, and also 
the location of the headquarter in areas where each of the three ethnic groups considers an 
area of high concentration of their people. In addition, the Ijaws and Itsekiris requested the 
creation of more wards in their areas in any such local government areas so that they could 
have more seats in the executive councillorship in the local government leadership. Going by 
the present figures in the 2005 census relating to the local government in that area, as it stands 
today, an Ijaw man or woman does not have the opportunity of being elected as a Chairman of 
Warri Local Government Council. Therefore, the Ijaws are demanding that they have the 
same number of wards as the Itsekiris, or even more, to allow them to take control of the local 
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government council. This demand is yet another source of tension between these ethnic 
communities. Although, this particular political struggle does not concern the Urhobos directly, 
they have found it convenient to team up with the Ijaws, since they all share a common 
sentiment and enemy—the Itsekiris. The Urhobos and the Ijaws share a common sense of 
marginalization and oppression that they perceive as coming from the Itsekiris, even though 
they are the minority. This is because they are highly educated and dominate the most 
powerful political positions in the federal, state and local levels. As a result, the Urhobos are 
willing to join forces with the Ijaws in fighting the Itsekiris. In fact, the most surprising elements 
in the fieldwork interviews conducted is that all the three groups involved in the conflict have 
no confidence in the ability of the government, both at federal and state levels to settle these 
issues. 
 In River State too, there is the Ogoni—Andoni conflict similar to the one in Delta State. The 
Ogoni ethnic group is one of the smaller groups which inhabit south-eastern Nigeria in the 
Niger Delta region. Over the last decade they have become a symbol for minority ethnic 
groups in their struggle for a fair and just share of national resources. In the spirit of Federalism 
(Federal character), the Ogonis have staked a clear, direct and unequivocal claim over the 
resource produced in Ogoniland. For them it is the only way to justice and equity for 
themselves and other minorities like them. The problem posed by this is serious because 
Ogoniland is one of the major source of petroleum and thus the most important revenue 
earner for the federal government. The struggle of the Ogonis is symbolic because most of the 
nation’s petroleum is mined in Ogoniland though residing there are small minority groups. 
Still, it just so happens that the Ogonis have articulated these demands most clearly and created 
the best organization for pursuing them. 
The movement for the Survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP) has been the vanguard of the 
struggle for Ogoni rights. There are two aspects to this struggle: (a) autonomy and self-
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determination for the Ogonis, expressed as ownership and control of the natural resources, 
including petroleum and natural gas, mined or otherwise produced in Ogoniland, (b) an end to 
the environmental damage being wracked on Ogoniland and its waters by oil companies 
exploring and exploiting crude oil resources in the area; compensation for the environmental 
damage already done.
283
  MOSOP argues that the Ogoni are so small numerically that the 
federal character policy cannot benefit them. They do not have the necessary numbers to 
influence federal government decisions on policy. Consequently, they have suffered a severe 
disadvantage in resource allocation. For example, although Ogoniland is an oil producing area 
the major town of the area, Bori, does not have electricity, water or tarmac roads. Rivers State 
which administers Ogoniland does receive the 13 per cent derivative oil fund in addition to the 
3 per cent development funds due to oil production in Ogoniland but talking to people in the 
area in my fieldwork shows that hardly any of this money reaches the Ogonis. Many other 
small ethnic groups are in a similar positions. 
To remedy the situation, to my understanding, Ogoni people came up with an arrangement in 
which each ethnic group had complete control over its natural resources and had to make 
contributions to the federation account for its upkeep. The federal government regarded this as 
a novel and radical idea of revenue allocation, so much so that the federal government 
classified MOSOP as a secessionist organization and are doing everything possible to crush it. 
It is within the context of this government hostility and that of Shell Development (the 
multinational oil corporation that exploits crude oil in Ogoniland that inter-ethnic conflict and 
violence ensued between the Ogonis and the Andonis. The results of the fieldwork 
questionnaires distributed to both the Andonis and Ogonis shows that since 2001, the Ogonis 
resisted the laying of any oil or gas pipelines by Shell Development Corporation contractors in 
Ogoniland by the pipe laying company—Willbros. Therefore, the federal government 
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intervened and stationed a permanent army battalion between Andonis and Ogonis local 
government areas. The implementation of this decision and the continuing protests against the 
arrest of some Ogonis leaders had led to a clash between the Ogonis and Andonis groups. 
Andonis leaders claim that the conflict was provoked by the Ogonis who closed all the roads 
leading to Bori town, thereby preventing the Andonis from free movement to their farmland, 
fishing and private work. They also accuse them of attacking Andonis residents in Ogoniland 
during demonstrations against the government and oil companies. 
The Ogonis leaders blame the government for military occupation and oil companies for the 
conflict and imply that they were trying to set the Ogonis up for punishment because their 
demands were causing them embarrassment and loss of oil revenues. The Ogonis point to the 
fact that all their neighbours have picked a fight of one sort or another with them because of the 
federal government divide and rule tactics in River State, especially the Okrika, Opobos and 
Oyibos. However, the conflict with the Andonis has been the most serious one since 2010. For 
example, the Ogoni and Okrika have fought in the streets of Port Harcourt over ownership of 
the waterfront in the city. It took security forces three days to stop clashes. On Easter Sunday 
2012, Ogoni and Oyigbo communities fought each other over a piece of land near Afram, the 
gas rich location of the Afram power station over a lack of electricity supply to their respective 
communities. Five people were killed, fifteen injured and the local government secretariat 
building in the town was burned down
284
  The Ijaws of Nembe and the Kalabari of central Delta 
also fought each over fishing rights in February 2013 in the area. The resulting killings have 
thrown the two ethnic groups into an almost open war situation. They now look at each other 
with great suspicion. North of the Delta, the Ikwerre and Okrika ethnic groups who have been 
both neighbours and rivals for a long time, renewed their dispute over the ownership of Port 
Harcourt. This conflict has remained one of the longest inter-ethnic problems in the area and a 
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source of tension between the upland and riverine peoples. However, this increased ethnic 
violence has been best expressed by the increased consciousness of the minority ethnic groups. 
Okwubida Nnoli (1995) believed that since the early 1990s the Ogonis have led the way in the 




Conclusion: The central feature of ethnicity and land in the politics of resource control is the 
fear of small minority groups that they will be marginalized by bigger ethnic groups at the 
national, state and local levels. Fieldwork evidence shows the structural irrelevance of who 
should be the chairman of local government, kingship or the percentage shares in oil revenue 
through the ownership of land is fuelled by the realities and consequences of the notions of 
differences of ethnic groups. One repercussion is that small ethnic groups and other minorities 
are under-represented and oppressed by those with power in the social, political, economy and 
oil industry employment system. At the heart of marginalization are the real consequences of 
differences in language, values and beliefs, and the tensions arising from them when merged 
with the different interests and aspirations of the groups. Groups attempt to ensure their 
dominance over others by controlling the key institutions, while minority groups struggle for 






                                                          
285 Nnoli (1995) Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria, where he argued that there has emerged a general 
stirring of peoples in the Niger Delta on the basis of ethnic identity similar to what happened after the collapse 
of the former Soviet Union in Europe, p.200-201. But for the Niger Delta peoples to have a fair share of 
resource revenue they should take the fight to the federal government, not fighting among themselves 
without coherent ideology. 
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                                                                  Chapter five 
                The Politics of Resource Control and the Nigerian Federation  
 The Niger Delta is the largest wetland in Africa and rich in both renewable and non-renewable 
of energy resources including oil, gas, bitumen and forest timber products and wildlife. Going 
by ethno-geographical division, Nigeria is divided into 36 states, with Abuja as the Federal 
Capital Territory. The Niger Delta region constitutes five of these states:  Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Cross River, Delta and Rivers. These states are the littoral oil and gas producing states in the 
Nigeria. But due to the fact that Nigeria Federation comprises about two hundred and fifty 
(250) ethnic groups with different languages, cultural traditions and customs, when there is 
disagreement about the share and who control natural resources, conflict is inevitable. For 
political and administrative expediency in the sharing of resource wealth and governance, the 
country is also divided into six geo-political groups, namely: South West, South East, South-
South, North West, North East and North Central. The Niger Delta is located in the South-
South geo-political zone
286
 (See map of Nigeria Geo-Political Zone, page 2). Despite this 
constitutional arrangement, there are ethnic groups in the North who believed that they are not 
getting enough share of the oil revenue; while the minority ethnic group in the south were 
natural resources are located also felt that their share of resource revenue must increase to 
carry out economic development of the area where oil and gas are being exploited. How to 
                                                          
286 The History of states creation in Nigeria started in 1963 when the formal 3 regions created in 1954: 
Northern, Western and Eastern region was split into 4 regions with the creation of Mid-Western Region from 
the formal Western region. In 1967 it was divided into 12 states in the mist of the civil war; 1976 further 7 
states was created for strategic security reasons of bringing power closer to local people making it 19 states; 
1987 it became 21 states; and in 1991 additional 9 states was created making it 30 states. Ethnic or other 
interest groups in the oil and gas producing areas in Niger Delta lobbied for new states to be created within 
their respective area with aim of being able to allocate financial resources themselves. So, in 1996 additional 6 
states were created making Nigeria 36 states Federation. The three principal oil producing states are Bayes 
(created in 1996 out of parts of River State), Delta State (created in 1991 out of parts of Bendel State) and 
River State (created in 1967 out of parts of the Eastern Region). 
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balance this ethnic division of resource share and control has become the key factor to 
instability in the Nigeria Federation. 
Nevertheless, in the politics of resource control and the Nigeria federation this chapter has a 
number of objectives: first, to examine the causes and factors responsible for the struggle to 
control natural resource wealth. Second, is to explore how and why competing groups and 
actors from different parts of the Nigeria Federation take the Niger Delta resource sharing 
formulae as important to their political and economic interest; and third, to investigate whether 
the creation of states and local government areas reduces the fear of  minorities in equitable 
distribution of natural resources wealth. All the key indicators show that the availability of oil 
and gas resources is the key to instability and the dynamic of conflict between the different 
actors. But because of the option of military power that the federal government holds do plays 
a crucial role in structuring access and control to oil revenue, particularly through the pursuit of 
federated statehood by use of force. 
Table 5.1: Nigeria Federal Structure and Three-tier System  
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Source: World Bank Report on Nigerian Federalism, p.67 cit in Rotberg I. Robert (edition)-Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the 
Challenges 2004, p.26 
Note: LGAs means Number of local government authorities. 
Revenue Allocations Politics, Oil and the Minority Question among Geo-political Zones 
As mentioned above Nigeria was informally divided into six geopolitical zones in the 
Constitutional Conference of 1994/95. These zones were regarded as a development zones for 
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sharing resources and political offices in the federal level among ethnic groups. But the 
dynamic of instability started when the Southwest zone pressed for a Sovereign National 
Conference to discuss the restructuring of Nigeria into Co-federation state. The federalist 
reading of meaning to this assumed that the Southwest is asking for a return to the 1960-style 
system of regional governments with their accompanying autonomy. Isawa Elaigwu (2012) 
believed that this demand was partly predicated on the assumption that the federation was too 
centralized and that those who controlled political power at the centre also controlled 
resources, including their extraction and distribution.
287
  The Niger Delta and Southwest 
therefore opted for the old regional autonomy in order to control their resources and 
management for regional development. 
Following closely these developments, was the pronounced intention to declare a “Republic of 
Biafra” for the second time after independence by the Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The Governors of the states in the South-South Zone 
met and issued a communique explaining they had set the machinery in motion to assume full 
control of its resources within the framework of true federalism. Again, such as reaction by 
State Governors of the Niger Delta zone reflects the level of dissatisfaction in the South with 
the operation of federalism. Similarly, the Middle Belt (North Central Zone) also reacted to a 
number of issues in the federation. The trigger for the Middle Belt reactions was complaint by 
the core North the Hausa-Fulani that the three Armed Forces Service Chiefs all came from the 
Middle Belt and not the North. There were spontaneous reaction to what was regarded as 
Northern hypocrisy by using the Middle Belt ethnic groups when it was convenient to fight the 
civil war in 1966-1970, and then turning around to dump them. The middle Belt Forum made 
                                                          
287 Elaigwu, J. I. (2012) Nigeria Governance and Society, p. 121-124 is one of the best expert and consultant to 
the Nigeria Federal Government in matters of Presidential system of governance and he is currently the 
president of institute of Governance and Social Research (IGSR). 
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it clear that it was no longer interested in being part of the old Northern geo-polity, or sharing a 
Northern identity with the Hausa-Fulani.
288
  In the Constitutional Conference, the Middle Belt 
supported a federation with a strong centre, with equity of opportunities for all. It also called 
for equity in the distribution of resources and the need to encourage solid minerals, 
agricultural, and industrial development in the zone. Like the Southeast, Southwest and South-
South zones, the Middle Belt (North-Central) zone called for a national conference to discuss 
all outstanding issues in the Nigerian Federation. 
In retrospect, the violent protests in the Niger Delta over perceived injustice in resource 
distribution by the Itsekiris—Ijaws and Ogonis—Andonis in the Niger Delta shows that; the 
MASSOB’s feeble attempt to resuscitate Biafra, and the demands for a Co-federation was a 
result of a political vacuum. The South-South demand for control over its resources is all part 
of the bubble of the Nigerian federation fragmentation. In fact, between January 2000 and 
December 2008 there were at least 40 ethnic and religious conflicts taking place in the Nigerian 
federation.
289
 However, the Governors of the South-south went beyond the expression of intent 
to increase their collective power and to influence the destiny of their people. The five states 
floated the oil company called BEDROCK OIL for exploration and production of oil in the 
Niger Delta. In addition, each state in the region also set up its own company. Governor Attah 
of Akwa Ibom explained the rationale of these actions: 
                   We can acquire the required technology, and we can also acquire the financial 
                         Ability to go for a major off-shore block and that is what we intend to do with 
                         It and I think that it is about time Nigerians started development themselves. 
                         That is what democracy is all about.
290
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289 Amnesty International Post-Colonial Sub-Sahara Africa Wars Report, 2010 
290 Vanguard Newspaper, July 27, 2000 p.5; also op. cit. in Elaigwu, 2012, p. 521 
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This shows that there is no doubt that the South-South geo-political zone, which is also 
involved in a call for a national conference, reflects the dissatisfaction of the states with the 
pattern of resource distribution in the federation. However, the prospects of a review of the 
Exclusive Legislative List in the constitution in favour of subnational in regional states units are 
very high among the southerners. The future is most likely to witness a relatively less powerful 
centre than Nigeria has now according to few government officials interviewed in the state 
levels. But it is unlikely that Nigerians would revert to the loose federation they had between 
1960—65, or even adopt a co-federal constitution.291   
Moreover, in response to the complaints of neglect in the Niger Delta a new body was set up in 
2000: The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace the military regime-era 
of Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). The NDDC was 
designed to alleviate poverty in the Delta area and embark on development projects aimed at 
improving the quality of life for the average Niger Delta person via the allocation of 3 per cent 
of total oil revenue to be specifically used in developing oil-producing communities.  To 
distribute development projects, NDDC loosely relied on the current inventory of 
communities’ contributions to net oil output (measured by the number of active oil wells). The 
conflicts that ensued were part of the scramble for control of land containing oil wells among 
different Niger Delta communities. In fact, the dilemma was that many local communities that 
hitherto lived together in peace were suddenly caught up in the throes of a ‘petro-revenue 
violence’. For example, the Ogoni prosecuted inter-ethnic wars against nearly all of their 




                                                          
291 The nearest Nigeria went to a Co-federal Constitution was crisis period of the civil war 1966-1967, when the 
then Federal Military Government issued a Decree No. 8. 1976, in response to the Aburi peace accord in 
Ghana. 
292 Kenneth Omeje (2004) The State, Conflict and Evolving Politics in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Review of 
African Political Economy, 31:101, 425-440 
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A similar trend of violence characterises the implementation of the current development 
provisioning programmes, as well as youth vigilante security contract practices of the various 
MNOCs. In the case of security contracts, local youths are hired and paid by the different 
MNOCs to protect the company’s oil facilities and services within their respective 
communities. But because of the substantial money involved, this practice has generated 
enormous violence between the various security contract teams on the one hand, and 
disaffected rival youth groups and factions of the traditional political elites on the other. This 
indicates that it gives opportunity rather than motivation for conflict, trickle-down effect rather 
than grievance. But all the evidences shows that, it has led to the proliferation of small arms 
predatory by militant groups, and that oil as a largely non-lootable but value assets is likely to 
increase the duration and intensity of conflicts in the Niger delta.
293
 
 Similarly, states with solid minerals also complain that in spite of environmental degradation as 
a result of mining activities in their areas, they have not been adequately compensated for this. 
They are, therefore, calling for the establishment of a Solid Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission (SOMPADEC). Interestingly, all the states from which 
hydroelectric power is generated have also called for the establishment of Hydro Power 
Producing Areas Development Commission (HYPPADEC) to compensate them for the 
consequences of any environmental damage caused by the activities associated with the 
generation of hydroelectricity. These are major issues that remain hitherto unresolved among 
geo-political zones in the revenue allocation formulae. 
Furthermore, in search for a greater political muscle, the Middle Belt Forum (North-central 
zone) and Niger Delta (South-South Zone) formed a new alliance of Northern and Southern 
minorities. To my understanding, the main aims and objective of this alliance is to bring 
                                                          
293 Collier, P & Hoefller, A. (2000), p 45; Omeje (2004) and Pearce, J. (2002), p.19-22 
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together like-minded people of both regions, refocus their energies, creates an economic block 
where regional autonomy is respected, they also advocate for the restructuring of the federation 
to effect equitable distribution of political powers, resources and opportunities to minorities 
groups. While it is possible to have such vigorous assertions and inter-zonal solidarity sought 
among Nigeria’s ethnic groups, the division among these groups stretched beyond the demand 
of resource control to a new dimension of identity explosion that might weigh heavily on the 
delicate balance of Nigeria’s federalism. In light of the above, there is a re-definition of 
aggressive boundary relations among ethnic groups and unwarranted conflagration resulting 
from strong claims to citizenship, indigenes and non-indigenes in Nigeria’s cities by these 
groups—something that is creating more instability and secessionist agitations.  
                                       The Scramble for Oil and Gas Revenue 
 At the root of the current problems of the Niger Delta region is the issue of resource wealth 
control, which is contested by the oil producing communities. Since the exploration and 
production of crude oil and gas commenced in the region over 50 years ago, the federal 
government has always claimed to have “owned” and “controlled” the resources while 
production is carried out by multinational companies under joint venture arrangement with it. 
However, there are three national policy issues that dominate the national democratic dialogue: 
the ‘national question’, distribution of the resources, and issues pertaining to peace and 
sustainable economic development. The national question is at the heart of Nigeria’s 
development prospects and informs a key rationale that can explains the Niger Delta conflict. 
The national question concerns the fundamental basis of the country’s political existence, its 
power sharing and the management of its resources in terms of access, control and 
distribution.
294
 Moreover, we have the question of: who owns the oil?’ as the peoples and 
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Delta conflict, Journal of Peace-building & Development, 6:2, 43-57 
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militant groups of the country’s lucrative oil-producing Niger Delta region have begun to 
demand from Nigeria’s multi-national companies a renewed sense of national consensus that is 
based on the equitable inclusion, acceptance of exclusive identity equal to others and fairer 
distribution of oil revenues. Needless to say, these calls have generated different discourses, 
however, with crude oil production making 85% of gross national income and the government’s 
budget, non-Niger Delta states and other stakeholders hold radically divergent views about how 
to solve these grievances. 
But to address this policy issues it is necessary to first look at the discourse surrounding 
compensation that is often linked to another, equally powerful narrative in Nigeria, namely: 
fiscal federalism, and in particular, the marginalisation of the oil-producing states when it comes 
to national revenue sharing.
295
 It is alleged that the subsisting revenue sharing arrangement do 
not sufficiently reward the oil-producing states. To underscore the seriousness of the ‘politics’ 
of revenue sharing in Nigeria, and its influence on internal conflict, Watts notes that ‘the history 
of post-colonial Nigeria is in a sense the history of the reconfiguration and contestation over 
revenue allocation’.296 Such an argument strengthens the view that oil-related community 
grievances in Nigeria is linked to the revenue sharing formula which some deem to be 
unfavourable for the oil-producing states. Therefore, oil producing states and communities 
argued that they have been left out in this arrangement (between the federal government and 
the multi-national oil conglomerates). Second, their frustration is against the arrangement 
whereby, less than 3% of the total oil revenue that the federal government has realized from its 
“control” of the oil and gas industry has been used in the development of oil producing 
communities. The result is that abject poverty is still pervasive in oil producing communities 
unlike many parts of the country and other oil producing communities around the world. Thus 
                                                          
295 Akpan and Umejesi (2013) Oil Exploration and local Opposition in Colonial Nigeria: Understanding the Roots 
of Contemporary State-Community Conflict in the Niger Delta, South Africa Review of Sociology, 44:1, 111-130 
296 Watts, 2008, p.242 cited in Akpan and Umejesi 2013 
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the oil producing communities have been struggling to wrestle back “ownership” and “control” 
of the oil industry from the federal government in order to compel the federal government and 
the oil companies to devote more resources to tackle the developmental and environmental 
problems of the oil producing communities.
iii297
 
However, the discourse is typically framed in a way that shoves aside the historical dimensions 
of the conflict. First, by emphasising compensational inadequacies, the analysis of oil-related 
community conflict appears to be only relevant to the postcolonial era, when oil production 
and its environmental effects became more pronounced. The discourse ignores local 
opposition in the inland communities that dates back to the late 1930s, when despite intense 
exploration activities, commercial oil deposits were not found. Indeed, current evidence 
especially those from archival data suggests that local opposition to oil activities in the years 
before oil discovery in large quantity in Oloibiri (1956) was not linked by a demand for 
“compensational justice”, despite the socio-ecological destruction that accompanied the 
operations.
298
 Another weakness of the compensation discourse is the implicit solution is offers. 
It portrays compensation as a quick fix to the myriad of socio-ecological challenges brought 
about by oil exploration, and thereby disregards important socio- economic damage to the 
environment. Political and economic analysts argued that, for example, the massive 
improvement and development of the area was the only solution because, that is what the local 
people are fighting for, nothing more.
299
 While lack of socio-economic infrastructure and 
poverty in the communities have the potential to trigger or exacerbate violence, it is not clear to 
                                                          
297 Cyril Obi & Siri A. R. (2011) Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, Managing the Complex politics of Petro-
Violence, p.27 
298 Shell D’Arcy Oil exploration in Colonial District of Okigwe, (File: NAE:0.P.24/1924:33)  dated 14th May 1940, 
which was obtained from National Archive Enugu (NAE) 
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what extent the provision of good roads, drinking water, electricity, schools and hospitals, for 
example, will be able to resolve local grievances. 
The main issue is that local communities believe that at independence in 1960, the founding 
fathers of Nigeria agreed to have a “true federation” of three regions.300  But in 1963, the Mid-
West region was carved out of the Western region, as the fourth region of the federation. Niger 
Delta inhabitant argues that the 1963 constitution was fashioned to reflect some of the tenets of 
true federalism. For instance, it included a provision for the payment of 50% derivation (of 
rents and royalties from mineral resources) to the regions from where such mineral resources 
were obtained. 
However, when the military took over the government in 1966 it opted for a unitary system of 
government and dismantled the regional governments, replacing them with 12 states 
governments and increased the number gradually to 36 states before handing power over to a 
democratically elected regime in May 1999. In line with the centralization of fiscal powers, the 
military regime abolished the 50% derivation in 1969. After the civil war, crude oil became the 
major sources of government revenue after the sharp increase in crude oil prices in 1973/74 
and the rapid increase Nigeria’s crude oil production. By the mid- 1970s, oil had become the 
mainstream of the economy, accounting for over 85% of federally collected revenue and 90% 
of foreign exchange revenue. All the oil is produce from the Niger Delta region and its 
adjoining offshore yet the region remained neglected and impoverished—along with the 
negative consequences of oil exploration and production activities.
301
 
                                                          
300 Urhobo Historical Society: Towards Peace and Security in the Niger Delta 2010. This organization of the 
West Niger Delta is based in the USA. 
301 Urhobo Historical Society: Toward Peace and Security in the Niger Delta 2010. This Organization of the West 
Niger Delta is based in the U.S.A. 
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Successive military regimes dominated by military generals who were not from the Niger Delta 
region did not deem it fit to tackle the development and environmental problems of the oil 
producing areas or allocate a good percentage of revenue accruing from oil to the oil-producing 
states to address these problems. In 1980, the federal civilian government reduced the 
derivative allocation to oil producing states to 1.5% and later increased this to 2.5% of the 
Federation Account to be allocated to a Committee to tackle the developmental problems of 
the oil-producing areas. The committee was ineffective and most of the revenue the committee 
received ended up in private accounts of bureaucrats and contractors and did not reach the 




Meanwhile discontent and restiveness continued to grow in the oil producing areas of the Niger 
Delta. The major grievances of different ethnics groups from the:  Ijaws, Urhobos, Isokos, 
Itsekiri and the Ogonis are related to the wealth distribution policies of the government which 
they deem unfair. The ethnics groups demand that a larger proportion of Nigeria’s oil wealth 
be spent on their communities, rather than distributed throughout the country. For example, 
under the 1960 and 1963 Nigeria constitution, 50 per cent of oil revenue was returned to the 
states in which the resources were derived. The dominance of the larger ethnic groups and 
their control of the accruable revenues have become a defining characteristics of the dominant 
elite in Nigeria. The state itself is to a large extent, dominated by an unstable coalition of 
Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo ethnic majority elites whose geographical homelands have little or no 
oil reserves. Therefore, the dominance of the latter is largely to the disadvantage of the ethnic 
minorities of the Niger Delta area where the bulk of Nigeria’s oil wealth is produced. Terisa 
Turner (1978:167) has used the concept of a ‘commercial triangle’ to depict these dominant 
elite forces which she conceptualises as a nexus between the multinational oil companies 




(MNOCs) and their local Nigerian associates consisting of private middlemen, otherwise 
labelled as “compradors”, and the state officials.303  Omeje also argued that both the 
compradors and the state officials rely heavily on the state’s oil revenues to ultimately fund and 
reproduce their societal dominance through highly unproductive contrivances, including 
spurious and inflated contracts and imports, and barefaced looting, that impede both economic 
growth and political stability.
304
 
Currently, under the 1999 Constitution, this “derivation formula” stands at 13 per cent but 
much of the money never trickles down to the community level due to massive corruption. 
While the federal government has offered to slightly increase the revenue allocation to the 
states. The ethnic communities are calling for derivation formula of 25 per cent. They are also 




 Partly as a result of these disagreements, the Ijaws, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Ogonis and the Isokos 
have formed militant groups to launch attacks against NNPC infrastructure and oil workers in 
the Delta, as well as against government authorities. They receive support from local 
populations, making it difficult for the government to isolate and eliminate them. Their success 
in damaging oil infrastructure and terrorizing international oil workers resulted in Nigeria’s oil 




                                                          
303 Turner, T. (1978), ‘Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup’ in K. Panter-Brick (ed), Soldier and Oil: The 
Political Transformation of Nigeria, London: Frank Cass, p.167 
304 Omeje, K (2004) The State, Conflict and evolving Politics in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Review of African 
Political Economy, 31:101, 425-440, Roultedge 
305 State allocations are based on five criteria: equal shares per state, population, social development, land- 
mass, and revenue generation. *The derivation formula refers to the percentage of the revenue of oil 
producing states retain from taxes on oil and other natural resources produced in the state. See World Bank 
Report (http://www.info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/5783/state and Governance Nigeria. 
306 Daily Champion July 24, 2008. 
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                              The Creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
In order to address the challenges and to fast track development in the region, the Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs was created in September 2008 and commenced operation in April, 2009. 
It also has the responsibility to coordinate the activities of agencies, communities, donors and 
other stakeholders involved in the development of the region. The functions of the Ministry are 
as follows: (1) oversee the implementation of Government policies on the development and 
security of the Niger Delta; (2) coordinate the formulation of the development plan for the 
region; (3) formulate policies and programmes for Youth mobilization and development; (4) 
facilitate private sector involvement in the region; (5) liaise with oil companies in the region, to 
ensure environmental protection and pollution control; (6) organize human capacity 
development as well as skills acquisition programmes for the youth; (7) take adequate measures 
to ensure peace, stability and security with a view to enhancing the economic potentials of the 




The contention is often heard that existing structure and institutions are unable to deal the 
Niger Delta developmental problems. This position is taken on three grounds. The first is that 
oil producing activity destroys the land and fishing grounds available for use in the oil-
producing areas, depriving the people there of a means of livelihood. The second argument is 
that oil itself is a non-renewable asset. Exploitation in Nigeria also wastes the natural gas 
resource available along with oil by flaring the associated gas instead of using it for electricity 
generation. Therefore, it is argue that, some years from now, these resources will no longer be 
available and the populations of the areas where they occur would have lost a rich source of 
potential development for good. The third is that when oil was not available, revenue was 
                                                          
307 Interviews and briefing conducted in the Office of the Hon. Minister of the Niger Delta Affairs on the 25 
October 2013, in Abuja. 
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allocated to the states on the principle of derivation. It is often alleged in chapter 4 that the 
supposed abandonment of this principle occurred because the oil is found almost entirely 
outside the territories of the major ethnic groups, or that it is due to a conspiracy among the 
non-oil producing states. 
To deal with these allegations, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was established in the federal 
level to alleviate the fear of the Niger Delta minorities. Nevertheless, the derivation principle 
has not been abandoned and that the 13% derivation still applies to tax revenue to be allocated 
to Niger Delta states. The fact that oil leads to ecological losses for people in the oil-producing 
areas is justifiable case for adequate compensation. It is widely observed in chapter 3 that the 
compensation as is currently paid, is far from sufficient to offset the losses. However, while the 
people of the actual oil-producing areas are entitled to such compensatory payments, the whole 
state where oil is found is not, since the inhabitants of such a state other than in the oil areas 
lose nothing. Then again the argument about oil being a wasting asset is cogent, but again rightly 
applies to the people whose land and fishing grounds are adversely affected by oil activities. But 
despite the derivation of oil from these areas, in term of development, local communities in the 
Niger Delta are conscious by the lack of attention given to them by the oil firms and the federal 
government. It is unfair local maintain to use revenue from these areas to develop Abuja, Lagos 
and Kaduna, while the area where it is found is neglected. 
These arguments about non-compensation and developmental neglect necessitated the setting 
up of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in 2008 by the federal government. This ministry will 
have budgetary funding like other federal ministries and agencies with the main aim of dealing 
adequately with Niger Delta developmental needs and will have a federal minster that reports 
directly to the president. This does not justify a change in the general allocation arrangement 
which permit the handing over of petroleum revenue to oil areas littoral states whose 
governments may pay no more attention to the compensation and development of public 
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infrastructure of the oil-producing areas. Most ethnic groups from the Niger Delta assumed that 
the oil companies and the Federal Government are owning them. But it must be pointed out 
however, that the question of people in oil areas being adequately compensated for loss and 
that their development being adequately attended to is at bottom of the government agenda. 
But it is a humane argument. It is based on the general case against exploitation of the people, 
inequality or uneven development. Scholars such as: Momoh and Adejumobi (2002) have 
argued the Niger Delta case on capitalist grounds that, there is no case for compensation, and 
that there is no basis for insisting on developing the people of an area from which resources are 
taken. They further stress that oil companies neglect the exploration areas that they despoil and 
destroy because this is what capitalist firms do all over the world.
308
  But I disagree with this view 
on the grounds that capitalism is a system in which capitalists shift losses to society or the weak 
in order to enhance profits. (See Table 6.5 and Appendix G that clearly show development 
activities being carried out by the Ministry) 
Since the amnesty process in 2009, there has been a general lull in the fighting in the Niger 
Delta region. However, the tenuous peace has done nothing to address the root causes of 
unrest in the area. In the absence of any widespread demobilisation, the financial incentives for 
militant action are increasing. For example, the volume of crude oil export, which dipped o 
about 700,000 bpd (barrel per day) during the period of unrest, rose to just under 2.2million 
bpd in 2012.
309
 It must be borne in mind also that, there is significant evidence that local militias 
are being organised and financed by local political elites pursuing a violent agenda of ‘politics 
by other means’. Interviews conducted in Yenagoa also show that the majority of people in the 
region are dissatisfied with, and alienated from their Local and State government, finding them 
unresponsive to their needs and lacking in transparency and accountability, especially in the use 
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of resources, including those obtained from the derivation of oil revenues.  Poverty, 
unemployment and conflict have also taken their toll on social cohesion: eroding local cultures, 
traditions, authority structures and spiritual values that have been central to the lives of the 
communities of the Niger Delta for generation. This erosion of social capital has increased 
tensions between and within communities and contributed to mass social protest.
310
 
Notwithstanding its social and political effects, the exploitation of oil and gas in the Niger Delta 
has also degraded the environment to the extent that the Delta is now classified as a highly 
polluted environment marked by canalisation, oil spills, gas leaks, gas flares, and subsidence.
311
 
This is devastating to the population, not just in terms of health and amenity but also because a 
high proportion of the people have livelihoods which are dependent upon the environment—
principally agriculture and fishing. The impact of this degradation has a double negative impact 
on the livelihood of many Delta residents. In addition to not receiving an appropriate share of 
the proceeds of oil and gas extraction, many traditional livelihoods have been undermined by 
the environmental impacts of the extractive sector. Lamenting the level of environmental 
degradation occasioned by oil exploration and exploitation activities in the Niger Delta, the 
South-south zone politician interviewed pointed out that the current 13 per cent derivation 
principle was grossly inadequate to address the challenges confronting the region.
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Today, the South-south calls for 50% derivation revenue sharing formula and the upward 
review of federal allocation. The Niger Delta States also insisted the federal government’s 
failure to meet the significant aspects of its objective necessitated the reduction in its direct 
duties. The states proposed a vertical formula in which the federal government share would be 
reduced from 52.68 per cent to 40 per cent, the states from 26 per cent to 36 per cent and that 
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of 774 local government from 20.6 to 24 per cent.
313
 Both States, however, differed on the 
proposed horizontal formula with Bayesla proposing a reduction from 40 per cent to a 10 per 
cent sharing formula based on population, while Akwa Ibom State proposed a reduction from 
40 per cent to 15 per cent.
314
 Their argument is that a reduction of money accruing to the 
federal government from the Federation Account would discourage the struggle for political 
power at the national level and enhance the capacity of the state and local governments to 
accelerate development and make life more meaningful for the people at the grass-root.
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The enormous resources at the centre have fostered a do or die mentality among the political 
elites in the federal level, most of whom go to the extreme to achieve their political ambitions 
to control the centre. States favoured by the principle of revenue sharing such as population 
and landmass have grown steadily dependent on allocation from the federation account and 
have lost initiative and drive in matters of economic planning and revenue generation claimed 
the officials in the Ministry of Finance in Abuja. 
What Drives the Struggle for Access to Control Natural Resource wealth in Niger Delta? 
In order to adequately address the primary research question which frames this thesis, and so 
reveal the extent to which the struggle for access to control natural resources wealth has been 
engaged in this research I provide here a systemic analysis of interviews and critical analysis of 
the results from local communities, NGOs staffs, unemployed individuals, local government 
officials, state governments, political elites and multinational oil companies operating in the 
Niger Delta region. This task is one which we have seen has not been carried out sufficiently by 
existing studies, therefore, I tried here to clearly establish what drives the struggle for access to 
control natural resource wealth. It is important first to set out the nature of the scramble for oil 
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and gas revenue since it became the main export earnings for the Nigeria Federation. Second, a 
consideration of mass poverty and high levels youth unemployment in the oil producing areas; 
and third, to explore the perceived lack of any community stake-holding in the oil business and 
grievances over exclusion from its proceeds which locals believe they are entitled to. As I 
previously mentioned (definition of key concepts in chapter 1), “local ownership of access and 
control”, refer to “local involvement”, or the idea of giving opportunities to local inhabitants in 
the Niger Delta to take a stake in the oil industry. 
It is however important to note that, the oil on which the Nigerian state and economy is 
dependent on mainly produced by foreign oil multinationals and companies: The Shell Group, 
Chevron Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total and ENI-NAOC. These companies are very 
sophisticated and powerful, and the good relations the state and oil company inherent of oil 
production tend to favour foreign investment with
316
more power and resources in their hands, 
due to favourable business condition of corruption, often at the expense of the poor oil 
producing communities of the Niger Delta. Interviews conducted at the grass root level in the 
Bonny Local Government Area of River State—in the heart of the oil industry suggested to me 
that at the core of the struggle to control oil wealth is related to the notion that those who are 
not geographically based in the region are the ones controlling its resources because of political 
arrangement that privileges other major ethnic group.
317
 Moreover, interviewees generally 
indicated strong support for Niger Delta indigenes control of at least fifty per cent (50%) of 
resource revenue. Several interviewees also noted that a well-designed operational-level revenue 
sharing formulae can resolve minor concerns before they escalate into major conflagrations of 
armed conflict between government forces and militant groups.
318
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This makes for a rather complex and ambivalent relationship between the oil companies and 
the Nigerian state. On the other hand, it may be argued that the state lacks the will and 
technical capacity to regulate the Oil Multinational, while the companies are of the view that the 
state is neither able to deliver basic infrastructure and social welfare services to its own people, 
nor able to effectively protect oil companies from local protests and violent militias. Yet, in 
spite of the occasional accusations and counter-accusations, the Nigerian state and Oil 
Multinationals are wedded together in a transnational extraction and sharing of oil profits.
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Moreover, the issues of unemployment, labour laws and retrenchment in the public and private 
sector in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta region in particular was mentioned as one of the 
drivers of calls for resource wealth control. These contributory factors have led to organised 
crime usually thriving in an environment characterised by weak governance, instability and 
conflict. These specific factors are driving illicit oil theft (bunkering) in the region. Several 
interviewees and informant in the Warri Local Government Area of Delta State confirmed that 
the real issues are therefore, related to social injustices linked to the inequitable distribution of 
oil revenue. As a result of a lack of structures and stable institutions in the Nigerian Federation 
this has created the atmosphere of lawlessness engendered by a long history of agitation and 
militant activity by communities and youths protesting environmental pollution and demanding 
a fairer share of oil production benefits. There are three forms of illegal bunkering identifiable 
in the region. The first are small-scale operations, carried out mostly by local gangs who steal 
crude oil, condensate or refined products intended for the local market. These small scale 
activities (theft and smuggling) also involve diverting trucks, already loaded with refined 
products, to unauthorized destinations within Nigeria, but also across borders especially to 
Benin Republic, Cameroon and Republic of Niger. A former Shell engineer interviewed (and 
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who was made redundant from Forcados Oil Export Terminal) confirmed that an estimate put 
the amount of losses to more than 40,000 barrels per day. Second, there are higher scale 
operations typically involving larger quantities of crude oil. The gangs obtain the crude by 
piercing pipelines (an operation known as: ‘Under Water Tapping’) or uncorking well heads 
and attaching a hose pipe and then siphoning the oil into relatively small barges of boats, which 
are then taken out to feed bigger trawlers offshores, before such oil bunker ships then sail off 
out to international markets and a delivery point. Such points may be in the neighbouring Ivory 
Coast or to Europe’s biggest port at Rotterdam in the Netherlands--the amounts involved vary 
significantly from month-to-month, but may be as high as 10 per cent of Nigeria’s exports, 
sometimes nearly 200,000 barrels.
320
 Some key figures indicating the growing nature of the 
threat faced by the oil and gas industry in Nigeria is particular are very worrying. Between 
January 2011 and December 2011, the total number of attacks equalled 49 in the Niger Delta 
alone. The increase in the number of attack in the period January to December 2012 to 
reached 62 attacks a notable sum by any measurement. The Gulf of Guinea was the place for 
97% of these attacks. The security services took positive action and 1,945 individuals have been 
arrested by the Joint Task Force.
321
 The third form of theft involves excess lifting of crude oil 
beyond licensed amounts. These illicit exports are sometimes based on fraudulent paperwork 
by forging ring organised at the high levels of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) in collaboration with Navy officers in the South and Western Command or its 
subsidiaries and other oil companies.
322
  This major driver creates patronage networks and the 
protection provided by senior government officials and politicians who often use “illegal 
bunkering”, as a source to fund their political campaigns to gain more power [See Appendix H: 
Confidential Interview with a Militant Commander in River Nun Creek Jetty]. Those who have 
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power and are well-connected to a network of corrupt revenues allocators in the state, and at 
the federal level have the control over natural resources revenues. As Cyril Obi (2010) argues, 
two issues flow from the foregoing. The first relates to the extent to which oil defines the nature 
of the Nigerian state and its capacity to manage its immense oil resources in ways that feed into 
democracy, political stability and development; while the second relates to the implication of 
the pervasive influence of oil on Nigeria’s political economy for regional state peace and 
development. With regard to the first, it should be noted that the impact of oil now relates to 
the ways in which it has accentuated certain features of the state, mostly the ruling elites, 
particularly its central role in accumulation and distribution. 
Also another driving force is the issue of corruption. In Nigeria, political offices are often seen 
as a get-rich-quick avenue because the legitimate salaries and benefits are enormous and are 
probably unobtainable elsewhere in the system. Another reason is that because oil generates 
enormous revenue regularly to government coffers, politicians can also meddle with the public 
funds with impunity. This has led to all arms of government collaborating in the looting without 
accountability, checks and balance. For Example, constituency allowance approved by the 
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) gives 200% of the basic 
salary for politicians but in reality, they are paid far more than that. The major flaw of this 
allowance is that the law does not require government officials to file receipts on how the 
money is spent.
323
 Moreover, in addition to the regular and legitimate salaries and allowances 
which Senator and Representatives were collecting yearly along with the irregular allowance of 
estacodes (foreign trips allowances), duty tours and for other things like car maintenance 
allowance. They were also collecting illicit quarterly allocations which are not provided for by 
RMAFC. (See Table 5.1 for Nigeria National Assembly Salaries and allowances) 
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Table 5.2: Nigeria National Assembly Salaries and Allowances  
ITEMS: Salaries and 
Allowances 
             Senator 
     In Millions Naira  
Representative 
In Millions Naira 
Percentage of Basic 
Income % 
Basic Salary/Regular      11,145,200.00      9,926,062.00           200% 
Furniture Allowance       3,039,600.00       2,744,454.00           300% 
Motor Vehicle Loan     5,066,000.00       4,963,031             75% 
Duty Tour Allowance 
per day 
         23,000.00        21,000.00             25% 
Severance Gratuity      6,079,200.00     5,955,637.00            300% 
Constituency 
Allowance per quarter 
      7,968,509.00      6,068,409.00             200% 
Hardship Allowance       1,242,122.70         956,508.00               50% 
Source: Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) 2012 
Newspapers Allowance      1,242,122.70      1,000,000.00                   50% 
Accommodation      4,968,509.00      3,621,061.37                    200% 
Wardrobe Allowance        621,061.37         501, 248.55                      25% 
Domestic Staffs and 
Personal Assistance 




Therefore, oil has become the fuel or source of power on which the Nigerian state runs. Those 
that organize to effectively capture the state also capture power over vast oil revenues controlled 
by the federal government. As such, the prize of controlling and distributing oil wealth which 
resides in the state is so high, though this does not mean that oil defines the state; it only 
implies that the state since the early 1980s runs on oil—the object of fierce contestations for 
power within the fractious dominant elite. In fact, the extractive and coercive logic of the state 
essentially remains the same, even if the government changes hand from military to civilian 
rule. The retired military generals contested elections, became senators, member of House of 
Representatives, regional state governors and federal executive ministers. So, governance is thus 
just a recycling of executive management in a constant shift of patronage and competing 
factions of the dominant elite, with little time or space left for local communities to participate 
in the affairs of the state. 
Furthermore, when assessing the extent to which unemployment, internal processes and labour 
laws are connected with the struggle to control oil revenues; there are also issues of 
redundancies and expatriate quota abuse. When oil companies are looking for ways to reduce 
costs, the first victims are domestic oil workers. Over time, companies have unjustly used 
redundancy in the severance to sack local workers in the oil and gas industry. Whether making 
workers redundant or retrenchment is involuntary and permanent loss of employment caused 
by either an excess work force or termination of a company’s span through sales, acquisition, 
liquidation and or declaration of force majeure through no fault of the employer.
324
 However, 
employers in the industry in the Niger Delta have grossly abused this term. They have hidden 
clause in employment contracts to terminate the employment of indigenous workers in various 
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forms and thus contravening Nigerian labour laws. Some companies do not have pension 
schemes. Rather, they have redundancy clauses to deal with any release of workers from 
employment, be it voluntary or involuntary in order to avoid the payment of retirement 
benefits. According to an unemployed man in Yenagoa interviewed through the phone, he 
confirmed that, strangely, workers have been rendered redundant even when the positions for 
which they were rendered redundant still exist in the oil company. Therefore, he concluded 
that he had no option or choice other than to join the creek boys in setting up an illegal refinery 
in the creeks. Moreover, according to regulations, before any employee in the oil and gas 
industry is released by his employer under any redundancy clause, the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) under the Ministry of Petroleum must be convinced that there is 
indeed no placement for the employee. The companies have also found ways of sabotaging this 
provision. The position of the law according to informants on redundancy is very weak as the 
employer is only expected to inform the Union before the declaration of redundancy. 
Moreover, with the global economic meltdown in 2007-8, every country tries harder to ensure 
that their citizens are employed before giving any consideration to other nationals. But the issue 
of expatriate quota abuse among the educated workforce in the Niger Delta region during 
interviews came top of the list of grievances during my fieldwork. Both Local communities and 
cities across the region demand from oil companies to that they employ their sons and 
daughters first before bringing in foreign expatriates to fill jobs that indigenous citizens are 
qualified to do. However, the reverse is the case in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry whereby 
expatriates are brought to occupy jobs that Nigerians could equally do. Unions have persistently 
called to the Government’s attention the fact that there are many unemployed Nigerians that 
can perform the duties of the expatriates brought into Niger Delta; however, this has been to 
no avail. For example, this has led to a very serious face-off between unions and Chevron 
Texaco management in 2012. The Union alleged that they had identified several jobs positions 
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occupied by expatriates that Nigerians had the expertise to do. After more than eight months of 
negotiation which lasted until February 2013, the unions and management finally agreed in 
March 2013 to a gradual reduction in the numbers of expatriates in accordance with local 
content provision in the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) relating to the numbers of expatriates in 
the whole oil industry and replaced them with competent Nigerians. 
It is a known fact that many companies do not adhere to the understudy clause in which two or 
three Nigerians become understudies of experts and graduate into the job in two years. There 
are cases in which experts work exclusively out of contract instead of both expatriate and a 
Nigerian working as a team. There are abounding cases where expatriates stay on the job for 
more than five years. Some of the expatriates after the expiration of their contracts find their 
ways into other areas of the company other than the jobs areas they were recruited for. With 
the passage of the Nigerian Oil and Gas industry Content Development Act 2010, it is 
expected that for each of its operations, the operator shall submit to the Board, a succession 
plan for any position not held by Nigerians. Such succession plan shall provide for Nigerians to 
become understudies of incumbent expatriates for a maximum period of four years. At the end 
of four year period, the position shall become Nationalised (section 31).
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Finally, local stake-holding is absent in management, production and allocation of oil revenues. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which the Nigeria government passed 
into law in 2010 was an effort to ensure that natural resource wealth is managed for the benefits 
of all a country’s citizens. This is a new industry standard to strengthen governance by 
improving transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. This is done through the 
publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining otherwise 
known as “Publish What You Pay” (PWYP) which was drawn from a Global Witness Report, 
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‘A Crude Awakening’.326 Since they are assets belonging to the country, it is important that 
citizens participate, have reasonable access to information about how much their government 
makes when contracts for exploration of natural resources are tendered. Also, they should have 
reasonable access to information about how much their government makes when such assets 
are sold. In the face of rampant corruption, public disclosure of the government’s oil revenues 
in Nigeria has uncovered regulatory loopholes and discrepancies between what the government 
has received and what they should have received according to the relevant laws and contracts. 
These identified discrepancies include payment that cannot be traced and missing tax payments 
from the national oil company NNPC that the Nigeria EITI (NEITI) argues are incorrect 
deductions of fuel subsidies. These deductions amount to US$8.3 billion in missing revenues 
for 2009-2011 (which is a larger amount than what the federal government spent on education 
during the same period).
327
 
However, the EITI has won public trust in its reporting, but high trust creates high hope and 
expectations. In fact, the Nigerian President challenged Nigeria EITI to “track down the thieves 
and those who receive the stolen oil crude oil money”.328 For example, a recent report by 
Chatham House estimates that the country annually loses between US$3 and $8 billion as a 
consequence of oil theft.
329
 Nigeria’s oil theft is not something that the EITI can solve. Many 
more efforts are needed to improve the governance of natural resources in Nigeria. However, 
NEITI is playing a useful role in clarifying the problems and remedies and building support for 
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necessary reforms. But the differences along ethnic lines are prohibiting an acceptable 
consensus from being reached. 
 The process in each implementation of EITI is overseen by a broad coalition of participants 
from local government/communities, the state level, companies and civil society. But in the 
Niger Delta, the picture is quite different. In an interview conducted with a member of the 
Urohbo Progressive Union leader in Sapele, Delta State, it is evident that there are cases in the 
extractive oil sector where there are economic exclusion, mistrust and suspicion between local 
communities, the government and the oil companies operating in the region. It was confirmed 
that there is no single member from Sapele communities/local government area that is a board 
member of Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria (SPDCN). Therefore, 
affected communities and ordinary citizens often assume that the government and companies 
are in cahoots to exclude them so that they can keep the wealth for themselves.
330
 But when 
locals protest and threaten oil company infrastructure and assets, sometimes, companies feels 
that the government and citizens are ganging up on them to reset the rules and renegotiate 
contracts. This is where I believe that creating a local stake holding that is transparent, inclusive 
and that promote collective decision making in term of management, distribution and sharing 
of oil revenue should come in. 
 In addition to this, there is competition between local communities for access to control of 
both oil and gas revenue and economic strategy these people currently lack such access and 
control and they sometimes rely on armed conflict to achieve their share of oil wealth. Since oil 
and gas contributes to 85 per cent of government revenue, and 95 per cent of exports which 
make the Nigerian state to be highly dependent on oil revenue. While on average, internally 
generated revenue represent less than 20 per cent of all states and local government areas’ 
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revenues put together in any given financial year. As a result, one can understand the federal, 
states and local level attachment to natural resource wealth. As Pierre Englebert makes clear, 
the derivative principle highlights the centrality of the Nigerian state dependency on resource 
wealth. Resources are extracted and appropriated along the federalism path, then redistributed 
along a parallel state and local government level. Therefore, these transfers constitute the main 
source of income of states and local government areas.
331
 This increases the demand for more 
states to be created, as well as local government areas as a means for local communities to have 
access and control to political offices as an effective means to benefit from resource wealth. To 
be more precise, as Friedman (2011) points out, this makes Nigeria a state without a nation. He 




For example, nationally, the number of states has risen from three in 1960 to thirty-six since 
1996; and the number of local government areas has gone from 301 in 1976 to 776 in 1996.
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In fact, most new states seem to have resulted from demand by ethnic group elites who 
perceived themselves to be marginalized and devoid of access and control to revenue from oil 
and gas coming from the Federation Account. At present, the distribution of oil revenues, 
which are collected by the federal government and monthly pooled into a Federation Account, 
and from which revenue is then allocated between the three levels of government is: 50 per 
cent of the funds the federal government, 25 per cent to states, and 20 per cent to local 
government areas.
334
  In addition, all states are entitled to a specific proportion of the revenues 
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collected in the area, and the called derivative principle applies to all states. But since 1999, the 
amount stands at 13 per cent and it is for all practical purposes an additional transfer to the oil-
producing states. But to the average Niger Delta person, with the on-going destruction of their 
local environment and appropriation of their land, the amount of resources coming back is 
unfair and inequitable. 
                                       Chapter Findings and Conclusion 
It is therefore logical to argue that the resolution to oil-related struggle in the Niger Delta will 
have to focus on four levels: the local (communities), state, national and multinational 
corporation levels. First, critical to the local and state is the need for a thorough distribution of 
resource revenue for social relations to improve around areas producing oil and the sharing of 
the benefits for the welfare of the local people. Related to this are issues of transparency, EITI 
accountability, social justice, equity and the involvement of people in decision-making regarding 
the use of oil revenues. This calls for the empowerment of the people in the Niger Delta so 
that they can assert their citizenship rights and hold their leaders and elites accountable for the 
use of oil as a critical factor for national cohesion, human security, economic inclusion and 
development. Interviews also show that this requires a transformation of resource governance 
and the existing political and economic structure along a proactive grassroots inclusion route, 
something which is necessary for peace and security. 
Second, from inception and up until today the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs has embarked 
on a number of projects aimed at fast-tracking the socio-economic and infrastructural 
development of the region. However, apart from the skills acquisition or training programmes 
(some of which have been completed), none of the infrastructure projects have been 
completed. All the projects are at various stages of completion. This is largely due to 
inadequate funding for the Ministry’s Projects. The effect of this is that the people of the region 
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have not really benefitted from the projects of this ministry and by extension have not felt the 
impact of the ministry. Efforts should therefore, be sustained to secure an increase in funding 
to enable the ministry to complete and commission on-going projects and also to embark on 
other short term quick-win projects that would impact positively on the people of the region 















                                Chapter Six 
External Dimension of Resource Control and Political                                            
                        Instability in Niger Delta                    
The first major oil exploration work in the Niger Delta was conducted by the Nigeria 
Bitumen Corporation, a Nigerian subsidiary of a German company between 1907 and 1914. 
Moreover, the Corporation was forced to withdraw from Nigeria due to the First World War, 
and the company was not allowed to resume operations since the British colonial 
authorities gave preference to oil exploration to British companies.335  This gave a monopoly 
over oil exploration to Shell and BP which began its drilling activities in 1951. In 1956, some 
450 barrels of oil were discovered at the Akata-1 well and in commercial quantities for the 
first time at Oloibiri.336  As a result of expanded operations, It’s was able to make other 
important discoveries, of which the most promising one was Bomu oil fields in Ogoni area of 
Rivers state in 1958.337  This led to the beginning of crude oil exports in Nigeria. The export 
portfolio increased rapidly and by 1960, crude oil export came to provide the bulk of the 
mineral exports. Indeed, the country recorded exports of 741,000 barrels of crude oil that 
year, compared to only 450 barrels in 1953. This increase made Nigeria the largest 
Commonwealth oil producing country and amounted to 41.5% of the total crude oil 
produced in the Commonwealth.338 This major export revenue coming to the Federation 
Account increases the power of minority ethnic groups in the Niger Delta and agitation for 
resource control and if not granted by the federal level, then may breakaway and declare 
                                                          
335 Frynas (2000) Politics and Economics in Africa Oil in Nigeria, Chapter 2, p.11 
336 History of Petroleum in Nigeria, Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) White Paper Warri, 2001 
337 According to Shell’s Statistics, 1959 was the peak year of drilling with 53 wells producing 847,000 barrels of 
oil per day; also, see Shell-BP World Energy Outlook, 1977, p.34 
338 See Frynas (200), p 34; also Nigerian Achieve, Office of National Statistics Report 1960, Ministry of 
Petroleum and Natural Resources/NNPC, Abuja  
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independent statehood. The fear for ethnic minority independent state hold for the Niger 
Delta region in the federal level has necessitate the creation of oil mineral producing areas 
development commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta development commission (NDDC) and 
now, the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) to appeased the minority groups. But these 
agencies failed to deliver economic development for the region. Therefore, militias groups 
argues that until their demand for the “Dubai” like development agenda are met, they will 
shut down the oil industry. These threats are real and still there for the Nigeria government 
to deal with but are being over-shadowed by Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East.   
Moreover, looking at the Niger Delta in the context of the twenty-first century global energy 
framework, the oil and gas Journal estimated that Nigeria has 37.2 billion barrels of proven 
oil reserves and 185 trillion cubic feet of gas (TCF) as of December 2010.339 The majority of 
reserves are found along the country’s Niger Delta River and offshore in the Bight of Benin, 
the Gulf of Guinea and the Bight of Bonny. Current exploration activities are mostly focused 
in the deep and ultra-deep offshore of the Niger Delta region. Official statistics shows that in 
2010, total oil production in Nigeria was slightly over 2.2 million barrels per day (bbl. /d) for 
that year, making it the largest oil producer in Africa. Crude oil production averaged 1.9 




                                                          




Table: Africa’s Oil Production, 2008-2015 (000b/d) 
Country 2008 2009 2010e 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f  
Algeria 1,993 1,811 1,825 1,830 1,855 1,915 1,950 2,010  
Angola 1,875 1,784 1,790 1,845 1,935 1990 2,100 2,250  
Egypt 772 742 733 720 697 700 698 681  
Eq. Guinea 340 307 302 335 385 415 430 447  
Gabon 235 229 246 252 255 250 245 240  
Libya 1,820 1,652 1,655 1,670 1,705 1,750 1,815 1,880  
Nigeria**341 2,116 2,061 2,320 2,395 2,440 2,535 2,600 2,750  
 E/f=Estimate/forecast. Source: Historical Data-BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010; BMI 
Moreover, according to the Business Monitor International (BMI), Angola has the greatest 
production growth potential along with Nigeria with exports set to climb if it can resolve the 
militant insurgency and other political issues. Recent offshore oil developments combined 
with the restart of some shut-in onshore production have boosted crude production in Nigeria 
to an average of 2.5 million b/d for the second quarter of 2011.342 However, developments in 
the upstream sector include the start-up of the Chevron operated Agbami field in September 
                                                          
341 **Regional oil production was 7.93 b/d in 2001, and averaged an estimated 9.98mn b/d in 2010. From an 
estimated 10.37mn b/d in 2011, it is set to rise to 11.92mn b/d by 2015. Nigeria accounted for an estimated 
23.24% of regional oil supply in 2010 and its market share is expected to be 23.07 by the end of the forecast 
period. Oil exports are growing steadily, because demand growth is lagging behind the pace of supply 
expansion due to the world economic recession. In 2001, the region was exporting an averaged 4.87mn b/d. 
This total had risen to an estimated 6.10mn b/d in 2010 and forecast to reach 7.44mn b/d by 2015, BMI 2010 
342 BMI, Nigeria Oil & Gas Report Q2 2011, p.47 
242 
 
2009, reaching its estimated peak production of 250,000b/d in 2010. There was also Eni’s 
start-up Oyo in 2009, which produced approximately 25,000b/d.343 Added to this is non-crude 
production which was boosted in 2011 with TotalFina/Elf’s Akpo condensate field which 
begun production in 2010, adding another 180,000b/d to total production.344 A return to 
higher production levels in Nigeria has indeed been taking place, and further progress is 
possible in 2015. 
Taking a more historical stock of the current issue leads us to the geo-political importance of 
natural resources, the Arab oil embargo in 1973 which was followed by the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution of 1979; and the political instability in the Middle-East which triggered a cut of oil 
flow to World Market by about 17 per cent at the time with non-OPEC production unable to 
meet world demand.345 Had Western consumption been anything near temperate, this 
temporary constriction in the flow of oil may have been vaguely tolerable. Instead, successive 
Western administrations lived in fear of a repeat of the 1970s oil shocks, shaping their military 
budgets, foreign policies, and economic packages in order to counter the perceived threats 
of its return.346 Therefore, the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea oil reserves represented the 
best alternative choice of energy supply. This made Nigeria an important oil supplier to the 
United States. Close to 40 per cent of the country’s oil and gas production is exported to the 
US and the light sweet quality crude is the preferred gasoline feedstock.347 But this trend is 
reversing already due to the discovery of shale gas and unconventional oil in the Bakken Valley 
in North Dokota—USA   
                                                          
343 Petroleum Economist, December 2010, p.8 
344 Petroleum Economic April 2011, p16 
345 Stokes and Raphael (2010),p.141 
346 Klare, M. (2004) Blood and Oil, How America’s Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us, p. 26-30 
347 Country Report-Nigeria, Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2011, p.7 
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Consequently, disruptions to Nigeria oil production by militant insurgents in the Niger Delta 
region impacts trading patterns and refinery operation in North America and also wider global 
oil market price. For example, in 2010, Nigeria exported most of its 2.2 million b/d of the total 
production (approximately 1.9 million b/d were exported). Of this, close to 800,000b/d (40%) 
were exported to the United States that year.348 Due to recent increases in Nigeria 
production, U.S total oil imports from Nigeria were 962,000 b/d for the first quarter of 
2011.349 These volumes represent a decrease from highs of over 1.1 million b/d seen in 2007-
2009.350 Part of the decline can be attributed to the volatility in Nigeria oil supplies leading 
some U.S. refiners to reduce purchasing Nigerian crudes. 
Additional importers of Nigerian crude oil include the: EU (24%), Asia (20%), Brazil (10%), and 
South Africa (4%).351 Despite shut-in production, Nigeria trade patterns in energy resources 
appear to have remained stable over the past three years, most of which can be attributed to 
additional capacity, amnesty to militias groups combined with slightly decreasing domestic 
consumption and increasing global demand. 
 
 
                                                          
348 Country Analysis Brief, Nigeria Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis-Oil and Gas, July 2011. Link 
www.eia.doe.gov/nigeria (accessed 20/10/11) 
349 ibid 
350 ibid 




Source: Global Trade Atlas, EIA, APEX 2011. Others importer of Nigeria crude are: Portugal, Italy, UK, Canada, 
Peru, Senegal, Switzerland, Austria, Australia, Sweden, Turkey, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, 




Prospect, Exploration Boom, Tax System and Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 
The fastest driver of Nigeria’s economic growth in recent years has been the oil and gas sector. 
This happened as a result of the prospects of new discovering of oil and gas, reforming of the 
tax system, and the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) that encompasses structural, regulatory and 
fiscal changes to the laws governing the oil and gas sector. The new prospect (seismic 
mapping) is that large commercial field have already been found in the maritime border 
between Sao-Tome E Principle, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. The first in 2000 was 
ExxonMobil’s Zafiro field about 60km northwest of Bioko Island (which, with Rio Muni in 
mainland Gulf of Guinea, makes up Equatorial Guinea). Nigeria’s large deep-water discoveries 
came in soon after Shell’s Bonga field (developed in 2004 with production starting in 2005) 
























production, storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel. Bonga lslands lies in the OPL 212 licence, 
120km offshore in water 1,020 metres deep.352 Although giant reserves in this area were 
assessed initially at 600mn barrels, the figure has since been increased to 1 billion barrels.353 
According to NNPC’s geological surveys, other large discoveries are under study for 
development in the Niger Delta deep-water areas. These are: Ebitemi, N’golo, Nnwa/Doro, 
Apro, and Akpo. (See Map). 
Niger Delta Offshore Map 
Source: Petroleum Economist 2010 
Energy analysts contended that due to a better prospect of finding oil in the Niger Delta and 
the general exploration boom in the areas, this makes the Niger Delta and its oil attractive in 
the international market. But since oil is intertwined with security issues (with the Iraq war 
adding to this scepticism), there is pessimism from the point of view of Western governments 
who contend that oil was found in all the wrong places—difficult to access and almost always 
                                                          
352 NNPC Corporate Planning & Strategy (CP&S Monthly Petroleum Information, December 2010, p.2-5; 
www.nnpcgroup.com (accessed 02/10/2011) 
 
353 Petroleum Economist, May 2010, p.18 
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far away, usually in less developed countries that become increasingly difficult to deal with as 
they develop economically and politically (mostly in the Middle-East).354 But despite that, the 
case of Nigeria seems different. First, the attraction of Niger Delta oil is that, there is excellent 
drilling success rate, and the general high quality of most of Nigeria’s crude. Second, sulphur 
contents are low and there are high yield of gasoline and diesel streams, making it suitable 
for stringent refined product requirements that attracts high price. Third, the location of Niger 
Delta oil and gas on the Atlantic coast, or in the open oceanic water of the Gulf of Guinea, 
ensures that, once loaded onto tankers, it can be swiftly and securely transported to major 
consuming countries. This is in stark contrast to reserves in many other regions of the world, 
like in the Middle East, which has to pass through various strategic chokepoints before 
reaching its destination. Third, the journey time to refineries on the US East coast is 
considerably shorter than a tanker loading in the Persian Gulf, and is in deep water far 
offshore, so that natives do not notice it being taken. Therefore, together with low domestic 
consumption and the unproblematic transport of exports to their destination, this makes the 
region an important asset in stabilizing the world oil market. 
Although the Niger Delta contributes relatively little in absolute terms when compared to the 
Middle East, both factors make it a potential swing producer, allowing oil companies to 
leverage export levels in response to changes in world demand and thus balancing export 
levels from other regions—which also benefits from secure transport routes along which the 
majority of oil passes.355 Accordingly by increasing production at relatively short notice, and 
with the liberty of exporting the entirety of Nigerian oil to world markets, oil companies 
operating in Niger Delta can, in theory at least  act quickly and securely to alleviate pressure 
                                                          
354 Stokes and Raphael (2010) Global Energy Security and America Hegemony-Stabilizing the Gulf of Guinea, 
p145-55 
355 Ibid, p.56 
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in the market arising elsewhere in the system. Therefore, Shell and other producers have 
maintained a strong interest in their Niger Delta operations, although keeping a low profile in 
times of political upheavals, particularly those relating to militant activities. 
Furthermore, in terms of exploration boom, this first started when oil and gas companies 
shifted their operations to offshore production due to lack of security for oil infrastructure 
and expatriates workers on onshore exploration sties in the Niger Delta. This resulted from 
militant attacks on sites. Second, in 1992 the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) gave the legal right to coastal states to establish sovereignty over their territorial 
waters, which extend 12 nautical miles off their coastlines and an exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) to 200 nautical miles off their coast. This led to the opening up of the Joint Development 
Zone (JDZ) in 2004 between Nigeria and Sao Tome & E Principle (STP), which in 2005 dropped 
their arguments for different principles to be used to decide on a borderline. Instead, the two 
countries’ governments agreed to create the JDZ and to share the proceeds 60:40 in Nigeria’s 
favour. The award of the first exploration licences were made in 2006.356 
The Joint Development Zone Authority received applications from 20 firms in the first round 
which auctioned nine block areas in the north of the JDZ, extending from about 700 square 
km to cover 1,700 square km of highly promising deep-water territory.357  Signature bonus 
bids for the licences was $123 million taken over by Chevron Texaco for the operatorship of 
Block 1, the nearest part of which is only about 20km south of Total’s Akpo discovery in 
                                                          
356 This area between the three countries is often known as the Golden Triangle in the Gulf of Guinea, covering 
the deep-water areas of Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome e Principle, was considered as the oil 
industry’s next boom province. Border disputes and other problems have acted as a brake on exploration since 
operation in 1,000 metre water depths became possible, but large discoveries made nearby have been an 
incentive towards resolving them. 
357 NNPC Monthly Petroleum Information 2009, 4th Quarter Statistical Highlights 
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Nigerian water.358 Conoil, a Nigerian firm, was said to have bid $120 million for the same 
operatorship.359 Three companies have preferential biding rights. These are: ExxonMobil 
which also provided technical assistance to the STP government in the evaluation of its 
offshores potential and taking 40% of block 1 and 25% of block 2, all of which were matches 
offers for signature bonus bids made by others.360 Petroleum Geo-Service, the seismic firm, 
was given unspecified rights as part of its agreement to promote the round; and another 
company called: environmental work and risk assessment which was given right to take 
interest in six licences.361 In two licences it took 15% and 20% in return for paying the same 
share of signature bonuses, but can also take ownership of 15%, 20%, 25% and 30% in other 
blocks without paying signature bonuses.362 But the company was only allowed to choose its 
licences after others had bid and, moreover, it also has rights to take interests in licence that 
might be awarded in STP’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ-outside the JDZ).363 With this 
exploration boom, the production outlook in the Niger Delta has marginally improved as 
companies continue to restore long-shut-in production. The two ceasefire period between 
the government and militias enabled companies to repair some long-damaged infrastructure 
and raise production level to more than 2.2 million barrels per day in 2010.364 With the new 
blocks, crude production capacity is expected to increase by 130 thousand barrels per day 
(b/d) to 2.7 million b/d by 2015. This represents an upward revision of around 225 thousand 
b/d.365 Also important is the fact that, while companies remain concerned over the proposed 




361 Petroleum Economist, April 2009, p.8 
362 ibid 
363 ibid 
364 International Energy Agency (IEA) Oil Market Report 10 December 2010 
365 Business Monitor International (BMI), Oil & Gas Report Q2 2011 
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new ‘Petroleum Industry Bill’, several key projects are moving forward as planned. The next 
big deep-water project to come online is the Total operated 180kb/d Usan field in 2013 
followed by the 200kb/d Egina field that begun producing in 2014.366 In the medium term, the 
outlook may well rise or fall, though this all depends on the government’s success in 
maintaining the fragile ceasefire accord with militant groups as well as the adoption of a new 
Petroleum Industry Bill that will not discourage foreign investment. While instability in the 
Niger Delta continues to threaten the near-term outlook for Nigeria production, MNOCs 
maintain a positive outlook and believe that, capacity expansion plans will move forward as 
planned. Nonetheless, it now seems likely that some projects awaiting a final investment 
decisions such as the 135kb/d Bosi deep-water field and the 110kb/d Uge field will be subject 
to the new PIB tax system.367 
Table 6.2 Nigeria’s Production Ventures 
Joint Ventures JV (Onshore and Shallow-Water Field *Estimated Recent Output (‘000bbl/d) 
Shell (Operator) 30% ,NNPC 55%, Total 10%, Eni 5%                        200 
Exxon Mobil (Operator) 40%, NNPC 60%                          400 
Chevron (operator) 40%, NNPC 60%                        250 
Total (Operator) 40%, NNPC 60%                        100 
Eni (Operator) 20%, ConocoPhillips 20%, NNPC 60%                        100 
Sinopec (Operator) 100%+                        100 
Others and NNPC                          5 
Production-Sharing Contract (PSC) Deep-Water Fields 
                                                          
366 IEA, Nigerian Oil & Gas Report 2013 
367 NNPC bulletin August  2010, p.6 
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SHELL (operator) 55%, Exxon Mobil 20%, Total 
12.5%, Eni12.5% (Bonga Field) 
                            225 
EXXONMOBIL (Operator) 56.25%, SHELL 
43.75%, (Erha and Erha North fields) 
                            190 
CHEVRON (Operator) 68.15%, STATOIL 18.85%, 
PETROBRAS 16%, SAPETRO 15% (Agbami 
Fields)# 
                             250 
TOTAL (Operator) 24%, CNOOC 49.19%, 
PETROBRAS 16%, SAPETRO 15% (AKPO Field)+ 
                             175 
ENI (Operator) 50.19%, SHELL 49.19% (Abo 
Field) 
                             30 
ENI (Operator) 40%, PACIFIC ASIA/CAMAC 60% 
(Oyo Field) 
                             25 
TOTAL (Approximate)                            2,100 
*JV Figures are indicative; PSC Figures are fields 
Plateau rates 
+PSCs covering onshore and shallow-water fields 
#Interests have not been confirmed by Total 




Moreover, favourable access to oil blocks, tax incentives and easy repatriation of profits has 
galvanized oil companies to take investment risks despite the security situation. The evolution 
of the tax system and oil operations in Nigeria started following a key piece of petroleum 
legislation called the ‘Mineral Oil Ordinance No. 17 of 1914’ was amended in 1925, 1950 and 
1958 before independence in 1960. The Mineral Oil Ordinance was passed to regulate the 
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search for oil, win contracts and produce oil and pay royalties to the government. In the 1970s 
with the new pricing levels from OPEC and the IEA, there was huge rent to be captured, that 
is, the margins between the sale prices of oil (the ‘full-cycle’ cost of oil), including an attractive 
margin of profit for companies involved.368 Unfortunately, this mechanism can only work 
effectively if prices remained been stable, but this is a dilemma because the system could no 
function when prices kept rising beyond expectation. Therefore, instead of imposing a 
windfall tax of X dollars per barrel on oil prices above a given level, the Nigeria government 
adopted in 1965 the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) which was assessed on each individual 
field’s profits, ‘ring-fenced’, with complex rules to define field profits, different from rules 
applicable to the definition of corporate profits.369 In 1978, when crude prices began to rise 
sharply again as a result of the ‘Iranian Revolution’ and the partial shutdown of the oil industry 
in the Middle East, Nigeria introduced the Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD) with 40% 
subsidies for domestic consumption but increased taxes for foreign oil companies and 
accelerated their payment after cost recovery.370 It was short-lived and was replaced at the 
end of 1981 by the Advance Petroleum Revenue Tax (APRT), similar to the SPD but subject to 
a couple of important differences of percentage of shareholding. The APRT was the 
cornerstone of Nigeria fiscal system applicable to oil production, and it reached the level of 
an 85 per cent tax in 2000.371 
However in 2008, the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was introduced and was submitted to 
National Assembly in August 2008, but failed to pass into laws owning to a number of prosed 
                                                          
368 Parra, F. (2010) where he argues that in the 1960s, the traditional system of royalties plus income tax was 
not up to the task, p.271; also see Frynas (2000), The making of Nigeria’s Oil Industry—Oil and the Nigeria 
state, p.46 
369 Chief Festus Okotieboh, Federal Commissioner of Finance Budget, 1965 
370 Ministry of Finance Budget, 1978 
371 Ministry of Finance Budget, Tax incentives for foreign oil companies 2000 
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amendment and opposition from important stakeholders. Reform of the petroleum sector 
under the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which is currently being debated by the National 
Assembly, aims to ensure the country remains competitive intentionally, streamlines 
procedures and agencies, enhances transparency and offers ample economic opportunity to 
indigenous companies and citizens so that equipment and services are provided internally, 
rather than externally.  
Effort are also underway to diversify into natural gas development so that domestic gas 
consumption increases three fold from 1.7bn cubic feet/day in 2014 to 5.4bn cu ft/d by 2019 
underpin power supplies and unlock the manufacturing and petrochemical industries.372  The 
main aim and objectives of the bill is promoting the participation of local operators to boost 
production, creating jobs for the youths in the Niger Delta region, and giving stalk holding to 
indigenous people in the second marginal fields licensing round, which offered 31 fields and 
closed in January 2014. 373The PIB is designed to solve some of the chronic problem of the 
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, which include widespread corruption, constraints on 
investment and an inability on the part of NNPC to meet its share of project investments. 
Among other provisions of the bill are as follows: 
 NNPC was restructured into several autonomous units and turned into a profit-driven 
company along the lines of Brazil’s Petro bras, allowing it to tap capital markets for 
funding; 
 Existing joint ventures (JVs) with IOC  partners will be renegotiated to impose higher 
royalties and taxes while a “use it or lose it” provision will be created that will allow 
the reallocation of unused licences; 
                                                          
372 Andrew Yakubu, Head of Nigeria’s National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in the OPEC Bulletin April 14 
2014, p.40 
373 Ibid, p.41 
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 Existing JVs with IOCs would be restructured under the bill, with old contracts 
renegotiated to impose much higher costs on IOCs; 
 Higher royalties on gas production, an increased tax on gas production by creating a 
new fiscal regime separate from rules governing oil taxation and changes to the way 
tax breaks are applied for new developments, including deep-water E&P; 
 The reforms will also allow the government to re-discuss fiscal terms for oil contracts, 
impose stricter cost regime on oil firms and require companies to return acreages 
they have failed to explore after a specific time limit; and 
 In addition, foreign oil companies will be required to lodge regular reports with a new 
entity—the Nigerian Content Monitoring Board—on the make-up of their 
workforce.374 
The bill actually comprises sixteen different pieces of legislations which have been 
amalgamated to one holistic major piece of legislation. Also, there had been a number of 
pertinent issues associated with its formulation, especially concerning the IOC’s in terms of 
deep-water production-sharing contracts and the fiscal terms, but also from some of the 
country’s indigenous operations who argues that the Nigeria Content Act (NCT) in the bill, 
which had opened up indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry did not go far 
enough because it still gave preferences to foreign MNCs with more advanced technology.375 
                                                          
374 Nigeria Industry Bill 2008, Overview of State Role, Licensing, Regulations, Local Content Requirements p.60-
66;Also  among the amendments was a three-years grace period has been granted to IOCs during which they 
are allowed to claim exemption from local content requirements by blaming limited capacity of local 
companies and poor infrastructure. Once the grace period expires, however, we expect ructions between IOCs 
and the government since it takes on average about 3 to 5 years to train engineers to take up foreign 
expatriate’s jobs. 
375 The PIB requires all oil and gas explorers, transporters and exporters to use a greater share of indigenous 
Nigeria service companies and personnel in their project development plans. Furthermore, in a move designed 
to boost local investment funds, every multinational company must domicile a minimum of 10% of its annual 
profits in a Nigerian Bank. Also, NNPC operates a Nigerian Content Board (NCB) which has taken concrete steps 
toward greater “Nigerianization” of the country’s oil and gas sector, including the training of engineers and 
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There was also strong opposition to the bill within Nigeria, including from state governors in 
the south of the country, who claimed that the bill was biased against the Niger Delta region. 
Also, there was serious opposition from the northern elites who acquired oil blocks during 
the military regimes through patronage and corrupt practices, they rejected the 10% stake-
holding of oil blocks due to be given to local communities in Niger Delta. Confidential data 
(ranked classified by the National Energy Commission) show that the majority of indigenous 
oil blocks are owned by northerners who used the opportunity provided by military rule for 
thirty-seven years to consider the nation’s natural resources like their personal assets (See 
Table of Ownership of onshore Oil Block in Appendix M).376 Militant groups in the Niger Delta 
are furious that northerners who do not suffer oil pollution, and destruction of their livelihood 
own oil blocks thereby  acquiring their land by the power of  the Land Use Act of 1979 . 
However, PIB has been criticized by oil companies for being too nationalistic. They say that 
the bill as it stands will increase government profit, give too much control to the state and 
make new investments in deep-water oil fields unprofitable. Furthermore, a lack of political 
support from the Niger Delta militant groups has hampered the PIB’s progress. IOCs were 
worried of new attacks on their oil infrastructure and the increased royalty payments under 
the PIB; they also expressed concern that the bill did not clarify how the restructured JVs 
would function. The bill called for two news taxes applying to both JV and PSC operations.377 
There was a new hydrocarbon tax set at 50%, which is levied on production instead of profits, 
so costs cannot be set against it and there will be a new corporation tax specifically for 
                                                          
pipelines welders. Finally, the scaling up of local steel plate and pipes manufacturing and greater availability of 
low-interest loans to local contractors 




petroleum operations, set at 30%.378 But companies complained that the new regime will bite 
deeper than the previous petroleum-profits tax, levied at 85%, but with costs allowed against 
it.379 
However, out of the sixteen different section of the bill, a quarter managed to pass in the 
National Assembly with up to 120 amendments, which means that there was no unanimous 
consensus between the zonal law-makers. But the bill envisages giving exclusive 
consideration to Nigerian indigenous service companies which demonstrate ownership of 
equipment, Nigerian personnel and capacity to execute jobs in the domestic oil and gas 
industry. This means that domestic oil firms seeking to bid on oil licences, or blocks will be 
given priority. In a further incentive, such firms will not be discounted, even if their bids for 
contracts are ten per cent higher than other submissions.380 The PIB also introduces higher 
royalties. At present, the standard 20% royalties for onshore operations is reduced for 
offshore fields in step with water-depth to: 16.67% for fields in up to 200 metres deep; 12.0% 
for 201—500 metres; 8.0% for 501—800 metres; 4.0% for 801—1,000 metres; and zero when 
the depth exceeds 1,000 metres. The new royalty, not depth-related will be linked to the 
production rate and the oil and gas price, and can rise up to 25% or more.381 A 30% income 
tax on all companies was also introduced in the PIB but no oil price thresholds on which 
adjustments will be made have been published.382 Changes in the way PSCs are structured 
                                                          
378 BMI Q2, 2011 
379 The Petroleum Economist, Make-or-break time for Nigerian Oil, where Martin Quinlan argues that the 
government’s oil reforms, seen initially as positive for the industry, have been high-jacked by the country’s 
legislators and now threaten upstream investment, May 2010, p.4 
380 Nigeria’s Petroleum & Natural Resources Minister, Mrs. Diezani Alison-Madueke (A New Era For Nigeria’s 
Energy Industry), where she argued that the new move is part of the country’s plan to improve the working 
and living standards of its people, which, in her views over the years has been the subject of unrest, especially 
in the Niger Delta region--the main oil-producing area in her opening speech during the 158th Meeting of OPEC 
Conference held in Vienna, Austria March 11, 2011, OPEC Bulletin. 




will also sharply increase the tax intake. At present, PSCs provide for 100% of revenue, after 
the discounted royalty to be available for cost recovery. When costs have been recovered, a 
stream of tax oil is deducted and the remaining stream of profit oil is shared between the 
company and the state. But in the previous 1993 tax system, contracts gave the company an 
80% share of profits for the first 350 million barrels of production of oil, with the share 
declining as cumulative production increases. For contracts signed after 1998, the initial 
company share is reduced to 70%.383 So, under the PIB’s changes, the revenue stream for cost 
recovery is reduced, although it is not clear to what extent clauses in the PIB will guarantee 
safety net for foreign investment. Therefore, the PIB is apparently contradictory, reflecting 
how it has evolved. The changes required taxes to be paid earlier and will increase the state’s 
share of revenue. 
Table 6:3 
Selected oil and natural gas projects in Nigeria  
Operator Project Liquids (bbl/d) Natural gas (MMcf/d)1 Est. Start 
Chevron Olero Creek Restoration Project 48  na 2013-2014 
Chevron Escravos Gas to Liquids Plant 33 na 2014 
Chevron Dibi Long-Term Project 70 na 2016 
Chevron Sonam Field Development 30 215 2016 
Chevron Nsiko na na 2017+ 
Eni Zabazaba-Etan 120 na 2015-2016 
ExxonMobil Etim/Asasa Pressure Maintenance 50 na 2013-2015 
ExxonMobil Bosi 140 260 2016+ 
ExxonMobil Erha North Phase 2 60 na 2016+ 
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ExxonMobil Satellite Field Development Phase 2 80 na 2016+ 
ExxonMobil Uge 110 20 2016+ 
Shell Bongo Northwest 40 na 2014 
Shell Bongo North 100 60 2016+ 
Shell Bongo Southwest (Aparo) 225 15 2016+ 
Shell Forcados Yokri Integrated Project 2 90 na 2015-2016 
Shell Southern Swamp Associated Gas 2 85 na 2015-2017 
Total Usan Future Phases 50 na 2016+ 
Total Egina 200 na 2017+ 
1MMcf/d is million cubic feet per day. 
2Units are in barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d) for the Forcados and Southern Swamp projects as these will produce both oil 
and gas.  
Sources: Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on company reports, PFC Energy, and OPEC Secretariat. 
 
International Oil and Gas Pipelines as External Dimension of Resource Control 
Apart from oil, a significant portion of Nigeria’s gas is processed into LNG. In 2010, Nigeria 
exported about 500 Bcf of LNG. Of this, 13.3 Bcf went to the United States, providing 3 per 
cent of total U.S. LNG imports (2% of Nigeria exports). Most of Nigeria’s LNG was also 
exported to the EU (66%), mainly Spain (31%), France (15%), and Portugal (13%).384 Other 
export destinations include Asia (15%) and Mexico (16%). Nigeria LNG exports were down 
close to 30% from 2008 volumes which can also be attributed to the problem of militant 
activities and gas pipeline attacks in the Niger Delta that affected the Nigerian gas hub of Soku 
gas processing facility.385 In addition to global export, Nigeria began exporting some of its 
natural gas via the West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) in early 2010. The 450 miles pipeline 
carries natural gas from the Niger Delta Escravos gas terminal to Ghana via Togo and The 
                                                          
384 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 2010, p.34-6 
385 Petroleum Economist, Glimmers of Hope for Nigeria, May 2010, p.19 
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Republic of Benin. Exports reached initial capacity of 170 million cubic feet per day by the end 
of 2010, and plans are underway to expand capacity to as much as 450 mmcf/d and possibly 
extending the pipeline further west to the Ivory Coast.386  
 
Map: West Africa Gas Pipeline 
Source: www.energytribune.com  
 
In addition to the West African market, there also international partners hungry for Nigeria 
energy resource. For example, Russia’s Gasprom negotiated a deal with NNPC in 2009 to 
increase investments to around $2.5 billion, possibly rising to $30 billion as a total of the 
Nigeria gas network market. Moreover, an agreement to form a 50/50 joint venture with 
NNPC for the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline (TSGP) was also reached. This brought momentum 
behind a project that has been under consideration for decades.387 Even Sonatrach of Algeria 
and Anglo-Dutch Shell showed increasing interest in Nigeria gas reserves. The TSGP project 
would stretch almost 4,500km from Warri region in the Niger Delta to Hass R’Mel in Algeria 
                                                          
386 West Africa Gas Pipeline Limited, news Bulletin December 2012 





where the gas would enter that country’s export system linked to Europe. The Nigeria section 
would run for 1,300km, the stretch across Niger would cover 750km, and Algeria’s portion 
would cross 2,500km of the Sahara Desert. The capacity of the 46—56 inch pipeline would be 
up to 30bn cubic metres a year (cm/y).388 The EU is also interested in the project as it would 
assist with its desire to diversify the source of its gas-supply. Unlike the proposed Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) from central Asia which in theory would supply gas to the EU continent, 
the (TAP) project does not have sufficient gas, but with Nigeria’s natural gas reserves 
amounting to 187 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) at least has sufficient gas to fill it.389 
                                                          
Source: Petroleum Economist 2009. 
388 Petroleum Economist, April 2009, p.10; The TSGP mirage where France’s Total says it wants to join or build 
another gas-export facility in Nigeria. But piping natural gas across the Sahara desert to supply Europe faces 
big problems 
389 The big players in this project are: Nigeria and Algeria and they continue to discuss the possibility of 
constructing the Trans-Sahara Pipeline (TSGP). The 2,500 miles pipeline would carry natural gas from fields in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta region to Algeria’s Beni Saf export terminal on the Mediterraenean. In 2009, NNPC signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Sonatrach, the Algerian National Oil Company in order to 
proceed with plans to develop the pipeline. Several National and International companies have shown interest 




But this project is equally as problematic, albeit for different 
reasons: 
1. If the venture is to succeed, it will need much more of 
political support and bilateral negotiations involving the 
three countries, this is because TSGP’s biggest problem 
would be the risk of sabotage and attacks on the pipeline. 
2. The gas will come from the Brass and Escravos hub of 
the Niger Delta and although TSGP might not have to 
traverse much of the turbulent territory, it would also 
become another symbol of how the region’s natural 
resources are exploited with revenue ending up elsewhere. 
3. The TSGP would be an easy target for some of the 
militants groups, like the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND).          
 Mend has been behind some of the attacks on Niger Delta oil 
and gas infrastructure in recent years that have reduced in 
some cases Nigeria’s total oil production by one million barrels 
(such as in 2008). 
4. Another particular threat is related to the Republic of Niger 
section. First, the issue of the Tuareg, a nomadic tribe in the 
Sahara desert fighting for independence in Mali and Niger could 
also see the pipeline as a target. Second, Al-Qaeda and Boko 
Haram could also pose a threat in the Maghreb, particularly in 
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Algeria and Niger. In fact energy security experts strongly 
believe that the weak spot is Niger, which—with its sparse 
population, vast terrain and underdeveloped security 
infrastructure—would find it hard to muster the intelligence 
and deployment capabilities required to deter and monitor 
potential threats to the pipeline. 
With these scenarios in mind, gas market analysts think that Nigeria should concentrate on 
its LNG industry that is already well established. 390 Therefore, the plan for larger LNG-export 
capacity will continue despite a dip in global LNG prices due to the Shale gas revolution. All 
indications shows that the market will tighten up again after 2013 shale gas boom, by the 
time some of Nigeria’s new trains should be on stream (see Table 5.3) 
 
Table 6.4: Nigeria’s LNG-Export Projects 
  Existing      
Projects 




(Million     
t/y) 
Number    




  Shareholders 
NLNG Train 
1&2 






             
2002 






 2005     8.20      2 Nigeria 
NLG   
NNPC49%;ShellGas25.6%;Total15%;Agip10.4% 
NLNGsix 2008     4.10      1 Nigeria 
LNG 
NNPC49%;ShellGas25.6%;Total15%;Agip10.4% 
                                                          




Total     21.15    
      
      
Planned and Proposed 
Brass LNG    2013    10.0   2        Brass LNG ConocoPhillips17%;Agip17%;NNPC49%;Total17% 
NLNG 
SevenPlus 
  2012    8.40   1 Nigeria LNG NNPC49%; ShellGas25%; Total15%; Agip10.4% 
OK LNG   2011    22.00   4 OK-LNG 
OPCO 
Chevron18.5%; NNPC49.5%; BG13.5%; Shell18.5% 
Progress LNG  2011+    1.50   1 Peak 
Petroleum 
FlexLNG; Mitsubishi; Peak Petroleum 
SPECULATIVE      
NLNG T8  2013+     8.00   1 Nigeria LNG NNPC49%;ShellGas25.6%;Total15%;Agip10.4% 
South-East 
LNG 
 2012+     4.80   1 ExxonMobil ExxonMobile; NNPC 
Total    75.85    




                    Table 6.5: NIGERIAN NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND DISPOSAL, 2003—2007 
Year Gas Produced 
 
 Gas Utilised  Gas Flared 
2003** 1,828.3272  982.5124  845.8148 
2004** 2,113.9921  1,230.2361  383.7561 
2005** 2,082.9260  1,241.5368  841.3892 
2006 2,116.8082  1,438.7148  678.0934 
2007 2,101.7706  1,615.4916  786.2790 




Conclusion: There is merit to the position of both local communities, militant groups and 
states level of the major assumption that ownership of natural resources in their land is being 
control by external forces. To present the primary argument and the data that support this 
idea put the Niger Delta conflict in the precarious position of instability and arms conflict. My 
hope is to both inform and install some clear picture on the subject to those who are 
steadfastly convinced or deny the fact that, all the evident points one way or the other. I first 
examine the research question that competition for natural resource like oil and gas can lead 
to arms conflict and threaten security. I find that the results and data presented have a lot of 
truth for this argument. 
Second, I argue that the Niger Delta dispute has shifted to two discourses that further fuel 
competition for resources: (1) from how oil and gas revenue is distributed and whom control 
the resources and the ownership of oil blocks; and (2) external dimension of resource control 
by multinationals energy companies in terms of investing or buying stake-holdings in Nigeria 
oil and gas reserves has resulted in greater grievances among the indigenes in the Niger Delta 
to have access and control their natural resources. 
Finally, the construction of international pipelines as a way of exporting oil and gas to 
international market has become another symbol of how the region’s natural resources are 











                                     Chapter Seven 
                                                       Conclusion 
This study analysed the role of ethnicity and dynamics of natural resources conflict in the Niger 
Delta.  
The first part of the thesis (chapter 2) investigated the contradictions spawned by the palm oil 
trade in colonial times and the significant role oil played in the past and into the future. It 
analysed the colonial trends such as the historical evolution of the Niger Delta, politics and 
intergroup relations before colonialism, what constitutes the Niger Delta, who are its 
inhabitants, ownership of land and ethnic composition debates, which consequently widened 
into sovereignty issues. Therefore, it can be argued that the struggle to control the palm oil 
trade in colonial time is an on-going phenomenon even after independence in the Nigeria state. 
This has a tremendous impact on heightening the grievances of the oil minority ethnic groups 
in the Niger Delta. 
In chapter 3, the study discussed the background, history, actors and key players, land and 
ethnicity, and the politics of natural resources control in the Niger Delta link to the 
development of militia groups and their role in creating instability in oil and gas mining areas. It 
was assumed that engaging and exploring these layers of instability will give the readers an 
insight into the research questions of thesis related to what drives the struggle for access to 
control natural resources in the Niger Delta.  While it can be said that the amnesty to militia 
groups is a step in the right direction in reaching a final settlement on how natural resources 
wealth should be shared; and who control the endowment, there are still major issues 
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unresolved. This include compensation claims related to the ownership of land, environmental 
pollution, inclusions of local communities in the oil industry, allocation of oil blocks, and 
public infrastructure development in the Niger Delta. By discussing the complex reasons for 
conflict, the chapter explored the perspectives of different groups in order to better understand 
the types of governance requirements Nigeria needs to put in place to increase security and 
save lives.  
In chapter 4, the politics of land, ethnicity, and different nations forming the Nigeria Federation 
was presented as being at the heart of this process of insecurity in the region, which began to 
see a major shift with the amnesty programme in 2009. This led to the disarmament of militia 
groups and the establishment of the Joint Task Force (JTC). 
 Findings presented here shows that at the grassroots levels, the federal government is lacking 
credibility and its motives are questioned with regards to their concern for communities 
affected by the natural resources trade. Claims of previous literature are radically challenged by 
the findings.  It is not only corruption, a lack of accountability and transparency issue that can 
create conflict in natural resources mining spaces such as: oil and gas. A lack of strong and 
united government policies, ethnic division and disputes concerning land ownership are vitally 
important. This study does provide primary data of tensions between these dynamics to 
confirm these linkages in the Nigeria case. It is suggested that those who investigate the issue of 
resources conflict should place less emphasis on the ruling elites and more on the structures 
and institutions that comprise the state. Chapter 4 established that, so far, not much progress 
has been made in land reform to reduce conflict in natural resource mining areas. Several 
reasons were identified that may have hindered the land reform relating to ownership of natural 
resource wealth in the oil sector: 
 Lack of land reform in the Land Use Decree of 1978 and Land Use Act of 1979. 
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 Absence of native rights in granting certificates of occupancy on inherited land. 
 Indigenisation policies at the local level for citizenships and marginalization of minority 
groups. 
 Lack of compensation for farmers and land owners for losses to their land from oil 
companies. 
 Forceful eviction and destruction of local properties for pipelines constructions; and 
 Conflicts of interest between the federal government, the state level and local 
authorities as a problem in sharing oil revenue. 
Finally, as chapter 4 concludes, the central features of land ownership and ethnicity in the 
politics of resource control within small minority groups’ and fear of marginalization from 
bigger ethnic groups from the federal, state and local level are major issues to be addressed. 
The key features and repercussion of this is that small ethnic groups and other minorities are 
under-represented and oppressed by those in power in all spheres: social, political, economic 
as well as the oil industry’s employment system. The majority groups attempt to ensure their 
dominance over others by controlling the key institutions, while minority groups struggle for 
recognition and a fair deal in the distribution of resources. 
Chapter 5 focused on the politics of resource control and the Nigerian federation, by taking the 
historic revenue allocation politics and the minority question among geo-political zones into 
account. Here again the analysis has shown that several factors determined how much revenue 
a region gets depending population, size, and the derivative principle, as well as percentage 
contributions to the federal account. This chapter showed that the six geo-political zones are 
unable to agree to a meaningful way forward and rationale in sharing resource wealth. The 
petroleum industry bill (PIB) is a way forward but behind the bill is thus ethnic divisions in this 
apparent complex equation of sharing oil revenue. Each individual geo-political zone with its 
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different ethnic sympathies developed clear preferences, self-interest, and greed while seeking 
personal gain via acquisition of oil blocks. This was done in order to protect their stake holding 
in resource wealth distribution system. 
Chapter 6 then followed the path of international oil companies and foreign interests and first 
showed how external dimension of resource control also fuel instability in the Niger Delta. In 
the first part of chapter six, prospecting, exploration booms, the tax incentives system and the 
petroleum industry bill were identified as major factors attracting foreign investors to oil 
exploration, production and export. Consequently, the construction of international pipelines 
as a way of exporting oil and gas to international markets has become another symbol of how 
minority groups view natural resource exploitation as their God given wealth which is being 
stolen with revenue ending up elsewhere. 
Taken together these considerations show that the present study contributes to the 
understanding of the impact of ethnicity in natural resources conflict in the Niger Delta, and to 
the bigger picture on what role ethnic diversity plays in instability in states in the twenty-first 
century. Furthermore, this study shows important evidence that there is a complex multi-
dimensional aspect to conflict, separate from corruption, bad governance, lack of institutions, 
security, the presence of militia groups of non-state actors, a lack of accountability and good 
economic management. It entered into the theoretical foundations of one of the most intricate, 
yet forgotten factors of conflict--ethnicity and cultural diversity. Major actors battle in a highly 
politicized climate over resource wealth revenue in the Nigeria state.  
As initially described in chapter two, since colonial times, access and control of natural 
resources in the Niger Delta—back then the palm oil trade between the British and indigenous 
chiefs and Royal Kings- has been a contested issues. Considering the importance of palm oil to 
industrialization in Europe, this resulted in the colonialization of the region from 1840 to 1960 
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before Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain. The consequences of the struggle for 
access to control natural resources have been used to frame the research questions. However, 
the thesis set out to test a sharply defined hypothesis and to develop rigorous definitions of its 
object of study. For future research, I suggest here that any theoretical conclusions are tentative 
emerging from data collected in fieldwork and reflecting what is happening on the ground. This 
approach has been influenced by the tradition of critical inquiry.
391
 The strength of the thesis 
and its conclusions derive from and is limited by the extent of the data as generated by the 
methodology employed. Conclusions emerge from the data created specifically for the thesis, 
and might need modification if extended elsewhere or applied to other periods, national 
contexts or other areas of security studies. It would seem that the approach lies within the 
inductive process of enquiry.
392
 It is therefore appropriate to use a discourse of international law 
on the ownership of natural resources to conclude this thesis. Having presented the different 
layers of conflict that linked to the instability discussed in chapter three, this chapter will 
conclude this thesis by highlighting the security implication of the Niger delta conflict to the 
Nigeria Federation and how corruption, lack of accountability and ethnic division have played a 
role in prolonging the Niger Delta question.  There is disagreement between the federal 
government and the state level, between local communities and oil companies, and between 
militia groups and the federal level due to their different perspectives on the true ownership of 
natural resource wealth in Niger Delta. 
In addition, the Nigerian state ought to be a major regional power, since it is also a major oil 
exporter and therefore has the revenues and resources to build power and internal cohesion. 
But for the Niger Delta ethnic groups, the very existence of oil has generated constant internal 
                                                          
391 This critical form of research is a meta-process of investigation, which questions currently held values and 
assumptions and challenges conventional social structures of society. 
392 Through the inductive approach, plans are made for data collection, after which the data are analysed to 
see if any patterns emerge that suggest relationship between variables. This has led to discovering a binding 
principle, taking care not to jump to hasty conclusions on the basis of the data collected. 
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conflict; the wealth does not go to a central infrastructure of state and institutions but is diverted 
and dissipated by parochial rivalries among ethnic groups. Rather than serving as the 
foundation of national unity, oil wealth has merely financed chaos based on the cultural, 
religious, and ethnic differences among the Nigeria’s people. Therefore, the Nigeria state can 
be describe as a comprador state—a state without a legitimate authority within its borders. This 
makes Nigeria a state without a nation. To be more precise, it is a state presiding over multiple 
hostile nations, some of which are divided by regional borders. This is because the state has not 
grown organically out of the different ethnic nations that comprises the Nigeria federation. 
Instead, the arrangements instituted by British colonial rule of imperialism have left the Nigeria 
federation in chaos. 
Furthermore, this thesis is not written for only academic consumption but for ordinary people 
who want to understand the causes of conflict, and another major contribution to knowledge is 
that: 
1. It cut across the facet of key issues of our time—(a) ethnic 
identity politics, (b) economic and social exclusion, (c) intra-
ethnic conflict based on ownership of natural resources, (d) 
Cultural differences based on customs, language and tradition, 
and (e) state legitimacy in multi-ethnic societies in the 
information technological era. 
2. It highlighted the fundamental issues of fragile state and their 
composition based on ethnic differentiation of “we” versus 
“them”, the outsiders in the Nigeria federation. On paper there 
is a state called Nigeria, but on the ground, it is a state of artificial 
creation that does not exist among the different ethnic groups 
that form the Nigerian federation. 
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3. Therefore, addressing the issues of ethnic identity that has been 
ignored in fragile states will be the key to conflict resolution in 
less cohesive states in the twenty-first century. 
Moreover, this thesis also contributed to knowledge in the sense that the only way out of the 
state chaos in the Nigeria federation is how power and resources should be shared in a multi-
ethnic society. In retrospect, effective power and resources must be located in a state that 
derives from and controls a coherent nation. This does not mean that there can’t be 
multinational states, such as USA, China, Russia Federation, and United Kingdom, Federal 
Republic of Germany or even states representing only part of a nation, such as the two Koreas. 
But it does mean that the state has to preside over people with a genuine sense of shared 
identity and mutual interest. 
                    General Discussion and a Reflection on the Amnesty Programme 
At the core of this research is an attempt to understand the perspective of key actors in Nigeria 
regarding what their rights are in sharing natural resources wealth. To do this, the thesis set out 
what natural resource rights are envisaged in the Niger Delta. Consequently, the thesis main 
focus is defining what is natural resources and the question of who owns it. And what are the 
international obligations of states to their citizens in the exploitation of natural resource wealth. 
A simple ethic based on international law of the Economic Right and Duties of States with 
resource wealth is found prominently in the UN Charter of 1974. Leif Wenar (2012) offered a 
current, generally accepted notion of what constitutes clean trade in Natural Resources. 
Currently, ownership of resource wealth are intertwined with human rights and due diligence. 
Moreover, according to Rae Lindsay et al (2012) in World Energy Law and Business present 
ownership of resources wealth in term of the guiding principles on Business and Human Rights 
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to avert grievances. Many oil companies and host states still maintain a narrower conception of 
citizen’s rights in the sharing of resource wealth. 
Above all, what the UN Charter under the auspices of International law sought to do is to set 
guidelines and principles for responsible contracts and extraction of natural resources. 
Embodied in the GATT/WTO 1974 Conventions, including Article 3 on Clean Trade in 
Natural Resources 1998, this provides for the internationally accepted guiding principles of 
corporate responsibility and due diligence. This international law reflects the idea that, even if 
there are greed and grievances, corruption and lack of accountability, restraint should be 
exercised to limit social and economic deprivation to humans and the environment where 
resources are being exploited. But GATT/WTO does not engage in the resolution of conflict 
in relation to ownership of natural resource wealth in any given state due to the fact that it may 
infringe on a particular state’s sovereignty and independence. 
But the legal aspect of ownership of resource wealth has two roots. The first is regarded as a 
fundamental principle of human rights, and the second is the distribution/sharing of resource 
wealth equitably--this reflects fundamental principles of procedural fairness. This principle 
raises a number of general issues in the Niger Delta, such as that of groups, local communities 
and regional states seeking to bring claims against the state, as well as issues that will be specific 
to individual grievances and whether they are legitimate, equitable, rights-compatible and 
predictable. The law also requires the disclosure by oil companies of information relevant to 
citizen’s grievances that it would otherwise consider commercially sensitive. If there is 
disagreement over ownership and conflict occurs, the principles of equitability may in some 
circumstance require oil company to fund services—through arms—length arrangement—that 
support stakeholders to alleviate their grievances in resource mining space. 
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As identified, there are security implications to the conflict in the Niger Delta.  While the 
Nigerian state and oil companies subscribe to the traditional state-centric perspective of 
security, the local people of the region and other stake holders in the region consider resource 
deprivation as paramount security issue. The clash of these two security conceptions has 
perpetuated conflict in the region over the years. 
This shift from the authoritarian, state-centric view to the notion of human security is premised 
on the fact that people are the means and end of the development process. Therefore, in the 
Nigerian context, and which recent development in the Niger Delta region have demonstrated 
the proliferation of arms is partly responsible for the continuation of the conflict. This 
influenced the creation of different militia groups which have led to:  
 Up to 250,000 barrels of crude oil being stolen daily by militants, their locals and 
foreign collaborators since 2000 thereby disrupting supply to global oil market; 
 The militants have gathered enough military hardware to terrorize and kidnap foreign 
oil workers for ransom payments in order to sustain instability in the Niger Delta and to 
proliferate small arms for robbery and piracy in sea shipping lines in the Delta region 
and throughout the country thereby preventing foreign investment in the oil sector; 
 Oil companies have to strike deals with local warlords before any exploration or drilling 
can take place. MNCs hoped in this way to persuade militants to give them access to 
oilfield to carry out recoup some of the losses incurred since 2006 (up to 500,000 
barrels a day were lost in attacks in the Delta since then). However, the risk is that 
contracts will be given to groups that caused the damaged in the first place. 
 The insurgency has created a black market for crude oil that finance militants illegal 
activities with proceeds from such arrangements funding the group’s weapons 
procurements and political campaigns as they seek to acquire more power at the federal 
level of government. 
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In order to restore oil and gas production levels, the government engaged all the militant 
groups for a ceasefire in July 2009 and a 60-days government amnesty in August 2009 was 
begun. A lull in violence followed, but negotiations started to unravel by the end of 2009. The 
President offered an amnesty to all fighters willing to turn in their weapons in exchange for a 
monetary stipend. At the end of the period, in October of that year, the government claimed 
that 8,299 militants had accepted the offer, surrendering some 500 weapons and 18 gunboats. 
Such progress was accompanied by a significant drop in conflict-related fatalities, down to 
possibly 100 for the entire year. But the exact extent of the amnesty’s success remains unclear, 
as various factions within MEND declined to participate. 
However, MEND declare a 60-day ceasefire in mid-July 2009, after the government met one of 
its preconditions and released the group’s reported leader, Henry Okah, from prison. They 
accepted an unconditional amnesty, and three days later a court dropped charges of treason 
against him. The group extended its ceasefire again, most recently for another year until 2010. 
However, by the end of 2010, former militant in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, and Warri, Delta 
State, had begun staging demonstrations to demand $2000 in compensation payments 
promised to them under the amnesty.  
Findings here suggest that military means alone are unlikely to resolve violent conflict in multi-
ethnic states. Rather, long-term peace and settlement seems most likely to be achieved through 
engagement with the key players on the grassroots level. Therefore, there is now a need for 
security experts to apply this finding to conflict resolution in the areas of war and dispute 
settlement under the UN umbrella.  Under the amnesty programme, screening centres were 
established in all five of the Niger Delta States to which gunmen were required to report and 
turn in their arms. Having registered and taken an oath renouncing militancy and violence, the 
militants received an unconditional pardon. Those who accepted the amnesty were granted a 
stipend of NGN65, 000 (US$500) per month for food and living expenses. According to the 
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Ministry of Petroleum Resources, the Nigerian government budgeted around US$70m for the 
amnesty programme, including the stipends for those who accepted a pardon. Its target was for 
around 10,000 militants to take up the amnesty programme. The payment programme for 
pardoned militants remains in place until this day. The exact figures on the number of militants 
in the programme are not available but it is thought that at least 10,000 are signed up, with 
some estimates suggesting up to 25,000 are included. Using the BMI estimates of 10,000, cited 
in chapter 5, the government’s monthly bill for the stipends would be US$4.33 million. The 
government hopes that production gains resulting from a reduction in violence will cover the 
additional costs but several other analysts claim the government could be pouring money down 
the drain, especially as much of the money is reportedly being siphoned off by administrators.
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Some government officials interviewed in the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources 
have suggested that IOCs should contribute toward funding the amnesty programme. But the 
oil companies argued that they cannot be seen to be channelling money to militant groups. 
MNCs however, believe that payments could be made under the ethics of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) programme in infrastructural development.  
Although the amnesty is a step in the right direction, it remains to be seen how effective it will 
be in the short term. In the longer term, unless the fundamental causes of unrest in the Niger 
Delta, including environmental degradation, lack of public infrastructures, education, jobs and 
services for the population are addressed, there is little hope that the government’s efforts to 
restore peace and security to the region will be successful. 
 
 
                                                          
393 Business Monitor International (BMI) Nigeria Oil & gas Report Q2 2011,p. 69 www.businessmonitor.com 
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                                       Post-colonial Ethnic Marginalization 
The reality of ethnic alienated consciousness and the threats to national security arising from it 
indicate that Nigeria, as it exists, may not have fully articulated the conditions for establishing a 
truly humane and progressive society. The reality is that the system is lacking in enduring 
principles of social justice and moral actions, which can promote genuine social reconciliation. 
This suggests that Nigeria remains a terrain of conflicting identities after decades of 
independence. The state is a battleground where individuals fight for whatever resources or 
power they can capture. This situation is worrying because the long period of co-existence 
among various ethnic groups has not yielded genuine mutual respect, understanding and 
common purpose. This is a significant pointer to the potential continuation of insecurity in 
Niger Delta. 
Minority ethnic groups feel that the Nigerian state in its post-colonial form is tied to 
marginalization. In turn, marginalization can be said to be central to experiences in post-
colonial discourse. Over the years, different governments, structures and institutions in Nigeria 
have systemically entrenched a culture of marginalization within the social order. The modern 
social system has produced widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable 
deprivation. The central feature of marginalization is the capacity to render regions structurally 
irrelevant. Evidence shows that structural irrelevance is fuelled by the realities and 
consequences of the notions of difference and dichotomies. What are the immanent 
consequences of this marginality? One repercussion is that small ethnic groups and other 
minorities are under-represented and oppressed by those with power in the social, political, 
and economic order. At the heart of marginalization are the real consequences of differences in 
culture, values and beliefs, and the tensions (sometimes violent) arising from them when it 
merges with the different interests and aspiration of these groups? Groups attempt to ensure 
their dominance over others by controlling key institutions, while minority groups struggle for 
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recognition and a fair deal in the distribution of resources. Political life is organized around the 
desire by the various ethnic groups to further and protect their own interests. These interests 
are culturally defined and have to do with what groups materially possess—as distinct 
communities—and what they can get from others in a competitive situation. Instability, over-
centralization of power, intense ethnic and elite competition for oil revenue, resources and 
power, and the diverse forms of repression also affect all levels of life. 
Consequently, the dangerous trend has emerged whereby violence and ill-trained militias have 
cashed in on these institutional flaws. Furthermore, the general lack of commitment to the 
common good has ensured that most military personnel seek only to satisfy their avarice 
through collaboration with militias for selfish interests instead restoring order. These conscious 
manipulations (of a negative kind) can lead to the loss of unity and cohesion. I may add that the 
objectionable state of public infrastructure, the moral decay in Nigerian society, the pervasive 
corruption, social discontent, lawlessness, selfishness and cynicism that have taken over all 
areas of national life are irrefutable manifestations of the security crisis in the Niger Delta. The 
security problem is bigger than any group or institution and is a matter of different ethnic 
groups challenging the federal authority.  These is evidence that national consciousness is on 
the decline. National consciousness has implications for national security, which itself is an 
important concern in the life of a person, group or society. The central features in the quest for 
national security is the concern for national survival, which cannot come about unless there is 
some degree of joint action and common purpose for a method on how to share natural 






                                  Findings and Implications  
The finding of this thesis increases our understanding of what make a state stable in the 
modern world. However, the findings further highlighted the difficult tasks ahead that 
international regimes will face in the future in stabilizing multi-ethnic states mostly in Africa, 
where divisions among the population cut across cultures, customs, tribal, ethnicity, language 
and religion. Previous studies have tended to the focus too much on the resource dependency 
theory as the main cause of instability in resource-rich countries. The findings from this 
research suggest that the selection of variables by leading researchers in these cases rests 
primarily on their obscure knowledge and ignorance of the internal composition of social, 
economic and political dynamics that make up these countries. 
 First, and as noted earlier the crisis in the Niger Delta has resulted in the reduction of oil 
exports by 25 to 30 per cent since 2006. The international Crisis Group, the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report notes that between 2006 and 2008, Niger 
Delta militants abducted over 200 expatriate oil workers, clashes with security forces left 86 
people dead, increased their arms inventories to alarming levels, and attacked the oil 
installations in the Niger Delta leading to huge losses for oil companies and the government. 
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As a result of this development 1 million barrels of oil was shut-in, thereby disrupting world oil 
markets price reaching $147 in June 2008. 
Second, it has led to oil trading speculations in the international oil market whereby if MEND 
warned of an attack on Facebook or released a message on its website, the market panics and 
causes volatility in the oil and gas market. 
                                                          




  Third, the instability in Niger Delta has resulted to the creation of a black market for oil 
supply. The consequences of this recent development is that, the higher the price of oil, the 
higher increase in the number of attacks on oil infrastructure as oil is siphoned off from 
pipeline (bunkering) a  form of oil theft which means oil eventually re-enter the international 
market at lower than market price. 
Fourth, it lead to hording in the oil market whereby, emerging global economic power like 
India and China fearing supply disruption created strategic reserves or engaged in forms of 
anticipated buying in case of war, sanctions or trade embargos on oil exporting countries. For 
example, the disruptions of the 1970s cost the global energy market between $2.3 trillion to 
$2.5 trillion. The National Defence Council Foundation suggest that, a disruption of similar 
proportion today could carry a price tag as high as $8 trillion—a figure equal to more than 60 
per cent of U.S. annual gross domestic product, or nearly $15,000 for every man and woman 
living in Europe and America. 
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As we can see, on a normal day these attacks impose a “fear premium” on the oil market of 
around $10 to $15 a barrels. Thus in today’s world oil prices are not controlled by oil exporting 
states, oil companies or by civil society but militants insurgents can influence its movement. It 
needs no elaboration that in a tight oil market, even a marginal disruption has profound impact 
on prices. Therefore, the link between resources and conflict should be at the core of current 
discussions on energy security. 
 Fifth, a growing concern over the availability of stable supplies of oil and gas has given rise to a 
new emphasis on energy security in many regions of the world. The concept of instability 
evokes a wide variety of concerns relating to value and interest for a range of actors, but it is 
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essentially still embedded in a state-centric approach. It remains an analytical tool of traditional 
geopolitics, in which state actors regard oil resources as a means for securing the interest and 
objectives of nation-state in relation to each other. But there are many complex and dynamics 
and perceptions of social and national identities that are shaping resource conflict. The political 
and social implications of such ethnic identity politics in relation to access and control of 
natural resources within oil rich countries such as Nigeria has turned in to a security hedge in 
the foreign policy-making of import-dependent countries like the EU and North America.  
The fact remains that due to miss-management of revenue in a number of oil exporting 
countries in Africa including Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria this has led to 
sinking real per capita incomes. More importantly, high oil price have led to instability and 
authoritarianism in these countries. However, these states (Europeans) are discovering that 
while the market can provide oil supplies, it does not create energy security. Energy security is 
comprised of three elements: reliability of supply, affordability of resources, and friendliness to 
the environment. This indicates a paradigm shift in any reassessment of the assumptions of the 
much talked about idea of energy security by replacing it with another formula.  The situation 
in the Niger Delta is best seen as resting in a context of a conflict-prone society whereby, 
decades of patrimonial decline, underdevelopment and state weakness provides the fertile 
environment for the emergence and proliferation of civil militias. These militias emerge to 
protect and serve a variety of vested interests, often ones not shared by the established by 
government or other states. 
Therefore, it needs no elaboration that in a tight oil market, even a marginal disruption has 
profound impact on prices. Social protests in resource rich regions cannot be resolved by the 
ruling governments alone. In fact, insurgents attack oil and gas installations, in some cases as a 
means of putting their demands to a global audience. Individual initiatives, either by acquiring 
assets by corrupt practices or by deploying armed forces cannot create conditions favourable 
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for oil security both at the national and global level. In my opinion, to understand oil security, 
collective global security requires consensus among the key stakeholders namely the state, 
companies, and the civil societies working together to rescue oil supply from resource 
nationalism and hegemonic control, the two have hitherto been mutually reinforcing. This 
means that growing world oil demand ought to be seen as a consequence of globalising world 
economy. It is a flawed formulation to look at the new demand as a threat. Similarly disruption 
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta needs to be seen as local discontent at globalisation and the assertion 
for more producer-consumer dialogue as and imperatives issue to globalisation. 
Furthermore, the issues are related to security threats associated with infrastructure such as sea 
lines, oil installations, pipelines, flow stations, liquification plants, export terminals and national/ 
trans-national electricity grid induced uncertainties in energy market. So far, the West has been 
the lead consumer but with the direction of oil trade shifting, the responsibility of infrastructure 
security should be borne by everyone  
Despite initial concerns that the amnesty programme for militias groups will not hold, 
particularly as oil companies sought to desperately repair some of the damaged pipelines and 
flow stations necessary to increase the production capacity, the amnesty did produce positive 
results with Nigeria’s daily oil production jumping from 800 bpd in 2008 to 2.2 million barrels 
in 2013.
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  The success of this initiative gave the federal government breathing space to meet 
their financial obligations to foreign creditors.  Another important feature of the armed conflict 
between the government and militia groups is that for the first time in the history of Nigeria, it 
has been recognized that the Niger Delta region needs a development plan, revealed most 
vividly in the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. This has resulted in a federal, state 
and local grassroots level for peace building process that is crucial in resolving the underlying 
grievances that is causing violent conflict in the Niger Delta.  
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As a result of shortfalls in oil revenue in the federal allocation to the region (states), however, 
there is significant evidence that local militias are being organised and financed by local political 
elites pursuing a violent agenda of ‘politics by other means’ to protect their interest 
An examination of the question of resource revenue sharing, the national energy commission 
document itself reveals how grotesque the unfairness of resource control between the northern 
and southern regions is in terms of ownership of oil blocks and lack of a tax system that can 
bring in addition revenues to states in the north. This has resulted in an overdependence on oil 
revenue allocations from the federal level to both regional states and local governments. 
As discussed throughout the previous chapters, debate around ownership of natural resources 
has shifted from revenue distributions to resource control in the allocation of oil block since 
1998 after civilian administration returned following 37 years of military regime. 
The inclusion of derivative principle in revenue allocation is a particularly a revealing features 
of the federal structure and regional autonomy that is associated with economic development 
and ownership of natural resources mining space. But the initial indication of the politics of 
resource control shows that every ethnic group is using the ownership of land in claiming rights 
in sharing natural resources. This feature was visible in all the geopolitical zones in establishing 
stake-hold in any productive projects, infrastructure or commodity that is derives from their 
land to be recognized as a contributing factor for their deprivation. 
The chapter on the “external dimension of resource control” also indicates how multinational 
oil companies influence the outcomes of who gets what percentage of resource revenue 
through trans-national investment in pipelines, LNG Terminals and Refineries in the export of 
natural resources wealth. Due to the fact that most countries endowed with natural resources 
are poor in terms of financing export projects and also lack the technology to extract, process 
and produce, their power to set the international trade agenda is very limited. 
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In the section dealing with security and militia groups operations in Niger Delta, there are 
indications that it is not enough to provide the Joint Task Force (JTF) with military capability to 
enforce the law without a clear-cut strategy as to how these forces are to be deployed and used. 
Such attempt which do not regard human rights cannot lead to the desired results or level of 
social and economic advancement required by a country confronted with diverse socio-cultural 
and ethnic challenges. This policy is not only limited in its scope and method, but is also prone 
to perversion. Moreover, in the section relating to the scramble for oil and gas revenue, we saw 
how it was a generally established facts and there is enough evidence to show that the Niger 
Delta variant of the general trend of instability, social injustice and local discontent seems a 
visible index of the state of disagreement in the Nigeria Federation. The ensuing shadowy 
conflicts have fermented the continual destruction of oil pipelines and installations, killing or 
abducting of local and expatriate oil workers and security personnel, hijacking of helicopters 
and ships—among other such as acts of violence.  The crisis vividly illustrates the inability of the 
Nigerian state to properly manage fundamental ethnic and nationality questions and to meet 
the challenges of development and nation building. The problems of environmental 
degradation and lack of compensation to the people in oil mining space and resource control 
remain central to the problems confronting the Niger Delta regions. The perception is that if 
their demands are meant, these will make their lives more meaningful. Hence, it has become 
clear that the Niger Delta situation raises irrefutable conceptual and empirical issues and 
questions about the character and context of political morality in Nigeria and the search for a 
viable social philosophy in a post-colonial framework. 
Similar to the issues of oil industry and violent armed conflict the data reveals something new 
about militant groups in the Niger Delta. They indirectly sponsor candidates for elections and 




An examination of the perspectives of key actors in sharing resource wealth shows that apart 
from the oil companies’ perspective that adopted the Alaska and Canadian model of 
community trust fund independent of government officials; this is distributed directly to local 
communities for development projects and can be a major step in the right direction if 
adopted. The other perspectives (federal, state, militias, local communities) is self-defeating due 
to lack of accountability, corruption and transparency in the Nigeria system. 
However, since Nigeria return to a democratic system in 1998 seem to be the beginning of a 
long process of nation building. Evidence shows that political elections for a democratic rule 
may not often lead to social and economic transformation. National security is threatened by 
natural resource conflict because of the absence of proper principles and values that determine 
basic structures and institutions that leads to harmonious and productive society. 
The problem of national security in Nigeria looked at from a historical perspective has always 
centred on the crisis arising from the nature of the relations existing among the various ethnic 
and other interest groups. The problem of security in Nigeria and the consequential conflict 
situation centres on tension, injustice and marginalization. The bone of contention is partly that 
while some segments of the country are carrying the burden that sustains the entire nation, 
other segments are enjoying the paradise that has resulted from this inequality. This problem 
has been linked to the character of the state and the actions of the dominant interests of the 
ruling class. 
One important realm of the manifestation of the problem of national security has been the 
generally overlooked, but extremely important, aspect of values. It is interesting to note that 
insecurity in Nigeria manifests itself in the form of completing values, beliefs and attitudes. 
Thus, central to the problem of national security in Nigeria has is a situation where there exist a 
fundamental conflict of personal and social values among various groups with regards to the 
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sharing of resource wealth, approaches to national integration, peace and stability within the 
polity. This conflict of values and the various abuses and injustices arising from it ensured that 
there were no clearly defined and established rules for harmonising these diverse interests, 
needs and values of the different groups and sectors in society in view of achieving the urgent 
task of national development. In short, the lack of shared beliefs, attitudes and values among 
the rulers and the ruled, as well as between the various segments of Nigerian society, ensured 
that conflict remained endemic in the nation. 
 The mistrust and hatred emanating among groups, and heightened intolerance has led to the 
proliferation of ethnically conscious militia groupings that ostensibly claim to be social 
liberators. In actual fact, these militias that are committed to ethnic violence have opened the 
opportunity for individuals to ferment tension in society and to violate the vital laws necessary 
for the sustenance of order, peace and stability. 
Thus, to put it bluntly, the lack of trust between the rulers and the ruled in Nigeria ensured that 
there was an obstruction of national development at all levels of social existence. Furthermore, 
it can be said that the absence or lack of operation of some core social values such as trust, 
cooperation, compassion, justice, and tolerance among the different interests and segments in 
the society contributed to the lack of sustainable development. The absence of a sense of 
responsibility has assumed the form of an institutionalized and sinister abdication of 
responsibility. 
 The structures and institutions that have been put in place to serve the people and make the 
lives of its citizens comfortable are now turning against them, becoming a source of insecurity 
and life threatening danger. This situation has created fear and apathy within the Nigeria 
society. This point is relevant to the issue of national consciousness and the phenomenon of 
marginalization. This situation has emerged out of decades of mismanagement of natural 
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resource wealth to provide infrastructure, health care, public order, electricity schools, water, 
oil refineries and good public transportation system in the country. It is characterized by 
neglect, under-utilisation and disregard for infrastructure and its role in national development. 
Most of these structures have moved from decay to dereliction. Criminals and hoodlums the 
human products of decades of social injustice, neglect, institutional deficiencies in law and 
education, have now found it easy to capitalise on any social instability however minor. 
Furthermore, by focusing on the question of what drives the struggle for access to control 
natural resource wealth in the Niger Delta allows us to appreciate the complexity of issues 
relating to land ownership, ethnicity, tension between geo-political zones, unemployment, inter-
militias/political elite relations, and the economic deprivation in resource mining space that has 
resulted in both oil theft and armed conflict. The thesis has tested a number of established 
theories of why oil-rich countries have failed woefully in a globalized world. But those 
narratives have been based on either resource curse theory, or on assumptions that corruption, 
lack of economic diversification to alternative sources of income, and mismanagement of 
revenues derives from oil wealth are the main causes, rather than social divisions in society. 
                                       Lessons Learned and Future Research 
Much remains to be learned. However, before we are likely to make significant headway in 
reducing ethnic conflict and instability, our collective ignorance about ethnicity, the problem of 
what ethnic divisions are and how best to solve them must be confronted. It is no doubt 
expecting too much that we can develop a quick consensus on this matter. At the very least, 
though we need to come to terms with the consequences of putting different people with 
diverse cultures in a federal state. But one of the most fundamental issues in this thesis relates 
to how we know ethnic conflict when we see one. The basic tensions that are analysed here is 
between an interpretative emphases on perceptions among threatened ethnic groups who are 
categorized as competitors in sharing natural resources.  The major question this thesis 
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addressed is: what drives the struggle for access to control natural resources wealth? Unless we 
can come to some early understanding regarding this question, future research will no doubt be 
overshadowed with emphasis on the role of structures and institutional failures in multi-ethnic 
state. The results of this study give us a deeper understanding of how the social fabric and 
ethnic composition within a country will determine its stability.  The findings of this thesis 
increase our understanding of the kinds of fundamental issues multi-ethnic states faces for good 
governance to surface. These issues vary from lack of ethnic cohesion, elitism, and regional self 
-interest to lack of unity of purpose in sharing resource wealth for development. The instability 
and dynamics of resource control in the Niger Delta also shows that having a democratic 
election in a state with weak structures and institutions may not necessarily lead to good 
governance. Thus, one needs to begin with some social manifestations of conflict. Inherently, 
ethnic conflicts are about relative scarcity and overlapping interests and goals. We cannot have 
as much as we would like of resource wealth because there is usually not enough of them to go 
round. If a desired resource is scarce, then someone’s gain usually means somebody else’s loss. 
We cannot attain all of our needs because to do so would interfere with somebody else’s 
maximal satisfaction derived from resource wealth. Therefore, ethnic conflict or 
misperceptions about one group by another may also make conflicts worse than it might 
otherwise have been.     
Thus, this thesis also shows that the country’s rulers have hitherto failed in their attempts to 
maintain stability in the Niger Delta due to their ill-conceived notions of resource wealth. The 
resource wealth calculus of the Nigerian state failed because it did not include vital aspects of 
social and national development such as the provision of basic amenities. Thus, the Nigerian 
state could not meet the social, economic, even the human conditions of national security. The 
failure of the state and security organs to maintain national security in the Niger Delta can be 
seen in the inefficiency of the armed forces and the police. Its abysmal failure to maintain law 
287 
 
and order and provide security for citizens continues to create a vacuum that is being filled by 
auxiliary ethnic militias, vigilante groups and militant civil society vanguards. The state has 
employed its repressive instruments, especially the army and the police, in order to regulate 
and regiment the political, social and economic freedoms and space of the other subordinate 
groups in society, and not to promote the general well-being of the people. 
But these measures have failed to produce positive outcomes. This also shows that for a 
resource dependence country like Nigeria to prosper, there should be integrated investment in 
infrastructure development targets as an enabler to incorporating poor people into the value 
chain of the oil and gas industry. For example, the development of access roads and electricity 
that can link hinterland oil mining communities to major commercial hubs for efficient flow of 
good, information and services. This would also create jobs for young people and provide 
hands-on training and experience to empowering them towards greater economic activities and 
preventing them from joining militant groups in the first place. 
Another lesson learned is that with high level of unemployment in the Niger Delta despite the 
fact that it produces 2.2 million barrels of crude oil daily shows that the oil industry is a classic 
enclave industry. It is capital-intensive and consequently does not create many jobs, particularly 
for local communities living in these areas. 
Moreover, the Niger Delta case also shows that whenever natural resource is the main export 
items funding the revenues of state, those who control its distribution and its use have the 
potential to abuse their position by allocating resources on the basis of ethnicity, patronage, 
kickbacks and political affiliations. In the case of Nigeria, revenue is not distributed on the basis 
of need or equality, but rather, it is fraught with politicians conspiring with criminal gangs to 





                The Way Forward, Policy Prescriptions, and Recommendations 
As presented throughout this study, several aspects--ranging from historical division to struggle 
for access to resource wealth, including ownership of land and ethnicity are some of the 
obstacles in resolving the Niger Delta conflict.  Proper resource management is therefore a 
central means to the maintenance of economic security. The degree of material well-being 
(security, peace and progress) generated by oil into the economy depends not only on its ability 
to fully employ the productive resources (labour, capital, resource wealth) available to it, but 
also in its ability to employ them in a way that contributes to the heightening of the societal 
standards of living. The dividends or advantages in cost and investment which the economic 
approach to security yields can be measured not only in terms of increasing profits, but also in 
terms of increasing both the economic and social well-being of citizens who live in resource-rich 
states. It is also to be seen in terms of the psychological and material enhancements of human 
productivity given the nation’s labour, capital and natural resources. The economic security and 
development of a state can be measured using core indices. Such indices include its economic 
growth, the standard of living of its citizens, the availability of basic infrastructure, efficiency of 
social amenities and productivity of industrial manufacturing systems, capacity for wealth 
generation and consolidation, an enabling financial environment and a viable system of human 
resources development. 
The economic dimension is the first important dimension of the security problem. The 
exploitation of the nation’s resources has brought about a breakdown in social service delivery, 
and entrenched poverty in the land leading to social and ethnic stratification. This has further 
worsened the security situation, which often manifests itself in disobedience to the law and 
large-scale conflict claiming the lives and properties of many. An economic poverty perspective 
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can be perceived in the activities of some multi-national industries which engage in exploitation 
often resulting in violent conflict. For example, after the discovery of crude oil, many multi-
national companies came in to assist in the development of the oil sector. The exploration of 
oil led to the degradation of the environment which the host communities relied on for their 
livelihood. Also, the basic infrastructure and amenities such as hospitals, roads, schools, were 
not provided in many of these communities. The fundamental question many indigenes in the 
Niger Delta are asking is that: how then do people survive when their means of existence have 
been threatened and there are no contingency plans to remedy the situation? Second, 
traditional community structures and mechanisms should be harnessed to a broad programme 
of training, engagement and development projects between communities for mutual 
institutional strengthening. The importance of existing local mediation, conflict prevention and 
response framework at community level should not be underestimated because it could have 
value in building a common set of peace between oppositions to avoid conflict. 
One result has been widespread violence which has claimed many lives, including expatriates 
and security operatives. Since the various ethnic groups in the area are united against the multi-
national companies, these companies often employ the strategy of divide-and-rule. This 
involves the supply of weapons to ethnic groups to fight each other in the quest to position such 
a group for monetary benefits from these multinationals. The destruction of lives and 
properties in the Niger Delta area has been a major problem for Nigeria’s security forces to 
control. Another dent to national security is the fact that in the Niger Delta region, there has 
been an influx of light weapons into the wider Nigerian community. What this indicates is that 
such weapons can be used for other criminal activities such as armed robbery, political 
assassination and waging ethnic wars in the Niger Delta region. 
Therefore, to combat intra and inter-ethnic discord, a government awareness campaign for the 
understanding of the pervasive phenomenon of ethnicity is essential. Since categories of 
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identity politics and conflict are just puzzling but equally disturbing to national integration, the 
more so because ethnic alliance cut across class-based identities and interests. This signifies that 
ethnic cleavages have a cultural content, interest—orientation in sharing natural resource wealth, 
and political articulation. Even before colonial era cultural symbols—mostly drawn from 
tradition—are manipulated by ethnic group for political mobilisation with a view to realising a 
set of goals and also gaining political power solely for their group. Against this backdrop of 
ethnic symbolisation, the Nigeria social, political and economic spheres have been 
characterised by struggle for power in gaining advantage in resource wealth distribution. 
Finally, the enormous resources at the centre have fostered a do or die affairs among the 
political elites in the federal level, most of whom go to the extreme length to achieve their 
political ambitions to control the centre. States favoured by the principle of derivative of 
revenue sharing such as population and landmass have grown steadily dependent on oil 
allocation from the federation account and have lost initiative and drive in matter of economic 
planning and revenue generation. Therefore, there should be a reduction of revenue accruing 
to the federal level from the Federation Account and also by enforcing accountability and 
transparency laws. This will discourage corruption and struggle for political power at the 
national level and enhance the capacity of the regional states and local government levels to 











Appendix A: Militias Attacks on Oil Personnel and Infrastructure 
 May 10, 2006. An Executive with the United States-based oil company, Baker Hughes 
was shot and killed in the south-eastern city of Port-Harcourt. 
 June 2, 2006. A Norwegian rig of Statoil offshore Niger delta was attacked and 16 crew 
members were kidnapped and ransom demand of $1 million. 
 October 2, 2006. 10 Nigerian soldiers were killed off the shore of the Niger delta in 
their Patrol boat by MEND mortar shell. Earlier that day a Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell 
convey was attacked in the Port-Harcourt region resulting in some people being 
wounded. 
 October 3, 2006. A militias group (NDPVF) abducted four Scots, a Malaysian, an 
Indonesian and a Romanian from a bar in Akwa Ibom state. 
 May 1, 2007. MEND seized six expatriate workers from an offshore oil facility owned 
by Chevron. The group of six consisted of four Italians, an America and a Croat. On 
the same day, MEND published photos of the captives seated on white plastic chairs in 
a wooden shelter around the remains of campfire. 
 May 3, 2007. MEND seized eight foreign hostages from another offshore vessel. 
$50,000 ransom demand were paid and then released, stating they had intended to 
destroy the vessel and did not want more hostages. 
 May 8, 2007. Three major oil pipelines (one in Brass and two in the Akassa area) were 
attacked, shutting down oil production and cutting power to a facility run by Italian oil 
company Agip, part of the ENI Energy Group. 
 November 13, 2007. MEND Militias attacked Cameroonian soldiers on the disputed 
Bakassi peninsula killing more than 20 soldiers. 
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 May 3, 2008. MEND militias attacked Shell-operated pipelines in Bonny island 
terminal forcing the company to halt 170,000 barrels oil a day of exports of Bonny 
Light crude. 
 June 20, 2008. MEND naval forces attacked the Shell/Total-operated Bonga oil 
platform shutting down 10% of Nigeria’s oil production in one fell swoop. The oil 
platform, shell’s flagship project in the area capable of extracting a massive 200,000 
barrels of oil per day was widely assumed to be outside the reach of the militias’ naval 
force due to its location 120km offshore. This attack has demonstrated a level of 
prowess and sophistication never before seen by the rebels and it’s now known that all 
of Nigeria’s oil platforms are within range of MEND attack. 
 April 19, 2009. A British oil worker was kidnapped from his resident in the city of Port-
Harcourt and a ransom demand of $100,000 was paid for his release. 
 July 13, 2009. A 3-year-old British girl-Margaret Hill (daughter of oil Executive) was 
kidnapped. She was freed after being held hostage for four day. 
 March 10, 2010. Three sports Journalist—one South African and two Nigeria national—
and one employee of French oil company (Totalfina) was kidnapped in Enugu state. 
 May 23, 2010. 12 employee of a steel company (three Chinese and nine Nigerian 
nationals) were held hostage for two weeks and nine of them were killed during their 
abductions. 
 November 7, 2010. 19 Afren oil workers a UK based oil company were held hostage 
but was released after ransom payment. 
 March 6, 2011. Law Enforcement of the Nigerian Army destroy nearly 500 illegal oil 
refineries established by militia groups in the Niger delta in a bid to stop the smuggling 
of stolen oil in the country. Special units using gun-boats and helicopters to track down 
the make-shift refineries located deep in the mangrove forests. 
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 October 5 2012-The Nigeria LNG (LNLG) consortium in Bomu-Bonney declared 
force majeure on deliveries from its 22 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) plant after gas 
supplies were interrupted from a feed-in gas pipeline after militant attack. 
 October 22 2012-Niger Delta pirates target a French shipping company-Bourbou in 
Port-Harcourt which supplies vessels to the offshores oil industry in the Niger Delta. 
Seven people kidnapped: six Russian and an Estonian with speed boat sub-machine 
guns. 
 24 October 2012-Nigeria police in Anambra state raided the hideout of major oil 
workers kidnapping ring in the southeast, rescuing a hostage, killing three kidnappers in 
a shootout and arresting three others. 
 October 29 2012-A British employee by an oil company in Delta state Warri was 
kidnapped by unknown gunmen demanding the equivalent of £72,000 in ransom 
payment for his release. 
 October 30 2012-At least twenty-five people was killed in Bayelsa state in a spiral of 
violence allegedly linked to tribal competition for oil revenue. 
 November 11 2012-The employee of Sigma Limited, an oil-service company 
contracted to Chevron Texaco was seized in the oil port town of Warri as he left a 
neighbourhood bar going home. 






 Appendix B: U.S. Supreme Court Holds Presumption against Extraterritorial Application 
Bars Claims under the Alien Tort Statute—Source: Department of Justice and Attorney 
General Office, Capitol Hill Washington D.C. 2013 
On April 17, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-anticipated ruling in Kiobel versus 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. regarding whether the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) allows plaintiffs 
to sue multinational corporations for allegation of human rights violations committed outside 
the United States. In a majority decision authored by Justice Roberts, the Court held that the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality” applies to the ATS and that petitioners failed to 
overcome the presumption where “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United 
States”. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.—(2013) (slip op., at 13-140. The Court 
did not address the additional question of environmental damages presented, whether 
corporation are liable under the ATS. 
The Kiobel decision effectively ends the trend at ATS cases in which plaintiffs have attempted 
to hold multinational corporations liable in U.S. federal courts for alleged human rights 
violations committed by foreign governments, on the theory that the corporation “aided the 
abetted2 the activity by providing assistance to or conducting business with that government. 
This is a significant victory for multinationals that have faced the threat to reputation and 
millions of dollars in potential claims posed by these suits. The court did preserve some 
ambiguity in its decision, signalling that some ATS claims under different facts involving more 
significant ties to the United States may be available. Going forward, the question will be what 






Kiobel involved a lawsuit by twelve Nigerians who alleged that Dutch, British, and Nigeria oil 
companies aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human rights violations 
in connection with its efforts to stop protest against oil drilling in the Ogoni region of the Niger 
Delta. In a decision that garnered national attention, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second 
Circuit held that the ATS did not apply to human rights claims against corporations. The 
Supreme Court granted review to consider that question in 2011. 
During oral argument, questions from the Justices signalled that they were concerned with a 
threshold issue—whether the ATS applied to conduct occurring outside the United States at all. 
Immediately after oral argument, the Court ordered the parties to brief that question and set 
the case for re-argument during the following Term. 
The Decision 
In this recent decision, the Justice agreed 9—0 to affirm the Second Circuit’s judgement that 
petitioners’ ATS claim could not be sustained under the facts that’s presented. The unanimity 
in judgement does not reflect agreement on the Court on a rationale for dismissing the claim. A 
majority of the Court relied on the presumption against extraterritoriality in a decision that is 
binding on the lower courts. In concurring opinions, several Justice provided their views on the 
rationale, with Justice Kennedy (while agreeing with and joining the majority) stating that further 
cases may present facts requiring elaboration on the presumption. 
Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy joining in his opinion, 
concluded that the canon of interpretation, the “presumption against extraterritoriality”, 
required the Court to interpret the ATS as not having extraterritorial application. This 
continues a trend in the Court of sceptical review of the extraterritoriality application of U.S. 
federal law, which started with the Morrison case rejecting the extraterritorial application of the 
securities laws. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). The majority 
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reasoned that “nothing in the text” of the ATS “nor…..did the historical background “suggest 
that Congress intended the ATS to apply extraterritorially, and that, “all the relevant conduct 
take place outside the United States” At the end of the opinion, the majority left room for 
some cases to be brought if they had a sufficient connection to the United States, but held that 
for those claims that do “touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” 
Significantly for multinational corporations, the Court held that because [c]corporations are 
often present in many countries….it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices”. 
While joining the majority, Justice Kennedy also wrote separately to emphasize his belief that 
some scenarios could overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Justice Kennedy 
observed that the Court was “careful to leave open a number of significant questions regarding 
the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute”, and noted that “[o]ther cases may arise 
with allegations of serious violation of international law principles protecting persons, cases 
covered neither by the [Torture Victims protection Act] nor by the reasoning and holding of 
today’s cases; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation”. 
Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion, joined by justice Thomas, stating that he would 
apply a stricter bar than the majority, allowing an ATS cause of action only where “domestic 
conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s requirements of 
definiteness and acceptance among civilized nation” (referring to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692 (2004)). 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred in the 
judgement only and challenged the presumption against extraterritoriality as an appropriate 
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limiting principle for the ATS. However, even the minority rationale would substantially limit 
suits for conduct occurring outside the United States, as Justice Brayer stated that he would 
limit jurisdiction to claims where “(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the 
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely 
affects an important American national interest”. Justice Breyer principally appeared motivated 
by an interest in not making the United States a “safe harbour” for individuals who commit 






























per day (in 
barrels) 
 







per day (in 
barrels) 
 
Value of oil 
shut-in per 
annum (in USD) 
 
Total Value of oil 
stolen or shut-in per 
annum (in USD) 
 
  2000           28.49            140,000           1.5 billion      250,000            2.6 billion                  4.1 billion 
2001           24.50             724,171          1.6 billion       200,000           1.8 billion                    8.3 billion 
2002           25.15           699,763            6.5 billion       370,000          3.4 billion                   9.9 billion 
2003           28.76           300,000             3.2 billion      350,000           3.7 billion                  6.9 billion 
 2004           38.27           300,000              4.2 billion      230,000         3.2 billion                  6.4 billion 
2005           55.67           250,000              5.1 billion       180,000         3.7 billion                  8.8 billion 
2006           66.84           100,000              2.4 billion        600,000        14.6 billion                17.0 billion 
2007           75.14           100,000              2.7 billion        600,000         16.5 billion               19.2 billion  
2008          115.81          150,000              6.3 billion        650,000         27.5 billion                33.8 billion 
2009          90.88             250,000              9.8 billion        150,000         13.5 billion               23.3 billion 
2010           80.00             300,000             2.8 billion        100,000          9.6 billion                12.4 billion 
2011            85.00            220,000               2.2 billion       200,00          20.4 billion                22.6 billion 
2012            100.00           350,000             4.2 billion         170,000          20.4 billion             24.6 billion 
Source: Coventry Cathedral, The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta (Coventry, UK: ICR, February 8, 2012), 159; 
Peace and Security Secretariat, “Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy Background Papers” (Unpublished paper, Port-Harcourt, 2012), 
25; and author’s estimates based on these two Reports.  






Appendix D:  Document 68, In closure in Document 66: Regulations for the 
Constitution of the Governing Council to manage the local Affairs of Brass-Oil 
River Protectorate—Source: British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Volume 21. 
The Niger and Oil Rivers, Series G 1860-1896. 
President: Her Majesty’s Consul for the Bight of Benin and Biafra. 
Vice-President: Charles James Townsend. 
Clerk of the Council: William E. Jinks. 
Other Members: Charles De Cardi, Alfred A. Whitehouse, James Cockbum, John H. 
Swainson, Thomas J. Davis, Rev. James Alfred Robinson, M.A., Archdeacon Crowther, 
Chief Kema, Chief Sambo, Chief Cameroons, Chief Smoke, and Chief Dogo. 
1. This Council will be called “The Governing Council of Brass”. 
2. The powers of the Council will be limited to the carrying out of Consular orders, 
the preservation of peace, the maintenance of highways and `means of 
communication, the regulation of commerce, and the hearing in Court of minor 
civil actions and criminal charges. 
3. No fines can be inflicted by the Council which exceeds £5. In value, nor any term 
of imprisonment beyond one week, nor corporal punishment to a greater extent 
than twelve lashes. In the event of any case being brought the Council wherein, 
after conviction, it appears to the majority of the members that a penalty 
exceeding those already mentioned should be inflicted, the case must first be 
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submitted to Her Majesty’s Consul, and only after obtaining his written sanction 
will the council be enabled to award and carry out the increased penalty. 
4. Appeal from the decisions of the Council may be made to Her Majesty’s Consular 
Courts, Old Calabar, under the following: 
1. The appeal must be made to Her Majesty’s Consular Court not less than fifteen 
days after the decision upon which the conviction or order was forwarded. 
2. The appellant must, within seven days after such decision, serve on the other 
party and on the Clerk of the Council notice in writing of his intention to appeal, 
and of the general grounds of such of appeal. 
3. The appellant must, when giving the notice of appeal as above directed, deposit 
with the Governing Council the full amount of such fines and costs as the Council 
may have sentenced him to pay, and he must further enter into such 
recognizances as Her Majesty’s Consular Court may direct, pending the hearing 
of such appeal. 
4. When the appellant is in custody, the Council, should it think fit, may release him 
on his entering into such recognizance or giving such security as may appear 
adequate to insure his presenting himself for the hearing of the appeal. At the 
same time, the Council may, at its own discretion, direct the appellant to be held 
in custody until the appeal has been heard in Her Majesty’s Consular Court. 
5. The Council is authorized to stop and detain any merchant-vessel entering the 
water of the British Protectorate of the Oil Rivers when any member of her crew 
is suspected or convicted of having infringed the order of the 20th October, 1887, 
prohibiting the importation, sale, or purchase of machine-guns, cannon, breech-
loading guns, bullet-cartridges, & c., and the Council shall be empowered to seize 
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and confiscate all arms imported contrary to this order; but the Council shall 
release such vessel if the person or persons charged with the misdemeanour are 
surrendered to the custody of the Council, or enter into recognizances to the 
amount of 500l, and to appear before Her Majesty’s Consular Court to answer to 
the charge. When the person charged is the master or owner of the vessel, this 
latter must also be detained pending the hearing of the charge. The Council is 
also empowered to deal in the same way with persons suspected of exporting 
slaves. 
6. The verdicts and decisions of the Council shall go by majority of votes; the 
President or, in his absence, the Vice-President to have the casting vote 
7. Three members will constitute a quorum 
8. Half of the entire amount of “comey” collected in the river will be granted to the 
Council, together with all Court fees and fines for expenditure in the interests of 
the country. 
9. The costs of hearing cases in Court by the Council are not to exceed the rate of 
30 pence per-day. This does not include the costs of summons, which are 4 
pence each. 
10. Cases brought before the Council wherein British subjects solely are concerned 
must be tried by such members of the Council only as are British subjects. 
11. No cases in which natives or native interests are involved is to be tried or decided 
by the Council without due notice having been sent to the native members of the 
Council, so that an opportunity may be given them to attend. If they absent 
themselves from the meeting of the Council after receiving this notice (which, in 
case of those members living in Nimbe, must be sent at least three days before 
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the date of the meeting), they can raise no after objection to the decision or 
verdict of the Council which has been given in their absence. 
12. At the expiration of every quarter the Clerk of the Council must forward to the 
Consul for his inspection and sanction an exact account of the receipts (fine, fees, 
& c.) and expenditure of the Council during the past quarter. He must further 
send an abstract of the Court books, showing what business has been done 
during the said quarter by the Governing Council. In cases where the Council 
considers that a greater penalty should be inflicted than it is in the power of the 
Council to award (vide Regulation 3), the Clerk of the Council must furnish the 
Consul with a full Report of the said case. 
13. The remuneration of the Clerk of the Council is at present fixed at £25 a year, 
payable quarterly by the Consul out of that proportion of the “comey” allotted to 
the Governing Council. 
14. The council will meet once a week to transact business. The day and the place of 
meeting will be settled in accordance with the convenience of the majority of 
members. 

















(a) Agreement between Consul John Beecroft and Daire (Governor) and other Itsekiri 
Chiefs 4 April 1851**Source: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: F.O. 5/7/195 
 
At a conference held this day, the 4
th
 of April 1851, on board Her Majesty’s Steamer ‘Jackal’, present 
John Beecroft Esqr Her Britannic Majesty’s consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra, Lieut. 
Commander Bedinfeld, Her Majesty’s Steamer, ‘Jackal’, Lieutenant Lombard…… 
Mr. Pendleberry, Agent for Messrs Horsfall & Sons, W. Day, Harrison & Co., W. Stowe, Reuben 
Hemminway Esqr, and Mr Briden Demean Bibb, Jerry of Jacqua, the Chief duly elected, with Jubaffaa 
and the principals of their town, Odessa of Yellow Towm, Offalicco of Fish Town and Tomah of 
Ullibah, the following laws and regulations were made and enacted. 
          
                                                  Article 1 
 
That the Chief of the River Benin with the Chiefs and people of the above mentioned Towns, pledge 
themselves that no British subject from this date shall be detained on shore or molested in any way under 
any pretence whatever, and if they (the Chiefs and people as above mentioned) do so they will incur the 
displeasure of Her Majesty, the Queen of England, and be declared enemies of Great Britain, and on 
such a complaint being made a Man of War will immediately come to Benin River and protect British 
subjects and Property. 
 
                                                     Article 2 
That in case of any misunderstanding between the Residents Agents Supercargoes and Masters of any of 
the vessel shall be at full liberty to go on shore free of molestation, and will with the chief and Gentlemen 
of the River Benin peacefully settle any dispute between the Parties. 
 
                                                      Articles 3 
 
That upon the arrival of any British merchant vessel off or in this River for the purpose of trading 
therein, the Agent or supercargoes of such vessels shall upon the sending of five Pawns per register 
tonnage to the Chief or person authorised to receive such custom, or comey, be allowed the privilege of 
trading without further molestation, the comey or custom to consist for a fair assortment of the goods 
304 
 
usually brought out for trade viz Guns, Powder, Cloth, Cowries, Rum, Tobacco, Salt, Beads, Caps, 
Knives, Iron Bars, Earthenware, etc. 
 
                                                     Article 4 
 
The Comey or Custom, to be tendered on the ship’s arrival, or as soon as convenient, and if not 
accepted by the Chief such vessel shall be at liberty to commerce trade. This however does not exempt 
such ships from paying the usual custom or comey if subsequently demanded. 
 
                                                    Article 5 
 
That if at any time any Agents or Supercargoes of any ship or vessel (after having paid or tendered the 
usual comey or customs for the Privileges of Trading) can prove that the trade of his ship has been 
stopped whether directly or indirectly upon any pretence whatever the Chiefs is to be held responsible 
for such stoppage and pay one Puncheon of saleable Palm Oil per dim per 100 tons Register to said ship 
as compensation for the loss incurred, the said oil to be paid within 7 days, after such stoppage shall have 
been made and continue to pay the same as long as the trade of any such ship is stopped. 
 
                                                Article 6 
 
That after the custom or comey has been paid, or tendered, to the Chief every Trader shall be allowed to 
trade in his own name, and neither the chief or any other trader is entitled to exact other customs, comey 
or pay whatever. 
 
                                                 Article 7  
 
That the Chief shall not, nor shall he permit any of his principals or chiefs or rather Tribes of the 
different towns or villages to demand or enforce any trust from any of the Residents Agents or 
Supercargoes of any ship or ships upon any pretence whatever. 
 




Whereas several boats have been plundered, amid lives sacrificed, it is deemed just and right, that all 
such aggressions, and depredations, committed upon British Subjects and Property crossing the Bar or 
otherwise within the limits of the Chief of the River Benin dominions shall be satisfactorily adjusted by 
the said Chief. 
 
                                                   Article 9 
 
And further be it enacted that any breach of any article of this Treaty shall be punished by the party or 
parties being quality of the same, paying ten puncheons of saleable Palm oil. 
 
 
                                                 Article 10 
 
Should any person take any trust from any Residents Agent or super-cargo of any vessel and be unable to 
pay his debts his house and property to be forfeited and sold by order of the Chief of the River Benin. 
The proceeds of the sale to go to the liquidation of the debts and that he be no longer allowed to trade. 
The Agent or supercargo of any vessel trading with him after his name has been published by the Crier to 
be liable to the penalty of Five Puncheons of Palm Oil. After the debtor has paid his debt he shall again 
be allowed to trade. 
Given under our hands on board HM Steamer ‘Jackal’ River Benin 4th day of April, 1851. 
 
                                                                (Signed) John Beecroft, Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul of  
                                                                              Bights Benin & Biafra 
                                                                Lt. Commander Bedinfeld, HM Steamer ‘Jackal’ 
                                                                Mr. Pendleberry, Agent for Messers Horsfalls & Sons 
 
[There followed the marks and Witness of the above signatures: 
Jerry Idiare, Moodawaa, Jubuffaa (Idibofun), Anne, Alluma (Olumu), Adeliwa, Abomay, Odessa, Bogie, 
Obeadee, Ephia, Allya, Ogre, Chichee, Achelo, Juatao, Amma, Nunezwaree, Abasshamunee, Amatiama, 
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Abejokoo, Fomma, Greggie, Affaliwo, Tomah, Captain Black, Datchee, Epioha, Margoogamee, 
Munaawaree, Unao, Liverpool, Ogoriee, Mahamaa.]    
 
(b) Treaty with Chiefs of Itsekiriland, 1884. Source: British Document on Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 19 West Africa Diplomacy of Imperialism 1880-1895, FO. 93/6/1 
 
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, & c., and the 
Chiefs of Jakri being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship which have 
for so long existed between them; 
 
Her Britannic Majesty has named and appointed E.H. Hewett, Esq., Her Consul General for the Bights of Benin 
and Biafra, to conclude a Treaty for this Purpose. 
 





                                                                   Articles 1 
 
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, & C, in compliance with the request of the Chiefs, and 
people of Jakri, hereby undertakes to extend to them, and to the territory under their authority and jurisdiction, 
Her gracious favour and protection. 
 
                                                                   Article 2 
 
The Chiefs of Jakri agree and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty 
with any foreign nation or Power, except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s 
Government. 
 




It is agreed that full and exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over British subjects and their property in the 
territory of Jakri is reserved to Her Britannic Majesty, to be exercised by such Consular or other officers as Her 
Majesty shall appoint for that purpose. 
The same jurisdiction is likewise reserved to Her Majesty in the said territory of Jakri over foreign subjects 
enjoying British protection, who shall be deemed to be included in the expression ‘British Subject’ throughout this 
Treaty. 
 
                                                                Article 4 
 
All disputes between the Chefs of Jakri, or between them and British or foreign traders, or between the aforesaid 
Kings and Chiefs and neighbouring tribes, which cannot be settled amicably between the two parties, shall be 
submitted to the British Consular or other officers appointed by Her Britannic Majesty to exercise jurisdiction in 
Jakri territories for arbitration and decision, or for arrangement. 
 
                                                               Article 5 
 
The Chiefs of Jakri hereby engage to assist the British Consular or other officers in the execution of such duties as 
may be assigned to them; and, further, to act upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of justice, 
the development of the resources of the country, the interests of commerce, or in any other matter in relation to 
peace, order, and good government, and the general progress of civilization. 
 
                                                               Article 6 
 
The subject and citizens of all countries may freely carry on trade in every part of the territories of the Kings and 
Chiefs parties hereto, and may have houses and factories therein. 
 
                                                                 Article 7 
 
All ministers of the Christian religion shall be permitted to reside and exercise their calling within the territories of 
the aforesaid Kings and Chiefs, who hereby guarantee to them full protection. 
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All forms of religious worship and religious ordinances may be exercise within the territories of the aforesaid Kings 
and Chiefs, and no hindrance shall be offered thereto. 
 
                                                                Article 8 
 
If any vessel should be wracked within Jakri territories, the Chiefs will give them all the assistance in their power, 
will secure them from plunder, and also recover and deliver to the owners or agents all the property which can be 
saved. 
If there are no such owners or agents on the spot, then the said property shall be delivered to the British Consular 
or other officer. 
The Chiefs further engage to do all in their power to protect the persons and property of the officers, crew, and 
others on board such wracked vessels. 
All claim for salvage dues in such cases shall, if disputed, be referred to the British Consular or other officer for 
arbitration and decision. 
 
                                                                       Article 9 
 
This Treaty shall come into operation, so far as many be practicable, from the date of its signature, except as 
regards Article 6 and 7 which are to be left for negotiation on a future occasion. 
Done is duplicate on board H.B.M.S. ‘Flirt’ anchored in Benin River this sixteenth day of July, 1884. 
 
                                                                     (Signed) Edward Hyde Hewett. 
[There followed the marks of: 
 
Nanna (Governor), Chanomie (Tsanomi), Dudu, Numa, Ogree, Fragonie, Nafomie, Etchie, Mudwa, Brigby, 
Awalla, Peggy.] 
Witness to above signatures: 
 
                                                                     (Signed) Theo. Hilliards 
                                                                         Chairman of Court of Equity. 





Appendix F: Confidential Interview 
with a Militant Commander in 
Yenagoa, Bayelsa State 
Date and Venue: River Nun Creek 
Jetty 25th September 2013—
17:30pm 
[It’s of great honour in welcoming you to 
this interview. If any question is not clear 
o you, please you are allowed to request a 
repeat of any particular question without 
hesitation. For your information in 
granting me your consent, your answers 
will not be recorded but coded or written 
down in the process of the interview. 
Therefore, you are permitted to raise any 
objection you are not happy with] 
Purpose of this Interview: To know what is 
responsible as a driver for the struggle to 
control Natural Resources in the Niger 
Delta- militant perspective. 
Q1: What do you think is the main driver 
for the struggle to control oil and gas 
wealth in the Niger Delta? 
Answer: The main cause of our struggle is 
poverty, unemployment and the 
destruction of our livelihood. All these are 
linked to a rising consciousness of the life 
styles of politicians in Abuja and the 
military Generals squandering our oil 
money like their personal empire. People 
from the region are increasingly looking 
outside and seeing what they have been 
excluded from. “You have the youths who 
have the future in their hands, and they 
are also travelling out to other parts of the 
country. After seeing how our money 
have developed Abuja (FCT) and other 
parts of the country……….the youths can’t 
bear it no more again. People from far off 
are benefiting from our resources. I think 
these are the main reasons. 
Q2: Where do you get your arms from in 
fighting the Joint Military Task Force 
stationed in your area of control? 
Answer: In fact, we are saturated with 
weapons. We don’t have any problem 
with supply at all. We have AK47s, rifles, 
light and heavy machine guns, and even 
four rocket-propelled grenade launchers. 
Some of these are bought, while the other 
we seized them from government JTF 
armies. Also, we don’t respect borders 
and we can cross to neighbouring 
Cameroon to buy arms and weapons 
dealers are ready to supply us from Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Yemen and Libya. 
Q3: So, where the militants get the money 
to buy the arms? 
Answer: A laugh and smile and he think 
for a time, as though weighing up how to 
answer the question. And he replied, “I 
hope you won’t tell anyone”, and I said 
No! And he said, we tap oil from the 
pipelines to sell on the black market. It’s 
our God’s given resources, why should 
people in Abuja steal it and it’s in our 
land? 
Q4: But is that enough to buy such 
massive weapons and arms? 
Answer: Well, our target a week is 
200,000 barrels. At least we have about 
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five badges in korokorose that delivered 
to our customer but now we are reduced 
to three because of Navy patrol. We are 
always monitoring the energy market, if 
the price is $110, we offer a quarter of 
that and business is booming, No 
complain! We sell at about $30. Also we 
refined the ones that we are unable to 
sell. Don’t forget all the Nigerian refineries 
are producing below capacity. At present, 
we refined 20% of the domestic market 
and the people are happy with that. That’s 
why the government supposed to give us 
a licence than chasing us from pillars to 
post. 
Q5: Do militant group have any link or 
collaboration with politicians or security 
forces in running this black market oil 
business? 
Answer: No! And I don’t have any 
knowledge of any militant group 
collaborating with security forces or 
politicians in pipelines tapping. But, what 
happen is that, when we are arrested, we 
call those politicians we helped in winning 
elections to protect us and bail us from 
prisons; and we will also pay them back 
when the elections comes. They can’t do 
without us and we can’t do without them. 
Sometimes, the security forces and oil 
company’s staffs are corrupt; and we also 
bribe them to set us free with the 
guarantee that we will protect their 
pipelines from other groups. So, it’s a win, 
win affairs to my knowledge. 
Q6: Do u think if the Federal Government 
increases revenue allocations to the Niger 
Delta states will reduce “illegal bunkering” 
and militancy in the region?  
 
Answer: No! Because as I told you earlier 
politicians, police, oil companies staffs and 
NNPC are so corrupt that increase 
revenue will not trickle down to ordinary 
people. On average every militia person 
make N400, 00.00 per months. That’s why 
we can’t leave the oil business; and no 
equity participation by local people. 
Politicians are stealing our oil money to 
marry multiple wives, buy Jeeps and build 
houses. When they stopped doing that, 
then we stop tapping pipelines because 
there is no different between what 
politicians are doing and what we are 
doing. If you call it criminal activities is up 
to you. 
Q7: Do you support the kidnapping of 
foreign expatriates for ransom payment? 
Answer? Yes! I fully support it because the 
oil companies are always aiding the 
security forces to crackdown on us and 
supplying arms like helicopters gunship, 
Gunboats and rocket launcher to attach 
our bases. Therefore, those foreign oil 
workers are our target too. We don’t care 
about what CNN will say about Niger Delta 
for kidnapping and ransom payment. 
After all, since 1950s, foreign oil 
companies have been stealing our oil and 
gas to develop their country and we don’t 
have any public infrastructure like 
hospitals, schools, road and electricity. If 
they want to trade with us, they should be 






Appendix G: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINISTRY 
Source: NDDC, MNDA, Minister’s Office and Fieldwork Documentation, October 2013 
 In order to address the challenges and fast track development in the Region, the 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was created in September 2008 and commenced 
operation in April, 2009. 
 It also has the responsibility to coordinate the activities of Agencies, Communities, 
Donors and other Stakeholders involved in the development of the Region. The 
essence of this paper is to take an over view of development activities of the Ministry 
in line with its mandate.  
 
FUNCTIONS OF THE MINISTRY  
The functions of the Ministry are as follows: 
 Oversee the implementation of Government Policies on the development and Security 
of the Niger Delta; 
 Coordinate the formulation of the development plan for the Region; 
 Formulate Policies and Programmes for Youth mobilization and empowerment in the 
Niger Delta; 
 Facilitate Private sector involvement in the Region; 
 Liaise with oil companies in the Region, to ensure environmental protection and 
pollution control; 
  Organize human capacity development as well as skills acquisition programmes for 
the Youths; 
 Take adequate measures to ensure peace, stability and security with a view to 
enhancing the economic potentials of the Region; 






DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE MINISTRY 
In line with its mandate, the Ministry is engaged in carrying out the following activities in the 
Niger Delta Region: 
- Maintenance of Peace and Security; 
- Road Construction; 
- Skill Acquisition Training (Non- Militants) and establishment of Skills Acquisition 
Centres; 
- Water Supply; 
- Electrification Scheme; 
- Housing Scheme; 
- Environmental protection and remediation projects; and 
- Agricultural and Industrial Development projects; 
 
MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY 
 The security of the Niger Delta Region has really improved since the inception of the 
present administration as the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs had intervened 
significantly through routinely organized security and consultative meetings to sustain 
peace and security in the Region. 
 
This has resulted in an increase in oil production from the pre- Amnesty level of about 
700, 000 Barrel per Day (BPD) to the current level of about 2.5M Barrel Per Day (BPD). 
 
 The goal and outcomes of the Niger Delta Action plan have been designed to tackle 
two key underlying causes of conflict in the Niger Delta; poor living standards and slow 
economic development consolidating and sustaining peace can also be promoted 
through direct and targeted initiatives. They include expanded general education and 
knowledge, strengthened community peace building institutions, and increased 








 Prior to the establishment of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs there was pervasive 
underdevelopment and infrastructure decay in the Region. However, with the 
development strides and efforts of the Ministry there has been a visible improvement 
in the provision of infrastructures in the Region in terms of road construction and 
other facilities. Construction and rehabilitation of roads is currently being embarked 
upon to enhance the movement of people, goods and services within the Region. 
Some of the road construction projects are as follows: 
 i. East – West Road 
The East – West road is a dual carriage way with a total length of 338km and 42 
numbers bridges under construction to link Warri, Ughelli and Patani in Delta State to 
Eket and Oron in Akwa- Ibom State through Kiaima in Bayelsa State, Mbiama, Ahoada, 
Port Harcourt and Ogoni Land in Rivers State. 
 
The East – West Road project which was awarded in four sections to three (3) different 
contractors was initially scheduled for completion by end of 2009 but due to 
inadequate funding the project has now been rescheduled for completion by 
December, 2014.  
 
The project which was inherited from the federal Ministry of Works at below 10% 
completion level was without detailed design/financial plan, has now attained over 
53% completion with detailed design/financial plan.  
 
 ii. Re-construction of Elele – Owerri Road (Rivers – Imo State) 39. 10%. 
 iii. Obehie – Azumini – Ukanafun Road (Abia – Akwa Ibom States)  sections 1 
& 2 – 34.98%. 
 iv. Rehabilitation of Okpuala – Iguruta Road (Imo – Rivers States) Phase 1  – 
33.10%. 
 V. Reconstruction of Benin – Abraka Road (Edo – Delta States) phase 1 – 
 46.10%. 
 vi. Construction of Orhorhor – Odorubuo Kpakama – Bomadi Road 
 (Delta/Bayelsa/Rivers States) phase 1 – 23%. 
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 vii. Gberegolor – Ogriagbene Road (Delta State) 32%. 
 viii. Construction of Obehie – Akwete – Etinan Road (Abia/Akwa Ibom 
 States) Sections 1 & 2 27%. 
 ix. Construction of Okputuite – Mbato junction – Orie market – Lomara 
 Road in Abia State- 13.11%. 
 x. Construction of Alode Onne (oil & gas free zone) – Afam – Oyigbo –  Imo 
River Bridge (Aba – Pot Harcourt Expressway) – 8.10% 
 xi. Construction of Emakalakala – Akipelai Road in Bayelsa State –  11.00%. 
 
SKILL ACQUISITION TRANING (NON-MILITANTS) AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SKILLS 
ACQUISITION CENTRES 
The Ministry has embarked on the construction of Skills Acquisition centres in the nine (9) 
States of the Region which are at various stages of completion. This is aimed at training youths 
in the various sectors of the economy including oil & gas, tourism, construction, marine and 
Agriculture/commerce. 
 
In line with this objective, 701 non- militant youths have been trained   locally and overseas – 
314 in oil & gas, 270 in Maritime, 90 in Agriculture.  
 
The Ministry has also contacted some major companies in the oil & gas sector for either 
permanent employment or on industrial attachment basis. The Nigeria Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has been contacted to place all the youths 
trained in Maritime studies on industrial attachment on board sea-going vessels. 
 
There is also a Niger Delta collaborative Development framework (NDCDF), a comprehensive 
and coherent programme investment in the social and public sectors of the various 
communities of the Niger Delta.    
 
All these efforts are aimed at reducing unemployment especially among the youths. The 






S/N   STATES  LOCATION  LOCAL GOVT. AREA TRAINING CENTRE 
1.   Abia   Owazza Ukwa West Commerce 
2. Akwa-Ibom Iwoachang-Ibeno  Ibeno  Oil & Gas 
3. Bayelsa Otuoke Ogbia Oil & Gas 
4.  Cross Rivers Ikot Nakanda Akpabuyo Tourism & Entertainment 
5. Delta Tuomo Burutu Oil & Gas 
6.  Edo Iguelaba Orhionmwon Dredging and Maritime 
7. Imo Egbema Ohaji Commerce 
8. Ondo Agadagba-Obon Ese - odo  Agriculture 
9. Rivers Elele Ikwere Oil & Gas 
 
WATER SUPPLY 
The Ministry has embarked on water project for the provision of portable water supply in four 
communities. They are as follows: 
i. Owerri urban, Imo State; 
ii. Idoro – Eaten – Itam, Akwa Ibom State; 
iii. Ukparamo, Ondo State; 
iv. Ubang, Utanga, Cross Rivers State. 
 
Each of these water projects is designed to serve several communities in the various States 
and they are at various stages of completion. However, considering the geographical terrain 
of the Region and the need for portable water supply, there is still a lot more to be done to 
ensure that clean potable water is made available for all the people of the Region. 
 
ELECTRIFICATION SCHEME  
In line with its mandate to fast track infrastructure development in the Region, the Ministry 
has embarked on four (4) electrification projects aimed at providing electricity for the people 
of the Region. 
The projects are as follows: 
i. Electrification projects in Khana Local Government Area, Rivers State at 80% completion. 
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ii. Electrification project in Eleme, Rivers State at 75% completion. 
iii. Electrification project at Erei, Cross Rivers State at 80% completion. 
iv. Electrification project in peremabiri - Ogbokiri, Bayelsa State at 40%. 
 
When completed, these projects would provide electricity supply to several communities in 
the area. However, it is still grossly inadequate and a far cry from the electricity requirement 
in the rural communities of the Region. 
 
HOUSING SCHEME PROJECTS 
In order to reduce the housing shortage in the region and to provide affordable houses to the 
people of the region, the Ministry is constructing a total number of 360 (Three Hundred and 
Sixty) housing units across the nine (9) States which are at various stages of completion.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND REMEDIATION PROJECTS 
Oil exploration and exploitation activities by oil companies in the Niger Delta Region has 
impacted the environment adversely and has seriously affected the sources of livelihood of 
the people in the area. 
 
Also, natural phenomenon or disaster such as erosion has seriously depleted the land in some 
areas. In order to address these challenges, the Ministry has embarked on several projects to 
achieve environmental remediation, reclamation and rehabilitation in some of the affected 
communities in the Region. Some of the projects are as follows: 
 
Canalization Projects 
i. Canalization/River training of Foupolo – Bulou Ndaro Creek, Burutu Local Government Area, 
Delta State. 40% 
ii. Canalization of Odoubou – Boloutou Creek, Ogbobagbene Burutu Local Government Area, 
Delta State. 65% 
iii. Canalization at Bateruren – Tselu – Utamoyibo Creek, Warri South West Local Government 
Area, Delta State. 25% 
 
Shoreline Protection and Land Reclamation Projects 
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i. Land Reclamation and Shoreline Protection in Kurutie, Gbaramatu Clan, Delta State. 80% 
ii. Land Reclamation/Shoreline Protection at Ogbobagbene, Burutu Local Government Area, 
Delta State. 18% 
 
Erosion Control and Land Reclamation Projects 
i. Land Reclamation/ Erosion Control at Igbontor/Igbanke & Oyomo/Oklelen – Awo Road, 
Uromi, Edo State. 97% 
ii. Land Reclamation and Erosion Control at Ibakang Nsit – Ikot Ekpo – Unyehe Road, Nsit Attai 
Local Government Area, and Akwa Ibom State. 75% 
 
Remediation and Rehabilitation of Oil Impact Site Projects 
i. Remediation, Rehabilitation and restoration of oil impacted site at Stubbs Creek, Eket, and 
Akwa- Ibom State. 26% 
 
AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRAIL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
The Ministry has taken steps to embark on fish production in the region using the Israel model 
with a view to re-establishing fishing which is the main tradition occupation of the people, 
which had been eroded due to negative impact of oil and other industrial activities on the 
aquatic ecosystem in the Region. 
 
Also, the Ministry has carried out studies to establish integrated farm centre in the Region. 
The Songhai Centre is a successful story that the Ministry is embarking on the replicate across 
the Niger Delta Region. It is an integrated farm system whereby wastes in a farm enterprise 
become raw materials in another enterprise. This will create a lot of jobs for the youth, 
enhance economic empowerment and boost the economy of the Region and the Country. 
 
It will also provide a platform for diversification of the economy of the Region from Oil & Gas 
to Agriculture. The Ministry is also embarking on the establishment of industrial parks in the 
Niger Delta Region. When established the industrial parks will house about 5,000 Small and 
Medium Enterprises that manufacture and produce goods and services in over 100 different 
sectors/areas of the economy. The success stories of the Ostim Organized Industrial Parks in 
Ankara, Turkey are to be replicated in all the nine (9) States of the Region. A memorandum of 
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understanding (MOU) has already been signed between the Ministry and Ostim of Turkey for 
the establishment of the Industrial Parks in the Region. 
 
This, no doubt will revolutionize the economy of the Region as most of the youths who have 
already acquired some skills through training will be gainfully employed in the Industrial 
Parks.  
 
THE NEED FOR “QUICK WIN” PROJECTS 
Most of the projects being embarked upon by the Ministry are medium and long term projects 
which span over some years. This explains partly why from inception to date, the Ministry has 
not commissioned and delivered projects to the people coupled with inadequate funding. 
 
In this regards, there is need for the Ministry to embark on short term “quick win” projects 
that will impact positively on the lives of the people in the Region.  
 
CHALLENGES  
Some of the challenges faced by the Ministry in its effort to deliver on its mandate are as 
follows: 
i. Grossly inadequate budgetary allocation and release have hindered timely execution of 
developmental projects; 
ii. The terrain in most parts of the Region constitutes a great challenge for infrastructural 
development; 
iii. In spite of reduced youth restiveness and insecurity in the Region, there are still cases of 
intermittent disruption of projects by the youth, excessive demands on contractors by 
communities and individuals and occasional incidence of kidnapping.  
 
 
   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 It is hoped that the funding of the Ministry’s projects would be significantly increased. 
However, in view of the increasingly competing demands for the Nations resources, it 
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is recommended that the Policy of Public Private Partnership (PPP) in the 
implementation of projects be seriously explored. 
 It is also recommended that the ministry consider the implementation of more short 
term quick-win projects that would impact positively on the lives of the people of the 
area. Examples of such programmes are: Water Supply (Bore-Hole) Projects, Rural 
Electrification Projects, Building and equipping the Clinics or Medical Centres in 
various Communities etc. 
 The establishment of the National Council of Niger Delta Affairs is a right step in the 
right direction. However, it is recommended that it should be a jamboree for 
everybody from the Region. Rather it should be a result oriented forum where 
carefully selected experts and personalities assemble to formulate workable Policies 
aimed at fast tracking the development of the Region.  
  Pursuant to the instrument establishing the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, which 
places on it the responsibility to coordinate the activities of Agencies, Communities, 
Donors and other Stakeholders involved in the development of the Region, efforts 
should be sustained to ensure that the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
is supervised by the Ministry. 
It is recommended that the Ministry collaborate with the Ecological Fund Office to ensure 
that Ecological Fund are used to address issues of Erosion Control and remediation in the 
Region instead of the Ministry’s allocation being used for these projects. This will invariably 


















Appendix H: Confidential Interview 
with the Managing Director, 
Security and Intelligence/Head of 
security Information, Shell 
Petroleum Development Limited in 
Nigeria 
Venue: Shell Operational 
Headquarter Port Harcourt, River 
State Niger Delta 
Date and Time 20th September 
2013—16:30pm 
[It’s of great honour in welcoming you to this 
interview. If any question is not clear to you, 
you are allowed to request a repeat of any 
particular question without hesitation. For 
your information in granting me your 
consent, your answers will not be recorded 
but coded or written down in the process of 
the interview. Therefore, you are permitted 
to raise any objection you are not happy 
with] 
Purpose of this Interview: First, is to know 
and understand the security and violence 
act associated with the struggle for access 
to control natural resources in the Niger 
Delta. Second, is to answer one of the thesis 
research question, whether the struggle for 
access to control natural resources 
increases the likelihood of armed conflict 
with non-state actors.  
Q1: What is the biggest challenge that faces 
oil & gas companies who are operating in 
the Niger delta? 
Answer: in my opinion the major concern is 
probably illegal tapping of pipeline for crude 
oil theft and maritime crime. There are 
violent militias groups and gangs of 
criminals in the region that prey on shipping 
and local commercial boat activity such as 
fishing boats and oil tankers. The Niger delta 
is one of the hot spot around the Gulf of 
Guinea coasts and the attacks can be 
armed robbery; these are relatively common, 
although kidnapping of mariners is still 
occurring. 
More recently we’ve seen the emergence of 
a group that is hijacking product tankers 
that are carrying refined petroleum products. 
They forced the crews to sail them to a 
location where they carry out ship-to-ship 
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operations and steal the cargo, which is then 
sold into markets elsewhere in Africa. 
Q2: What others specific challenges do 
expatriates in the oil & gas industries faces 
when operating in onshore oil fields? 
Answer: That’s not so quite so easy to 
answer; apart from violent crime at sea and 
on the navigable creeks and rivers, the other 
most serious concern is probably corruption 
associated with Port operations in some of 
the Ports in the region. Another challenge is 
the inability or unwillingness of security 
forces to respond to distress calls when 
militant group attack our stations. Many of 
the incidents are not officially reported and 
those that are reported are heavily 
suppressed. This generates an erroneous 
impression of the risk levels associated with 
doing business in the Niger Delta. The risks 
are actually considerably higher than 
reported figures would suggest. 
Q3: In our own estimates what is the 
accurate figures? Do you think the figures 
are skewed before they are reported to the 
media? 
Answer: I know that figures that are officially 
released by some bodies are low and that’s 
because some operators request that their 
reports are not propagated. When I compare 
all the official set of data, which are reported 
to my office in 2012 was something in the 
order of 89 events in the Nigerian coast. I’d 
found approximately 140 attacks in the 
Niger delta region alone. So, there are 
significant discrepancies, and of course that 
gives people a slightly false sense of security 
of oil and gas infrastructure about doing 
business here. There is also a problem in 
that the official figures only really focus on 
international trade. The reality is that a large 
number of local commercial oil vessels are 
also attacked. So, by the same groups-and 
these statistics are not normally included in 
the overall risk assessments carried out by 
the maritime industry. However, if we ignore 
these attacks we ignore a significant 
percentage of the activity and, again, get a 
false impression of a relatively benign 
environment. 
Q4: What is the most unpredicted 




Answer: In term of geography, pirate 
methods and behaviour have been identified 
over the past two years. The hot spots have 
not changed much. We have seen a much 
reduced level of activity off the Bonny River 
in the Niger Delta since Commander Sotonye 
Ikiba’s group was arrested last November. 
We did see one of his Lieutenants try to set 
up a new group early in 2013, he went by 
the name of Sambo, however that failed very 
quickly. I think the government security 
forces got on top of that very quickly. 
In terms of behaviour, or the way that they 
operate, as I mentioned earlier, we’ve seen 
an emergence of a group, which is targeting 
product tankers off the Calabar estuary. 
They’re then hijacking them to an area we 
think is off Delta State coast in the Niger 
Delta, where they conduct ship-to-ship 
operations and steal the cargo. There is one 
other trend that we’ve seen emerging in 
2013. The distance from shore that some 
groups are operating has increased. We’ve 
seen at least three events where an attack 
has been mounted against a vessel in 
excess of 70 nautical miles from shore. I’ve 
spoken to a number of people and there’s a 
general consensus of the opinion that 
they’ve learnt from and are emulating the 
Somali pirates in East Africa. They are doing 
this and this particular group is operating 
with Mother Ship with double engine very 
fast for a getaway in order to achieve those 
distances. 
Q5: How much of a problem is arm 
smuggling in the Niger Delta? 
Answer: There are certainly a lot of arms 
smuggling going on in the region generally, 
both in the maritime environment and 
onshore. Of course, quite large tracts of 
borders and in some cases, the ports are 
poorly regulated as well. With regards to 
this, I think that this is very wide spread in 
the region and certainly up until the amnesty 
in the Niger Delta; MEND was shipping 
weapons in sources. I think what we’ve seen 
recently with the detection of a number of 
containers full of weapons in Lagos port, 
highlights the problem. It’s actually an 
environment that lends itself to smuggling 
because corruption is endemics and it’s not 
very difficult to corrupt port officials when 




If you look at the border areas between 
Cameroon and Nigeria, they are very porous. 
There are very solidly established and 
traditional smuggling routes through the 
region with pretty much everything being 
smuggled through there in one form or 
another. Weapons were certainly being 
smuggled in through that route whilst MEND 
was conducting its operations against the 
Nigerian government and the oil companies. 
The Bakassi area is a very porous region. 
Q6: How does the militant insurgent impact 
the local communities and oil & gas 
business? Are local communities being 
caught up in this at all? 
Answer: The impact of smuggling on these 
sectors is an area that I don’t have a lot of 
information on. I do know that a lot of local 
communities are afraid to go about their 
daily activities like: fishing, farming and 
water transportation because of the fear 
that they may be caught in a cross-fire 
between militias and the Nigerian Military 
Task force. 
In regard to oil companies, as the large off-
shore footprints in a number of Gulf of 
Guinea countries expands, for instance in 
Ghana. Angola and Equatorial Guinea, the 
major impact on the oil and gas industry 
caused by the activities of maritime criminal 
groups will be in the forms of abduction of 
personnel and attacks on supply vessels. 
They have even in the past attacked a 
tanker during crude lifting operations at 
Bonny. And on top of that they attack 
offshore static installation. To give you an 
example of the impact, when they attacked 
the Bonga FPSO in June 2008, they forced it 
to shut down for a number of days. Of 
course, such activity costs the companies 
and the state and the losses are measured 
in millions of dollars per day. So these really 
are very high impacts events. 
Q7: As militias change to piracy as an ever 
more sophisticated business model, are you 
concerned that it will spread beyond the 
areas historically considered high-risk? 
Answer: My thought on that are that 
militants groups in the Niger Delta are 
following oil companies from onshore to 
offshore platform like a bee looking for 
Horney. They exploit opportunities and it 
needs some kind of manoeuvring space to 
succeed. What we are seeing is a target-rich 
324 
 
environment with poor regulation and weak 
law enforcement. We will continue to see 
militia’s attacks on oil infrastructure and I 
think that maritime criminal’s activity has 
evolved significantly in the last five years 
and has pretty much filled all of those 
opportunities. I can’t think of anywhere 
where you will find a lots of shipping and 
very little regulation in place or security 
where there is no piracy. So, I think that 
rather than see a geographical expansion, I 
think that we might see more sophistication 
in the way that they conduct their 
operations. For example, the emergence in 
the last six months of the group that’s 
currently operating off Cotonou coast and 
hijacking product tankers is clearly an area 
for concern. It’s a relatively new tactics for 
the region and it’s clearly supported by some 
powerful actors on shore. They have very 
good intelligence about which vessels to 
attack and they’ve clearly got established 
markets in which to sell the stolen cargo. 
We’re talking about large volumes of cargo, 
so it’s not a small operation; and it is 
sophisticated and very well supported and it 
has an international dimension as well. This 
is different and indicates the evolving nature 
of maritime criminal activity in the region. 
Q8: What is your advice to the Nigerian 
government in solving the Niger Delta 
question? Do you think giving a large 
percentage of oil revenue to Niger Delta 
indigenes will reduce the likelihood of arm 
conflict? 
Answer: This is a question that I am least 
comfortable answering. I was talking with 
someone yesterday who is quite 
authoritative and knowledgeable in this 
particular area of revenue allocation and we 
were debating whether government should 










Appendix I: Confidential Interview 
with the Direction of Housing and 
Public Infrastructure Development 
in the Ministry of Niger Delta 
Affairs in Abuja 
Venue: Federal Secretariats, Central 
Business District Gariki, Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja. 
Date and Time: 20th October 2013—
5:30pm 
[Sir, you are welcome to this interview 
and if any question is not clear to you, you 
are allowed to request a repeat of any 
particular question without hesitation. For 
your information in granting me your 
consent, your answers will be coded or 
written down in the process of this 
interview. Therefore, you are permitted to 
raise any objection you are not satisfied 
with]. 
Purpose of this interview: First, is to know 
and understand the environmental and 
economic issues facing this newly created 
Ministry. Second, the barriers to public 
infrastructure development in the Niger 
Delta; and third, address the issues of 
ethnicity and land ownership in the 
region. 
Section A: Environment and Economic 
Q1: What is your opinion of the 
environmental policies of the Nigeria 
government relating to conflict in the 
Niger Delta Region? 
Answer: Environmental policies of the 
Nigeria government are not enough and 
adequate to accommodate the needs of 
the people within the region; and if they 
are, are not properly implemented and 
funded. 
Q2: Why are they not adequately 
implemented and funded? 
Answer: There are a lot of problem the 
Federal government faces. First, Oil 
companies interpret the laws based on 
international standard, while the 
government are unable to bridge the gap 
between local demand and federal 
regulations. Second, Lack of enforcement 
by the Ministry of Environment and 
supervisory roles of oil companies 
operational areas; and third, rough 
elements in illegal syphoning of oil from 
pipelines and lack of monitory system. 
Q3: Do you think lack of infrastructural 
developments, like: roads, hospitals, 
schools, rural electrification, drinkable 
water, bridges and public water transport 




Answer: Yes! Hence the duty of the 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC) is 
to fast track the infrastructural facilities 
for development and stability of the 
region. 
Q4: Is the revenue derivative allocation 
formulae fair to the Niger Delta region? 
What percentage do you think will be 
acceptable to the states governments, 
militants groups and local communities? 
Answer: No! 25% percent to state 
government and 15% to local 
communities, constitutionally militant 
groups are no recognised. 
Q5: The lives and means of sustainable 
livelihood in the Niger Delta region are 
positively or negatively affected by the 
investment activities of the multinational 
Corporation. Are you happy with the level 
of employment, contracts and services 
given to local people? 
Answer: The livelihood of the Niger Delta 
region is positively affected by 
degradation of the environment through 
spillage and gas flare. Also through 
employment and infrastructural 
development and the enactment of PIB 
laws, the services of the local people can 
be improved. 
Q6: Do you think if the federal 
government make changes to the 
derivative principle, it would positively 
impact the lives and livelihood of the 
Niger Delta Region? 
Answer: Yes! It will impact their lives and 
bring development to the region. 
Q7: Do you think that the fiscal policies of 
the Nigerian government are more helpful 
to the oil and gas companies than to the 
native local communities of the Niger 
Delta Region? 
Answer: Yes, the policies are more helpful 
to the oil and gas companies because the 
deliverables are not used for development 
of the local communities. 
Q8: Do you think the federal government 
is aiding oil companies in invading 
financial compensation to local 
communities in environmental damage to 
their land and agricultural crops? 
Answer: The only answer I can give you is 
that, because the fiscal policies and 
responsibilities are not fully implemented 
by government, therefore, the issue of 
compensation are not adequately funded 
by oil companies due to loopholes in the 
system. In fact, this have played into the 
hands of oil companies and compensation 
are not paid when due. 
Section B: Security and Violence Conflict 
Q9: What’s your opinion on the notion 
that, “militancy in Niger Delta is leading to 
the militarization of the region thereby 
preventing economic development”? 
Answer: Militancy hinders and slows 
down economic development within the 
region. Foreign partners are afraid to 
invest and participate in all the major 
economic development stake-holding in 
the region due to lack of security for their 
staffs. 
Q10: In your personal estimates, do you 
think small arms proliferation is the major 
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causes of violent conflict in the Niger 
Delta? 
Answer: Yes! Our borders are too porous. 
Q11: Do you believe that there is 
collaboration between militant groups 
and political elites in gaining political 
power thereby undermining peace? 
Answer: No, I don’t believe that. Such 
collaboration is usually based on 
assumption and instigation of the public. 
Q12: In your own opinion do you think 
“illegal bunkering” is he major causes of 
oil spillage leading to environmental 
degradation rather than Oil Company’s 
lack of maintenance of their pipelines? 
Answer: It’s not. Its lack of maintenance of 
oil pipelines over the years that have 
cause oil spillage leading to environmental 
degradation. 
Q13: Do you think that due to lack of 
public infrastructure and high 
unemployment in the Niger Delta lead to 
increase of criminal activities among the 
youth movement? 
Answer: Yes, because it leads to youth 
violence in the region that’s why 
government is setting-up apprenticeship 
centres to tackle the issues. 
Section C: Ethnicity and Ownership of 
Land 
Q14: What do you think is the main driver 
for the struggle to control natural 
resources wealth in the Niger Delta? 
Answer: Greed and grievances due to 
neglect of infrastructural development of 
the region which over years have been 
grossly inadequate by successive 
government. 
Q15: What’s your opinion on the notion 
that, “Migration of other ethnic groups to 
the Niger Delta urban cities in search of 
employment due to oil and gas 
exploration in the region has led to over-
crowded thereby has made cost of living 
in the region very high”. 
Answer: The cost of living has increased 
due to migration and thus rural centres 
need to be developed across all 
communities. 
Q16: Do you think if all public 
infrastructures promised by the Federal 
Government were provided, like: 
electricity, good roads, bridges, health 
care, Housing, Schools and 
Telecommunications will stop militant 
agitation for self-determination? 
Answer: Yes, it will reduce the militancy 
problems but not eliminating completely 
in the region. 
Q17: In your personal opinion, do you 
think compensation for land and 
environment damage is adequate for the 
Niger Delta communities? 
Answer: It is not adequate, and 
compensation should be converted for 
development in the local government 
areas coordinated with transparency. 
Q18: Is ethnicity and land dispute 
between communities in the Niger Delta 




Answer: Yes, every ethnic group want 
their interest to be looked upon. 
 
  
Appendix J: Niger Delta Indigenous 
Movement for Radical Change 
(NDIMRC) 
Office: Oporoza, Headquarters of 
Gbaramatu Kingdom, Warri-West 
L.G.A., Delta State; and Sani Abacha 
Expressway, Yenogoa, Bayes State, 
Nigeria 
Communique: Opposition by some 
Northern Governors against Re-
Election bid of President Goodluck 
Jonathan 
Source: THISDAY, September 27, 
2013 
Our group, the Niger Delta Indigenous 
Movement for Radical change (NDIMRC) is 
imploring some selfish politicians from the 
North to forget the Presidency till 2027 
and also to make it known clearly to some 
of the Northern Governors that they 
cannot stop the re-election bid of 
President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015. 
We will not hesitate to cut oil supply to 
the North should leaders from the region 
continue to oppose the re-election of 
President Jonathan in 2015. 
We want some northern leaders to know 
that we are aware of their game plans 
with some Governors from the North to 
frustrate the re-election of President 
Jonathan in 2015. We want these 
governors and their co-travellers to take 
this as a warning that we will resist any 
attempt by them to stop the President in 
2015. 
We are not begging these Northern 
Governors and other selfish leaders from 
the region to allow the President Jonathan 
in 2015 is sealed, signed and delivered. 
Nobody can stop the moving train of the 
re-election of the President. The plan by a 
section of the North to use Boko Haram to 
frustrate President Jonathan has failed 
hence the enemies of the President are 
now using some Governors from the North 
to destabilize the administration of the 
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President and they will equally fail in this 
their mission. 
We are aware of the desperation of some 
self-centred politicians from the North 
take over power in 2015, but they have to 
wait till 2027. After the tenure of 
President Jonathan in 2019, power will 
shift to the East till 2027 and so the North 
should perish their Presidential ambition 
till 2027. We are serious about this and 
that is the way it must be. 
And we want to tell our brother, Governor 
Rotimi Amaechi of River State to be 
reasonable and support President 
Jonathan, rather than allowing himself to 
be used by some selfish Northern 
politicians to stop the President in 2015. 
THE CALL FOR THE SACK OF PETROLEUM 
MINISTER 
We are not going to spare those 
clamouring for the sack of the Petroleum 
Minister, Mrs. Deizani Alison Madueke. 
They are warned to halt their action 
against the patriotic Petroleum Minister. 
The Petroleum Minister is doing a great 
job for our country and she should be 
encouraged to do more. But we want to 
sound a note of warning here that those 
doing everything to frustrate the Minister 
to desist from such act. The Minister is 
good and the President will continue to 
retain her even till 2019. The President 
has been able to carry all parts of the 
country along. 
In the past when those from the North 
were in-charge, the Petroleum Minister 
and the Group Managing Director of the 
NNPC came from the North; but the 
President who is very transparent has 
changed all that. If we are pushed too far, 
we will cut oil supply to the North and 
ensure that the positions of Petroleum 
Minister and GMD of NNPC are retained 
by people from the South-south region 
because for too long, we have tolerated 
the insensitive of the North to the plight of 
the people from the oil-rich Niger Delta 
region and we are saying enough is 
enough. 
The Petroleum Minister as a good 
daughter of the Niger Delta region is 
spending the resources from the oil-rich 
region prudently in the oil and gas sector, 
unlike others from the North who are 
controlling oil blocs of the Niger Delta 
region and do not know what to do with 
the money at a time when the people 




OIL COMPANIES AND PEOPLE OF NIGER 
DELTA REGION 
We are not happy with the treatment our 
people are getting from the oil majors 
such as Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC), Chevron Nigeria Limited 
(CNL), Nigeria Agip Oil Company (NAOC) 
and Total Nigeria. We are warning these 
oil companies who are not employing 
people from the Niger Delta Region and at 
the same time not patronizing local 
contractors to wake up now and do the 
right thing as we will not hesitate to come 
to them soon in full force. Therefore, they 
should promote Niger Delta people who 
are working but have not been promoted 
for over six years. They should equally 
dole out contract to our local contractors. 
LONG LIVE NIGER DELTA REGION! 
NELLY EMMA: President 
JOHN SAILOR: Secretary 































Appendix K: NLNG is a huge 
Blessing to Nigeria 
Interview with Mr.Babatunde 
Omotowa, the Chief Executive 
officer (CEO) of NLNG and BGT 
focuses on: 
 How has NLNG immense 
success rubbed off on 
Nigeria? 
 What is his take on some 
national problem? 
 Earns $25 billion from $2.6 
billion investment; and 70% of 
its earnings go to Nigeria. 
 Supplies over 70% of cooking 












Source: The Nigerian Guardian 
October 12, 2013 
Synopsis: Nigeria is a big country that has 
not quite lived up to its billing. It has few 
transnational companies and fewer world-
class companies. Anyone that will look at 
the Nigeria business landscape from the 
outer space will, but for one or two blips, 
you will see vast emptiness. One of those 
blips will be Nigeria LNG limited. The 
other will be Bonny Gas Transport limited. 
These are perhaps the only Nigeria 
companies you can count amongst the 
first eleven in their respective industries, 
globally speaking. They are perhaps the 
only two Nigerian world-class companies. 
They represent something very unusual in 
these climes: consistency, seriousness, an 
uncompromising attitude and work ethic 
that is daunting, single-minded, and 
almost perfect. Their main focus is 
improving/expanding the market—the 
building blocks of all economies. Together 
they have done so well as to have given 
Nigeria over USD $25 billion over the 
years and to foreign shareholding—Shell, 
Total and Agip—fabulous returns on their 
investment. 
In term of net worth, this business in 
which Nigeria invested less than USD $3 
billion in 1993 has grown to six-train plant 
worth over USD $15 billion with 24 ships 
in its fleet and six new carriers under 
construction in Samsung and Hyundai 
dockyards in South Korea. The ships 
expected to set sail in a few years. In real, 
NLNG and BGT assets and cumulative 
earnings have surpassed the asset and 
earnings of the 189 companies listed on 
the 53-years oil Nigerian Stock Exchange 
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with a total capitalisation of USD $57 
billion as at December 2012. It is that big 
and important to Nigeria’s economy and 
prestige. Those who appreciate its 
importance to Nigeria’s wellbeing moaned 
in anguish recently when it was blockaded 
for a dispute over $140 million levy. In 
other business climes, the company would 
still have allowed to go on with its 
business until the matter has been 
resolved in courts and fines, if any, paid, if 
anything, to avoid revenue loss and 
reputational damage. But this is 
Nigeria….what happened seemed to be a 
sad case of a prophet not honoured in its 
homeland or what the Igbos would 
describe as the abominable act of killing 
an acclaimed warrior in a family dispute! 
But that’s a story for another day. 
Independence anniversary is usually a 
good time to count a country’s blessings 
and the focus naturally turns on great 
companies such as the NLNG, which has 
not only helped the country to put out 
flares, thus improving the health and 
environmental conditions of the Niger 
Delta and monetizing gas resources that 
were hitherto wasted, but has also 
(perhaps, even more importantly), single-
handedly provided the country with elite 
manpower comparable with any around 
the globe. 
Q1: You have been the managing Director 
of Nigeria LNG for almost two years. What 
are your most important achievements 
and challenges? 
Answer: There were two targets set at the 
beginning: one was to sustain the 
excellent performance of NLNG and the 
other was to move the business to the 
next level. We have maintained and even 
surpassed NLNG’s historical success. Last 
year was a record performance in the 
history of NLNG, in terms of production, 
financials and operations. This year, we 
have continued the same trend, 
maintaining the fundamentals despite the 
fact that we have faced significant 
challenges in terms of gas supply 
interruptions and the Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency 
(NIMASA) incident, both of which will 
have impact on our year-end result. On 
moving the business to the next level, we 
have put a lot of effort into the growth of 
NLNG, which is Train 7, but we have not 
moved as far as we had hoped. We are 
working on it and we remain optimistic. 
On shipping, we are modernising our fleet 
by building six new ships which increases 
capacity by over 10 per cent. We are also 
making progress in installing a world class 
culture, evolving our long term strategy as 
well as refurbishing our plants. On the 
whole, it has been a fulfilling period. 
Q2: NLNG was said to have recorded an 
unprecedented achievement last year. 
What in specific terms was achieved? 
Answer: We earned $11.6 billion revenue 
which is 20 per cent higher than any 
revenue earnings in the history of the 
company. Earning before tax was $5.6 
billion, which is another record. So, 
financially, it was outstanding. This 
resulted from excellent underlying 
performance, including production 
volumes which were unprecedented at 
334 LNG cargoes. In terms of plant 
performance, plant reliability was 97 per 
cent which is top quartile performance. 
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Significant commercial success was 
achieved in moving products from 
depressed markets to more attractive 
markets. 
Of course, we were building on the 
shoulders of our predecessors and 
continuing their previous hard work. Also, 
we did benefit from the high global oil and 
gas price. And as an organisation, every 
part of the company pulled together to 
achieve these results. 
Q3: How has Nigeria benefitted from 
NLNG success? 
Answer: Significantly and in many aspects; 
firstly, about 70 per cent of our profits in 
NLNG now go to Nigeria. The 
Government, through Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), owns 49 
per cent shares in the company. 
Therefore, it gets 49 per cent of our 
dividend. But Nigeria also gets 30 per cent 
company income tax that NLNG has 
started to pay after the end of the tax 
holiday. You then add other payments 
NLNG makes like VAT, Education Tax, etc. 
So, anything that happens to NLNG, 70 
per cent of it actually is happening to 
Nigeria. 
NLNG also plays a big role in the society 
by providing over 70 per cent of the 
cooking gas in Nigeria. We recently 
increased our supply to the domestic 
market by 67 per cent and we have 
ensured that supply is no longer a 
problem in Nigeria. We are now working 
with other stakeholders on how to 
increase the usage of cooking gas in the 
households to prevent the health and 
environmental problems that alternatives 
like firewood have. Also, our contributions 
to the education sector, including the 
prestigious science and literature prizes, 
as well as our community development 
projects, all bear testimony to how NLNG 
has continued to be a force for good in 
Nigeria. 
Q4: NLNG has been accused of cherry-
picking the country’s laws in terms of 
revenue payment. Can you address that? 
Answer: NLNG pride itself as a company 
that strongly complies with the laws. Most 
of those who make such accusations have 
not read those laws because when you 
read them, you will understand the 
various provisions. For Example, the NLNG 
Act has several provisions. A section is on 
the company income tax which gives a 
ten-year holiday period. Another section 
is on levies, duties and charges which 
grants an evergreen waiver. So, it is not a 
matter of cherry-picking. It is a matter of 
abiding by the different provisions of the 
law. There is nothing unusual about this as 
governments all over the world do grant 
incentives to attract investors. For 
example, we have a number of export 
laws in Nigeria that provides evergreen 
tax free incentives to companies who 
operate in free trade zones. I will 
encourage those accusing NLNG of cherry-
picking to go and read exactly what is 
stated in those laws. Only then will they 
be able to understand better rather than 
mix up issues. 
Q5: I know NLNG is in court with NIMASA 
which is at the heart of this dispute? You 
have listened to their case; what do you 
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think of their position and your position. 
Why is there a gap between the two? 
Answer: The government of Nigeria in its 
wisdom puts various laws through 
legislation and it is not unusual that some 
laws may conflict especially with laws 
being passed over time; some were 
passed in the 1960s, others in the 1970s 
and some in the 1990s, amongst several 
others. Also remember that we have three 
arms of government: the Executive, the 
Legislature and the Judiciary. When laws 
created by the legislature are in conflict, 
the Judiciary is the best place to resolve 
such. This is why we have approached the 
court to resolve what we believe is a 
conflict in law. 
Q6: In the course of your defence during 
the argument with NIMASA, you said your 
position was informed by patriotism. In 
other words, NLNG was protecting the 
interest of Nigeria vis-à-vis the inflow of 
foreign direct investment. Could you be 
more explicit? 
Answer: One of the challenges Nigeria 
faces, with 160 million people, is that we 
don’t have enough money to execute all 
our developmental needs including 
power, industries, road, rail, agriculture, 
etc. Huge investments are needed and the 
Government has been on a drive to 
attract foreign investors. Take the 
Telecommunication industry for instance; 
we saw how the involvement of foreign 
investors transformed that sector. But we 
are in competition with other countries 
since foreign investments can flow 
anywhere. Just as the Government is 
going round looking for it, other countries 
are also looking for the same fund. From 
experience, investors take their funds to 
where there is clarity, stability, and 
returns; not necessarily where there is the 
highest return, but where there is rule of 
law. 
So, for a country like Nigeria that needs 
hundreds of billions of dollars for 
development, respecting the rule of law is 
crucial. Think of this: it is how you treat 
your first wife that will inform how your 
second wife will prepare when coming 
into your house. If the new wife sees that 
you treated your first wife very badly, 
then she will ensure that she will not 
suffer the same fate. It is important for a 
country in need of investment to treat 
previous investors in a fair manner; that 
what we have promised and committed 
to, we are able to honour; and that where 
there is need for clarification or change, 
we work in accordance with the rule of 
law, otherwise, future foreign investment 
will either shrink or come at a premium. 
That is why we were very keen at NLNG 
that Nigeria was not put in a position not 
to be able to attract good investments 
needed for the development of our 
country. 
Q7: Do you think that message was lost on 
those who ought to know that you were 
trying to protect the country? 
Answer: Issues were quite varied for the 
several parties involved. For us, it was 
about the rule of laws. For some, it was 
about generating more revenue for the 
country. For others, it was about capacity 
building of government agencies, etc. 
However, what was missing was for key 
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stakeholders to take a step back and look 
at the bigger picture. Let me give you an 
example; of the $140 million we paid as 
NIMASA levy under protest, 25 per cent 
goes to the Federal Government, which 
means $35 million. The same 
Government, unfortunately, lost $560 
million revenue due to the blockade from 
its 70 per cent take from NLNG. To lose 
$560 million revenue for a gain of $35 
million is the bigger picture. 
Q8: Can you clarify? Who gets the 
remaining 75 per cent? 
Answer:  I was made aware by very senior 
government officials that only 25 per cent 
of payments to NIMASA go into the 
Federal Government’s coffers. I do not 
have any information where the rest goes. 
Q9: Let’s talk about the bigger picture. It 
would appear that all the benefits Nigeria 
can get from this kind of investment is not 
on the table or obvious to everybody. Is 
that your reading of the situation? How 
can you get policy makers to understand 
so that these kinds of issues do not arise? 
Answer: As a company, we have followed 
exactly what the Government put in place 
for its interest in NLNG. As I earlier 
mentioned, 70 per cent of what NLNG 
makes goes to the country. Some of that 
flows through NNPC and others directly to 
the Federal Inland Revenue Service, States 
and Local Governments. We have no 
opinion on where Government choose to 
put its returned revenue. If that in itself 
has created any gaps in terms of how 
much NLNG is seen to be contributing, we 
have just followed the Government’s 
directives. But the facts are there on the 
significant contributions from NLNG. 
Q10: There was a complaint especially 
from the legislature that NLNG Act tied up 
its hands; it encroached on the nation’s 
sovereignty. Have you heard about this 
complaint? Is this something that 
everybody needs to sit at a table and look 
at again? 
Answer: It is the lack of people taking time 
to read and understand these laws that 
makes them utter such uninformed 
statements. There is no law of a country 
that ties the hand of that same country or 
government. That simply defies logic. One 
of the things stated in the NLNG Act is 
that in such a review, the parties to which 
those incentives were given should be 
consulted, which is in line with the 
principles of International Bilateral 
Investment Treaties.  
Q11: Does that mean the hands of the 
Government are tied just because it is 
consulting people in the process? 
Answer: Consultation in a democratic 
environment is indeed the right thing to 
do which is why we have public hearings 
before new laws are passed. But it doesn’t 
stop the Government or legislature from 
carrying out a review at any point and as 
such, when done properly, appropriate 
changes can be made. 
Q12: I thought there are parts that you 
can’t impose additional levies on the 
company other than the normal run of 
doing business. Is it a usual act? 
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Answer: We have several free trade zones 
backed by laws which give quite a lot of 
generous incentives to encourage exports, 
much more than what the NLNG Act does. 
There is nothing unusual in evergreen 
incentives. Remember that for more than 
30 years, Nigeria tried to get an LNG 
project without success. It took the NLNG 
Act to attract the investment and 
technical know-how to get this project 
going. The Nigerian Government invested 
about $2.6 billion and today, revenues to 
the country has exceeded more than $25 
billion. So, it is unfortunate to have 
created such huge reputation problem 
and financial losses for the country for 
levies that all comes to less than $200 
million, for a company that the country 
has already reaped $25 billion from. These 
are the bigger pictures we need to keep in 
view. 
Q13: You wear several hats including 
protecting the interest of the 
shareholders. Would it be a fair thing for a 
country that contributed 49 per cent to 
take 70 per cent? 
Answer: This is not unusual. If you look at 
the joint ventures in the upstream sector 
in Nigeria, the Government owns about 55 
to 65 per cent. The total take of the 
Government in those ventures is over 80 
per cent. It is not different to what occurs 
in many other countries especially as it is 
the country that owns the resources. So 
once the initial investments have been 
fully recovered and appropriate returns 
made, and after benefiting from a 10-
years tax holidays, it is only fair that some 
of those incentives like the company 
income tax holiday fall away and for the 
















Appendix L: Ownership of Nigeria Indigenous Oil Blocks-Map of Oil Fields in Nigeria 
 
Source: www.nigeriaoilandgasintelligence.com  
A breakdown of oil leases granted operators showed that total number of oil Leases (OMLs) in 
operation by December ending 2012 was 109, while Oil Prospecting Leases (OPLs) stood at 
92. The Federal Government had in 2012 set a production target of 2.48 million barrels of per 
day (mbpd) were expected from the onshore and shallower water terrain, while deep-water 
concessions accounted for 900,800 bpd, which are currently controlled by the multinational 
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companies. Of the 2.48 mbpd produced in 2013, the entire production by indigenous 
companies totalled 276,600 bpd, accounting for about 11 per cent of Nigeria’s production.397 
A detailed breakdown of indigenous concessions and their directors/shareholders are shown in 





S/No Name of 
Operator 






     1 Kommer 
Complex Ltd 
OPL 215. 840 
&902 







     2  R.D. Adelu   OPL 310      1992 Ibrahim Bunu 
as Chairman & 




      3 Tajudeen 
Dantata 





Dubril Oil Co. 
Nig. 
      4 A.E. Ihuegbu OPL 96        1987 U.J. Itsueli as 
Chairman & 




       5 Tunde Afolabi OPL 112 & 117    1998 &1999 Sanni Bello as 
Chairman 
Atlas Petrol        6 Ikechukwu OPL 109          1996 Arthur Eze 
Consolidated 
Oil 
       7 O. Adenuga OPL103, 458 & 
136 
     1993, 1998                
& 2006  
Mike Adenuga 
as Chairman 
Source: Department of Petroleum and Natural Resources (DPNR) 2012 
 
 
                                                          





        8 Usman 
Danburan 
  OPL 115       1999 Mohammed 
Inimi as 
Chairman & 





         9 Cavendish 
Petroleum 







         10 Allied Energy OPL 120 & 121          2001 Kase Lawal as 
Chairman & 
Mickey Lawal as 
Director 
Peak Petroleum          11   Eni  OPL 122         2001 M.A. Oluokun 






         12   Summit OPL205 & 206       1990 L.K.O Abiola as 
Chairman & 








Famfa Oil Ltd.           14   Famfa OPL216 (OML 
127) 







         15  Folawiyo OPL 113       1998 W.I. Folawiyo 
as Chairman & 
S.T. Folawiyo as 
Director 
 
Transcorp          16 Transcorp Oil OPL281       2011 Femi Otedola 
as Chairman & 
Tony Elumelu 
as Director 
South Atlantic          17   SAPETRO OPL 264 OML 
130 
      1998 T.Y Danjuma 







River Energy & 
NPDC 
         18     NPDC    OPL242       2011 Chris Garuba as 
Chairman & 
Emeka Offor as 
Director 
 
Pan Ocean         19   Pan Ocean OPL98, 275 1976 & 2007 M.D. Yuduf as 
Chairman & 




         20   Afren OPL907, 917 2005 & 2008 Rilwan Lukman 




Gas Trans & 
Power Ltd. 
         21 Gas 
Transmission 
OPL 905     2005 Babangida 
Hassan as 
Chairman & 




         22 GECL OPL 135   2005 & 2010 M.A. Koshoni 
as Chairman & 




         23   NDW OPL 34        2012 David Richard 
as Chairman & 




        24     EER OML 141         2001 Emmanuel 
Egbogah as 
Chairman & 




          25    SIRPEM OPL284, 228 & 
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2005 & 2006 Buba Lawal as 
Chairman & 
Odunsi Ade as 
Director 
MoniPulo           26      Eni OPL 114, 239, 
234 & 231 
1999, 2008, 
2008 & 2007 
Lulu Briggs as 
Chairman & 




Peak Petroleum         27 Transocean OPL122   2001 M.A Oluokun 
























        29     Nesco   OPL 274   2007 Buba Lawal as 
Chairman & 
Cole Tonye, 
Odunsi Ade as 
Directors 
Seplat Oil and 
Gas 
       30     Agip OPL 4, 38, 41   2010 A.B.C. Orjiako 
as Chairman & 




        31  Centrica/CCC OPL 276, 283 2005 & 2006 Jake Mirica as 
Chairman & 




        32 Energiewde OPL 42    2011 Amesi Azudialu 






















Oil & Gas 
       34 Suntrust Oil Umsadege 
(OML 56) 













Source: Department of Petroleum Resources, 2012 
 
Appendix M: Types of armed groups in Nigeria 
     Form   Ethnic Militias Confraternities/Cults Vigilante groups Criminal gangs 
    Purpose Aims are to redress 
grievances and 
injustices and protect 
and defend the rights 
of the ethnic group 
Self-enrichment and 
defending territory 
Provide security to 
communities; provide 
law & order services 
in areas where police 














   Support base Typically grassroots 
organizations 
receiving widespread 
support; able to 
mobilize more widely 
Members alliance 
with other armed 
groups and politicians 
using them as tugs for 
intimidating their 
political rival  
Community support, 
community funding 





Area of operation Communities of 
ethnic group; also 
across states where 
ethnic group is 
dominant 
Confraternities tend 
to be on campus, 
similar to US 
fraternities; cults 
operate off campus, 
tend to be the more 
violent of the two; 
localized area of 
operation 
Localized area of 




localized area of 
operations 
  Main activities Defence of ethnic 
group rights might 
include: political 
protest, attacks on 
politicians, attacks on 
oil pipelines, 
kidnapping of oil 
workers and oil theft 
(bunkering) 
Control of ethnic 
group territory; drug 
trafficking; oil 
bunkering; reputation 
for being brutal and 
secretive, with 
elaborate rituals for 
initiation 




to suspects, or take 
the law into their own 
hands; some groups 
work with police to 
enforce law and order 
Engage in armed 




       Arms Paramilitary groups of 




Not all are violent, 
but most are armed; 
prospective member 
must demonstrate 
bravery and ability to 
use weapons 
Not all are armed Not all are armed 
   Examples NDPVF, MEND, 
Federated Niger 








Vigilante service and 
O’odua People’s 
Congress (OPC) 
Area Boys: The 
Yandaba groups 































NAME TYPE OF 
GOVERNMENT 









    Civilian Igbo (Ibo) Christian North-west 
(Niger) 
      Coup 
1966 Gen. Johnson 
Aguiyi-Ironsi 
     Military Igbo Christian South-east 
(Abia) 





    Military Ngas Christian North-
Central 
(Plateau) 


















Shehu Shagari Civilian Hausa-Fulani Muslim North 
(Sokoto) 







 Military Hausa-Fulani Muslim North 
(Katsina) 
       Coup 
1985-93 Gen. Ibrahim 
Babangida 
  Military Gwari Muslim North-west 
(Niger) 
Forced to step down 
after nullifying 
democratic election 
1993 Chief Ernest 
Shonekan 
  Civilian Yoruba Christian South-west 
(Lagos) 
     Coup 
1993-98 Gen Sani 
Abacha 
  Military Kanuri Muslim North 
(Kano) 


































Dead of Cancer 
Vying for election for a 
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